



THE NAVY OF VENICE

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THE NAVY OF VENICE





ΑΠΟΓΗΕΟΣΙΣ ΟΥ ΤΗ ΒΑΤΤΛΗ ΟΥ ΛΕΡΑΝΤΟ.

Detail from the picture by Paolo Veronese, in the Ducal Palace, Venice.

[Frontispiece.]

THE NAVY OF VENICE

BY ALETHEA WIEL

AUTHOR OF "VENICE," "THE ROMANCE OF THE HOUSE OF SAVOY,"
"VERONA," ETC., ETC.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS



Trabacolo in Full Sail

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TO THE MEMORY OF
MY NEPHEW
RICHARD EDWARD LAWLEY, R.N.
(OOTACAMUND, SEPT. 4, 1909)

PREFACE

THE history of Venice has been told in many ways and by many writers. Poets, novelists, and dramatists have in turn portrayed the romantic charm and tragic fate of the amphibious city. But by some inexplicable oversight her Navy—the expression *par excellence* of her peculiar character, the instrument by which she both built up her actual fabric and shaped her destiny—has been ignored, or has been treated only in conjunction with those of other Italian seaports. Its individuality and its importance have thus been obscured.

The object of the present work is to endeavour to make good, as far as may be, this deficiency ; and to give its due prominence to a subject which should appeal, not only to specialists and experts in naval matters, but to all who feel the fascination of the sea, or who are attracted by the marvellous tale of the rise and fall of Venice.

I do not, alas ! belong to the ranks of the experts and specialists : I have not even attempted to adopt their language when I describe the vessels most in use in the Venetian Navy and the exploits in which they gained renown. I have rather striven, as far as in me lies, to set before the general reader the important part that Navy played, for more than a thousand years, in developing the individuality of the Republic, and I have also striven to prove how fatally the wealth and luxury in Venice undermined the simplicity and vigour of her citizens, and how their indifference and apathy as to the maintenance of the Navy was the cause of the downfall of the city. That no work dealing exclusively with the subject has yet been written is a strange and curious fact—that it should be handled for the first time by a woman and a foreigner is stranger still.

This work makes no claim to be either a complete or a technical history of the Venetian Navy. Its aim is rather to bring into strong relief all that relates to the Navy; to enlarge on its essentially twofold character as a trading and a fighting force; and to recount its achievements from its earliest days to the time when, through neglect of this same Navy, Venice fell away from her high estate and ceased to rank as a sea-power in the history of Europe.

A special and an artistic value has been given to the book through the kindness and generosity of Miss Clara Montalba, whose permission to use her original drawings of river barges and boats in use on the Venetian lagoon calls forth my deepest and warmest gratitude. These drawings are reproduced on the title-page and on pages 210, 235, 333, 348, and 349.

I have, too, to acknowledge with much gratitude the unvarying kindness and courtesy shown to me by every one of the officials, especially Dottore Giulio Coggiola, at the Marciana Library—the library from which most of the material here used has been taken; to Commendatore Carlo Malagola, the head of the State Archives in Venice, for the loan of books, and much valuable advice; to Signor Camillo Manfroni for a most useful list of books dealing with naval matters; to Contr'-Ammiraglio Cesare Agnelli for several photographs of models of ships at the Arsenal. I have also most gratefully to acknowledge Dr Edmund Warre's kindness in going over the chapter on the galley, and for making some excellent suggestions and alterations relating to the same chapter.

I must, too, thank Mr John Murray and Mr A. H. Hallam Murray for the help they have given me, and the interest they have taken in the production of this book—an interest and a help for which I beg to offer them both my deep and abiding gratitude.

A. W.

CAMPIELLO QUERINI STAMPALIA,
VENICE, *January* 1910.

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
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
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


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A Warship of the Fourteenth Century.

THE NAVY OF VENICE

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY VENETIANS ON LAND AND SEA

452—943

Rise of the Navy. Its first Achievements. Strife with Charlemagne. Wars with the Saracens. The Saracens in Italy. Wars with the Slavs of Dalmatia. Slave-Trade in Venice. Rape of the Brides. Festival *delle Marie*.

THE band of fugitives who fled before Attila and his Huns were guided by a heaven-born instinct when they chose the islands of the Venetian lagoons for their home. The smoking hearths of Aquileja, Concordia, Altino, and Oderzo bore witness to the need felt by the exiles for a barrier between themselves and their pursuers, and a haven away from the land which gave foothold to their foes. Unconscious of any destiny, inspired by no ambition, they craved only peace and freedom, and an asylum where, unmolested and apart, they could work out the even tenor of their lives. They became the pioneers of a race of seamen whose fame spread as wide as the waters of the great deep, and whose mighty naval achievements echoed through the world. To tell the story of some of those feats, and to trace how the Navy of Venice came into being and the part it played in history, will be the object of this work.

The position of Venice was the determining influence of her greatness. Placed at the very fringe of the land,

she confided to the sea her life, her fortunes, her all, and nobly was the trust repaid. The element she had turned to imbued her sons with energy and endurance, and face to face with Nature's forces they learnt the secret of success. In her "splendid isolation," Venice held aloof from the strife of party; and for centuries the factions which rent the inland towns and states throughout the rest of the Peninsula were unknown in the *calli* and canals of the sea-girt city. Her aims and ambitions were exclusively her own; and just as her forms of government differed from those of other towns, so too did her pursuits and ideals. The sea was her element, and upon the sea was based her very existence and well-being. Her Navy sprang into being through the stress of necessity, and grew with her growth till it assumed proportions of undreamt-of size and grandeur. Those waters which first carried the primitive rafts on which the refugees from the mainland punted from island to island, were in after days to bear, in proud succession, the Biremes, the Triremes, the Quinqueremes, the Dromons, the Bucentaur, and a host of other craft beside, suited, as the ages advanced, for transport, commerce, and war. How all this developed is a story of war and trade by sea, of enterprise, and courage, and administration, and shows this handful of fugitives fulfilling their destiny as a conquering race, the owners for hundreds of years of the supremacy of the sea.

The siege of Aquileja in the fifth century (a siege of three years' duration) completed the exodus begun at the time of Attila's invasion to that weird spot where Venice was to arise, and confirmed the exiles in their selection of a home bearing in some respects a faint similarity to the one they had been forced to leave. The flat marshes of the lagoon were but extended continuations of the level fens where their lives had been passed, and where the presence of canals and rivers had given them a certain



A BIREME.

From a Model in the Arsenal, Venice.

experience in handling the boats and barges needed for transport and traffic. This experience had now to be turned to account, for on its development was to depend their sustenance and means of locomotion, and through it they were to emerge, slowly and gradually—perhaps, too, unconsciously—from the seclusion which had been their safeguard into a dominant, ruling power. Their trade was, naturally enough, limited at first both as to carrying-distance and in quantity, and was then confined to the lagoons, the Paduan estuary, and to the neighbouring coast of Friuli. As time went on and the inhabitants of the isles increased in number and vigour, they were compelled to extend their dealings, and to put forth their strength in the universal struggle for existence and supremacy. Communications with the mainland were therefore set up, timber was procured from the forests of Venetia, and the size and number of the boats and ships needed by the Venetians were augmented year by year. These journeyed to the coasts of Africa, to Illyricum, and to Greece; and each voyage bore fruit, not only in an increased traffic as to exports and imports, but also in new fashions and improvements in shipbuilding. And indeed the Venetians were not slow to turn such knowledge to account. An old chronicler, writing of them in those days, says: “They are nourished by the sea, they are wanderers, as were the Phœnicians, and they are of a most astute mind.”¹

The great change wrought too at that epoch over the north of Italy by the Lombard invasion was felt very strongly in Venice. The simplicity of life which had characterised this part of Italy was lost; the peculiar form of government marked by a strong sense of equity was relaxed; and a craving for the increased commodities, not to say the luxuries, of life began to be felt. To satisfy these desires the shipping power of the city was put into

¹ Nicetas Coniates.

requisition, and expeditions of greater length and importance were undertaken, greater ventures were made, and in all directions fresh designs and devices were adopted for the improvement and development of the Navy. It must, however, be borne in mind that it was the growth of the mercantile service which led to the development of this same Navy in other directions beside, and from ships sent out to sea to act as escorts to the trading vessels of old sprang a fighting power able to hold its own at Lepanto and Candia, and to win for Venice the proud title of "the safeguard of the West." The two services were, however, absolutely united in the early days of the Republic's history. The nature of the times demanded that a vessel carrying merchandise should sail with an escort capable of protecting her from the attacks of rivals or the assaults of pirates—an escort fitted for defence and offence, and whose very quality of protector assumed in time a wholly warlike character. The question when the two branches of the service—that of war and that of trade—became distinct is more easily asked than answered. This dual existence in truth continued for years, one strengthening and supporting the other, till each drifted on to different lines and issued forth a separate and individual entity. It may be likened to a broad river flowing on its course, till, at the delta, the waters glide into distinct courses, each working out its purpose alone and unaccompanied.

This division, with now and again a marked interruption (such as the *Chelandie* and the *Gumbarie*, in the ninth and tenth centuries), though foreshadowed in the fourteenth century, did not take actual shape till the fifteenth and following centuries, when ships exclusively for war were built in the Venetian dockyards.¹ In the fifth century, the

¹ Camillo Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana; Dalle Invasioni Barbariche al Trattato di Ninfeo*, Livorno, Giusti, 1899 (vol. i., pp. 47, 48), thinks that ships only for war were built in 841, after Venice had

earliest date when records exist of the kinds of vessels owned by the Republic, the first ship mentioned is one "for commerce and for war," and more than half of those on the list are adapted to this double purpose. Before this period, *i.e.*, before A.D. 400, no records exist as to vessels in use among the Venetians, no description of their make or shape or properties, nothing, in short, to enlighten one as to the naval architecture of the early days of the Republic's history. To arrive at some knowledge of the vessels first used by the Venetians, we must consult a list of those in vogue at that epoch among the Romans for coast service on the shores of Croatia, Istria, and at the Grecian ports, for, for some centuries to come, the Venetians did little more than copy the ships with which they came most in contact. The inhabitants of the lagoons merely adopted the shapes and varieties which seemed best fitted to their immediate requirements, and were not inspired to develop a special art of their own. The importance of the Navy was, however, thoroughly realised from the beginning by the rulers of Venice. The Doges—for the most part hard-headed, far-seeing men—set their faces from early times to develop the shipping power of the state in all its manifold and different departments. The very first Doge, Paolo Lucio Anafesto (697), was also the first to set the example. He directed that at every station where boats and ships were kept, their numbers should be increased, and brought up to the strength required for the size and needs of that station. The shipyards were also to be girt about with walls, to protect them from the too frequent attacks of pirates and corsairs, and from the danger of robbery or incendiarism.

In the days of Doge Orso Ipato (726) the Navy advanced still further. He devoted himself especially to endure defeats from the Saracens, and from the pirates or Slavs of Dalmatia.

strengthening it against the Longobards, as well as against the pirates. For the first time we find the Navy utilised for more than a means of transport or to defend the isles of the lagoons: it now acts on the defensive and makes trial of its new capabilities. The Doge also urged on the youth of the town the need of military exercises; he set up schools where shooting with the bow and crossbow was taught, and he met his reward in arousing in his subjects an enthusiasm akin to his own. He saw likewise to the improvement of the ships. He devised plans for increasing their safety and speed; adding, when possible, to their carrying properties, and improving their powers of defence and attack.

These preparations were put to the test in the war waged at Ravenna on the occasion of the Emperor Leo the Isaurian's edict to suppress the worship of images. The Emperor had decreed that all images should be removed from the churches, and this decree not only aroused intense opposition in the lower classes, but was also hotly combated by Gregory II., Bishop of Rome, and by his successor, Gregory III., who called on the cities of the Exarchate of Ravenna—the Exarchate, it will be borne in mind, consisting of the Byzantine possessions in Central Italy—to aid in resisting the imperial mandate. This strife between Church and State was seized upon by Liutprand, King of the Lombards, in order to add a long coveted part of Italy to his dominions, and about 737, Hildebrand, the nephew of Liutprand, entered the Exarchate and possessed himself of Ravenna. Gregory III., who hated the Lombard King as cordially as he hated the Emperor of Constantinople, applied, through the Patriarch of Grado to Jovianus, the Master of the Soldiery at Venice, to come to the rescue in ousting this unlooked-for foe, and in restoring order and confidence in the land. His appeal was not in vain, for the prospect of

taking part in such a campaign commended itself warmly to the inhabitants of the lagoons. The priests, likewise, advocated it from the altars; the men of state urged it with all the weight of their eloquence and position; reasons of commerce brought it home with conviction to the people. The Lombards were daily pressing forward, conquering and confident, and, unless some resolute opposition was offered to their progress, the trade and existence of Venice were alike at stake. It was settled that the attack should be directed against Ravenna, and in the year 740 a large fleet was got ready, consisting of sixty or even eighty sailing vessels, well chosen and equipped; and to lull the enemy's suspicions it was given out that the expedition was directed against the Saracens. The ruse answered perfectly. The Venetian fleet reached Ravenna, and meeting with no opposition, took the town by surprise. The assault was both sudden and fierce. Peredeo, Duke of Vicenza, was killed while endeavouring to save the city, and Hildebrand was taken prisoner.¹

This victory meant even more to Venice than the glory consequent on the action. Ravenna and Venice were rivals of long standing. The interests of both towns were commercial, chiefly the commerce of the East, and both alike strove for a monopoly which would mean success to whoever attained it. Venice's victory secured all this. It assured to her the supremacy of the Adriatic; it opened out to her trading rights which till then had centred in Ravenna; and it confirmed to her the right to build warehouses in the "Ravennate" and the Pentapolis,²

¹ The operations at Ravenna are thus narrated by Joannes Diaconus, writing in the tenth century. Some later writers place the events earlier—about 726, when Gregory II. was Pope and Orso was Doge of Venice; see Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. vi., p. 490.

² The towns of Rimini, Sinigaglia, Fano, Osino, and Ancona formed the Pentapolis.

to buy lands, and to be exempt from taxes. No knowledge exists as to the kind of ships used by the Venetians in this expedition against the Longobards, the documents having unfortunately been either destroyed by fire, or the details of these important concerns omitted. Those introduced by Doge Orso are said to have been biremes, and to have been succeeded shortly after by the dromons—vessels of which mention will be made elsewhere.

In the dukedom of Giovanni Galbajo (787) Venice had the satisfaction of taking part in the final overthrow of the Longobard power in Italy. A Venetian fleet sailed, under the command of the Doge's son, to aid Charlemagne at the siege of Pavia against Desiderius, King of the Longobards. Desiderius had reckoned on supplies reaching him by way of the Po, but these supplies were intercepted by Venetian ships, and the Longobard monarch had no choice but to capitulate. He gave himself up, a prisoner, to Charlemagne, and with his surrender the Longobard power came to an end after a duration of little over two hundred years. Great rejoicings awaited the fleet on its return to Venice; and Charlemagne, to mark his sense of the signal help it had rendered him, bestowed many concessions and trade privileges on the Venetians.

This amiability on Charlemagne's part was not maintained when he tried later on to detach Venice from her alliance with Constantinople, and to win her over to his side. It was no light task he then undertook. The relations between Venice and Constantinople dated from very early times, and were of a very close nature. At the beginning of this intercourse, Constantinople was recognised as the suzerain of Venice, and exercised a protectorate over the young state, without attempting to interfere with the nomination of the rulers of the city, or in its treaties and dealings with foreign powers. The period in which Venice, to this limited extent, was

subject to Constantinople was of short duration, and gave place to a season when a very genuine and close alliance united the two peoples. As Venice rose to ever greater heights of importance and prosperity, the rôles were reversed. The Republic of St Mark became a potentate: she then dictated where she had once obeyed, and she ended by treading underfoot the city whose protection and friendship she had alternately claimed and courted. The day of the overthrow of Byzantium was, however, yet far distant, and long before it dawned Venice had given proof to the world of the force and efficiency of her Navy. For generations indeed the new power had been growing within her, century after century beholding the building of new ships, each one adding something in the way of invention or discovery to the perfecting of the process. The summons to emerge into publicity came in the ninth century, and from that hour Venice was called on to take her place as one of the sea-powers of the world, and to give evidence of her right to hold so honourable a position. Her Navy had, however, to encounter and overcome three obstacles of no small magnitude in the course of its development, and to combat in turn: the hostility of the lords of the mainland; the rapacity and ambition of the Saracens or Arabs; the insolence and piracies of the Slavs and Narentines¹ of Dalmatia.

The first of these difficulties arose in connection with Charlemagne. As has been said, the friendship extended

¹ In the first half of the seventh century two races of Slavs settled in Dalmatia, namely, the Croats in the North, and the Serves in the South. The former embraced Christianity; the second, better known as Narentines from the river Narenta, near which they settled, were a wild and warlike race. They remained pagans for years, and gave themselves up to piracy and plunder, often persuading their neighbours to join them in scouring the seas, and often acting entirely on their own account. See Benussi, *Nel Medio Evo, Pagine di Storia Istriana*, Parenza, Coana, 1897.

by the Frankish monarch to the Venetians after the defeat of Desiderius was not of long standing. He now set to work to try and undermine the Greek influence in Venice, and succeeded in gaining over to his cause a considerable party, headed by Giovanni, Patriarch of Grado. The murder of this high dignitary of the Church soon afterwards was generally attributed to the rival Greek faction, supported by the Doges Giovanni and Maurizio Galbajo, and was speedily avenged by Fortunatus, the dead prelate's nephew, and his successor in the patriarchate. The Galbaji were deposed, and exiled to Mantua, while the Tribune Obelerio, a partisan of the Franks, was elected Doge in their stead. Obelerio repaired at Christmas time, 805, to Germany, where he did homage to the Emperor, receiving as a reward numerous trade privileges throughout the Empire of the West for his fellow-citizens, together with a kind of imperial investiture for himself. Byzantium, however, was in no way minded to accept the secession of so faithful an ally as Venice, nor did she view with equanimity the prospect of her becoming a tool in the hands of the "Holy Roman Emperor." Under the command of the patrician Nicetas, a Greek fleet was therefore despatched to the lagoons, and called on the Doge to supply naval assistance whereby Dalmatia could be wrested from the Franks. The records of these years are so involved and contradictory, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assert what actually took place; but the one thing certain is that a great struggle raged between the West and East over which of the two powers should absorb the allegiance of Venice.

In spite of a victory claimed by the Franks at Comacchio (808?), the Greek faction was in the ascendant at Venice. Doge Obelerio was expelled by order of the Byzantine Emperor, and Angelo or Agnello Participazio was raised in his stead to the dukedom.

Doge Agnello's policy was inimical to the Franks, so Charlemagne, in order to regain his hold on the Venetians, whom he felt seceding from him, ordered his son Pepin to sail to the lagoons and possess himself of the town. The danger in which Venice found herself was very real. Dissension and party strife reigned in the city, proving as great a source of peril as the presence of the foe ; while the risk of escaping from the Frankish power, only to fall into that of the Greeks, was most serious. From such disasters, however, the Venetian spirit of freedom and independence saved the people ; and as of old, deliverance came to them from the sea. The Emperor's fleet, after occupying Heraclea, Brondolo, and Chioggia, ventured as far as to Malamocco. From there, lured by the guile of the Venetian mariners, it pursued the light, agile boats of the islanders into the canals and shallows around Venice. Here, it is supposed, was then fought that battle which wrought such havoc to the Franks ; their heavy vessels being stranded in the shallow waters of the lagoon, while the smaller, slighter craft of their foes dealt irreparable damage, and escaped almost untouched. So, at least, says the legendary history of that date, which also fixes the site and name of the place where the engagement was fought, calling the canal that of the Orphans (*Canal Orfano*) from the numbers left fatherless on that day, and placing the locality between the islands of S. Servolo and S. Clemente.

In spite of his defeat, however, Charlemagne's attitude towards the Venetians was friendly, and the Doge lost no time in making the most of this. At the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed in 810 between that monarch and the Emperor Nicephorus, Charlemagne renounced his pretensions to Venice, and recognised the autonomy of her government. He also conceded many commercial privileges. He granted a licence whereby, on payment of a certain impost, Venetians might traffic freely in all Italy

subject to his rule. This licence, in fact, opened out to Venice all the countries beyond the Alps which owned Charlemagne as their sovereign, and drew on the markets of Italy for luxuries, especially those of an Eastern nature. From Byzantium the Doge gained concessions equally advantageous, though of another character, for his fellow-citizens. He established the quasi-independence of his state, consenting only to record the Emperor's name on public documents; to submit his nomination and that of his successors to Constantinople for approbation; and to come to the imperial aid, at least in Eastern waters, in all maritime wars.

The seat of government was, at this period, transferred to Rialto from Malamocco, and a new era of prosperity inaugurated—especially of a commercial character—which grew and expanded till the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

We have said that the second obstacle with which the Venetian Navy had to contend in its early days was the ambition of the Saracens, and in the year 812 we find the Venetians engaged again on their own behalf against these foes. No special engagement is named, but the invaders were defeated, their ships were chased by those of Venice, overtaken and burnt. This is the first time that the Venetians were brought into direct conflict with the Saracens, and it leads us to consider this latter people's presence in Italy, and the great issues consequently at stake for Venice and her Navy. The Saracens, or, as different writers call them alternately, Arabs or Mussulmans, must in no way be confounded with the Turks, though, like them, they professed the Mahometan faith. The Saracens, who hailed from Arabia and claimed sonship from Ishmael, were a restless, nomadic race, warring continuously among themselves, and with the tribes with whom they came in contact, and ever seeking fresh

kingdoms to conquer, possess, and abandon in turn. The defeat they inflicted upon Charlemagne in the Pass of Roncesvalles, when they cut to pieces the flower of his chivalry, and left the paladin Roland dead on the field of battle, they had not turned to account. They had imbibed a dread and awe of the monarch which served to arrest their advance, and withheld them from any attempt to spread westward further than Spain. Charlemagne's death in 814 altered all this. That check removed, the Saracens again took to their boats; made frequent incursions upon the coasts of Sardinia and Corsica, and, when occasion offered, they invaded Sicily. This is not the place to enlarge on the causes which led to this latter step, but the Arab settlement in that southern island had a marked effect on the history of all the naval towns of Italy—especially those situate on the shores of the Adriatic.

The treaty existing between the Greeks and Venetians obliged these latter, in 827, to come to the aid of their allies in Sicily, where the presence of the Saracens proved a growing menace to the Byzantine power. No record exists of the force of the expedition, or its leader; we know nothing beyond the fact that it was required to aid in repelling the invaders. No engagement took place, but the Arabs, cowed by the advance of a foe superior in numbers and in nautical skill, burnt their ships and retired to their mountain fastnesses, showing by this act how serious a blow had been inflicted on their prestige.

In 829 the Venetians again went to the help of their allies, though what the expedition consisted of and where it sailed to we know not. Doubtless, it was as usual against the pirates, but the statement that the fleet returned *senza trionfo* leaves us to draw our own conclusions.

The alliance (spoken of by Italian writers as an *empia alleanza*), entered into between the Neapolitans and the

Saracens, was concluded about this period, and explains many of the engagements that took place between Naples and Venice. These engagements were of frequent occurrence, and were, doubtless, caused to a large extent by the rivalry created over the slave-trade which these two states drove on their own account. The support thus given to the Saracens emboldened them to extend their incursions ever further along the Italian seaboard. They advanced far in the Ionian Sea, and proceeded, undaunted and unchecked, to pursue their depredations into the Adriatic. The increasing jealousy of Venice for the freedom of that sea was but the natural outcome of her need to be supreme there, and the obligations of her alliance with Constantinople. So it came to pass that when, in 840, a Greek envoy came with a request for aid, the demand was readily complied with, and Doge Tradonico despatched a fleet of sixty ships of war (*bellicosas naves*) to support his ally and withstand the Mussulman.¹

The Doge's son, Giovanni, was in command of the expedition, and he led the force out to Taranto, only to encounter defeat and a heavy loss in killed and prisoners. The foe, emboldened by this success, knew how to make the most of it. They advanced far up the Adriatic; they plundered the island of Cherso, on the Dalmatian coast; they besieged and sacked Ancona; they touched at Adria, and on their return they captured a convoy of merchant ships which were coming from Sicily. Speaking of this battle of Taranto, Guglielmotti says:—

“In the days of the Romans . . . an armed fleet was always stationed at Ancona as a centre between the two

¹ It must not be assumed for a moment that all these vessels were Venetian, but it is equally impossible to define the numbers contributed by each ally. The historians on both sides report with the same divergence and partiality the numbers contributed, and the chaos consequent on this direct contradiction is bewildering in the extreme.

chief ports of Aquileja and Taranto. Here flocked traders from Greece, Dalmatia, and Asia, and the prosperity consequently accruing to the town gave it its pre-eminence over Rimini, Fano, Sinigaglia, and Osino, which, together with Ancona, formed the Pentapolis. Ancona flourished gloriously under the Empire, and was never under the dominion of the Goths. The Lombards set a Marquis there, whence the province took the name of 'March,' and finally it passed under the high rule of the Popes. In the year 839 the Saracens, already masters of the Mediterranean, turned their ships' prows towards the Adriatic, determining there to continue their former course of ruin, rapine, and extermination. The inhabitants of Ancona and of Venice foreseeing the danger, stood armed at the entrance of the Gulf. Aware, however, of their feebleness, they applied to the Emperor of Constantinople to join them, if, that is to say, he was anxious to save his provinces in Epirus and the Morea. The negotiations not proceeding quickly, owing to the distance and difficulty of communication, the enemy's fleet came up the Adriatic at full sail under the command of its admiral, Saba (Sâhëb). The navies of Venice and Ancona, consisting of seventy ships, went out from Taranto to meet the foe, and fought valiantly. They were sadly outnumbered by the Mussulman forces, and met with a crushing defeat, hundreds of them being drowned or taken prisoners. The enemy, inflated by their victory, devastated the coast of Apulia, and then set to work to besiege Ancona."¹

All that valour and skill could do to save the town was done, but all in vain. It fell. The Saracens burnt and destroyed it, and Venetian records do not evince a sense of deep regret over the misfortunes that befell a city which they dreaded more as a rival than they esteemed as an ally.

This engagement may be looked upon as the first naval battle in which Venice, as a republic, took part. Its

¹ Padre Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della Marina Pontificia, nel Medio Evo, dal 728 al 1499*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1871.

failure was the more to be deplored as she was at that moment beset by the third obstacle to which allusion has been made, *i.e.*, the incursions of the Slavs of Dalmatia into the Adriatic Sea. The Doge Tradonico, a man evidently alive to the danger threatening his capital, had devoted much attention to the Navy—originally spurred on to such a course by the frequent piracies and inroads of these Slavs. They, on their part, had made good their hold on the islands scattered along the Dalmatian coast, where, when the decadence of the Greek Empire had commenced, they established themselves in undisturbed security. In the third year of his reign the Doge sailed off to repress these robbers. He reduced them chiefly through fear to a state of docility, and forced from them an oath to abstain from their evil practices. Needless to say this oath was not kept. The Slavs mustered a strong armament, and sailed against Venice. They were victorious, and the Doge, in spite of a gallant resistance, had to lead back his defeated navy, having lost a large number of his followers slain in action. These repeated defeats increased the peril of Venice to an alarming extent. The difficulty of making head against two such powerful enemies as the Saracens and the Slavs was enough to tax the resources of a very powerful state, and Venice could hardly be said to have attained as yet to that position. The peril, however, only developed to the full the resolution and energy of her indomitable sons. Fresh ships were built (and a glance at the list of vessels given in the Appendix will prove what activity prevailed during the whole of this century in the Venetian dock-yards), chains were used for barricading the lagoons, and no means were omitted to provide against the danger.

The following year (841), the Saracens again came forth to action, and again the Venetians sailed out to meet them. A battle ensued at Sansego, near the island of

Lussin, in the Gulf of Quarnero, but Fortune still forbore to smile on the Venetians. Several of their ships took to flight, and several were captured. The Saracens made good their victory by penetrating as far as Caorle, which they plundered.

These misfortunes were, however, obliterated by some victories obtained against the Slavs by the united Greek and Venetian fleets, which drove the pirates out of the Adriatic. The Venetians, led by the Doge Orso Partecipazio, were victorious on several occasions. One of these fights was again at Taranto, and though next to no details are to be gleaned, it is comforting to read it spoken of as the first great naval triumph of the young Republic—a pleasing contrast to a former record. A very decided victory was gained, in 870, off the coast of Istria, when Damagoi, the Ban of Croatia and leader of the Slav forces, was killed, with numbers of his followers. A second expedition (probably in 880), again led by Doge Orso, was even more successful. The Venetian ships numbered thirty, and not only were the pirates hotly repulsed, but many prisoners were rescued and much booty was taken. A treaty was signed between the combatants from which, however, the Narentines were excluded. Against these latter in the meanwhile a new expedition was being prepared, but was not employed until the first year of Pietro Candiano's dukedom. Beyond these limited details no information exists as to the nature of these encounters, their duration, their single or allied character, the rank of the commander—all is unknown to us.

It may be asked why the wars between the Venetians and the Slavs were of such excessive length, and so unequal in result—seeing that the victory often remained with the weaker side? According to a modern writer, worthy of all consideration, an explanation is suggested by the fact of the slave-trade carried on in common by

the two people. The Slavs, by purchase or by theft, imported large numbers of slaves from the markets of the East. They found a ready sale for such "goods" among the Venetian merchants, who were fully alive to the value of these articles of commerce, and who sold them again to the Saracens. These, in their turn, were steady and frequent buyers, being obliged to replenish the decimated ranks in their army if they would carry on their wars in Europe. This slave-trade, which brought in a larger and more certain revenue than even the rich stuffs and spices of the East, was the chief source of the wealth of Venice at that date. To the credit of the Venetian government it must, however, be noted that Venetian statesmen did all in their power to stop this nefarious trade. They issued laws and ordinances prohibiting these practices, and waged constant war upon the pirates. Doge Orso sternly forbade it: he laid heavy fines on all who bought or sold slaves, and he also fined all captains who received or conveyed these human wares. This decree, however, was probably less the result of spontaneous justice than of pressure applied by the Frank monarchs, and was never more than a dead letter. The merchants of Venice found means to continue their dealings with the Slavs, and conspired to frustrate the efforts of the government for the suppression of the pirates and their pirated wares. It is, therefore, easy to understand how the struggle was kept alive, and that it was only after an obstinate strife of war and diplomacy that the good cause triumphed at last. That the evil lasted so long may well be explained. Too many interests were at stake, too many fortunes to be amassed for the commercial spirits in Venice to aid and abet the putting down of a people who provided them so surely with the means by which to gratify their money-making instincts. So the slave-trade thrived, and may perhaps account for the two disastrous expeditions which

were undertaken by Pietro Candiano against the Slavs. The first of these, consisting of but few ships, came home discomfited (887); the second, under the command of the Doge in person, was formed of twelve vessels and anchored off the port of Mucules (Muncaro), near Zara. Here a great defeat awaited them: the Doge was slain; his followers were forced to fly after having, with difficulty, rescued their prince's body from the victors. No steps were taken to avenge the Doge's death, or to wipe out the disgrace of the defeat. When we consider the flourishing condition of the Navy, and the number of ships ready for action, it would seem as though the slave-trade was responsible for this strange inaction, and the love of money at the root of the evil. This conjecture gains ground when we find how gallant and successful the Venetian arms proved against the Huns in the reign of Pietro Tribuno, Doge Pietro Candiano's successor, at the beginning of the tenth century. These Huns, or Hungarians, of Tartar origin, coveted the riches and possessions accumulating in the sea-girt city, and resolved to acquire them for themselves. They conquered far and wide around Venice, and then besieged Malamocco and Rialto. The Doge prepared a fleet, which he manœuvred in the Canal of Albiola. He attacked the invaders and routed them. The victory was a boon to all Italy, as the gallant stand made by Venice checked the further invasion of the Barbarian forces, and saved the north of the peninsula at least from bloodshed and rapine. The alarm of such an invasion opened the eyes of the Venetians to the facility with which their town might be attacked. The need of forts was apparent, and it was at once determined to build them. Some trace of the work then accomplished has come down to us in such names as Castel Forte, near San Rocco; Castello, and so on.

In 933, during the reign of Pietro Candiano II., a very

emphatic recognition of Venice's increasing status was given in the most important towns of Istria, Trieste, Pola, Cittanuova, and others claiming the protection of Venice. This aroused the indignation of Gunther, Marquis of Istria, who resented his subjects invoking any other protection. He was supported in his protest by Hugh, King of Italy, and the possessions of the Doge and clergy of Venice—which were for the most part invested in lands in Istria—were sequestered, and several merchant ships belonging to the Republic seized and plundered. As it was not expedient for Venice to go to war with the Marquis of Istria and the King of Italy, she adopted another course, and suspended all commercial dealings between the two countries. This proved so injurious to the lord of Istria that he sued in the most abject terms for the removal of the sentence. He not only consented that his subjects should remain under the Venetian protectorate and pay a stipulated tribute of 100 *anfore* (jars) of wine, but he also vowed never to attack Venetian vessels, and declared that, were his sovereign lord to lay such a command on him, he would, before executing the command, first warn the Venetians. This shows that Venice knew already in what direction to strike, and proves how important she made it for all concerned to keep well with her in matters of trade. To be boycotted by the Republic of St Mark, even in those early days, meant too serious a commercial disaster for any state to risk without gravely counting the cost.

The trade of Venice in the meanwhile was progressing by leaps and bounds, most of all in the direction of Constantinople and the East. The slave-trade flourished also, and to such an extent that a new edict, drawn up on stricter lines than the former one, was promulgated in 945 for its suppression. But, as of old, the edict was unheeded; the only result, according to Manfroni, being to stir up the Narentines to fresh incursions, for on seeing their trade

threatened, these sea-robbers determined to defend it. More than one expedition was fitted out at that period against the Narentines. The first, under the command of Orso Badoaro and Pietro Rusolo, was formed of thirty-three *Gumbarie*,¹ and met with defeat. The failure of this expedition was made good shortly after, for the Doge in person led out a fresh force, and obtained a great victory. The place of this fight is not revealed, but the legend of the Rape of the Brides has been woven around it, and in spite of the discrepancies as to when that incident really took place, the date is generally ascribed to this time. The great festival known as that "of the Maries" (*delle Marie*), which was connected with this event, and was annually celebrated at Venice on the 2nd of February, was, without doubt, held in commemoration of some naval exploit. We cannot, however, assert confidently that it took place during Doge Candiano II.'s reign, though there is much to sanction such an hypothesis. The story of the Rape of the Brides is as follows:—


The rite of marriage was held as essentially honourable in Venice, and the 2nd of February, the festival of the Purification of the Virgin, was set apart every year for a special function in connection with it. The brides of the town assembled at S. Pietro in Castello, which, till St Mark's took its place in 1807, was the cathedral church of Venice, each bride bearing a casket containing her marriage portion. Here the bridegrooms awaited them, Mass was said, and the bishop, after delivering an address, invoked a blessing on each couple. The Doge always attended the ceremony, but as time went on the festival increased in display and magnificence, and lost much of the simplicity which had marked its primal character. The publicity it now acquired attracted the attention of outsiders, and suggested an opportunity for brigandage

¹ For an account of the *Gumbarie*, see Appendix.

altogether congenial to the old enemies and rivals of Venice—the Slav, and Narentine pirates of Dalmatia. They determined consequently to take advantage of this national merrymaking for their own fell purposes, and for this intent repaired to the lagoons, and anchored off the island of Olivolo, on which stands the church of S. Pietro. Here they lay in ambush among the bushes and underwood then growing rank and thick on the island, and awaited the arrival of the maidens with their dowries. As soon as they saw the brides approaching the cathedral they bounded from their covert, and with drawn swords possessed themselves of their prey. The onslaught was so sudden and unexpected that they succeeded in escaping, carrying with them the dowered maidens, and leaving consternation behind them. The bereft bridegrooms, however, were not slow to avenge an insult of so deep and personal a nature. The Doge encouraged their just wrath and placed himself in command of the fleet, which was promptly got ready to sail in pursuit of the robbers. No time was lost, and in the port of Caorle—known ever after as the port *delle Donzelle*—the Venetians' ships overtook those of the Narentines. A sharp fight ensued; the pirates were defeated, and the maidens rescued.

To commemorate this naval triumph it was decreed that the Doge, followed by processions from different schools and corporations, should annually visit the church of Sta Maria Formosa on the 2nd of February, and endow twelve poor maidens known as *le Marie*, with a marriage portion presented by the state. The reason why this church was chosen in preference to any other was owing to the fact that the cabinetmakers who lived in that district, and who made the caskets in which the brides carried their dowries, had shown themselves especially zealous and efficient in the work of rescue. When asked to name their reward, they requested that their parish

church should be honoured by an annual visit from the head of the state. "What if the heat be overpowering?" asked the Doge. "We will give you wherewith to refresh yourself," was the reply. "And should it rain?" asked the Doge once more. "We will furnish you with hats." So the request was granted, and to make good the words spoken, Malmsey wine and hats of gilded straw were regularly presented to each Doge on the occasion of his visit to the church of Sta Maria Formosa, a visit which was paid annually till the fall of the Republic in 1797.



A Bireme.

CHAPTER II

TRADE AND PAGEANT AND WAR

959—1085

Doge Pietro Candiano IV. Slave-trade. Doge Pietro Orseolo II. Naval Triumphs in Dalmatia. *Lo Sposalizio del Mare*. The Bucentaur. The Normans. Siege of Durazzo.

A VEIL of mystery and obscurity hangs over the nomination of Pietro Candiano IV. to the dukedom of Venice. He had been his father's associate as Doge, but removed from that position with ignominy; the whole people uniting to condemn him to perpetual exile, declaring that he should never be chosen to succeed his father. This occurred about the year 950, and in 959, on the death of Doge Pietro Candiano III., this same son of his was recalled from exile and unanimously elected to fill the vacant throne. Had the general opinion merely veered from one extreme to the other? or, was it as a modern writer suggests, that the whole matter turned on the question of the slave-trade? Signor Manfroni's theory is that the father, Doge Pietro Candiano III., was actually in favour of slave-trading, while his son was opposed to it. During the father's reign the faction which supported the trade was in the ascendant, and worked with such success as to compass the downfall and exile of the son. The old Doge's death in 959 brought the rival faction into power. Pietro Candiano the younger was recalled, his return invested with all the honours of a triumph, and he was

raised by the anti-slave-traders to the highest dignity of the state. The edict issued by Pietro Candiano IV. as soon as he became Doge would seem to some extent to bear out this theory. He decreed the absolute suppression of the slave-trade; he ordained that whoever was caught either making slaves or selling them, should himself become a slave; and he laid heavy sentences on all captains of ships who should have any slaves, or slave-judges, or slave-dealers on board. Fearing, too, lest the Venetians should still find means to evade his laws, he forbade them to give money to the Greeks for this purpose.

Another edict, immediately affecting a different branch of Venetian commerce, also emanated from the Doge Pietro Candiano IV. This was a decree issued in answer to some "terrible threats" (*terribili minacce*) made by John Zimisces, Emperor of Constantinople, against the Venetians for selling what he considered contraband of war to his enemies the Saracens. This contraband consisted chiefly of iron, arms, timber for shipbuilding, pitch, sails, and other things which were not to be found in Africa, and which formed a profitable branch of Venetian trade. The Doge convoked a great assembly, when prefacing his speech by the remark that it was a "grievous pity" to furnish aid to pagans, he forbade the sale or giving of any of the above-named articles, and only sanctioned the carrying of such arms as were needed for defence on the Republic's vessels, and a freight of so much timber as was requisite for the repairs on board.

This decree has a special value in setting before us the kind of merchandise in which Venice trafficked in those days. Till then the staple of her trade had consisted almost entirely of spices, bales of silk, and Eastern wares. To these were now to be added the home industries of the Republic, chief among them being those supplies of

timber which the forests of the Veneto furnished in great abundance. The merchants of Venice, foiled in their dealings as to slaves, were, however, in no mood to see another branch of their trade taken from them: the edict issued in 971 was more honoured in the breach than in the observance, and in a short time it became altogether a dead letter.

In 976, Doge Pietro Candiano IV. died by the hands of assassins, leaving Venice a prey to the dissensions of rival factions and in imminent danger of losing her independence. The short and feeble reigns of three successive Doges served only to increase the danger, and the outlook became ever more and more menacing. The elevation to the dukedom of Pietro Orseolo II. at this crisis, however, averted the peril, and raised the state to a height of unprecented glory. The new Doge was a man of great power and ability; and his wisdom and statecraft not only cleared the political horizon in all directions, but opened out to his country possibilities and opportunities as yet undreamt of. From the moment of his election he turned his attention to resuming the tactics which experience had shown to be most advantageous to the welfare of the state. He renewed the alliance between Venice and Constantinople (which an over warm *rapprochement* to Germany had loosened), being well aware of the commercial gain consequent on such a step, and he obtained from the Emperor Basil II. a reduction on all imposts and sailing duties. These duties were now fixed as follows: every Venetian vessel on entering the Dardanelles was to pay a duty of 2 *soldi* of gold; while on leaving the vessel paid instead 15 *soldi*—a clear proof of the far greater importance of imports over exports in Venetian trade, and showing that the Venetians sailed to Constantinople with their ships well-nigh empty, to return home with heavy cargoes and boats richly laden with the

merchandise of the East. This agreement was drawn up not only to favour the Venetians, but to intimate to the people of Amalfi (who till then had had almost the monopoly of the Byzantine trade) that their day was over and that they must give place to the newcomers. Further privileges as to the examination of Venetian ships were conferred for the same reason. These privileges were not had for nothing, for a clause in the treaty was also inserted by which the Venetians agreed to lend their ships for the transport of Greek troops from the East to Italy. These imperial concessions raised the position of Venice at Constantinople far above that of her neighbours and rivals. She was able to sell the richest products of the Levant at reduced prices, and to undersell all the other towns and states of the Mediterranean littoral.

Another stroke of far-sighted policy on the part of the Doge was the treaty he made with the Saracens. Disregarding the reproach of dealing with "the Infidel," he despatched embassies to the various Saracen princes in Asia, in Egypt, in Spain, and in Sicily, and ended by converting these adversaries of long standing into allies and friends.

The Doge's powers of conciliation and diplomacy were also called into requisition nearer home. John, Bishop of Belluno—certain of the support of the Emperor Otho II.—had taken advantage of the bad feeling then existing between Germany and Venice, to seize some lands in his diocese actually subject to the Republic. These lands, in which stood the "Bosco del Cansiglio," and most of the forests of the Cadore, were of special value to Venice, as from them came the greater part of the timber used in the town, not only for building purposes, but more especially for the construction of ships for the Navy. The suspension of the timber trade was a serious matter, but it was one which Venice did not long tolerate. She refused to supply

the Bishop and his province with salt; she forbade the importation of provisions; and she threatened to procure timber from other sources. Bishop John and his people could not exist under such conditions, and they speedily came down from their high horse. They appealed to the German Emperor to intercede for them; and in 996 friendly relations were once more resumed.

The crowning glory of Doge Pietro Orseolo's reign, however, was the conquest of Dalmatia, and the consequent cessation of piracy on the seaboard of the Adriatic. For some time past the Venetians had paid a kind of tribute to the Slavs on condition that their vessels and lands should be respected. This blackmailing—for it was nothing less—the Doge determined to abolish. He despatched a convoy of six ships, under the command of the patrician Badoero, to signify his decision to the pirates and to provide against reprisals. Badoero invaded the Dalmatian coast; he carried fire and sword into the stronghold of Lissa, and returned to Venice with a large number of prisoners. This was but the beginning of mightier doings. In 999 the inhabitants of Dalmatia entreated to be taken under the protection of the Venetian Republic. This appeal (which was prompted by the inability of the people to withstand the incursions of the Slavs, and by the withdrawal of all support from Constantinople) was at once acceded to by the Doge. He set sail from Venice on Ascension Day, 1000, at the head of a strong naval force, and touching first at Parenzo and Pola, was heartily greeted by the populace, who, headed by the clergy, flocked to do him homage. The same reception awaited him at the island of Cherso, and also at Zara, at Spalato, and at Ragusa, where the inhabitants acknowledged him as their suzerain-lord and swore fealty to him. The Byzantine Emperor, too weak to show open resentment at these doings, stipulated, however, that he was

still to be recognised as overlord of the land, although he owned himself willing to admit the influence exercised by Venice, and decreed that the title and duties of Duke of Dalmatia should henceforth be assumed by the Doges of Venice. The hordes of sea-robbers that formed the different tribes of the Slavs and Narentines were not so easily disposed of. They fought to maintain their rights to pilfer and maraud, and to keep out a foe who had ideas of discipline and order altogether alien to their own. The Venetians, on their side, fought for the rights of the people who had turned to them for succour and defence, and for the preservation of law and quiet in the place of rapine and piracy. The Venetian arms were victorious at every point. Trau was first taken, when the Narentines lost heavily as to ships; Spalato then fell; and after severe fighting, the forts of Curzola and Lesina were captured. The fiercest encounter took place at Lagusta, the chief stronghold of the freebooters which was perched on the summit of a rock, and till then had been considered impregnable. A long and bloody engagement was fought, the Venetians returning again and again to scale the heights, undismayed by the difficulty of their task, or the courage of the defenders. They succeeded at last by possessing themselves of some outlying towers, and from there carried the citadel by storm. The Doge checked the carnage and butchery that began the moment his troops had gained the fort, but the city was destroyed and the inhabitants were all carried captive. The Narentines were completely defeated and disheartened. They looked upon the struggle as hopeless, and abstained from further molesting the Venetians, who now remained undisputed rulers of Dalmatia, and gave instant proof of their wisdom as administrators and colonisers. The laws of the country were honourably respected and preserved, and only a small tribute was levied on each town in proportion to its

products and trade. Furs and silks, oil and wine, were exacted from some towns, while others had to furnish a contingent of "two armed galleys and a bark" whenever a Venetian squadron put out to sea. Not the least gain to the Republic in these transactions was the increased facility for obtaining timber for shipbuilding. This wood was to be had in abundance from the forests of Curzola; and the larger supply now obtainable not only rendered Venice independent of the Cadore and the province of Belluno, but it also reduced the prices which till then had prevailed, and which had made the construction of vessels a costly item in the expenditure of the state. More ships could, therefore, be added to the Navy, and seeing the impetus given to trade by this opening out of the Dalmatian provinces, the need of increased means of communication became a very urgent one.

Doge Pietro Orseolo returned in triumph to Venice. He had deserved well of his country, and the honours that awaited him were no more than his due. The title of "Duke of Dalmatia" was confirmed by the unanimous voice of the people to him and to his successors; and in commemoration of this added dignity it was decreed that on the festival of Ascension Day (the day on which he had set sail for Dalmatia) the Doge of Venice should betake himself every year to the Lido for the ceremony of "Blessing the Sea." This was a simple form of the far grander rite which was instituted more than a hundred years later under the name of "The Espousal of the Sea" (*Lo Sposalizio del Mare*). This dated from the time of Doge Sebastiano Ziani, when Pope Alexander III. was in Venice, and when the Papal presence added unwonted magnificence and sanctity to the function. The earlier and simpler ceremony was as follows:—


Early in the morning a barge known as a *Piatto* was made ready and covered with crimson cloth. A bucket of

water, a jar of salt (for purification), and an *aspersoir* of an olive branch were placed on board, and then the canons and clerics in their vestments took their places, and all moved out by the Canal of S. Nicolò del Lido to await the arrival of the Doge on his state barge.¹ The procession then moved on towards the Lido, two canons intoning the psalm *Exaudi nos, Domine*, and chanting litanies. These being ended, the bishop arose and spoke the following words in Latin—"We pray Thee, O Lord, to grant this sea unto us; and to all who sail on it vouchsafe peace and quiet. O Lord hear us, we pray thee." He then blessed the water, and when San Nicolò was reached, before nearing the sea, he approached the Doge's barge when the *primicerio* exclaimed: "Thou shalt purge me with hyssop, O Lord, and I shall be clean." Upon this the Bishop sprinkled the Doge and those who were with him, and poured the rest of the water into the sea. At the close of that century, when the body of St Nicholas had been brought to the Lido from the East, the bishop landed at the church dedicated to the saint, accompanied by the abbot and escorted by a long procession. High Mass was chanted, and the prelate blessed the people and the vast concourse of boats of all sizes and varieties that assembled on these occasions. The service over, the Doge returned to Venice with the same pomp with which he had set out, and the rest of the day was given up to feasting and merriment. The pageant was one not only of outward splendour and beauty, but of deep true religious feeling as well. This was even more the case in the first years of its institution, when the Venetians saw in the ceremony of

¹ The vessel known in after times as the *Bucintoro* was not used, under that name at least, on these festivals till some centuries later. The first decree which alludes to it for these purposes dates only from the year 1311, when the barge till then in use had to be restored, and one on a grander scale, ever after known as the *Bucentaur*, was constructed.

“wedding the sea” the symbol of a close and holy union with the ocean—their safeguard in days of yore, and the centre of their hopes and fortunes in the future.

This meaning was still preserved when a yet greater display marked the ceremonial of the *Sposalizio*, even though the fervour of the early Venetians had then lost somewhat of its freshness and sincerity. The rite of that time was amplified, and many ornate fashions were introduced, which added not a little to the effect and impressiveness of the scene. The Pope presented the Doge with a ring, saying as he gave it: “Receive this as a pledge of the sovereignty which you and your successors shall hold over the sea for ever.” On the eve of Ascension Day the Bucentaur was brought from the Piazzetta and prepared for the Doge and his suite. Three admirals and 100 chief officers from the Arsenal were in command, while 160 *arsenalotti* worked the oars, which were forty-eight in number and had four men to each oar. The Bucentaur had two floors or decks. On the upper one were seated the Doge, the Signory, and the head officials. This deck, which extended the whole length of the ship, was covered with crimson velvet edged with gold braid and tassels, and had bas-reliefs around representing the Arts and Sciences. On the lower deck were the workmen of the Arsenal, the *arsenalotti*, who claimed the privilege of rowing the Doge on these occasions. The ring was thrown into the sea from a small window at the stern of the vessel. In front of this window was placed a highly decorated chair for the Doge, raised on two steps, and having a canopy overhead shaped like a shell, and supported by cherubs. On each side were two wooden gilt figures, one representing Prudence, the other Strength. The Patriarch, the ambassadors, the governors of the Arsenal, and other high dignitaries of state were seated near the steps on gorgeous stools. The walls were adorned with classical decorations,



THE BUCINTAUR.

From a Model in the Arsenal, Venice.

with bas-reliefs of Apollo and the Muses, while a lavish profusion of gilding at every conceivable angle added greatly to the colour and brilliant effect. The procession, headed by the Doge in the Bucentaur and followed by an extraordinary assemblage of boats, gondolas, and barges of every description, set out for the Lido, the first halt being made at the island of St Elena. Here the Bishop of Castello, who came to meet the Doge, was offered a collation by the monks of the island, consisting of "clean," *i.e.* peeled, "chestnuts and red wine," while they presented a bunch of damask roses in a silver vase to the Doge. One of these roses the Doge kept for himself, the rest he distributed among his followers, and the procession moved on to the mouth of the harbour of the Lido. Here the Bucentaur passed through the port into the open sea, the Patriarch blessed the ring which he handed to the Doge, who threw it into the waves, exclaiming: "We wed thee, O sea, in token of our perpetual dominion." A solemn mass was then intoned in the church of St Nicholas, after which the Doge put back to the ducal palace, and in the evening he entertained the three admirals, the 100 head officers of the Arsenal, the ambassadors, and the chief magistrates at dinner. For eight more days the revelling in honour of the *Festa della Sensa* (Ascension) was kept up (it was afterwards prolonged to fifteen days), indulgences were granted to all who frequented the churches during that time, and the attractions of every sort, grave as well as gay, drew a vast crowd of sightseers and foreigners to Venice.

The lovers of the beautiful—and the scene must have been one that would appeal to all such—must have been struck again and again by the dignity and gorgeousness of the Doge's state barge—the Bucentaur. The etymology of the word has given rise to a host of surmises, none of which have as yet been considered altogether conclusive.

The explanation that carries most weight is that it came from *bucio*, or *buzo*, a ship which was adapted for war or trade, and that from the amount of gold and gilding on it, was said to be of gold (*oro*), hence *buzin d'oro* and *bucintoro*.

The Bucentaur was renewed more than once, though the one that saw most service and lasted the longest was the one constructed in 1311. This vessel went to fetch Caterina Cornaro, when, in 1477, she returned from Cyprus, and when the Signory, having forced her to abjure her rights as queen, were ready to shower the hollow and outward signs of royalty on her. In the sixteenth century this same Bucentaur was got ready to escort Henry of Valois, when on his way from Poland to succeed his brother, Charles IX., as King of France, he stopped in Venice and made a tour of the lagoons on this state barge. The last Bucentaur ever built in Venice was the successor to this one, and was constructed in the Arsenal in 1722, from designs by the naval architect, Michele Stefano Conti. She was launched in the basin of the Arsenal, 12th January 1728, and sailed out from there on 12th May of that same year. When, in 1797, the Venetian Republic received its death-sentence from France, the fate of the Bucentaur was also sealed. Her doom was pronounced by Napoleon, who ordered that all the gold on her should be removed, melted down, and taken to the treasury at Milan. To the grief and consternation of the citizens of Venice, this order was carried out. All the gilt work of the vessel was piled in heaps on the island of San Giorgio, and burnt on the morning of 9th January 1798. The costly ashes were washed so that no atom of gold should be lost, and were then collected and carried away as Bonaparte had directed. The carcase of the vessel, reduced to little more than her hull, was equipped with seven guns and used as a floating battery ship, stationed at the Lido to guard the entrance of the port. The very name was taken

away; and the vessel, christened anew as *The Hydra*, was placed under the command of one, Prudhomme, a French lieutenant. At the overthrow of the French Republic *The Hydra* also went under. A decree of the council in 1824 pronounced her final doom, and she was demolished. All that now remains of the Bucentaur is an octagonal trunk, which is kept in the museum of the Arsenal, and is a part of that original mainmast from which for so many centuries the proud banner of St Mark had floated in triumph. This vessel had measured 100 feet in length, 21 feet in width, and 24 feet in height. Like her predecessors, she was pre-eminently a fine weather ship, never going out unless the sky was serene and the air and sea were absolutely calm.

The love of pleasure and of pageant had not, in those times however, absorbed the thoughts and energies of the Venetians to the exclusion of sterner behests. The call to arms was answered as joyously and readily as ever, and the appearance of fresh foes did but stir the fighting instincts of the people to their very depths. The foes now to be engaged were the Normans, whose presence in Italy dates from the beginning of the eleventh century. They came—a band of adventurers—to make capital out of the intestine quarrels raging in the southern part of the peninsula. They attained—through the ability of Robert Guiscard, their leader—to the possession of an extensive duchy, and ended by founding a dynasty whose rulers proved themselves the conquerors of kings and emperors.

The first years of their settlement in Apulia were in no ways signalised by the naval prowess which in time made their name so famous and so dreaded, and it was only after they had overcome the Greeks in several engagements on land—chiefly owing to the brilliant charges of their cavalry—that they turned their attention to the sea. Aided by supplies from the mother-country, and strengthened by their alliances with the coast cities of

Bari, Giovinazzo, and Monopoli, they quickly developed into a sea-power of a very high order. Under the guidance of Robert Guiscard, the fourth of the twelve sons of Tancred of Hauteville, the Normans added to their dominions in the south; and the recognition of their possessions by Pope Nicholas II. confirmed to them the lordship of numerous cities in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily.

The conquest of the towns of Amalfi and Salerno formed an especial turning point in the naval history of the Normans. The position occupied by Amalfi and her rich possessions in Constantinople were now taken over by the victors, so that a door was opened to them for trading in the East, and for adding to their rapidly increasing wealth and influence in the world of commerce. The Greeks saw at a glance all the danger threatening them in such a move. They hated the Normans; for they realised, none too soon, that these invaders had established a footing in the peninsula which would make it more difficult than ever for Byzantium to reconquer the hold she once had on Italy, and which she was always vainly trying to recover. The Normans, in the meanwhile, were expanding by land and sea. Their expeditions and ventures led them ever farther afield, and their determination to augment their commerce and increase their sailing powers in the Adriatic could not fail sooner or later to bring them into collision with the Venetians. And, indeed, there could be but rivalries and jealousies between the two peoples. Both aimed at an uncontrolled and unchallenged right of way throughout the entire length of the Adriatic; both had interests to guard and further in the commerce with the East; and both considered their rights to the supremacy of the sea to be paramount.

The incursions of the Normans on the Dalmatian coast brought matters to a crisis. The Doge of Venice, at that moment Domenico Selvo (1071), resolved to put a

stop to proceedings on territory which recognised the Republic of St Mark as its suzerain-lord, and made ready for war without loss of time. He set out at the head of a naval force; but the enemy having thought prudent to fly at his approach, he found no one with whom to engage, and summoned instead the heads of the Dalmatian provinces. From them he exacted an oath, under pain of death and the confiscation of all their goods, that from that day forward they would admit neither Normans nor any other foreigner into their ports. This deed, which was signed by the priors of Trau, and Spalato, and Zara, and by the chief magistrates of other towns, is of value in showing the confines of her dominion in Dalmatia as marked by Venice herself, besides determining the date when her strife with the Normans first began. It was of no special use, however, in maintaining Venetian supremacy in that region, nor in keeping the Normans away from those coasts.

Robert Guiscard had established himself as absolute master of Apulia and Calabria. His brother, Roger, had driven out the Saracens from the greater part of Sicily, and both brothers were bent on extending their rule and interests in the East. Duke Robert, who was as able a statesman as he was a warrior, saw his chance in an insurrection which broke out in Constantinople in 1078. He espoused the cause of the dethroned Emperor Michael VII., he betrothed his daughter, Helena, to Michael's son, Constantine, and when that monarch had been immured in a monastery he carried out hostilities against Alexius Comnenus, the founder of that house and of a dynasty that reigned in Constantinople for over a hundred years. Alexius was named Emperor in 1081, a nomination which Robert Guiscard resolved to annul. He prepared for war, and raised ships, to the number of 160, in all the ports of Sicily and Southern Italy. Galleys and transport vessels

were got ready to convey no less than 17,000 men of arms, and about 2000 horses. These preparations filled the heart of Alexius with dismay. He knew well that his Greek subjects were in no wise fitted to make head against so formidable a foe. He was also aware that no sovereign in Europe would support his cause, and that the only quarter from which he could expect any aid was from Venice. Venice was all-powerful in the Adriatic; her interests were closely bound up with his own as to curbing the ambition of the Norman; and the ties of former friendship and alliances would surely induce her to come to the rescue. Venice, however, was not to be won over by sentiment. She saw her opportunity in Alexius's perplexity, and she succeeded in making the most of it. She began by feigning an indifference as to who would gain the mastery—knowing all the time that the conquest of Byzantium by the Normans would work even more ruin to her than to the Greeks—and delayed answering Alexius's fervid appeals for help till she had obtained from him the concessions she exacted in return for her assistance. The Imperial messengers had to make many a journey between Constantinople and Venice ere terms were settled to the satisfaction of the coquettish Republic. This was at last accomplished, however, and in justice to the Venetians it must be said that their services once given they were given thoroughly. They undertook to arm every available vessel in their possession; to defend the lands owned by the Greek Empire; and to serve with the Greek army in its warfare against Duke Robert. Their rewards, on the other hand, were not small. Alexius promised (whether he remained conqueror in the struggle or not) to pay an annual tribute of 20 lbs. of gold to the church of St Mark: to bestow on the Doge *in perpetuo* the title and stipend of *Protosevasto* ("most august prince"), a title which other doges had enjoyed of old, and which

was now to be secured to his successors; to grant the title and stipend of *Ipertino* ("most honourable") to the Patriarch; to compel the citizens of Amalfi to pay a yearly tax to the church of St Mark, which was to be levied on all the warehouses and goods owned by them in Constantinople; to make a free gift of a warehouse, some houses, four landing stages, and a bakehouse with its dues, to the Venetians resident in Constantinople; to make a gift to them of the church of St Andrew at Durazzo, with its tithes; and finally, to grant the Venetians free trade absolutely, with no duties of any sort, whether of customs, anchorage, and the like, in all the ports and cities in his states, except in Cyprus and Candia, which are not mentioned in the contract. No magistrates might limit the Venetian commerce, and no restrictions as to goods or tariffs could affect them. This decree of His Imperial Majesty was to be irrevocable and absolute, and all were to bow in silence and submission to it. The advantages that such privileges meant to the Venetians can hardly be overstated. Where other merchants were subject to duties of every kind, ranging from 4 to 10 per cent., those of Venice had no duties whatever; where others could only anchor in certain places and on payment of a costly fee, they could anchor where they chose and free of all charges; they were not limited as those of other nations were to the sale of certain articles, but could traffic in every sort of wares; and they could sell at enormous profits and outbid every competitor. In fact, the treaty of 1081 with Alexius Comnenus was a most important epoch in Venice's commercial history. Her relations with Constantinople were henceforth closer and more important than they had ever been; her hold on the markets in the Eastern city was exclusive and exacting, for she aimed—and succeeded perfectly—in ousting every other competitor, and in establishing an absolute and strict monopoly.

Nor was the naval status of Venice less affected and less benefited by this treaty than its commercial welfare. The Navy, indeed, may be said here to have advanced hand in hand with the trade of the Republic, and to have attained simultaneously to the same height and development. Till now it had taken its part—and that with honour—only in fights and quarrels in the waters of the lagoons, or along the Adriatic and Dalmatian coasts. It was now to carry the Standard of the Winged Lion to distant seas, and to spread the glory of the great Republic abroad in the world.

While these negotiations were going on, Robert Guiscard was advancing with his forces. He first attacked Corfu, and though rebuffed at the outset he ended by conquering it, and afterwards proceeded to besiege Durazzo. He encountered a terrific storm on his way there: a storm which sank several of his ships, and would have daunted a less daring spirit, but Duke Robert was endowed with “a gigantic courage,” and no obstacle was ever allowed to check his course. The town of Durazzo was defended by George Paleologos. He was supported by the Venetian fleet, under the command of Doge Selvo in person, consisting of fourteen galleys, nine *uscieri*, and thirty-six other vessels. They anchored three miles off the port of Durazzo at a place called Palle, in the month of July 1081. The Norman duke was not so keen to rush into action, but that he first tried what diplomacy would do, and sent his son Boemond to the Doge, suggesting that he should abstain from aiding the Greeks and meddling in affairs which did not concern him. The Doge, in order to gain time, feigned uncertainty as to his reply, and said his answer should be sent the following morning. The night was then devoted to preparing for the next day’s engagement. The Venetians were evidently inferior to the foe in number, and sought

by strategy and seamanship to make good their deficiency. The wind being contrary to them, they could not anchor near the shore, so they bound their biggest ships together with great cables, so as to form a floating rampart whence they could attack with greater safety and likewise defend themselves more securely. The boats known as *uscieri* were those used for this purpose, and when lashed together they assumed the shape of a semicircle, and lessened the possibility of any sudden or unexpected assault.¹

They added yet further to their defences by erecting movable stands on the masts of these *uscieri*, which could be hoisted or lowered at pleasure. On these were placed men who were entrusted to shoot arrows or slings, or to hurl stones at the foe, the space being sufficient to hold two or three men together with their ammunition. These preparations were all carried out during the night, and when morning dawned and Boemond came for his answer, he found the Venetians ready for action, and no further reply forthcoming.

The Normans, however, were confident of victory: their ships outnumbered those of the Venetians, and their skill and valour as warriors, whether on land or sea, was unquestioned. Boemond drove his vessel straight against the linked *uscieri*, convinced that were he but once able to break up the bulk of this fighting material, he could easily

¹ The historian, Princess Anna Comnenus, describes this manœuvre as follows :—

“The wind having fallen, the large vessels could no longer advance. They, therefore, bound them together with huge ropes, thus forming a sort of naval camp—a field of ships—shaped in a point with a frontage of the bigger ships, and the smaller ones acting like wings. The turret ships in the centre defended the outside ones, while these in their turn carried out all necessary evolutions. So formidable was this united force that the Normans forebore to attack, and not till the Venetians, by insults and taunts hurled at them from their wooden walls, had goaded them to madness, did they commit the folly of adventuring themselves against this unassailable obstacle.”

scatter the smaller lighter ships, and the day would be his. He reckoned, however, without his host. The mass against which he flung his ships maintained a stern unbroken line. The Venetians never yielded an inch, and the light craft of the Normans, lying low in the water, only served as a mark upon which the shower of fire, stones, and missiles from the high decks of the enemy poured with relentless and frightful damage. Boemond himself had a narrow escape. His ship, which was in the very thick of the fight, was so roughly handled by the heavy beams and darts which fell on her that she began to fill with water, and the prince was only saved with difficulty before she went down. The Normans had no choice but to retire; and Paleologos profiting by their defeat, made a sortie from the town and joined his arms to those of the Venetians in harassing the retreating foe. Robert Guiscard had sustained a heavy but not crushing defeat. He was forced to raise the siege of Durazzo; to draw his ships up to the land, as the Venetians threatened to cut off his retreat by sea; and to restore the Greek towns which had hailed him as their lord. But his land forces were still in a position to act on the offensive, and with the help of the men of Ragusa he routed a combined movement of the Greeks and Venetians (18th October 1081), and the campaign was continued into the winter. The Venetian fleet had then to withdraw owing to the inclement season; and the Normans began to besiege Durazzo anew by land. They succeeded this time in taking the city, though they owed this success to treachery rather than to their own valour. A Venetian, to whom history allows no name beyond that of Domenico, living in Durazzo, turned traitor, and showed Boemond a way by which he could possess himself of the town. Durazzo capitulated on 21st February 1082, but Robert Guiscard's schemes for following up his victory by carrying his arms farther into Grecian territory

were frustrated by the presence of enemies at home. He was forced to return to Italy, leaving his son Boemond in command of his forces in Greece.

The Venetians had taken no part in the campaign of 1082; but Alexius, no doubt eager to profit by Robert Guiscard's absence, implored them to come again to his aid, and take advantage of the favourable opportunity now before them. They responded at once to the Emperor's appeal. With a still larger fleet than had sailed originally against Durazzo, and strengthened by the presence of a few Greek ships under the command of one Admiral Morice, or Maurix, they attacked and took Corfu—with the exception of the citadel which was stoutly held by the Normans. From there they moved on to their old haunts near Durazzo to await the Norman fleet. This fleet had been summoned by Boemond, who saw his soldiers and possessions falling away from him, and who urged his father to come to the rescue and retrieve their damaged fortunes. Duke Robert gathered a mighty force, superior both in quantity and quality to the one he had led in 1081; he appointed his four sons, Boemond, Robert, Roger, and Guy, to separate commands, and, as soon as the season allowed of it, he sailed out to meet the Venetians. His first object was to carry relief to the garrison at Corfu. The Venetian ships lying all around the island, and composed, according to Anna Comnenus, of "biremes, triremes, and swift sailing vessels," were bent on keeping the Normans out of the Ionian Isles. The rival forces met in the Canal of Casopo, where the first encounter took place. This was fought in a different fashion to the previous engagement, for here the attack was delivered in close proximity, with less hurling of stones and darts and more personal action. The Venetians were victorious, but they were unable to follow up their victory or dislodge the foe from his position. Duke

Robert made an attempt, three days later, to baffle the enemy; but he was again unsuccessful, and the Venetians, fearful of the approach of winter, and confident that no further battle would be fought for some months, sent many of their ships home, retaining only the heaviest galleys and sailing vessels. Robert Guiscard was duly apprised of this act of the Venetians, and resolved to attack the fleet in its diminished condition, regardless of time or weather. He divided the command of ten galleys between himself and his four sons, and leaving the other vessels in the rearguard, he went into action. The Venetians resorted to their old practice of lashing their heaviest ships together, so as to advance in a semicircle with the lighter galleys acting as wings, and hoped in this way to make good their deficiencies as to numbers. The ships, however, had next to no ballast on board; the victuals and provisions which they had carried being all consumed, their draught was consequently very light, and the least shock sufficed to make them heel over. The Grecian *chelandie* also decamped early in the day, leaving their allies to bear the sole brunt of the battle, and to withstand a wholly unequal strife alone. The Venetians made a gallant stand; but seven of their galleys were taken, numerous ships foundered, and many had to surrender to the victor. Few Venetian vessels indeed escaped, and the loss of life was excessive. No less than 5000 are said to have perished in the waves, while those of the survivors who fell into Duke Robert's hands were treated by him with great cruelty. The Normans regained possession of Corfu; but the inclemency of the weather and a raging pestilence among their ranks prevented their reaping all the advantages that should have accrued to them from so signal a victory.

The news of this defeat spread consternation in Venice. The mob rose in fury against Doge Selvo, they

forcibly compelled him to enter a monastery, and they elected Vitale Faliero as doge in his stead. The next thought was to wipe out the stain of their overthrow, so the covenant with Alexius was renewed and a fresh fleet despatched against the enemy. The result of this campaign is not easy to determine. The Greek princess and historian, Anna Comnenus, declares that the Venetians came upon the Normans at Butrinto,¹ took them by surprise, and overcame them with a great slaughter. They nearly succeeded also in capturing Sigelgaita, the wife of Duke Robert, and one of her sons; and if the story is true they would seem to have obtained a decided triumph. The Venetian chronicler, Doge Andrea Dandolo, on the other hand, says that his countrymen were defeated by the Normans near the island of Saseno. The Norman writers make no mention at all of these events, and only relate that in the year 1085, Duke Robert began the war anew, that he sent his son Roger to take Cephalonia, which the prince failing to do, Robert went in person to superintend the operations. Here he fell ill of a fever, and died in July of this same year. The facts are certainly not easy to unravel, but weighing one statement with another, there is more to prove the likelihood of Anna Comnenus's account than that of Doge Andrea Dandolo.

In any case the issues consequent on either victory or defeat were rendered altogether nil by the death of Robert Guiscard. The disappearance of this heroic figure from the page of history freed Constantinople and Venice from a very present danger, and removed a foe whom they had every cause to fear and to respect. His death left Venice at liberty to devote all her energies to the benefits that accrued to her from her valour and enterprise, and without let or hindrance to continue her work of expansion by land and sea.

¹ Butrinto, the classic Buthrotrum on the coast of Epirus, is the legendary birthplace of Judas Iscariot.

CHAPTER III

THE WARSHIPS OF VENICE

The Galley. *Galee Taride*. *Galee Grosse*. *Galeazza da Mercanzia*. Triremes, or *Galee Sottili*. Rowing *Alla Scaloccia*. Quinqueremes. Quadriremes. Galleons. *Galeoncino*. *Galeazze da Guerra*. Galley Slaves.

It is difficult for anyone not a specialist in maritime matters to handle the subject of the galley as it should be handled, or to do more than ask for a forbearing hearing upon questions which perplex and divide even experts and authorities.

The Venetians in common with nations of remoter ages adopted the galley as their vessel for war, reserving it—notwithstanding its extreme unsuitability—almost exclusively for this purpose. Its graceful long lines, its high peaked prow, its narrow beam, lying low in the water, seemed made more for beauty than for use, and though it was worked by sails as well as by oars, its sailing powers were of small account in rough weather, while in the teeth of an angry sea its oarsmen could make but little, if any, way. The constant changes it underwent through the course of its history serve to prove that those who used it most were most aware of its shortcomings, though throughout these changes, it will be admitted, the original type of the galley was faithfully maintained.

The origin of the word “galley” is ascribed to many and different sources. Some say that it was taken from the Arabic *chalaja*; others from *Galeos*, “the swordfish,”

which, from its agility and shape, and from its sharp beak or *rostrum*, it was said to resemble; and others again from *galleria*; i.e., "a ship with a gallery or place set apart for the rowers."

The first mention of the galley in Venetian history occurs in the ninth century, when it is spoken of as a "swift warship," with but a single bench of rowers, and carrying but one mast.¹ The way in which the rowers were seated; the fashion in which they rowed; the number of men to one or more oars, has given rise to a host of conjectures and discussions. Some writers assert that the men were in rows (*ordini*); others that they were in groups; and this last explanation is without doubt the one to be accepted, receiving as it also does confirmation from the series of pictures and engravings which show the galley in action, and the distribution of the rowers and fighting men. These groups consisted of two, then of three, and later on of four and even more men, and from this the vessels took the ancient classical names of biremes, triremes, quadriremes, quinqueremes, and so on. As a rule each rower in the group handled his own oar, although on some galleys it was the custom to row *alla scaloccia*—a method totally dissimilar to that of the groups, and in which several rowers handled one large single oar. Sanudo the Elder (1300-1320) gives the dimensions of a galley as slightly over 121 feet long by 16 feet wide; the height being at the prow $9\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and $10\frac{1}{2}$ at the poop. He also states that the rowers were 120 in number, arranged on sixty benches, thirty on each side—a number which he says can be increased when needed to 180 by adding one oar to each bench. These figures were, however, by no means stationary, for both greater and smaller numbers are constantly mentioned in connection with the galleys. As many as 200 oars were sometimes used, especially

¹ *Venezia e le sue Lagune*, vol. i., part ii., p. 198.

when great speed was required, or important messages had to be conveyed in haste. Manfroni, speaking of these vessels, says that they often carried a sort of castle (*castrum*) in the midst of the deck, in the shelter of which stood the archers and slingers; around the sides or walls was the *impavesata*, formed of the shields of the warriors; at the prow were the catapults and engines for hurling stones, as well as a huge beam with its point cased in iron. This was hung from one of the yards on a pivot, whence it could easily be used in action to strike or sink the enemy's ship. A large awning was spread over the rowers to shield them from sun and rain, but during a battle it was removed. The outside of a galley was often covered with leather to protect it from "Greek fire," and then the galley was known as "padded" (*imbarbottata*) or simply as *barbotte*. Till the close of the thirteenth century these ships of war had two large oars placed near the stern to act as auxiliaries to the helm.¹

The family of vessels which sprang from the galley was both varied and numerous, differing widely as to character, and even, at times, as to name, and kept with difficulty within the bounds of a common ancestry. This family was divided into two classes: the slender (*sottili*) and the heavy (*pesanti*) galleys. Other subdivisions followed in their turn: the first or slender class consisting of the *galeotte*, the *fuste*, the *panfini*, *brigantini*, *saettie*, *felucche*, and *mezzagalea*; the second and heavier class comprising the *galee taride*, the *galeazze*, the *galeoni*, and the *galeoncino*. The slender or lighter kinds (the *galee sottili*) were, as has been said, used exclusively for war; while their heavier brethren (the *galee pesanti*) served for the most part for transport, though at times of emergency they could be, and occasionally were, pressed into the fighting force. The names of others denote the special

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 454.

service for which they were told off: thus a royal galley, (*reale*) was the chief galley of the kingdom; a *generalizia*, that which carried a general; a *capitana* the chief of a squadron; a *padrona* the second in a convoy; and a *sensile* was the term applied to the ordinary one. There were also the different varieties of these classes: the *pianella* or flat-bottomed kind; the *quartierata*, ships of large beam and wide stern; and the *bastardella*, of mixed sorts. A few, such as the *galee da mercanzia*, were reserved for trade, when they carried silk, cloth of gold, and other precious wares, and sailed to the East, to Holland, and to England, well armed against pirates and smugglers. They were then known as the galleys of Romania, of Flanders, of London, etc., and were constructed and equipped in such a fashion as to fit them for their nearer or farther destination.

At the head of the crew was the *Sopracomito*, or commander—a soldier and a gentleman; in the Venetian fleet generally a noble. This commander was always paid. A decree of 13th July 1294 ordained “that the galleys should be equipped by the richest families in proportion to their wealth.”¹ This was no light burden. The cost of a galley is estimated by Sanudo at not less than 15,000 florins a month, or about £280. In those days the crew was also paid, and it was not till the sixteenth century that the galleys were worked by slaves. The galleys served also as training-ships for the youthful patricians of Venice, the lads from the age of ten to thirteen being selected by a captain, who appointed two to each *galea sottile*, two to each *Nave grossa*, and four to each *Galeazza*. “In this way,” says Pantera, “they begin in youth to learn the art in which they become so expert as to be competent to serve according to their

¹ Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, Venezia, 1854, vol. ii., p. 332.

proficiency in such other and higher maritime offices as are nearly always bestowed on those who have experience in navigation, and who by practice have shown themselves apt in the service.”¹

The importance of the heavy galleys, with their dual usefulness both as vessels of war and of transport, is evident from the numbers built in the thirteenth century, and the frequent mention made of the various kinds then constructed. Among these were the *galee taride* (or *tarete*, and again *tarite*), which were essentially transport ships for conveying troops, horses, provisions, and munitions of war, as the occasion required. In length about the same as the slender galley, they exceeded her considerably in width, and carried two masts instead of one. They were slower in movement than the *galea sottile*, and when used in action occupied the second line or reserve. The usual number of oars on board a *galea taride* was 150, and most of them carried “cages” (*gabbie* or *coffe*) aloft.

The next in order of construction were the *Galee Grosse*, or *Galee Grosse di mercato*, first built at the Arsenal, in Venice in 1294, from the designs of a Venetian, one Demetrius Nadal. They too, though destined for commerce, were, in case of need, employed in war, and were of a heavier build than the *taride*. Four years later fifteen more of these *galee grosse* were built on a plot of ground, known formerly as Terranova, on the site of the present Royal Gardens.²

These vessels were especially constructed for trading with the Eastern Empire, and were worked with both oars and sails. In the fourteenth century some of them

¹ Pantera, *L'Armata Navale*, Roma, 1614, libro primo, cap. xii., p. 115.

² A part of this ground was at one time occupied by the wild beasts given in homage to the Doges, and where they were kept with great care; another part was devoted to the Genoese, who in 1380 were taken prisoners in the war of Chioggia.


carried as many as 100 oars; and a document of 22nd September 1318 says that their length was occasionally of 115 feet. Their sails were four in number—*artimon*, *terzaruolo*, *papafigo*, and *cochina*; they had “castles” or turrets at either extremity, and a shelter in the centre for the protection of the soldiers in action. They were also furnished with engines, known as *perdichette* or *perdicatti*, for hurling stones or other missiles against the foe, and they also carried crossbows—weapons used by the Venetian marksmen with deadly effect. A fleet of these ships required an equipment of 15,000 seamen all told, and the cost of maintenance ran to 432,000 gold florins, *i.e.*, about five million francs, or £200,000 of our money. After the second half of the fifteenth century, the *galee grosse* were built on reduced lines.

Next in importance to these great galleys came the big merchant galleons, the *galeazze da mercanzia*, which were likewise low in the water, and armed with a projecting beak or spur. Marin Sanudo relates how at the end of the thirteenth century these *galeazze*, when at sea, had their rowers seated two on a bench—they were then biremes—and that only in later times did mariners become aware that three oarsmen could be seated on one and the same bench. “Sanudo uses the word *ordine*,” says Manfroni, “but it is evident that he did not by this mean *ordini*, or rows, overlaid with oars: his meaning being that on the galleys the benches of the rowers were arranged in two steps (*gradini*), and that, when fighting went on, the upper seat was vacated in order to leave more space for the combatants, while the rowers herded together on the lower bench.”¹

The *galeazze da mercanzia* were for the most part triremes (*i.e.*, they had groups of three men, one man to each oar), as too were the *galeazze da guerra*, and Canale

¹ *Op. cit.*, App., cap. i., p. 453.

tells us that the men in each group had special names corresponding to their places on the bench. The one nearest the centre of the ship was *pianero* (also called *piamero*), next to him was the *posticcio*, below him again was *terlicchio*, whose seat was the lowest of the three, as his oar was the shortest. The handle of each oar was so adapted as not to come in contact with either of the other two; while the benches on which the rowers were seated was inclined in such a way as to leave every man's separate action free—a result that was assured provided the rowers kept time. The rowlocks were placed between the first and third rower. The length of the oars used on these galleys was always a subject of dispute: some admirals advocating the use of the long, others of the short, oars. The usual number on the old *galeazze* was 150, seventy-five on each side; consequently twenty-five benches would be ranged on either side, with three men to a bench. The Doge Tommaso Mocenigo (1414-1425) raised the number of an average crew to 300 men. Till his time it had generally been 200, of whom 150 had to see to the sails and oars, while the others had charge of the internal administration of the vessel. There were also on board carpenters, calkers, crossbowmen, archers, slingers, and others, which shows that the *galeazze* sailed provided with all that was necessary for defence and attack. The *galeazze* were for the most part built in the Arsenal at the expense of the state, but a form of competition was encouraged by the government empowering any Venetian patrician—and none but patricians might compete—to fit out at his own expense a *galeazza da mercanzia*. The reward for this costly privilege consisted in allowing the donor to call the ship after his family name. By a decree passed in the Senate, March 1529, a *galeazza da mercanzia* was to measure 133 feet from prow to stern; the width was to be 23 feet, the height 9 feet. She was a third larger in



TRIEME.

From a Model in the Arsenal, Venice.



BRIGANTINE.

From a Model in the Arsenal, Venice.

every way than the original slender galley, and had her benches set at wider intervals. The sails, two or three, or even more in number, bore the same names as in the *galee grosse* of the preceding century. The masts, usually three in number and vertical, were—the mainmast, which was large and stout; the *trinchetto* or foremast, and the *mezzana* or mizen.¹ The helm was the same as in other ships, except that two large oars were placed on either side of it to help the *galeazze*, which were rather slow and cumbersome, to turn more easily and quickly. The carrying freight of these ships was 1000 *botti*, or about 500 tons.

The actual Venetian trireme is first met with in the naval history of the Republic late in the fifteenth century, when a decree dated 27th August 1494 speaks for the first time of the *galea sottile*, or *leggera*, the *Trireme Veneziana Minore*; though some evidence exists as to its having possibly been in use in the preceding century.

These galleys were famous for their speed, and for the ease with which they could be manœuvred. They measured some 133 feet in length, and carried the usual sails. The slaves on board numbered 180, and there were besides a fixed number of crossbowmen. A very long *rostrum* or big spur (*sperone*) projected beyond the prow, while on the prow itself were placed powerful weapons of defence. For it must be borne in mind that the object of the galley was, above all else, to attack, to board the enemy's ships, to smash their oars so as to destroy all motor force, to overpower and kill the crew, and remain master of the vessel. Such attacks had always to be frontal: any flank movement was absolutely inadmissible, for the sides—taken up as they were with the oars—were at once the parts most exposed and least

¹ It must be borne in mind that *mezzana* and *trinchetto*, though generally used to denote the mainsail and foresail, are also used, especially by old writers, when speaking of the mainmast and foremast.

capable of defence, and required in consequence most protection, whether in attacking or defending.

The business of fitting out a *galea sottile* for action was a serious one. The material required for attack consisted mostly of stones. The space, therefore, needed for storing such ammunition, let alone its weight and bulk, added largely to the difficulties of going to war. The light galley of the fourteenth century was provided with machines and catapults for hurling stones (called in Venetian *cozoli*), and laws are extant deciding the number of boatloads of stones which the galley was to carry. The arming of the crew was contrived with all the ingenuity and cunning of those days. They had cross-bows as well as other bows, differing in size and all made of iron. There were scimitars, swords, "knives for wounding," also of iron, and there was a formidable weapon in the shape of a lance, made of beechwood and 15 feet long, having the lower part of the woodwork bristling with blades for the space of 5 feet at least. The point was formed of a sharp iron peak, covered with spikes or hooks. There were implements called *capi-remi*, supposed by Filiasi to have been for damaging the enemy's oars; grappling irons of every sort and device for attacking and injuring and holding on to the ships of the foe. There were darts of extraordinary length; arrows, javelins, *ronchi*, or knives fastened on to long handles, and a host of other arms, long obsolete, and whose very names are now meaningless and obscure.

The crew were also provided with defensive armour—helmets, casques of iron and leather, vizors or masks, cuirasses, etc., generally made of iron. No precautions seem to have been taken against fire, till Padre Coronelli, writing in the seventeenth century, alludes, as though it were a novelty, to five different instruments "wherewith to extinguish any fire which might occur,

and to prevent fires in the Arsenal or town of Venice."

The *galea sottile* carried her band. This was considered a necessary adjunct for cheering the crew, for inciting them to bravery, for stirring their souls when fighting, and for accustoming them to the different calls to duty, so as to insure precision and punctuality from all on board. The band consisted of two timbrels, one drum, two trumpets, and a few *naccherista*—a combination that made for noise sooner than sweetness or harmony.

With the discovery of gunpowder the equipment of a *galea sottile* underwent a complete change: the cargo of stones with all its requisite appliances making way for the modern arms and ammunition required for this altered form of warfare.

Pantera,¹ writing early in the seventeenth century, describes the arrangement of the cabins as they existed a hundred years before this time on the "light galleys" of the Venetian Republic. There were six "rooms" (*camere*) below the deck, most of them being but a row of store-rooms or closets, and known under the following names: *Camera della Poppa*, *Scandolaro*, *Compagna*, *Pagliolo*, *Camera di Mezzo*, *Camera della Prora*. The first one alone boasted a seat or bench, and was reserved "for the captain, the officers of the poop, for the passengers and people of consideration, for their weapons and their goods." The second cabin, the *Scandolaro*, was where the arms and possessions of the under officers were stored, and when need arose, "here too might be stored some barrels of wine." The third cabin, or *Compagna*, was also a store-room "for wine, for the salted meat, known as *compatico*, for oil, vinegar, sausages, and suchlike provisions." The fourth cabin, or *Pagliolo*, was for the biscuits, bread, flour, beans, and other victuals. In the

¹ Pantera, *op. cit.*, libro primo, cap. iv., p. 45.

“middle-room,” or *Camera di Mezzo*, were kept the sails, some of the rigging, the passengers’ luggage, merchandise, and various stores. The powder and other ammunition for the artillery was also stowed here, unless, as sometimes happened, it was kept in a special place near the mast. The sixth cabin, the *Camera della Prora*, was but a continuation of the “middle-room,” as no division whatever existed between them, though this “room of the prow” boasted a separate entrance near the prow. This entrance was for the use of the second officer in command, and for the sailors to get at the rigging, ropes, and their own goods and chattels. The other and usual entrance by the mast was for the commander.

“In this sixth room the chaplain and the barber have their sleeping-berths; and here too are kept the drugs. . . . In all these cabins there is space for the soldiers, the sailors, and in particular for the sick and wounded. Above deck the galley is divided into three parts: the poop, the prow, and the space in which the benches for the rowers are ranged. The poop where there are no oars is devoted to the captain, the nobles, the folk most worthy of esteem, and the helmsman. The part occupied by the oarsmen is divided in the midst by a deck, raised above the benches, and made so as to afford a place for walking. This is called the *corsia*, or causeway. Towards the prow and at the further end are two raised squares or spaces (called *rembate*¹) upon which, when sailing, the mariners stand to work the *trinchetto* or foresail, and here too stand the soldiers to fight. Below are placed the anchors and the artillery stores.

“The third part of the galley is the prow, or forepart of the vessel, in front of which projects the spur, called of

¹ The *rembata* was a kind of castle at the edge of the prow, and was formed of two stands, joined in the middle by a bridge. This castle or rampart was of the width of the widest part of the galley, and was set apart, as it were, for the field of action, for the placing of the engines or artillery, and as a barrier for checking the oncoming of the foe, and for preventing him from boarding the ship.

old the *rostrum* or beak. Beyond the body of the galley and on either side of it are the 'dead works' (*opere morte*), so called because they are outside the ship, and because they are no other than pieces of wood or beams made to extend beyond the body of the galley in order to strengthen that part. On these the soldiers and sailors can take up their position, and leave extra space for the rowers and the remainder of the crew to perform their avocations, and on occasion to rest. These 'dead works' are as long and large as the galley herself, and occupy much space. Without them the labours of the crew would be much hindered, for they could neither row nor perform their tasks, neither could they take repose. The oars rest on *posticci* (frames or supports for the oars projecting outside the vessel), which form part of the 'dead works,' and there is one such rowlock to each bench. . . . Every galley carries her own skiff (*schifo*). Some are kept on the starboard side at the eighth bench, placed on tressles, and others in a recess (*remiggio*), also at the eighth bench in order not to encumber the galley on that side. . . . The galleys carry four irons or anchors . . . two at the prow under the ramparts (*rembate*), and two others near the skiff, . . . one on each side."

The practice of rowing *alla scaloccia*, alluded to above, was on a totally different system, and was performed by so many rowers to one oar only. The number of these rowers differed on different galleys. Four men or even five was the usual number allotted to each oar, but some authorities held that a reduced number was better in that it lightened the ship, and left more space when manœuvring or in action. These reasons doubtless weighed with the Venetians, for when they rowed in the *scaloccia* fashion, they did not allow more than four men to the oar. Pantera tells us that he had picked the brains of naval experts on this point, and was therefore entitled to speak with authority. He is in favour of either the trireme, or the *scaloccia* mode of rowing, given in the

latter case that four men are always told off to the one oar.

“We may assume,” he says, “that the Venetian Republic did not assign more than four men to each oar, and that only when they adopted the large oar called *scaloccia*. Formerly, when the galleys were manned by three, four, or five oars to a bench, as was the case of old, instead of one oar worked by four men, as it is done now, they did not send out their galleys with more than three men to a bench, who worked as many oars, each man his own. This mode of equipment (as I have learnt from old men who commanded galleys manned in this way) answered better than one oar worked by three rowers. But when four men are put to one single oar, they doubtless progress better than four men with four oars would do; since with one big oar more force can be obtained over the water, the vessel will be propelled with greater impetus, and consequently greater speed will be obtained than with four small oars; four men being able, with the big oar, to manage better and to pull with greater velocity, as well as being better able to bear the fatigue (as is shown by experience); and being less closely crowded together than four men with four small oars, even supposing they are of special prowess. But were three men to be set down to one single big oar, the galley would advance less quickly than if worked by sets of three men with three oars, since the weight of the oar would be in excess of their strength, and they would not be able to ply it with the vigour necessary to obtain the pace equal to that of the three small oars, and so the vessel would make but little way. On the other hand, with the three men rowing as of old, each man to his oar, more effect will be produced, and the men would be able to row for a longer time than with the three rowers working one big oar. . . . Besides this, should one or two out of the three rowers fall sick or die, or by any other cause be disabled, two of the small oars could still be worked by his remaining mates, whereas in the case of the big oar it could not be worked without its full complement of rowers.”¹

¹ Pantera, *op. cit.*, libro primò, cap. xv., p. 150.

The first half of the sixteenth century saw the invention and construction of the Venetian Quinqueremes. These vessels, larger than the quadriremes, and worked by five rowers to a bench, had been used by the Romans of old, who commenced their own war fleet by copying a Carthaginian quinquereme which had been washed ashore on the south coast of Italy. A Venetian, Vettor Fausto by name, devoted much time, thought, and study to this question of quinqueremes, and endeavoured to turn it to good account for his native town. The description of how he presented his plan to the Senate is preserved to us by Sanudo, himself an eyewitness on the occasion.

“On 18th August 1525, Messer Vettor Fausto exhibited before the Senate a most beautiful plan for making a galley to be rowed with five oars to each bench (the *galea sottile* having but three); and he showed us this plan in order that it might be submitted to the College.” The plan was warmly approved of. A decree was passed in October of the following year, directing that “A dockyard be set apart for the said Fausto in the Arsenal where he could construct the quinquereme.” The vessel was finished in the year 1529. The Doge Andrea Gritti went in person to inspect it on 11th January, and on 29th April it was launched. The trial trip is recorded as follows: “On 23rd March 1529, the galley with five oars to a bench, made by Messer Fausto Vettor, rowed forth, accompanied by two galleys of three oars from Chioza (Chioggia), as far as to the ‘Two Castles,’ and passed them.” The commandant on this occasion was Ser Alvise Sagredo, patron, or director of the Arsenal; but the permanent command was entrusted to another patrician, Girolamo Canale. An entry in Sanudo’s Diaries, dated 23rd May 1529, tells how this galley proceeded up the Grand Canal “as far as the Palazzo Foscari, where she was turned about, but with the greatest possible trouble, as

she was 28 paces long (roughly speaking, some 156 feet), and more than 3 paces (some 18 feet) wide."¹

Another decree, of 24th June 1529, ordains that the number of rowers on this galley shall be double the number on a *galea sottile*, and that whereas the crossbowmen on a light galley numbered fifty, on the quinqueremes they should be 100. This would bring the rowers up to a force of 200 men, distributed on forty benches: twenty to a side, with five men to work each separate oar. The crew, too, was numerous; and the supply of ammunition both in quantity and quality far exceeded that allotted to a *galea sottile*.

The quinquereme did not, however, find favour in Venice. The Government, it is true, approved of the scheme, men learned in naval matters gave it their support, but no proof exists that a second quinquereme was ever constructed, or that she served as a model for future ships.² The enormous cost lavished first in the building and then in the maintenance of the vessel told against her; whilst the possible loss in action involved consequences of too serious a nature, and crippled the fighting force of the country too heavily to be incurred.

The ill-success of his quinquereme did but spur Vettor Fausto on to other inventions. He set to work on a quadrireme, arranging groups of four rowers to the same number of oars in place of five, so as to economise space and labour, besides leaving freer room for the movements of the men. From this he went on to build a galleon—a large and heavy warship—which was also to serve, if

¹ Jal gives rather different measurements: the length according to him was 214 Venetian feet, or over 74 metres; the width 29 Venetian feet, or nearly 11 metres; the height 14 odd Venetian feet, or a little over 5 metres; adding after these figures, "What a gigantic galley!"

² A different opinion is held in this matter by Giovanni Battista Ramusio, who asserts that this vessel of Vettor Fausto's stood as the model for all future quinqueremes, as long, that is, as such ships existed.

required, for purposes of commerce. This so-called invention of Fausto's was, in reality, but an adaptation of a vessel already in existence, and much in use in the Venetian Navy. The first galleon spoken of was launched from Venice on 10th October 1531, and formed part of the squadron sent under the command of Girolamo da Că Pesaro against Solyman II. in the year 1537. Bertuccio Contarini was the first commandant of this galleon, but he died the same year in which he was appointed, and another patrician, Alessandro Bondumiero, was chosen out of twenty-one candidates to succeed him. The working gear of this galleon was evidently none of the stoutest. She had to go into dock for repairs in the fort of Calamata, near Ragusa, in the autumn, and in the following spring she had to put into Famagosta for the same reason. In the fight off Sta Maura, when the Venetians and their allies fought against the Turks, this galleon performed prodigies of valour. She was, however, becalmed and separated from her sister ships (who in sooth did not come very readily to her rescue), and suffered to such an extent as not to be able to use her oars.

The Venetian galleon was altogether different from the Spanish ship of that name. The Venetian had two, sometimes even three, decks; she had three masts, besides one at the prow; she had "cages" aloft, and pennons; she carried 128 "mouths of fire," and eighty other guns of different bore. These were distributed all about the vessel in the places considered most advantageous for fighting, some being even erected on the mastheads.

In the year 1600 a *galeone* of an extraordinary size was laid down, and "the dockyards of St Anthony, which are in the newest part of the Arsenal" (*i squeri di Sant' Antonio che sone nel riparto Arsenale Novissimo*), were set apart for the building of the ship. She was finished and manned in 1608. Her crew was of over 100 men, and she

carried eighty guns of different bore, some of them being considered large enough for attacking purposes. This *galeone* distinguished herself in the war of Candia (1647), when, under the command of Tommaso Morosini, she held her own against forty-five Turkish galleys, which attacked her in the waters of Nilo by order of Mousa Pasha, the Captain-General of the Mussulman fleet.

Another vessel of the same order as the previous war-galleys, and known as a *galeoncino*, belongs to this date. She was also the invention of Vettor Fausto, and is thus mentioned by an old chronicle: "On the 29th day of April 1570, a *galeoncino* was launched that for many years had been in course of construction in the Arsenal by Vitor Fausto, a celebrated builder of battleships; but she was never finished nor equipped so as to be sent out for war." In spite of this assertion the *galeoncino* *did* set out for the seat of war. She left Venice under the command of Girolamo Contarini in 1570, and on 17th September 1571, she reached the harbour of Sattia, on the north-east coast of Candia, with the Venetian squadron, commanded by Francesco Duodo. For some reason, which does not appear, she did not take part in the great fight at Lepanto.

Far otherwise was the fortune of the *galeazze da guerra*, which came into being towards the middle of this sixteenth century. They bore so distinguished and important a part in the crushing defeat of the Turks at Lepanto as to have, it is said, secured the victory to Venice and her allies. These vessels were, in reality, but a variety of the *galeazze da mercanzia*, only transformed in such a way as to serve better for their altered purpose. The inventor and designer of the *galeazza riformata*, as this kind of craft was sometimes called, was Giovanni Andrea Badoero, of the house of Participazio. The vessel he constructed was built on such lines as to be fit to meet heavy seas, to

be swift, and also to manœuvre and turn. She was a formidable opponent in that she was armed with forty pieces of artillery all told, each piece being of bronze. The *galeazze* had three masts, besides the so-called *bompresso*, or bowsprit; the sails were all triangular or lateen,¹ and the oars were grouped three to a bench, as had been the wont on the *galeazze da mercanzia*, from which, indeed, Badoero took his model.

A *galeazza* equipped for war cost the Republic the sum of 120,000 ducats (£14,920), and its actual upkeep for war came to 26,000 ducats (£3280), this sum being exclusive of the money needed for gunpowder and other ammunition.

No mention of the galley can be considered complete without some account of those who toiled at the oar and who worked out their doom under conditions of the greatest misery—those wretched slaves whose lives of labour and degradation were of such absolute importance and necessity to the success and glory of the Venetian Navy.

In the early times of the Republic, however, the business of working the oars was one of honour and of advantage to the community. For no one who was not a Venetian subject was admitted to row on board the galleys, and this branch of one of the most important services of the state was entrusted only to the men whose stake in the government was as great as that of the patrician who commanded the vessel. It has been even said that one of the chief causes of the decadence of Venice may be traced to the time when she committed to foreigners and hirelings the work once set apart exclusively for her own sons, and that a decided step in

¹ The lateen (or Latin, *latina*) sail was so called, says Admiral Fincati (*Le Trirème*, p. 41), from *alla trina*, to distinguish it from the quadrangular, or *alla quadra* sail.

the downward path of the Republic's history was trod when slaves took the place of Venetians on board the galleys of St Mark—a step which came about in 1549.

These slaves, to quote again from the chronicler, Pantero Pantera, were divided into three classes, namely: "the condemned," or *condannati*, the "slaves," and the "volunteers," and were all distinguished, the one from the other, by their dress. The "condemned" were those who had been sentenced to the galleys by the law for life, or for a set time. They were never allowed to quit the ship, or be loosed from their chain, on any pretext whatever until they had worked out their sentence. Besides rowing, they had to know how to handle a needle, for to them was entrusted the task of sewing the sails, the canvasses, and the clothes of the ship's crew. "The men doomed for life as condemned criminals turn out better," says Pantera, "than those who serve a shorter sentence, and answer capitally either at the oar or at any other service." He enjoins, therefore, that they be made much of and be well treated, especially at the outset of their term, seeing that once the first year is passed they get used to the work, to the discomforts on board, "and then they endure for a long while." A distinctive mark that stamped them as separate from their fellows was that of being shorn. Their allowance of food was 30 ounces of biscuit a day, and water. In winter, soup was added every other day, and on every day when in port. This soup was made of 3 ounces of beans flavoured with a quarter of an ounce of oil per head, and was not given when at sea for fear of heating the men overmuch and of making them less alert and fit for their work. Another reason for this diminished fare when at sea was also the limited accommodation in the kitchen department, or, as our chronicler briefly states, "cooking too becomes difficult when sailing." Rations of

meat and wine were given four times a year—at Christmas, Easter, Whitsuntide, and Carnival.

The second category of galley slaves, known simply as “slaves,” were, for the most part, Turks who had either been bought, or taken prisoners in war. They are classed under three heads—Moors, Turks, Negroes. The Moors ranked highest, as having generally come off some of their own galleys or warships, and consequently having some knowledge of their trade. They were, besides, accomplished rowers. “They are, however, by nature,” says Pantera, “so proud, bestial, treacherous, and seditious that one must note them well as people whose behaviour is such as to lead them at times to murder their mates.”

The Turks, though more tractable, were but poor sailors, very indifferent handlers of the oar, and far less fitted for the fatigues of a seafaring life than the Moors.

The Negroes are quickly disposed of by the old writer. Speaking of them, he says: “The Negroes are the worst of all, and the greater part of them die from sheer melancholy.” The “slaves,” unlike the *condannati*, have a tuft of hair left on the top of the head; “all the rest is shaven and bare.” Beside the work of rowing, the “slaves” had also to go on land to fetch supplies of wood, water, and other necessities, and to help the *maestranza*¹ in their labours.

We now come to the third order, the “Volunteers,” whose presence on board a galley evidently brought a certain amount of stir and advantage to their mates. They were not of a high standing as citizens, seeing that they were generally men who had to serve a set time for some crime, or who had gambled away their liberty, or who were such utter “ne’er-do-weels” as to find this the only service where they could get taken on. They rowed in chains, but were set free when any fighting arose, and

¹ The *maestranza* consisted of the carpenters, calkers, etc.

often proved good fighters. This latter quality frequently gained for them the regard of the captain, for we read that for this cause "the captains seek to procure many of them, and to treat them so that they shall not desert. Their chains are removed by day, so that they walk about the deck with but one iron on, or with but one foot fettered; but they are not allowed off the galley save under a strong guard, and at night their chains are put on again. They are distinguished from the rest by having moustaches, which they wear as a sign, otherwise they are clean shaved." Two of these "volunteers" were deputed to assist the executioner in his grim office. Their daily rations were the same as a seaman's, and their wage was at the rate of two crowns (*scudi*) a month.

The dress of the galley slaves was another detail that received due attention. Some attempt was evidently made at a uniform, for one particular colour was prescribed for each separate galley, so that when a "brave show" was required it was obtained by all the rowers appearing clad alike. The dress apportioned to each man was two shirts, two pairs of linen drawers, a coat of red, or green, or blue (whatever the special colour of the galley happened to be), which came down to the knees; a red cap, and a *gabbano* or cloak of coarse rough cloth, reaching down to the feet. Extra clothing was given in winter, when a pair of thick coarse cloth drawers was provided; shoes and stockings were to be found for both "slaves" and "volunteers" when they went on land, and at least two blankets (*schiavene*) for each bench.

"From these three grades two men are chosen on each galley," continues Pantera, "who are high of stature, healthy, robust, and more cunning at the oar than the others, to put to the work of the shoulder (*spalla*).¹ These are called 'shoulderers' (*spallieri*), the better man being

¹ The *spalla* is a space reaching from one side of the galley to the

to the right, the other to the left, and they set the time of the stroke, this being the secret of the good progress of the galley. They have rations similar to those of the 'volunteers,' and are petted and favoured by the captain, being exempt from other services on board so that they may the better perform what is allotted to them. The others who serve on the bench of the *spalla* have to look after all that pertains to the poop, that is to hoist and adjust the *mezzanino*" (the rope which upholds the awning and serves to set it up and take it down); "they haul up or slacken the ropes with which the galley is made fast; they tie on the *mantellini*¹ which are wont to be fastened on to the ropes; they keep the tallow (for greasing the rowlocks) always moist and covered so that it shall always be fresh when needed, and not dried up by the sun; they sweep and clean the 'shoulders,' the tabernacle, and the ladders; they ring the Ave-Maria night and morning; they toll when anyone dies, and they carry him, when dead, on land to bury him. They are also in charge of the lookout, and of the *orza alla poppa*² during the sailing manœuvres. Two other men are likewise chosen from among the crew for the last bench of the prow, which is called 'the rabbit's bench,' hence are they termed *coniglieri* (rabbits)." ³

The *coniglieri* directed the movement, or set the *sia* to

other between the stern and the lower ranks of the first rowers, where the ship's small ladders were kept.

¹ *Mantellini*, or "little cloaks," were the twisted cords placed under the cables used for mooring a galley and acted as fenders.

² *Orsa di poppa* is a rope tied to one of the ropes of the *carro* (the thickest part of the yard), and which served to pull it towards the poop. It was only used when sailing.

³ Pantera in his *Vocabolario Nautico* explains this word as follows: "*Coniglia* is the last bench of the prow, so called from that vile animal the rabbit, and because here are put the vilest and weakest of the galley slaves." Jal does not accept this interpretation. He thinks the word comes from *conio*, not from *coniglio*; and declares that this bench, being at the base of the prow, was in shape like a *triangle*, and that in action, when filled with efficient men at arms, the form of the attack would take the peculiar *cuneus* (three-cornered shape) that marked the tactics of ancients.

the rest of the crew.¹ The *coniglieri* had besides to attend to all appertaining to the anchors, and to a host of minute details as to sails and rigging, "for which service there is no need of men of experience and long practice in the art of galley-sailing."

"When need arises to transmit an order forward, the 'shoulderer' on the right-hand side passed it from rower to rower down to the *coniglia*, and the 'rabbitman' (*conigliero*) at the right passed it on to his mate on the left. He again gave notice that the message be sent on in the same way to the shoulderman at the left aft, and then the captain can be sure that the word has been passed all through the galley."²

More details follow as to the sails, rigging, position of the oarsmen, and so forth, and then comes an account of the trumpeters or musicians on board, and the manner in which they are to be petted (*accarezzati*) and made much of. "The trumpeters," says Pantera, "are also drawn from among the galley slaves. They are generally eight in number, and besides the ordinary allowance, they are given daily the same half ration that a 'volunteer' receives, so as to induce them to learn to play well. Seeing that a good concert of trumpets reflects credit on the galley, and causes great solace and lightness of spirit to those on board, be they 'slaves' or 'volunteers' who delight therein, they must be petted and made much of in everything,

¹ The *sia*, or stroke was of two kinds: the *sia-voga* being the stroke of the oars from back to front; the *sia-scorre* being the stroke from front to back when the ship had to back. Pantera also says that *siare* is to row standing up with one's face to the prow, and sending the stern of the ship forward. *Sia scorre*, he explains, is when on one side of the ship one rows standing, and on the other one rows as usual in order to turn the vessel. In Venice this was called *sia-voga*. Jal says that in Venice the order was shouted out *sia-voga* when a galley or other ship with oars was to turn; in the Papal fleet the order was *sia-scorre*, i.e., to back the vessel.

² Pantera, *op. cit.*, libro primo, cap. xiii., p. 132, etc., etc.

and on no account must they be allowed to go and work on land unless out of dire necessity." The business of getting together a galley's crew was an arduous one, "no free man," says Pantera, "being easily persuaded to work an oar, or submit to being chained, to being beaten, and to the innumerable discomforts of the galley. Were it not for the needs and foolishness of many vagabonds, or of emancipated villains full of the lowest vices which lead them in the end to sell themselves, it may well be believed that no man would ever be found who would spontaneously submit to so unhappy a life, full of such miseries and of such horrid accidents."

This business of recruiting was not carried on without loss of honour and temper, and ways were used which were not always highly commendable nor free from violence and dishonour. Condemned criminals were pressed into the service; men who were sentenced to death were chained to the oar instead of being strung up, and every judge was petitioned "to send diligently and without delay" the culprits who came under his condemnation to serve according to their sentences on board the galleys.

Offenders of high rank were entitled to buy themselves off, especially if they had been arrested for debt. They could then expiate their sentence either by purchasing so many slaves and despatching them on board in their stead, or by maintaining a given number of slaves for the time which they themselves should have served. In fact every rascal abroad was swept off as a galley slave under one pretence or another, and the mass of so-called humanity that was collected in this way was formed of all that was bad, degraded, and violent. It was no easy job to keep such a crew in order, and the cruelty and harshness needed to maintain discipline and rule among these offscourings of the earth is sickening to read of. The regulations as to food, clothing, washing, and hygiene were very strict; as

were too the injunctions for the sick, "not only," adds Pantera, "because Christian charity demands it, but because with good administration and physics many men can be saved who, if neglected, would be lost. This I say because it appears to some (whether from inexperience or avarice I know not) that every remedy applied to sick galley folk, when they are on the galley, is superfluous and altogether unnecessary, because (as they say) suffering so many discomforts, the physics are but thrown away and can be of no avail, and that when the slaves are ill, or seem so, either the illness is feigned, or they are left to die." Our chronicler is not in favour of such doctrine, and argues that good treatment of the galley slaves, whether in sickness or in health, is of advantage to all concerned.

On board every galley was an *aguzino* or warden, who was appointed to act as guardian over the galley slaves, and to see that none escaped. The post was one of much responsibility, and was held by a head warden, who had the supervision of a whole fleet, and by sub-wardens, who were told off severally to each galley. Pantera points out how this officer must be diligent, and severe, and disinterested, "for the greed of a bad warden causes him to ill-treat the slaves, and in hope of gain to torment them with excess of labour, to load them with double chains, and to oppress them cruelly so as to extort something from them. Hereby many slaves, unable to purchase the good will of the warden, take refuge in flight and escape." The *aguzino* had to see to the frequent shaving of the men, "so as to keep them clean and make a fair display on board." He must also examine into the state of the irons and manacles, seeing to them every evening, "changing those which are damaged or unsafe, and fastening on the double chains to those who are condemned for life or suspected of flight; warning the sailors who take the night watches to be on the lookout that all shall be done with diligence; that the

lanterns be trimmed and lit at the ringing of the Ave-Maria, and fit to burn well all night." He had besides to institute a special search twice a month into the possessions of the crew, to see that no files or tools be hidden wherewith to open the chains or undo the handcuffs. He had also to inspect the store of wood for the firing on board; to see to the water, and to other things. He had to arrest and imprison any criminals, and, when the occasion arose, to see to their execution, for which office, as has been said, he had the assistance of two of the "volunteers." His quarters were situate near the room adjoining the poop, where too were kept all his irons, chains, and manacles; and where were also stored the other iron tools which served for chopping wood and the like. The sub-wardens had double rations daily, and a salary of three *scudi* a month. The head warden, who bore a wand to signify his high dignity, had a very large salary, and was possessed besides of emoluments to give away.

The instructions given to the galley slaves, over and above their duties as to rowing, were endless and most minute. Each separate bench of oarsmen was appointed to attend to some different part of the rigging, and injunctions were given to some to "turn, twist, and fold," to others to "fasten," to others "to hoist or lower" the infinite number of cords and ropes on which the sails and masts depended for their proper manipulation. No bench on either side of the vessel was exempt from these duties, and the elaborate relation of them proves how lengthy and complicated a process it was.

The other services on board were also performed by galley slaves. They waited on the captain and on the passengers, of whose possessions they took charge. There was also an under-secretary or "little scribe" (*scrivanello*),¹

¹ The word *scrivanello*, says Jal, is one of contempt, as opposed to *scrivano*, who drew up the commissariat of the galley, and who was always a person of much consideration, besides being a freeman.

who waited on the master (*padrone*) of the galley, and who had to keep an account of all that was brought to the ship and dispensed on board, and enter on a register the rations allotted to every man; there were overseers and dispensers of these rations and of the stores, and keepers of the various properties of the ship. There was also the barber and his attendant; the latter, says Pantera, "usually a volunteer, or a slave who was liable to be sent on land to procure the things needed for the sick, who were under the charge of the barber, and who had also to supply the patients with food and medicine, with the dressing for their wounds, besides doing whatever they required."

Every man on board had his allotted task; and the care that was taken to provide for the working of the ship would certainly imply that order and discipline were as rigorously exacted on the galleys of Venice in olden times as they are in our navies of to-day.



A Merchant Ship.

CHAPTER IV

THE CRUSADES

1097—1130

The Venetians set sail for the Holy Land. Winter at Rhodes. Strife with the Pisans. Siege of Caifa. Capture of Sidon. Venetian Colony planted there. Siege of Zara. Death of Doge Faliero. Doge Domenico Michiel. Naval Fight and Victory at Ascalon. Siege of Tyre. Triumph, Retirement, and Death of Doge Michiel. Expansion of Venice after the First Crusade.

THE part played in the Crusades by the three maritime republics of Italy has not always met with its full meed of recognition; and yet it is hardly too much to say that, but for Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, the Crusades could not have come about. These cities not only provided for the transport of the troops and arms, but they also kept on conveying the supplies of food and ammunition, without which the hosts in Palestine must inevitably have perished. They acted, besides, as guardians and defenders all down the coast-line, leaving the land forces free to maintain their footing in the enemy's territory, and to advance when possible up country. That in return for such aid they exacted a very ample remuneration need not surprise us. The need of the Christian armies was their opportunity and they seized it.

The Venetians, it must be owned, did not evince any excess of zeal, when at the close of the tenth century the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre first aroused the chivalry of Europe. The policy of the Republic was before all else

calculating, and a project was always weighed calmly in the balance of advantage and profit before it was taken in hand. At no period of her existence did Venice allow sentiment or emotion to sway her from the path of gain and aggrandisement, and she esteemed the greatness of her commerce, and consequently of her Navy, before everything. Though religion was a very real and living force among the Venetians (especially in early times), it did not affect the matter-of-fact side of their character, or make them follow after godliness to the exclusion of worldly advancement, or in such a way as to endanger a good bargain. Whether the Holy Sepulchre were in the possession of Jew, Turk, Infidel, or Heretic, was a matter of equal unconcern to the inhabitants of the lagoons; but it did matter extremely to them what fleets would be cruising in waters where their ships were wont to sail, and whether friends or foes would be encountered when their rich argosies returned heavily laden from the markets of the Levant. Venice for many years had been mistress of a right of way over the seas dividing her from the East; and in the war about to be waged by Europe in the Holy Land she saw and gauged to the full the risk besetting her trade and prosperity. She saw the commerce which had been her monopoly in Constantinople interfered with by rivals whom she might be unable to repress, and whose competition might exhaust her resources. She saw Pisa and Genoa thrusting forward their claims to buy and sell in markets where she had dealt alone, and assuming rights as to traffic which she had monopolised till then exclusively. Venice had ample cause for these fears. Till now neither of the maritime republics of Pisa or Genoa had had any dealings with the East. Their trade had been chiefly confined to countries owned by the Saracens, and to the northern coast of Africa. The Crusades were to open out to them other and fairer fields. The citizens of both

towns, unlike those of Venice, were in heart and soul true Crusaders, and the material advantage to be gained by enrolling themselves under the banner of the Cross was a less powerful motive in their case than the fervour and conviction of their religious zeal. The material advantages were not, however, to be set aside or despised; and the chance of being able at last to establish warehouses and colonies in distant and rich lands was not one to be neglected.

The Genoese were the first in the field. They went in July 1097 to the assistance of Boemond, the son of Robert Guiscard, when he besieged Antioch, and his arms proving victorious, he rewarded their services by presenting them with a church, a square, and thirty houses in the town. This gift was a piece of cunning on the part of Boemond. He had, of necessity, to reward the Genoese for the help they had given, but his special object was to bind them to his cause, knowing well that the alliance with one, at least, of the maritime cities of Italy would prove an invaluable addition to his forces, should his possessions at home ever be menaced.

The success of the Genoese, in obtaining this their first foothold in the East, fired the Pisans to follow suit. They, too, went accordingly to the aid of Boemond in his warrings against the Ionian isles, Jaffa, and Laodicea, and contributed, by their presence at least, to the success of the Norman arms.

Venice now realised that it was time for her to act, and that not only with a view to checking the advancing trade of Genoa and Pisa, but also to arrest as far as possible the inroads that the Saracens were now making, year by year, in the nearer Mediterranean. An appeal, too, from Baldwin, King of Jerusalem, for transport ships to convey soldiers and pilgrims to the Holy Land gave her an excellent reason for shaking off her attitude of

passive neutrality and participating in the holy war. The Doge, Vitale Michiel, summoned a great assembly, at which he pointed out the sacredness of the expedition, the advisability of partaking in an undertaking at once holy, lucrative, and creditable, and dwelling on the reproach which would for ever attach to them should they refuse to join it. Nor did he abstain from whetting their commercial instincts and appetites by reminding them how Pisa and Genoa had gone ahead in this business, and that it was far from befitting that they should hold aloof from issues of such great and important moment. The Doge's words went home. His audience, either from interest or from genuine zeal, voted eagerly for the equipment of a fleet, worthy in every way of Venice and of the cause which she had resolved to espouse. The Doge's son, Giovanni Michiel, was appointed to command the expedition; Enrico Contarini, Bishop of Castello, went as its spiritual head. The fleet consisted of 200 ships, which some writers (without, however, sufficient warrant) have said was composed of eighty galleys, fifty *taride*, and seventy sailing vessels. A solemn service was held before starting, in St Mark's, when the Doge attended, escorted by his councillors and followed by a vast throng of people. High Mass having been sung, the Patriarch of Grado, Pietro Badoero, consigned a banner with the Cross on it to Bishop Contarini, while the Doge gave another, with the arms of the Republic, to his son. The flotilla, reinforced by a few ships from Dalmatia, set sail from the Lido amidst the acclamations and rejoicings of the people, and passing through the Adriatic and Ionian seas, reached the island of Rhodes, where it was obliged to winter.

The Emperor Alexius, in the meanwhile, was in great perturbation over the turn things had taken. The Crusades did not appeal to him in the least; and the fact that his allies, the Venetians, had joined them, boded ill

for the harmonious continuance of their friendship. Alexius strove hard to dissuade them from their purpose, and tried in many ways to induce them to turn back from a cause which could only work harm to his Empire. The insidious offers and suggestions of the Eastern monarch were met and opposed by the Bishop of Castello, who used all his eloquence and influence in pointing out to his flock the iniquity of withdrawing from their present purpose. He dwelt on the sorry figure they would cut before the world at large, and the wrath that would fall on them from God should they abandon the cause which they had in hand. "Owing to all these wise considerations," says Marin, "and to the fact that they were Christians, as forsooth they always had been, they paid no regard to the alliance contracted with the august Alexius, despising his threats and heedless of his exhortations and entreaties."¹ Alexius's ambassadors had therefore to return to their master to report the failure of their mission.

The long halt at Rhodes was not conducive to order and quiet. A fierce and bloody strife broke out between the Venetians and Pisans, and for the first time in their history the ships of Venice and Pisa came into collision. The reason of the strife has been ascribed in turn to jealousy, insolence, and rapacity. The forced inaction, and the close quarters in which the troops found themselves, had probably more to do with it than anything else, and was responsible for scenes and doings which disgraced warriors who had armed in the same cause and taken the Cross as their badge.

After a long and sanguinary contest the Venetians, owing to the superior number of their ships, gained a distinct victory, when, according to Marin, the Pisans lost thirty galleys, with 4000 men taken prisoners. The victors

¹ Marin, *Storia Civile e Politica del Commercio de' Veneziani*, Vinegia, 1798, vol. iii., p. 15.

restored both ships and prisoners to the Pisans, on condition, however, that no Pisan should set foot in any territory of the Greek Empire with the intent to traffic there. This condition showed pretty clearly the cause of the quarrel and the determination on the part of Venice to keep the trade of the Levant, as far as she could, exclusively to herself. With the approach of spring the fleet moved on to Mira.

Mira was known to be the resting-place of the body of San Nicolò, a saint coveted by the Venetians, as he was reputed to be "glorious by land and by sea," and one whose remains they were bent on obtaining by fair means or foul. A few pioneers alighted from their boats and began to look around to ascertain how best to secure their object. They found the town well-nigh deserted, it having been lately invaded by the Turks, and returned with this favourable report to headquarters. Thereupon a large body of men disembarked, and directed their steps to the church of St Nicholas, behaving with ruthless violence, and breaking open every nook and cranny where they thought the saintly body might be reposing. So keen was the spirit of greed, and so small the spirit of Christianity, that they put four wretched custodians to the rack in order to wring from them a confession as to where the saint was hid. This measure proving useless, they rifled still further, till they came upon the bodies of two saints, St Theodore and a St Nicholas, who it seemed was, unluckily, not the one they wanted, though a near relation, being indeed an uncle of the one for whom they were searching. Bishop Contarini in the meantime entreated with tears and prayers that the desired St Nicholas might be vouchsafed to them, and just as they were leaving the church in dire affliction, all their efforts seeming vain, his prayer was granted. An odour of excessive sweetness proceeding from a remote altar was wafted through the air, they

retraced their steps hurriedly, and there below that altar lay St Nicholas. They at once removed the prize on board ship, and sailed away, anchoring, in June 1100, in the port of Jaffa.

On arriving at Jaffa they found there Godfrey of Bouillon sick unto death, but eager to see the Venetian commanders, and confer with them as to the number of galleys they could provide for the conquest of Palestine and the terms they demanded for the aid given. Doge Michiel knew the worth of the services he was about to bestow, and he was sufficiently master of the situation to dictate his own conditions. He was not, either, burdened with false modesty, and was also able to make the most of the circumstances existing in his favour, one of the most potent of these being that the Venetians were the only naval power at that moment on the spot. Had the Genoese or Pisan fleets been at hand, it may safely be assumed that the Doge could never have made the demands he did make, and that those demands would never have been entertained by the Crusaders. His claims were: that in every town which the Crusaders had conquered, or would yet conquer, in the Holy Land, a third of that town should be given to the Venetians; a church and a square with the appertaining revenues was also to be allotted to them; and any Venetian vessel shipwrecked on the coast of Syria was to be exempt from the heavy and unjust dues which at that time were enforced on all shipwrecked traders.

These terms having been agreed on, the plan of campaign was then considered, and it was decided to besiege Acre, or, as it was called in later times, St Jean d'Acre. The Venetians were to attack by sea, and Tancred the Norman by land. Before operations could be begun, however, news came of the death, on 18th July 1100, of Godfrey of Bouillon, and the generals, judging it

prudent to concentrate their forces, resolved to defer the attack on Acre, and to begin instead by besieging Caifa, a small port lying at the foot of Mount Carmel. The Venetians made a furious onslaught, in which they made free use of the battering-engines on board their ships; and by the erection of a big tower on one of the vessels, which reached to the walls, they gained access to the town where they joined forces with Tancred. Caifa was taken, but fierce and unseemly disputings arose as to its possession between the Venetians and Tancred, the latter being set on keeping it for himself and refusing to allow it to be handed over to the kingdom of Jerusalem. The contention between the allies was bitter, and whether the quarrel was protracted over the division of the booty, or whether the Venetians had had enough of the fray and felt that they had shown sufficient zeal and reaped sufficient honour, remains a matter of absolute uncertainty. Whatever the reason may have been—and numerous ones of every sort have been adduced by numerous writers—the fact remains that immediately after the fall of Caifa the Venetian fleet sailed for home and dropped anchor at Venice on 6th December 1100.

The behaviour of the Venetians in retiring thus early from the Crusades has given rise to much discussion. Different writers assign different motives to such action, and certainly on the face of it, it would seem to have been a mistaken policy. The field was now left free to the Genoese, and the quick use made by these rivals of Venice to found and establish their hold in that region was to prove a serious evil to the Republic of St Mark in days to come. On the other hand, affairs were wholly unsatisfactory in the East. Discord, enmity, and self-interest had become rife among the leaders of the crusading forces; the Turk was in possession of many of the fortresses lying in the thick of lands taken by the

Christians; many of the soldiers, disheartened by the jealousy and ambition and greed which had taken the place of piety and unselfishness, had sailed for home, and those who remained had none of the fervour needed for the furtherance of their cause. The state of affairs, too, at home had doubtless much to do with the departure of the Venetians, let alone the difficulties and expenses consequent on the maintenance of a large fleet in distant and foreign seas.

The year following their return from the East, the ships of Venice, together with those of Ravenna, were employed on the Po to help Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, to recover Ferrara for the Church. The expedition was entirely successful, and for the aid given, Venice had her reward in numerous privileges in the city of Ferrara, and the right to establish a consulate there.

An alliance entered into shortly after with Caloman, King of Hungary, increased at the same time the cares and responsibilities of the Republic. This alliance had for its object the suppression of the Normans on the Dalmatian coast. A Venetian convoy was sent to the shores of Apulia, and in conjunction with the armies of Hungary, succeeded in sacking Brindisi and Monopoli. A kind of guerilla warfare went on after this for a while, in which the allies had the advantage on the whole. These were the last warlike doings in the reign of Doge Vitale Michiel. He died the same year, and was succeeded by Ordolafo Faledro or Faliero.

A fresh expedition to Palestine marked the opening years of this dukedom. Boemond, Prince of Antioch, had come over to Europe to collect a new army with which to hold his own against the many Turk, Greek, and Mussulman foes who were constantly thwarting his efforts to found a Christian kingdom in the Holy Land. He had managed by a ruse to escape from his capital, Antioch,

where he was closely besieged by the Greeks. He caused a report of his death to be circulated in the enemy's camp, and then placing himself in a coffin, he passed through the midst of the besiegers' lines under the guise of a corpse. Once in Europe he applied for help to regain his lost possessions and be avenged on his foes. The Pope, Pascal III., received him as a hero and martyr; he consigned to him the standard of St Peter, and authorised him to gather together an army and fight afresh against the infidel. Boemond succeeded in raising a considerable force, and in January 1105, he embarked at Bari with a fleet of 200 ships and thirty galleys. With these he crossed the Adriatic and set siege to Durazzo, instead of pursuing the wiser course of warring against the Greeks and endeavouring to recapture Antioch. His proceedings were watched with consternation by Alexius, who at once applied to the three maritime republics, imploring them "not to be beguiled by Boemond's windy talk," but to come instead to his aid. Pisa and Genoa remained unmoved by the appeal, but Venice, faithful to her old ally, and more alive than any other seaport town to the need of keeping the Normans out of the Adriatic, sent a fleet to the support of the Emperor. It is not evident that the Venetians were engaged in any actual action, but in conjunction with their allies they succeeded in harassing Boemond's communications, in forcing him to raise the siege of Durazzo, and to sign a far from advantageous treaty with Alexius.

The Venetians, no longer hampered by affairs in Constantinople, were free to devote themselves anew to Eastern concerns, and respond to an appeal made by Baldwin I. of Edessa, now King of Jerusalem, for men and money. They sent a fleet consisting of 100 vessels, and were mainly instrumental in capturing the town of Sidon. They also put down the pirates infesting those seas—an

act as advantageous to themselves and their trade as to the pilgrims then thronging to the Holy Land. Baldwin recompensed them for such signal services by conferring on them the right to own a church, a street, and a market-place in Sidon, with power to use their own weights and measures, and to judge their subjects by their own laws. This was the first colony of the sort planted in the East by Venice, and it served as a model for many others set up by the Republic along her path of victory and expansion; but the claims of such outlying colonies involved upon her a strain of no slight order, and though greater prestige accrued to her in consequence, her duties became more onerous, and the tax on her home resources was often tried to the uttermost.

A series of misfortunes in the shape of earthquakes, storms, and fires swept over the town at this period and devastated it to a grievous extent. The state of desolation at home, and the absence of the greater part of the fleet in Eastern waters, made King Caloman of Hungary deem the moment a fitting one in which to break the treaty existing between his country and the Republic, and to possess himself of several towns in Dalmatia. The Venetians were in a sore dilemma. To recall their fleet was but to invite the Pisans and Genoese to step at once into their place; to wage war upon Caloman meant disaster of another nature. They had no choice but to prepare a fresh fleet and despatch a convoy of fourteen galleys, with the Patriarch of Grado on board, to ask Alexius to stand by them in their trouble.

While these transactions were going on, the fleet sent to Boemond's help had come home laden with many reliques, of which the most precious was the body of St Stephen. This prize had been obtained after much violence, the body having been stolen from one of the Basilicas in Constantinople, to the rage and vexation of

the Greeks. The weather was unsettled, and it was foretold that the voyage home would be fraught with much danger. The Venetians thereupon set sail immediately, but they judged it expedient to avoid the coming storm by sheltering in the harbour off Cape Maleo, while they called on the saint whose body they had stolen to protect them from danger. Their prayers were heard: they reached Venice in safety, and crowds came out to meet them and to do honour to the first of martyrs. The Doge assisted at the ceremony of laying the body to rest, and was one of the bearers who carried the coffin shoulder high to the tomb assigned to it in the Church of San Giorgio Maggiore. And here, during the palmy days of the Republic, the Doge and all the chief officers of state were wont to pay an annual visit in great pomp out of reverence to St Stephen.

During this period the Navy of Venice continued to flourish and to contribute a large share to the well-being of the state. The trade carried on by its means laid ever more solidly and widely the foundation of those riches which made Venice powerful at home and abroad; the alliances which, owing to this same Navy, she could contract with foreign powers contributed to her importance; while she was able—thanks again to this Navy—to build up a policy which furthered her interests in every direction and made her title of “Queen of the Sea” far more than a mere phrase. These riches and this exalted position, which the Venetians maybe took no trouble to veil with superfluous modesty, aroused afresh the jealousy and hatred which existed of old against their state in the hearts of rivals such as Padua, Treviso, and Ravenna. The possession of the small island of St Ilario, lying off the mouth of the Brenta and ardently coveted by the Paduans, served as an excuse to these latter for war in 1110. The Doge led the expedition in person, and the Venetians were victorious. They took over 500 prisoners and put the

rest to flight. Peace was restored through the intervention of the Emperor Henry V. of Germany, and the prisoners were set at liberty.

In Dalmatia again things were in a very unsettled condition. Stephen of Hungary, the son and successor of King Caloman, rebelled against the treaties existing between his country and Venice, and war ensued. Doge Faliero again led the Venetian force in person, when a series of triumphs awaited him at Zara, Sebenico, Trau, as well as on the Croatian seaboard; and having obtained the allegiance of all these places, he sailed home in triumph. His reception in Venice was most picturesque. Before him were borne the standards taken from the enemy, followed by the prisoners of war with spoils and trophies, while shouts of joy and praise rent the air, acclaiming Faliero, "Doge (or Duke) of Dalmatia and Croatia," and hailing him as a conqueror.

The Hungarians were far from acquiescing quietly in their defeat: two years later they again declared war, and again the Doge set sail with a fresh force to oppose them. Operations began under the walls of Zara, when Doge Faliero bore himself most valiantly. Wherever the fight raged fiercest he was always to be found, encouraging his soldiers and urging them on to victory. This, however, was not to be. He fell, borne down by the foe, and the Venetians, dismayed by the death of their leader, were defeated with horrible slaughter. Faliero's body was rescued and carried into the town of Zara, from whence it was taken to Venice and buried amid universal lamentation. This was the second Doge who had met a soldier's death fighting for his country,¹ and Dandolo in his *Chronicle* alluding to Faliero speaks of him as one "who had ended his days gloriously."² To this warrior prince

¹ The other was Pietro Candiano I.

² *Gloriosissime dies suos terminavit.*

is also due the foundation of the Arsenal, which was begun in 1104, and which is hallowed to all time as the cradle and home of Venice's greatness and renown as a sea-power.

Ordolafo Faliero was succeeded by Domenico Michiel, who at once concluded a five years' treaty with King Stephen of Hungary, by which Venice retained part of her possessions in Dalmatia.

Doge Michiel was a keen crusader, and bent on securing tranquillity from his foes near home so as to enable him to devote all his energies to the wars in the Holy Land. Affairs in that region were again taking a most disastrous turn. Baldwin I. had been succeeded as King of Jerusalem by his nephew, Baldwin II., who, only a few days after his coronation, was attacked and defeated by the Saracens. This defeat encouraged other foes to molest him in their turn, and Baldwin in his perplexity applied to the Pope and the States of Italy for help. The Pope, Calixtus II., sent a special legation to Venice to plead for convoys of troops and provisions, while both spiritual and material advantages were guaranteed to all who aided in the good cause. The *Savii* of the government were in no wise carried away either by the entreaties or the offers of reward, and weighed with much deliberation the wisdom of joining the enterprise. The Doge succeeded, however, in convening a gathering of the clergy, patricians, and people of Venice in St Mark's, when he strove hard to infuse some of his spirit into them. The scene must have been a striking one. The Mass of the Holy Ghost was first chanted, after which the Papal brief was read out by the Patriarch, and then the Doge addressed the multitude. He spoke of the trials endured by the Crusaders in Palestine, of the imprisonment of King Baldwin, of the insufficiency of the forces and the perils they underwent; he dwelt on the renown which had waited

on Venetian arms in previous campaigns, the advantages already gained, and those yet to be gained, together with the profit which would accrue to the cause of Christ and religion once a Venetian fleet appeared in those waters.

“All the kingdom of Jerusalem,” he concluded, “lies desolate. The Holy Father exhorts, nay implores, you to uphold the faith and preserve it from the peril threatening it in those regions. For the sake of that faith you must employ the naval powers committed to you by God. Think of the undying glory and credit that will encircle your name for ever. Think of the merit that will be yours before God. You will be the admiration of all Europe and Asia; the banner of St Mark will float triumphantly over those distant lands; and fresh gains, fresh sources of grandeur will be the guerdon of this noble country. Who is here present to-day so unpatriotic, so indifferent to his country's weal as not to wish to extend her ever-widening empire, and to see her unrivalled on the seas? Stirred by the zeal of true religion, moved by your brethren's sufferings, urged on by the example of others in Europe, take up your cross, bearing in mind the blessings of Heaven and its honours, and rewards, and triumphs.”

This speech failed, however, in having the immediate effect that the Doge expected. One consideration that weighed heavily with his audience was that of allowing the fleet to be so far from home while matters in Dalmatia were still so unsettled. Another reason was the effect such a step would cause in Constantinople, where the Emperor John the Handsome¹ had not renewed the privileges granted by his predecessor, Alexius, and where

¹ Gibbon, speaking of this monarch, says: “His swarthy complexion, harsh features, and diminutive stature had suggested the ironical surname of Calo-Johannes, or John the Handsome, which his grateful subjects more seriously applied to the beauties of his mind.” —Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. vi., ch. xlviii., p. 119. Finlay follows authorities which say that he was really distinguished for personal beauty.

too the approach of a large naval force would arouse suspicion and irritation in the minds of both prince and people. In the end, however, sentiments of a nobler and more disinterested nature triumphed, and preparations were set on foot to make ready for action. This was promptly done, and an armament sailed forth, consisting of forty galleys, twenty-eight *gatti* (a ship larger than a galley, and manned with 100 oars, each one worked by two rowers), and four big *onorarie*, or transport ships. The Doge was in command of the expedition, while his son, Luchino, and another Domenico Michiel (probably a cousin), were left as regents. A gay and beauteous spectacle was to be seen as the fleet weighed anchor. The ships were all painted different colours, their gaudy hues set off by the sparkling waters beneath them, while an infinity of fashions and dresses donned by the crowd of pilgrims, warriors, and sailors on board added an effect of colour, dazzling in its variety and brightness. This gallant company touched first at Bari, where they pledged themselves to commit no violence to the inhabitants, and from there they proceeded to Corfu. Here their approach aroused great hostility, for the Venetians living on the island had made themselves hated for the pride and arrogance that, by reason of their excessive wealth, they had assumed towards the islanders. By way of mending matters the Crusaders devastated the country around, to avenge, said they, the slights put upon their countrymen by the Emperor Calo-Johannes, and after that they wintered in the isle. In the spring they set fire to their habitations, and then went on to Cyprus, laying waste Chios, Lesbos, and Rhodes on their way.

News reached them in Cyprus that the Saracen fleet, after apparently making for Joppa, had altered its course to Ascalon, where the Venetians determined to follow it. Doge Michiel held a council of war in which it was

decided to divide the force into two parts: one part with the Doge on board to sail eastward, and to lie hid behind a promontary on the Syrian coast between Joppa and Ascalon; the other and smaller part to put out to sea in the guise of a small squadron of merchant ships carrying pilgrims from Cyprus. The artifice succeeded perfectly. The enemy seeing the small detachment, gave chase, intending to capture it easily. The Venetians craftily decoyed them on, always just eluding the "easy capture," which the Saracens saw and believed to be within their grasp, till they had drawn them close to their partners, and had them safe between their two ranks. The day was dawning when the Saracens saw where they were and realised the trap into which they had fallen. The sea was calm, lit with the rays of the rising sun, and fanned by a faint breeze overhead. Cries of surprise and rage broke the stillness of the scene, while the despair of the enemy when he saw himself hopelessly caught may be imagined. A fierce battle ensued, for the Saracens were determined to sell their lives dearly, and acts of heroism and valour were performed on either side. A Venetian galley, having the Doge on board, bore down with such impetus on the Saracen Admiral's flagship as to sink her, and this advantage fired the Venetians to fresh endeavours. Their galleys pressed steadily forward, the engagement became general, and so fierce was the slaughter that the victors are said to have stood ankle deep in blood on their decks; the sea for miles round ran red, and the air for weeks afterwards was tainted with the pestilential odours from the dead bodies washed on shore. The Venetians possessed themselves of four galleys, four *gatti*, and one huge vessel belonging to the Saracens, who, seeing the day lost, endeavoured to save themselves by flight. The Venetians pursued them almost to the shores of Egypt, and captured a fresh prize of ten merchant ships. These

were carried off to Acre in triumph with a quantity of booty, consisting of silken goods, timber, drugs, pepper, and aromatic spices. "It was a victory," says William of Tyre, "that will be famous throughout all ages." The news of it revived the drooping hopes of the Crusaders, and congratulations and thanks were showered on the Doge. He on his part waited till his fleet was safely anchored at Acre, and then went in fulfilment of a vow to Jerusalem, where he spent Christmas.

At the beginning of the year (1124) a council of war was held to decide as to the next point of attack. The Christians were entirely divided on this question, some being keen to besiege Ascalon, others bent absolutely on attacking Tyre. The siege of Tyre presented endless difficulties. The town, strongly fortified and ably defended, was well-nigh impregnable, and the most heroic efforts would be needed in order to subdue it. Ascalon, on the other hand, offered no difficulties. It could easily be taken. Its occupation would give the Christian armies a foothold of considerable importance, and the success of the venture would do much to instil confidence in the troops. All the same, some fierce discussions raged as to which of the towns should be attacked, and, as neither side would yield to any argument, it was finally decided that the question should be settled by lot. The names of the two towns were accordingly written on two slips of paper, placed in an urn, and a child was made to draw one of them. The paper drawn bore the name of Tyre, and preparations were at once begun for besieging the town. The Venetians, with much acumen and diplomacy, drew up the conditions they thought fit to make ere operations began, and laid them before a meeting held in the Church of the Holy Cross, when a solemn oath was taken by the leaders of the Christian forces to adhere to the terms thus insisted on. These were : that in every city subject to the King of Jeru-



TAKING OF TYRE.

From the picture by Antonio Aliense, in the Ducal Palace Venice.

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saalem and his barons the Venetians were to have their quarter, or district, consisting of a square, a bath, and a bakehouse, free for all time from all dues; in the town of Jerusalem they were to have the same extent of territory as would be allotted to a king; in Acre they were to build a bakehouse, a mill, a bath, and have their own weights, measures, and scales. These, too, they might use in their dealings with strangers or among themselves, but when they were buying from strangers they were to use the king's measures. They were to go free of every custom and duty either on entering or leaving the country; they paid no taxes when living in any place, and the only toll exacted from them was when they carried pilgrims on their ships. They were then obliged to pay a third of the fare to the king; but to compensate for this the King of Jerusalem and his barons undertook on each feast of St Peter and St Paul to pay 300 Saracene *byzants*¹ to the Doge of Venice. Any lawsuits arising between Venetians were to be settled by their own statutes, but should a Venetian bring an action against one of another nation he must summon him in the king's law-courts. Other concessions as to the making of wills were granted them, and should any Venetian meet his death by drowning or shipwreck, his possessions were divided among his nearest of kin. The authority granted to the Venetians over their quarter was as absolute in the town as that exercised by the king in his quarter; and as soon as they had helped the Franks to conquer Tyre and Ascalon, a third part of those cities was at once to be theirs. This contract was to be signed by Baldwin II. as soon as he was set free, and in the meantime it was witnessed by his deputy, Guarmond, Patriarch of Jerusalem, and a goodly host of Bishops, Archbishops, Priors, Abbots, Grand Constables, and barons, who swore to observe the conditions

¹ A *byzant* was half a Venetian zechin.

there set down both for themselves and their successors. This document, signed before it was even settled which town was to be attacked, is an irrefragable proof of the sore strait in which the Crusaders found themselves and their absolute dependence on the Navy of Venice.

The conditions being ratified, the siege of Tyre was begun. This city, though not then the opulent town described by Isaiah, with all her citizens princes, was yet the most flourishing city in Palestine, and also the most populous. She rose in the midst of a smiling fertile plain, watered by many streams, while fields upon fields of sugar-canes stretched away on all sides. This vast source of wealth was further supplied by a brisk trade in purple dyes and glass. The fortifications of Tyre were also exceptionally strong. On the sea side rose a double circuit of walls crowned with high towers; on the land side the walls were threefold, equally crowned with towers and protected all round by a deep trench. Two long lines of breakwater, stretching out into the sea, formed a large natural harbour, and this the Venetians determined at once to take over, as they would then be able to guard the approaches by sea, and prevent any entrance to or exit from the city. The other Crusaders were to act in the same way by land, and prevent any succour reaching the town on their side. No pains were spared to make the besieging operations as perfect as could be. A high engine was constructed to overtop the walls, on which were hoisted machines for hurling stones and other missiles likely to work havoc to the garrison. The attack was vigorously pressed both by land and sea, and bravely met by the besiegers. The walls and fortifications, however, offered so stout a resistance that the Venetians saw clearly that on the sea side, at least, the town was quite impregnable, and that their efforts in that direction were altogether unavailing. They consequently pulled their galleys on to

dry land, leaving only a few ships to guard and block the port, while they set to work to build engines for furthering the assault by land. An odd incident is related during the siege which shows the unconcern of the Venetians towards these galleys, and the careless way in which they left them. One night some of the Tyrians made a sortie from the town with the intent to rob one of the galleys. They found but five men on board, who took to flight the moment the robbers appeared, and saved themselves by swimming to shore. Another incident must also be mentioned as testifying to the straightforwardness of the Venetians when charged—most unjustly—with baseness and disloyalty towards their allies. Rumours of various sorts were abroad as to the means of relief that were being organised to succour Tyre. The Egyptians were supposed to be preparing an army; the Saracens, it was said, were about to rush the camp; and the courage and endurance of the Venetians was not considered to be proof against the want of success which till then had attended their arms. They were openly accused of being dismayed at the length and obstinacy of the siege, and of having settled to steal away home, leaving their allies in the lurch, and indifferent as to the rescue or fall of Tyre. “The reverberation of a noble mind” shines out in the manner in which Doge Michiel met and answered the accusation. He dismantled his ships in such fashion as to make all question of using them impossible, and caused the sails, together with the masts and rudders, to be carried into the Christian camp.¹ So convincing a proof

¹ Dandolo, in his *Chronicle*, says that a plank was taken out of each galley and given as a pledge to the Crusaders. The improbability of such a statement prevents much weight being attached to it, for it cannot be conceived that the Doge would render his ships so unseaworthy that it would have taken weeks to refit them, even admitting that each ship had on board the requisite number of carpenters and calkers for the job.

of good faith and steady resolve to stand firm to the end, a proof shown by deeds instead of words, was not to be gainsaid or withstood. Confidence was restored, and the siege was pressed on with renewed vigour.

Nor have legends been wanting to add their touch of fancy to the tale of this beleaguered city. They are not, it is true, mentioned by the most trustworthy historians, yet many writers allude to them, and some basis of truth probably surrounds their origin. One of these is that Doge Michiel, finding his supply of money running short, and unable to pay his men their wages, cut pieces of leather which he gave as pledges of the sums still due to them, and which he undertook should be repaid on their return to Venice. This was faithfully carried out, and in token of it the Michiels to this day quarter twenty-one pieces of money (*bizanti*) on a blue and silver bend.

The other legend tells how the besiegers intercepted some carrier pigeons flying into Tyre, and bearing under their wings messages of help and succour from the King of Damascus. This message was changed by the Christians to one destroying all hope, and forbidding the Tyrians to look for any relief or assistance, counselling rather that they should surrender. The besieged in any case were in sore plight, famine being now added to their other privations, and they had no choice but to yield. Ambassadors were sent to the camp of the allies, when honourable terms were granted by the victors, and the banners of Jerusalem, of the Count of Tripoli, and of St Mark flew from the heights of this "great mart of the nations." The agreement as to the partition of the town was strictly observed: a third of it was handed over to the Venetians, and the 30th of July, the day on which the allies took possession of Tyre, was held as a solemn festival.

The Venetians lost no time in building three churches

in the town: one to St Mark, another to St James, and another to St Nicholas. The administration of justice was entrusted to a bailiff (*bailo*), and a viscount (*vicecomes*) was appointed to see to the local defence and security of the quarter. A regular form of oath was drawn up and taken by the citizens of the colony, in which they vowed obedience and fealty to the Doge of Venice and to his successors, and swore, should the occasion require it, to safeguard Venetian possessions in the East. Another formula was also drawn up and subscribed to by those concerned with the administration of justice; and the whole organisation for the maintenance of the colony on a law-appointed and prosperous footing was introduced in all its details.

The siege and capture of Tyre mark a special epoch in Venetian history. A scheme of expansion was then started which placed the Republic in a new and more onerous position than she had yet occupied, and which involved her in questions of increased magnitude and responsibility. And the branch of service most affected by this expansion was the Navy. The need of a greater supply of ships for the conveyance of traders and merchants, as well as of goods, made itself felt more strongly day by day, and the pulse of Empire-building that began to throb through the heart of the lagoons bore witness to the great destinies that Venice was preparing to undertake.

The difficulties, however, which attended her at every step on her upward path were not slow in making themselves felt. Stephen II. of Hungary began to stir up rebellion in Dalmatia, and the warnings uttered in St Mark's at the time of the general assembly as to the risk of allowing the fleet to be for so long and so far away from Venice seemed about to be fulfilled. The Hungarian monarch proceeded to invade Dalmatia, where he possessed

himself of several towns, including Spalato and Trau. At the same moment Calo-Johannes, Emperor of Constantinople, began operations against the Venetians, his cause for complaint being the enormous strides made by them in the matter of commerce, and the supremacy enjoyed by them over the Greeks in the markets of the Levant. The Doge resolved to deal swiftly with each of these foes. He set things in order to the utmost of his ability in Palestine, and then sailed for home, stopping on his way at the Greek islands, which he laid waste. He proceeded to Dalmatia, retook the conquered cities, and having renewed his supplies, he bore down upon Cephalonia. The Greek Emperor, alarmed at his progress and threatening attitude, hurriedly despatched an embassy desiring peace. This was only accomplished after much delay and debating, for relations were sorely strained between the two people, and the irritation and ill-feeling existing on both sides was not easily dispelled. The Venetians, it need scarcely be said, succeeded in the end in gaining most of the points they deemed essential to their own interests, not the least being the renewal of the rights conceded by the late Emperor Alexius respecting their trade.

The Doge's return to Venice was a triumph in every way. He had been victorious in war and in negotiation; he had brought home an abundance of wealth that seemed fabulous from its amount and value; and he had besides a goodly array of saints and their relics to add to the hallowed store owned by the Republic. He had deserved well of his countrymen, and the title conferred on him of the "Terror of the Greeks" (*Terror Graecorum*) was in no sense an empty name. The ambition of remaining in office had, however, no attraction for him, or it may be that the strain and fatigue of all he had undergone made him long for a quiet life; but in any case he retired shortly after his return from the Holy Land to the Monastery of

San Giorgio Maggiore, where he died, and was buried in the year 1130, deeply and deservedly mourned.

For several years after Domenico Michiel's death no wars disturbed the Republic's interests in the East, and she could reflect with some degree of calmness on the changes brought about in her history by the first Crusade in which she had played a part. She had sent out three expeditions, one and all under the command of the Doge, and supported by the unanimous voice of the people. Extreme skill had been displayed in the management of these expeditions, even if at times we cannot wholly exonerate the leaders concerned in them from the charge of intrigue and self-interest. These same expeditions were also of untold advantage to Venice in gaining for her an ascendancy in Syria far beyond that enjoyed by any other power, and enabling her to establish, if not a monopoly, at least a preponderance in Constantinople. They also aroused in her the consciousness of her strength and of the potency of her Navy, so that from henceforward she knew well that her friendship and her enmity were alike to be courted or dreaded. But on the other hand Venice did not know how to gain the love of the peoples with whom she was brought most into contact. The very superiority to which she had attained made her envied and hated, while her pride, and the careless disdain springing from it, kept her from forming friendships and alliances which would have stood her in good stead in the day of adversity, and saved her maybe from the coalition which in the shape of the League of Cambray was to arm most of Europe against her and drag her down to the very verge of destruction.

CHAPTER V

THE ARSENAL

1104

The position of the Arsenal. Dockyards in Venice. The "New Arsenal." Gunpowder. The Arsenal enlarged. Galleys and Timber at the Arsenal. The work done there. Inspectors. The *Arsenalotti*. Their Banquet.

IN St Mark's and the ducal palace was centred Venice's pride of power and of opulence, but the force which generated that power and wealth lay in the Arsenal,¹ the mainstay and backbone of the Republic's greatness, and the most impressive and characteristic spot in the city.

It occupies two islands to the east of Venice known as the *Gemelle* or *Zimole*, so called, say some writers, because in olden times the worship of the twin deities, Castor and Pollux, prevailed there. Though surrounded by water on three sides, it possesses but one channel of sufficient depth to afford access from the lagoon. This in itself formed

¹ The etymology of the words *Arsena* and *Arsenale* is a subject of much controversy, but by the most widely accepted theory it appears to be derived from the Arabic *Darsenaa*, or rather *Daar Sanaah* ("house of work or labour"), from which came the Italian *Darsena*, i.e., a vast pool or basin of sea-water protected by a slip of land and forming a natural harbour in which ships could lie securely. *Darsena* leads in its turn to *Arsenale* and *Arsenà*, the latter made famous by Dante, when in the *Inferno*, canto xxi., 7, he describes the Arsenal of Venice, and uses it as a symbol for the lake of boiling pitch into which the fraudulent and extortioners are to be immersed.

an element of strength and security, but it was further strengthened by massive crenellated walls, which from time to time were extended until eventually they enclosed an area of two miles in circumference, and were flanked in 1688 by great square towers made especially striking from the bright red colour with which they were painted. These walls, however, were not completed in their entirety until more than two hundred years after the foundation of the Arsenal in 1104.

Before that date there was not one *single* Arsenal. The dockyards of Venice were scattered throughout the city, and, in the beginning of her history, served their purposes well enough, for in those days the amount of "making and mending" was not extensive. The fact, however, that in 725¹ a fleet consisting of eighty ships of war could be equipped and sent to sea, is proof enough that even then the shipbuilding capacities of Venice were of no mean order, and argues considerable skill amongst her citizens in the art of naval construction. These scattered dockyards, or *squeri*, as they were called in Venetian dialect, were situated at Cannareggio; St Alvisè; probably at San Rocco, on the site known as Castelforte; at Sta Trinità, on the spot where the Ponte dei Lovi now stands; and on the spot at present occupied by the gardens of the royal palace. They were not, however, sufficient for the demands made on them in later years. By degrees Venice began to want both a larger supply of ships, and ships too built on larger lines and provided with all the inventions and improvements that time and an ever increasing civilisation brought in their train. The growing strength of the Republic by sea, together with the spread-

¹ This was the expedition against Ravenna, and placed by some writers in 728 and even later. The Venetians on this occasion defeated the Longobards and took Hildebrand, King Liutprand's nephew, prisoner.

ing development of her commerce, the extension of her colonies, and the widening of her foreign relations, required that the places in which to build and repair her ships should be enlarged; and in the early years of the twelfth century an Arsenal, on that part of the present site known as the "Old Arsenal" or *Arsenale Vecchio*, was formed. Even then, however, no special attention was bestowed upon its protection from attack, and no jealous care was taken to guard it from outside observation. It was open to all comers, and ships were built here or there in it according to the space available at the moment.

This simple trustfulness could not be maintained for long. A wall was built round the "Old Arsenal," and as time went on more territory was acquired. The first addition was made in 1303 or 1304, during the reign of Doge Pietro Gradenigo, the able statesman to whom is due the "Closing of the Great Council," which proved one of the wisest of many wise acts of the Venetians, and secured to the Republic the continuation for centuries of her greatness and prosperity. The land then bought and assigned to the Arsenal had been the property of the Molin family. It was of a boggy, marshy nature, lying close to the Lake of San Daniele, and was three times larger than the *Arsenale Vecchio*. Walls and towers were at once built round this new quarter, which was known in its entirety as the *Arsenale Nuovo* to distinguish it from the *Vecchio*, and in it were centred several places of interest. Here was the part called *La Tana*, containing the hemp-house (*Casa del Canevo*), where the hemp was stored and converted into ropes, sails, cordage, and all the rigging needed for the shipping. Here, too, were the store-rooms for the oars; and here in 1390 the smelting-houses were built on a site which had been assigned to the Jews, and was called *Ghetto*, a word that according to Muratori comes from the Tuscan *Guitto* or *Ghitto* and means "sordid"; or, according

to Buxtorfio, comes from the Hebrew word *Ghet* and means "separation." Here again the gunpowder was stored, a fact sufficiently proved by an old chronicle of Cicogna, which alludes to an explosion that took place in 1509, when the wall of the Arsenal towards San Daniele was blown away, a great part of the monastery was destroyed, and some men and horses were killed. The use of gunpowder was, however, known to the Venetians long before that date. They substituted it for Greek fire in the fourteenth century, and we read of their using firearms in the war of Chioggia (1379), and again for the first time on land in 1376, when they fought against the Archduke Leopold of Austria at the siege of Quero, a fortified village a little to the south of Feltre. Nor was the Arsenal the storehouse only of the gunpowder used for Venetian warfare: it was also the place where it was manufactured; and in 1501 the Spaniard, Pietro Martire d'Anghiera, writing to his sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, tells how he had seen the Arsenal and in it "the wheels wherewith they make and grind gunpowder." There were, too, huge basins or reservoirs of Istrian stone kept for the saltpetre, and large magazines and warehouses were set apart for storing the explosives. A law passed in 1500 forbade any experiments with shells and bombs, but in spite of all precautions many accidents occurred, sometimes causing loss of life, and frequently damaging also the walls and buildings around. One of the worst explosions recorded took place on the night of 14th September 1569, when an enormous quantity of powder blew up, killing the guards on the spot, and scattering the tiles and chimneys of the houses in the neighbourhood, besides wrecking a great deal of property.¹ The disaster would have had even

¹ Pantera (*op. cit.*, p. 64) alluding to this fire, says: "In the year 1569 a fire broke out in the Arsenal of Venice, when, the flames having attacked the gunpowder, great havoc was wrought in a brief space of

more serious 'consequences but that a large mass of powder had been removed only a short time before to the island of St Angelo di Contorta, known afterwards as St Angelo della Polvere, which has been used ever since as the site of the powder magazine—the Venetians fully realising the danger of storing gunpowder in the Arsenal. The manufacture of saltpetre, though continued for a while, was eventually given up.

Further additions to the Arsenal were made in 1326 under Doge Giovanni Soranzo, whose reign, begun in 1312, inaugurated a long period of peace and prosperity, and enabled the Venetians to put their pet theories of Preparation and Precaution into practice by strengthening and enlarging the "seat of Venetian greatness." The tract of ground now acquired included a basin or *Darsena* formed from the Lake of San Daniele, which, together with a wooden house and two mills beside the lake, had been presented to the San Daniele brotherhood in 1202 by the Bishop of Castello. All this the monks, reduced in numbers and wealth, were only too glad to cede to the state, when walls and towers were at once set up round it, and a canal, known as that of the *Cà Nuovo*, made to connect the *Arsenale Vecchio* with the new part.

Other alterations and additions were made in 1451 and again in 1457, when larger spaces were opened out between the different dockyards. At the end of that century (1473), under the dukedom of Doge Andrea

time. The noise was horrid ; the ruin great ; for not only was part of the Arsenal burnt, but the galleys and the ammunition therein were consumed together with many houses, and those, too, far distant in the town. There was also a suspicion that the mischief had been compassed by the bribery of those who were envious of the happiness and greatness of the Republic, especially the Sultan Selim, who could not disguise his glee, knowing as he did the designs of Venice upon the kingdom of Cyprus."


Vendramin, a fresh extension was made, when, besides the usual building of walls and towers, works of draining and reclaiming the marshy land around were carried out, and the name of *Nuovissimo Arsenale* was given to the quarter. These additions were made around the spot already mentioned as *La Tana*, and *Campagna* (so called, doubtless, from the meadows and marsh lands owned originally by the Molin family), and consisted of immense workshops, offices, store- and warehouses, and iron-foundries. These were yet further amplified in 1539; and in 1544 a vast building rose in which to house the Bucentaur, in a district called alternately "Alberi" and "Isolotto," from designs by the Veronese architect, Michele Sanmicheli. After that great pleasure-boat had been destroyed, and when Venice was under the rule of Austria, this building was used for storing the Imperial state boats and barges. A public decree was passed in 1579 authorising the erection of a specially large warehouse for cordage, from a plan by Antonio da Ponte, which in size exceeded that in any other arsenal then existing in Europe. It measured over 1000 feet in length, was 45 feet high, more than 65 feet wide, and was supported by eighty-four stout pillars.

No additions to the Arsenal of any importance were made after this date, but improvements of various kinds were constantly being carried out in the succeeding centuries, and in the last century especially a vast number of changes were effected. These changes, however, in no way affected the original plan and arrangement of this great establishment. The sections into which it was divided may be classified under three heads: the first was that of the Arsenal proper, where the vessels lay ready for service, or for the purpose of undergoing repairs in the numerous offices and workshops in which all the arms needed for war, whether by land or sea, were

also got ready. There, too, from the end of the fifteenth century was the Museum, in which was kept all the trophies taken in battle, and the models of galleys and of the most approved ships in use in the Venetian navy. The second division was set apart for the galleys, and reserved exclusively for all that related to these ships. Here they were built, stored, and repaired; and here, too, were all the smithies and foundries and other buildings for their special use. These included the cordage department with the *Casa del Canevo*, and all its offices, warehouses, and dependencies.

The third section was dedicated entirely to the artillery and all relating to that special branch of the service.

The section devoted to the galleys may be considered almost the most important part of the Arsenal, at all events during the time when Venice was great. The Venetians were past-masters in the art of galley-building: no galleys in the world equalled theirs for endurance and swiftness, nor for the skill with which they were constructed. Even the Genoese, the most crafty and formidable rivals and foes of the Venetians, acknowledged this superiority, and ascribed it to two causes: the cleverness of the builders, and the excellence of the wood used in the building. The supervision of the timber used for shipbuilding was an important item in state matters, and was entrusted to the heads of the Navy. All private interests, of whatever nature, had in this respect to give way to the state, and no appeal concerning timber was allowed to weigh for a moment when it clashed with the exigencies of Naval construction. The forests of the Veneto supplied a certain amount of the timber. Some came from near Padua, and some again from beyond Verona. A large supply of magnificent pines, larch, and beech came from the Forest of Cansiglio, above Treviso, and more still from the Cadore, and the province of



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF A TRIREME.

From a MS. of Da Canale, at the Marciana Library, Venice.

Belluno. The transport of the wood, either on rafts or by simply floating it down the rivers and canals, greatly facilitated the means of conveying it to Venice, besides economising the time and labour required for the task. These home supplies were not, however, sufficient either in quantity or quality to meet the demands of the Arsenal, the most valuable wood of all, oak, not being obtainable in the Veneto, or only in such small quantities as not to count. Oak was accordingly imported from Istria and the Romagna, and, indeed, up to recent times the chief supply has been drawn from around Pesaro and Ancona. As soon as the timber brought into the yards had been measured, marked, and cut, it was immersed in a deep basin of sea-water outside the Lido and left to soak there for ten years. After so thorough a seasoning it was well-nigh petrified, and rendered impervious to heat or cold, or other warping influences.

The characteristic of all work done in the Arsenal was thoroughness and precision. No shirking of any kind was allowed, and each detail had to be as finished and perfect as the whole. In times of great emergency the amount of work accomplished in a minimum of time was extraordinary. During the war against the Turks which culminated with Lepanto, it is said that 100 galleys were turned out in as many days, and that each morning a galley equipped for action was launched from the Arsenal and sent out to sea. A proof of the skill and rapidity in building of the *Arsenalotti* (as the workmen of the Arsenal were called) was given on the occasion of Henry III. of Valois's presence in Venice, on his way to assume the crown of France after resigning that of Poland. Henry visited the Arsenal, where a banquet was prepared for him in the large hall. While he and the other guests were at dinner, a galley, of which the keel and the ribs alone were in position, was entirely and completely

equipped in the space of two hours, and launched in the presence of the monarch.

Every item belonging to a ship was made from start to finish in the Arsenal: the masts and yards, the anchors, the keys, locks, screws, the nails and rivets, as well as the sails and ropes, all were made on approved models, and bore testimony to the finish and high-class work of the Venetian craftsman of old. The cordage and canvas furnished by the Arsenal was also of a particularly good sort, and declared to be the best in the world. This excellence was ascribed alternately to the superior quality of the hemp, and again to the special way in which it was prepared and spun. This hemp was largely imported from the East, but a considerable quantity was also grown on the Republic's territories on the mainland, and some of the very best came from the province of Padua.

The Arsenal proper contained eleven enormous halls, which have retained their primitive shape to this day, and which formed the dépôt where the arms for the different branches of the service—infantry, cavalry, and the Navy—were stored. One alone of these halls was calculated to hold the material necessary to equip no less than twenty galleys. Other parts contained the dockyards—for building and housing—and factories and smithies for forging and repairing the arms. Each separate article manufactured in the Arsenal, whether cannon, rigging, tools, down to nails of a certain size, were all stamped with the badge of the Republic—the Winged Lion; and woe betide the individual who was found in possession of one of the least of these stamped goods—he was at once condemned to the galleys.

The third section, that of the artillery, was, as has been said, altogether distinct from the rest of the Arsenal. It was under the direction of its own special *Provveditore*, and was particularly renowned for its bronze and iron

foundries. Here all the latest inventions as to guns, cannon, and boring engines were tested; some even of Leonardo da Vinci's models were brought here on trial, and every sort of device had to obtain its patent of excellence here. The artillery engineers had among their other duties that of superintending the state of the lagoons, and to see to all the dredging required to keep the canals clear and prevent the silting up of the sand or other subaqueous deposits throughout the waterways in and around Venice. There was also a school of musketry in this division, the Republic rightly enough setting great store by the proficiency of her marksmen. Prizes and even life pensions were bestowed on the best shots, and the citizens as well as the soldiers and sailors were encouraged and trained in time of peace to practise target-shooting.

The administration of the Arsenal was a matter of peculiar importance, and in 1491 a special order of magistrates, the *Provveditori all' Arsenale* (inspectors of the Arsenal), and the *Provveditori all' Artiglieri* (inspectors of the artillery), were appointed as heads over the Arsenal. These offices were generally assigned to elderly patricians who had served their country honourably as ambassadors, or generals, or procurators. Unlike most of the public offices in Venice, which were held only for sixteen months, the Great Council decreed that the *Provveditori* should remain in office for three years, in order that they might learn their business thoroughly, and that during a long war or in any other time of strain and anxiety the affairs of the Arsenal should be in the hands of men who knew how to guide them. The office of *Provveditore* was no sinecure. These magistrates had to supervise all that related to the construction and arming of the ships; they had to direct the works, the purchase of wood and iron, to organise the hours for work and relaxation, to see

to the discipline of the workmen, to the ordering of the troops, to the instruction of the sailors, and they had to superintend the preservation and housing of the stores and rations, and the drawing up of contracts. Together they also formed a commission to judge or test any experiment and examine into any new invention, whether propounded by their fellow-citizens or by strangers. Their decision was then referred to the *Collegio*, who, in its turn, passed it on for acceptance or rejection to the Great Council.

An official inspection of the Arsenal was held annually by the Doge in person escorted by his Council—a visit more, perhaps, of ceremony than of actual utility, and yet fulfilling its purpose in demonstrating the importance of this centre of Venetian power, and the respect and honour in which it was held by the state.

With the close of Venice's long day, the glory and importance of the Arsenal came also to an end. In 1603 the Spanish ambassador in his reports speaks of having seen a fleet of 200 galleys there ready for action. One hundred and fifty years later that number had dwindled to twenty warships, sixteen galleys, and two galleasses. At the present moment not one vessel of any size or weight is to be found in it. A certain amount of ship-building and repairing does, it is true, give some life and movement even yet to the Arsenal, but its position in this respect is inferior to La Spezia and Taranto, and the number of workpeople employed in it can only be counted by hundreds instead of by thousands as in the great days of old.

The workmen of the Arsenal—the *Arsenalotti*—were a picked and special class. Half artisans and half soldiers, they underwent a military training, and the vigilance and precision developed by this dual education made of them a staff of men peculiarly fitted for the tasks allotted to

them. They were also called on to aid in the civic duties of most weight and interest. They acted as the firemen and guardians of the town, and were besides the "police-men," so to speak, of Venice. To them was entrusted the task of carrying the Doge shoulder-high round the Square of St Mark, when after his election he was shown in this manner to the people. They stood as guards outside the ducal palace when the Great Council was sitting, and whenever a big fire raged in the town, it was invariably the *arsenalotti* who were called on to extinguish it. In the balmy days of the Republic they numbered from 10,000 to 16,000 men, and when at work their overseers were also the officers who commanded them in time of war. These officers or overseers, known as *La Maestranza*, were equally with the workmen subjected to extremely severe rules. They had, however, many privileges: they were provided for for life; their children were entered on the books of the Arsenal at an early age, and were admitted when still young to the docks. Here they worked their way up through the different stages till they reached the same position which their fathers had gained before them, and were admitted to the dignity and rank of the *Maestranza*. When they were past work they were either pensioned off or admitted to a kind of home for aged or infirm seamen.


A picturesque figure among the *arsenalotti* was that of the "High Admiral," a title bestowed on the workman who, by his skill and industry and proficiency, had shown himself superior to his fellows. His nomination was ratified by the *Provveditore*, and recognised by the state, which doubtless saw the wisdom of instituting a post whereby to stimulate a proper ambition among the men, and make them proficient in every department of their trade. The title of "High Admiral" was no empty form of speech. The bearer of it had the immediate direction

of all the labour done in the dockyards, and authority over the workmen. His privileges were numerous; and on the occasion of any great ceremony his dress rivalled that of the nobles for beauty and costliness. It was a red satin cassock, over which was worn a vest reaching down to the knees, while on his head he wore a cap of violet damask, trimmed with a gold fringe and surmounted with a heavy tassel. He occupied a place of honour at any great public function; and when any sovereign or person of renown visited the Arsenal, it was his business to take them round and introduce them to the dockyards and other places of interest subject to his control. When, on the Feast of the Ascension, the Doge went in state on board the Bucentaur to wed the Adriatic, this High Admiral acted as pilot, and guaranteed the safe going and coming of the mighty barge. This he only undertook, however, when the weather was fine. He had the right to refuse to guide the vessel beyond the lagoon should there be any appearance of troubled skies or a rough sea.

The *Festa della Sensa* was a great day at the Arsenal. On the eve of the function, the Bucentaur was loosed from her moorings there, and taken to the Piazzetta. On the lower deck were seated the 168 *arsenalotti*, whose special privilege it was to row the Doge on this great occasion, while the *maestranza* were placed around the Prince and the officers of state on the upper deck. The Doge was always mindful of his rowers at this festival, and on their return from the ceremony he personally bade them attend a feast prepared for them in the ducal palace. A master-calker, writing in the eighteenth century, tells how he "had the glory to be" among the 168 chosen *arsenalotti* in the reigns of three Doges, Alvise Mocenigo, Paolo Renier, and Lodovico Manin, to row them to and from the Lido, and how, after being presented with his 167 comrades to the head of the state, they were treated to

bread, cheese, and wine before starting, and to dinner on their return. At the dinner he says they were seated at ten tables and fared as well as their betters. Certainly, if the bill-of-fare which he gives us is correct, there was no stint in the three courses set before the guests. First of all came the *antipasto*, consisting chiefly of "sweeties," many of which are in vogue to this day in Venice, and are much in favour with people of all classes. There was: "A plate of slices of Spanish bread (*pan di Spagna*) for everyone, a plate of sponge-cakes (*savojardi*), a dish of light cakes (*rafioli*), a dish of puff-pastry, the 10th part of a dish of cream for everyone, a dish of sour oranges for everyone, a dish of sausage-meat, the 10th part of a dish of lemon-peel for everyone, the 10th part of a salted tongue for everyone." It was certainly an odd mixture, and was followed by the middle course, which formed the substantial part of the meal. This was: "A large dish of tripe of veal for everyone, a slice of liver for everyone, the 10th part of a plate of croquettes for everyone, the 10th part of a calf's foot boiled for everyone, a pigeon apiece, the 10th part of a quarter of roast veal for everyone, half a roast turkey for everyone." Then came the last course, the *dopopasto*, of: "The 10th part of a dish of custard, of cream-cheese, of apples, of asparagus, of fennel, of artichokes, of dried chestnuts, of prunes, with tart, with puff-pastry, with cheese; a box of comfits for everyone, a star-shaped stuffed cake for everyone, a small bottle of sweet wine (*moscato*), two large bits of white bread for everyone. The wine was of two sorts—red and white—and each person could drink as much as he chose." After the repast the Doge sent for his guests, and expressed his hope that they had been well served and attended to. No wonder that the master-calker deplores the falling-off of such good customs, and laments that "the political upheavings" of the year 1797 were of such a nature as to

prevent him and his mates from taking part in the great *Festa della Sensa* and from assisting at the banquet to which he had been personally invited by Lodovico Manin, the last Doge of Venice.



A Trireme.

CHAPTER VI

VENICE AND CONSTANTINOPLE. THE FOURTH CRUSADE. ENRICO DANDOLO

1143—1205

Negotiations with Constantinople. Fightings and Recriminations between Greeks and Venetians at Corfu. Grecian Treachery and Vengeance at Constantinople. Ill-fated Expedition under Doge Vitale Michiel II. His Murder. Germans and Venetians Leagued against Ancona. The City Attacked and bravely Defended. Origin of the Fourth Crusade. The Venetians engage in it under the Doge Enrico Dandolo. The Start from Venice. Siege of Zara. Alexius Angelus persuades the Crusaders to go to Constantinople. The City Besieged and Sacked twice over. Division of the Greek Empire. Dandolo's Death. Result of the Fourth Crusade.

THE effect of the Crusades was in many ways of far deeper significance and more abiding consequence at Constantinople than in Europe. The Byzantine rulers were fully alive to the evils involved thereby to their state, and their policy—always crooked and suspicious—was rendered a hundredfold more tortuous by this contact with the powers of the West. The old friendship and intercourse with Venice was also destroyed; and though spasmodic attempts were made to renew the alliance, they only healed the breach superficially, and brought about no lasting understanding. So bitter indeed did the antipathy between them become, that a public decree was issued in Venice ordering every Venetian to shave and to abstain

from wearing a beard—a fashion which prevailed in Greece and consequently was not to be countenanced in Venice.

At Constantinople, Manuel, a monarch who united to an unwonted degree courage, effeminacy, and craft in almost all his actions, had succeeded his father, John, in 1143, and one of his first acts was to form a league with the Emperor Conrad of Franconia, in order to stem the power of Roger II., the Norman king of Sicily. The navy of Sicily was indeed a source of common danger to Italy and Greece. Composed of Normans, Mussulmans, Sicilians, sailors from Amalfi, Gaeta, Bari, Naples, and all the maritime seaport towns of Southern Italy, it had so grown in numbers, as well as in skill, as to excel the other navies of the Peninsula, except that of Venice. King Roger knowing well the hatred and distrust that his ambition and strength aroused, determined to be beforehand with the foes combining against him. He despatched a fleet, under the command of his admiral, George of Antioch, to the coast of Greece, where operations commenced by an attack on Corfu. The Norman fleet captured the island—whether by guile or strategy is not known—and thence ravaged and pillaged in Greece, so that Manuel had no choice but to resort to arms. The moment was a difficult one for him. Bernard of Clairvaux had just stirred up the Second Crusade, in which both Louis VII. of France and Conrad III. of Germany were taking part; and what with the Crusaders on one hand and the Norman invasion on the other, Manuel was in a sore dilemma. He was too weak to act alone, and must needs seek allies to aid him ward off the impending dangers. The Venetians were the people whose interests were already most bound up with his; their zeal for the Crusade was not so fervid as to blind them to their own special advantage, and their desire to restrain the power of the Norman navy was even more intense than his own.

Venice agreed to listen to the Emperor's proposals, and two envoys, Domenico Morosini and Andrea Zeno, were appointed to arrange the terms of alliance. A long time was occupied with negotiations ere both parties were satisfied, and as usual Venice was no loser by the bargain. Her former privileges in the East were confirmed to her; an increase of the territory allotted to Venetians in Constantinople was granted; and, in the islands of Cyprus and Rhodes, where hitherto the door had been shut to all save Greeks, she was to be accorded trading rights. Finally a naval expedition was agreed on between the allies, and Venice contributed a goodly contingent (*copiosum exercitum*), whilst the Greeks (if we are to accept the numbers given by their bombastic historians) supplied a fleet of no less than 1000 sail, including, it is said, a number of *pentecontori*, *mioparone*, and *ippogaghi*.

The Venetian ships sailed under the command of the Doge Pietro Polani. He, however, was taken so ill before he left the lagoons that he put back to Venice to die, and the command was then entrusted to his son, and brother; and sailing on to Corfu, the Venetians joined the Greeks, and the siege of the town of Corfu was at once undertaken. But the alliance had been one of policy merely, and the rivalry between the allies augured ill for the success of the enterprise. The Greeks accused the Venetians of not supporting them properly, and their writers, in later years indeed, went so far as to ignore the very presence of the Venetian force at the scene of operations. The Venetians in reality played their part vigorously and nobly throughout the campaign: they erected big machines for hurling stones and battering the fortifications; and their ships, the stout and stalwart *gatti*, and not those of the Greeks, ventured again and again to the assault, and furnished the platform whereon the scaling ladders were placed against the walls. The enmity existing between the two people

was not long in openly declaring itself, though the actual cause which brought matters to a climax is not known. From words they came to blows, and fell to fighting in savage earnest, and the Venetians, owing to inferior numbers, were defeated. They swore to be avenged, and retiring in their ships to the island of Asteride, between Cephalonia and Ithaca, they lay in wait to seize on any Grecian vessels that might pass that way to the scene of action. They captured some and burnt others, and fortune having thrown into their hands no less a prize than the imperial galley, they exhibited their fury and vengeance in a personal insult to the Emperor Manuel. They decked the poop of the galley with costly carpets and hangings, and erected on it a throne. On this they placed an Ethiopian—an allusion to Manuel's swarthy complexion—distinguished for his ugliness, whom they decked in royal apparel and crowned with an imperial diadem. Then, escorted by men-of-war, they rowed the galley in front of the whole Grecian fleet, and paraded this figure of imperial majesty up and down the line, yelling at him abuse of the coarsest and most obscene nature. Manuel's indignation may be imagined, but he was forced to dissemble his wrath, and even stoop to implore the Venetians to return to his aid in attacking Corfu. The siege dragged on till the autumn of 1148, when after an obstinate resistance, the island was taken by the allies. A treaty was at once signed between the Doge and King Roger, when fresh advantages for the furtherance of her trade in Sicily were secured to the Republic of St Mark.

The chief result, however, of this campaign—excepting for the alliance now formed between Venice and Sicily—was to accentuate the animosity already existing between the Normans and Greeks, and between the Greeks and Venetians. The Venetians, on their side, expressed open disdain for a people whom they dubbed cowardly, effete,

and incapable of holding their own against a few Norman ships. They began, too, says Manfroni, to regard Constantinople as a possible prey for themselves, and set to work, secretly but surely, to undermine the foundations of the Empire. The Greeks, in return, hated the Venetians with a hatred the more intense in that it was coupled with fear. They wrote and spoke of them as "frogs of the marshes," "water-snakes," "depraved, sacrilegious, and miserly folk," whilst the insult offered to their Emperor at Corfu rankled in every mind. This insult was to be avenged in deadly earnest. Manuel did but bide his time, though never neglecting to annoy and harass the Venetians whenever an occasion presented itself. And these occasions were not wanting.

Doge Vitale Michiel II. (1156) had issued a mandate forbidding Venetian merchants to traffic in the Byzantine seaports. This decree, published at the moment when Manuel fell foul of the Republic, involved a heavy loss on Venetian trade, and greatly exasperated the citizens. It was repealed, however, when affairs in the East seemed to be assuming a more friendly aspect; and when amicable overtures had been made, two ambassadors, Sebastiano Ziani and Aurio Malipiero, were despatched to Constantinople to see and report how matters really stood. They were received with such courtesy and cordiality that all fears and suspicions were laid aside, and confidence was fully restored. Venetian ships laden with heavy cargoes flocked as of yore to Constantinople and other towns in the Empire, and Venetian merchants strove one against the other to redeem the time and money which this suspension of trade had cost them. But Manuel was only waiting until his prey was well in his clutches. Then he secretly gave orders to seize on a certain day every Venetian subject throughout his dominions, and these orders were carried out on 12th March

1171. The number of prisoners was so great that the gaols were not sufficient to hold them, and they were thrust into the convents and monasteries as well. Ten thousand persons are said to have been arrested, their goods were confiscated, and the Venetian quarter of Constantinople given over to military occupation. A few of the richest of the captives managed, by bribery, to escape on board a Greek vessel. They set sail instantly for Venice, but were hotly pursued, and only saved their ship from destruction by covering the deck with felt soaked in vinegar, which preserved her from the Greek fire hurled by the pursuers. A remnant of the Venetian colony had contrived also to get away from Constantinople with their possessions before the Emperor's decree was fully executed, and reached home with twenty ships to tell the tale of treachery and woe.

In Venice the indignation and dismay was general. A cry for vengeance and war went up on all sides, and all preparations were swiftly made for action. The Doge ordered 100 new galleys and twenty big transport ships to be built at once; he commanded every Venetian who was abroad to return home by 1st September; he omitted no detail that could further the work of preparation, and made ready to lead the expedition in person. The vassal towns in Istria and Dalmatia were also called on to furnish a contingent of ships, as they were pledged to do by their terms of allegiance, and they supplied ten galleys. A gay and gallant company which set forth from Venice in September 1171, was only to encounter disease, death, and disappointment, and to fail entirely of their purpose. A few successes, it is true, were obtained at first. The Venetian fleet captured the towns of Trau and Ragusa, which had declared for Manuel, and had in future to recognise the supremacy of the Winged Lion. They then approached Negropont, but instead of following up his

successes, the Doge allowed himself to be drawn into diplomatic negotiations with Manuel's envoys, and to be hoodwinked by a tissue of lies and subterfuges on the part of the wily, vengeful Emperor. The Doge's error in being taken in by such duplicity cannot be sufficiently deplored. Time and opportunities were alike thrown away, and before the negotiations reached any conclusion the winter set in. The Doge determined to pass that season at the island of Scio, and there he led his host—a host dispirited and dissatisfied, sore at having been duped, and wild at not having been led to battle. To add to the general discontent, the plague broke out among the Venetian troops, and a report was spread abroad that Manuel had poisoned the wells. The Doge, in the endeavour to find a better climate for his men, took them to some of the surrounding islands; but he returned to Scio for Easter, to await once more news of peace from Constantinople. He had sent a fresh embassy there, but his envoys met only with insult and ill-treatment, one of them, the famous Enrico Dandolo, having his head forcibly held over hot steel for so long that the sight was permanently injured, though the legend that he was actually blinded by the Emperor himself cannot be accepted. It was not until his troops had been thoroughly disabled and disheartened, and their ranks decimated by pestilence, that Doge Vitale Michiel began to realise the treacherous nature of the game which Manuel had been playing with him. With damaged ships and shattered forces he at last set sail for Venice, little suspecting the reception and fate that awaited him there.

The friends and relations of the men who had perished in this inglorious campaign thronged around him, clamouring for those who were no more, while the rest of the citizens were wild with fear lest the return of their luckless countrymen should spread the plague among them. In a

fit of exasperation they rose up against the Doge, whom they held responsible for all the evil, and murdered him near the church of San Zaccaria on 28th May 1172.

Doge Vitale Michiel II. was succeeded on the ducal throne by Sebastiano Ziani, but a change of ruler did not bring with it a change of policy. Venice and Constantinople remained at enmity. Venetian ships, avoiding any direct attack, kept away from the seaports of the Levant, and carried on only a sort of guerilla warfare against Greek traders and all who trafficked in the waters where they would fain have established a monopoly. Such a condition of things was far from advantageous to Venice, and she resorted to measures hitherto foreign to her policy, hoping thus to re-establish her commerce and humble the pride of Byzantium.

The Republic had held aloof from any intercourse with Frederick Barbarossa when, in 1158, he came into Italy, but, on the contrary, had shown sympathy with Pope Alexander III., the Emperor's foe and rival. Now, however, the rulers of Venice sought the friendship of the German monarch, and were overjoyed when he proposed that they should join him in an attack on Ancona. This town, says Guglielmotti,¹ though under the dominion of the Roman Church, was governed by a popular form of administration. As support was not always forthcoming from Rome, Ancona, in order to strengthen herself against the encroachments of Germany, made overtures to the Byzantine court. This advance pleased the Greeks: it suited the people of Ancona, who saw in it a chance of increasing their commerce with the East; and it by no means displeased the Pope, who was not anxious to promote an understanding between this important seaport town and the German Emperor. Frederick, on his side, had no love for Ancona; nor did the idea of admit-

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 300.

ting the Greeks as neighbours and traders coincide in any way with his schemes with regard to Italy. Venice, of course, was more anxious than any other state to exclude the Greek power from the Adriatic, whilst the prospect of avenging herself on the Emperor Manuel, and at the same time injuring her old foe, Ancona, was sweet indeed. Muratori, speaking of this period, says: "The Venetians aimed at being sole lords of the Adriatic and of the commerce in the East; hence the strife and hatred between Venice and Ancona was of long standing." Two Venetian chroniclers write in the same vein. "The Doge of Venice," says Andrea Dandolo, "sent his fleet against Ancona, less mindful of the service to be rendered to the Emperor Frederick than of hatred towards the people of Ancona, who were loathed as supporters and partisans of the Greeks."¹ The Altinate Chronicle in its turn says: "The Venetians hated the men of Ancona as much because of old-time enmity as in consequence of the league which they had made with the Greeks to work woe on Venice."²

The enmity between Venice and Ancona dated, indeed, from early times, for in 1168 some Venetian galleys bore down upon five galleys of Ancona and carried them off in triumph. A similar exploit was repeated shortly after, when the Lion of St Mark was again victorious; while in later times the support given by Ancona to Manuel had incensed and exasperated Venice beyond endurance.

Early in April 1173 (some writers put it at a year earlier, some at a year later) the Venetian fleet appeared before the port of Ancona, under the leadership of Pietro Ziani, the Doge's son. The force consisted of forty galleys armed for war, and a galleon of such inordinate size that she was nicknamed *Tuttilmingtono* (the Whole

¹ Andreas Dandolus, "Chronicom Venetum," *S.R.I.*, xii., 299.

² "Cronaca Altinate," *Arch. Stor. It.*, viii., 172.

World). Besides these there were the transport ships. The greater part of the fleet of Ancona was away on distant seas, but the galleys and ships which remained in the port were despatched against the invaders, only to have to beat a retreat, and prepare for defence nearer home. Steadily and in close ranks the Venetians came on, blocking the harbour and anchoring the huge galleon across the bar, from whence they proceeded to blockade the town. The land forces were under the command of Christian, Bishop of Mayence, "more soldier than bishop, more vandal than Christian," says Guglielmotti, "although he bore the name both of bishop and Christian, and professed to be both."¹ His troops were a motley gathering, who ravaged the country and forced the Anconatans to retreat into the city and defend themselves within the walls. This double attack, both by land and sea, taxed their resources to the utmost, and involved them in an almost impossible undertaking. They were, however, fighting for their hearths, their honour, and their families, and they considered no effort too great to safeguard such treasures. A legend was current in the city that Ancona was to be saved by a woman, and a priest. The legend was to work itself out in very deed, and to the saving of the town. Famine and misery within the walls had reduced the citizens to the last stage of suffering and despair. A young and beautiful woman, Stamina by name, determined to attempt the salvation of her city or die in the endeavour. She hit upon the original idea of setting fire to the besieger's engines and battering-machines, hoping in this way to force them to relinquish the siege. With a lighted torch in her hand she advanced through shot and steel into the enemy's ranks, and passing through their midst as though she bore a charmed life, she accomplished her purpose. The fire spread along the line

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 302.

of battering-engines, carrying death to the men who were directing them and making their work altogether unavailing. The success of Stamina's manœuvre, while it wrought incalculable harm to the allies, encouraged her countrymen to yet greater deeds of heroism and devotion. The rest of the legend came also to pass, for while Stamina carried out her heroic purpose by land, a priest, one Don Giovanni, was planning noble deeds at sea. Taking advantage of a strong wind that blew off the land and greatly harassed the Venetian ships, he threw himself into the sea, bearing a huge cutlass in his hand. He swam towards the huge galleon, and the Venetians saw with dismay that his intention was to cut the ropes that held the anchors of the *Whole World*. Every sort of missile was hurled at him from all sides, stones, arrows, javelins, every weapon available, were all thrown in turn and all equally in vain. He dived like an osprey or swam like a fish, and sheltered under the hull of the big vessel when too closely pressed by his foes. He hacked and sawed at the thick taut ropes, but before he succeeded in dividing them, he had to put back to shore, spent and worn, with all he had undergone. His efforts, however, were successful. The ropes, hacked nearly in two, gave way under the weight of the galleon, and *Tuttilmondo*, loosed from her moorings and blown about by the violence of the wind, crashed into the smaller ships which lay around, causing as much havoc and destruction as if she had been an enemy's vessel. The Venetian fleet suffered heavily: many galleys were destroyed, many soldiers and sailors were killed and drowned, and though most Venetian writers pass lightly over the event—some indeed ignore it altogether—the defeat was an important and decisive one. Muratori rather sarcastically remarks: "The Venetian historians do not show themselves much acquainted with this famous fight."

The siege of Ancona came to an end in the autumn of the year 1173, when the levies, sent to the aid of the besieged town by the Countess of Bertinoro, compelled both Germans and Venetians to withdraw and give up their dreams both of humbling the Greeks, and of possessing themselves of a southern seaport in the Adriatic.

The failure of these hopes in no wise daunted the spirit or resources of the Venetians. They saw only the expediency of forming an alliance that would compensate for the loss of their commerce in the East, and if possible, strengthen their hands eventually against Manuel. Such an alliance was to be found with Sicily, which was one of the chief granaries of the Republic and from which she also drew supplies of wool, sugar, and precious stones. William II. of Sicily had indeed but lately been in league with Constantinople, but the two states had not one single interest in common; their traditions and circumstances made them foes, and the King and his people were only too ready to treat with Venice. An alliance offensive and defensive was accordingly formed for twenty years, and as usual the *Serenissima* got the best of the bargain. On all imports and exports her citizens obtained a reduction of 50 per cent. on the tariffs drawn up in the time of William I.; they had free egress and ingress to all the seaport towns, and were to be safeguarded in every part of the King's dominions, whether by land or sea. This condition did not, however, apply to corsairs, nor to those who had served or were serving the Greek Emperor. The formation of this league caused dismay in Constantinople, and convinced Manuel that it was time to lay aside his intrigues and animosity against Venice. He knew well that his Navy could not contend for a moment against the combined navies of Venice and Sicily, and that should they elect to make war upon him, he was undone. He consequently lost no

time in making restitution to the Venetians of their sequestered goods, of their quarter in Constantinople with all its attendant privileges, and he speedily released the prisoners. Fortune seemed to smile on Venice, and peace to be in sight. Her renewed friendship with Byzantium bade fair to be lasting and steadfast; her alliance with Sicily meant prosperity and power; and her relations with other states were universally harmonious and amicable.¹

The age of the Crusades was not one, however, in which peace could be the condition of any European state for long—least of all, perhaps, for Venice. Her riches, her Navy, her traffic in the East rendered her conspicuous, and pointed her out as the power most fitted to aid in the Crusade which Innocent III. was then preaching against the Infidel, and especially against Egypt. In the third Crusade—the one in which Richard Cœur de Lion and Philip Augustus had played so undignified a part—the Venetians had not engaged sufficiently to affect their history; and beyond engaging in a series of skirmishes and petty fights on the high seas with Pisa, the Republic had not for some while taken any prominent part on the stage of the world. But now she changed her attitude, and in the Fourth Crusade, Venice was from beginning to end the chief actor and the leading spirit. Her line of conduct, with regard to this the most important event in the history of the Middle Ages, has been called in question again and again. She has been

¹ I have not gone into the vexed question of the battle of Salvore, a battle which many Venetian writers describe as taking place at this epoch between the navies of Venice and Germany. The Venetians are reputed to have gained a glorious victory, capturing many prisoners, among them the Emperor's son, Otho, a lad of eighteen years, in command of the Imperial forces. The fact that such a battle never took place at all is now so generally accepted by modern historians that it seemed out of place to do more than make this passing allusion to it.

accused of treachery, cupidity, selfishness, ambition, godlessness, in turn ; and the venom of her detractors has been so bitter as to enlist on her behalf a host of equally ardent champions who exonerate her completely and ascribe her policy and action to the highest motives only. In a work dealing with the doings of her Navy it would be out of place to enter into a long argument on this subject, or to enlarge on all the political reasons which prompted Venice's action in the Fourth Crusade ; but some allusion is at the same time necessary, the more so that the principal part throughout all the campaign was played by her Navy.

The Fourth Crusade was preached against Egypt, where Saladin's skill and valour had so often and so successfully prevailed, that the defenders of the Cross were threatened with complete defeat, and called on their brethren in Europe for help. But the army that was equipped, nominally to succour them, was employed instead in a campaign that could not claim to be a Crusade at all, and which ended in a bitter and disgraceful strife between the Christian powers of the East and the West. Who was responsible for this change? And was it a premeditated, deep-seated design, or was it the result of absolute chance? The accusers of Venice reply that Venice, and Venice alone, was to blame.¹ Her lust of gain, her ambition and desire for supremacy prompted her, say they, to bend all means to her ends, and induced her to disregard the injunctions, the threats, and the entreaties of the Pope, to ignore the wishes and aims of the

¹ Gibbon, speaking of Venice at this epoch, says : "The policy of Venice was marked by the avarice of a trading, and the insolence of a maritime, power ; yet her ambition was prudent. Nor did she often forget that if armed galleys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause and supply, of her greatness," vol. vi., ch. lx., p. 292.—Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. London : John Murray, 1887.

Crusaders, and in short, to override every obstacle that stood between Venice and the possession of Constantinople. The champions of Venice in their turn deny these charges *in toto*. They lay the blame instead on Philip of Swabia, who, they maintain, diverted the course of the Crusading forces for family reasons, and turned the expedition undertaken against the Infidel into an attempt to advance his own interests in the East. Neither explanation is completely satisfactory, for neither advocate succeeds in vindicating his client altogether. It is far more probable that the trend of circumstances opened out a series of possibilities, hitherto unsuspected and unthought of, which the crafty and ambitious mind and master-spirit of Dandolo saw how to seize and adapt to the advantage of Venice and the extension of her greatness and fame. These circumstances were as follows:—In 1201 the ambassadors of Louis, Count of Blois; Thibaud, Count of Champagne; and Baldwin, Count of Flanders and Hainault, arrived in Venice to negotiate with the Doge and his Council for the loan of transport ships to convey to their destination themselves and their followers, to the number of 4500 knights, with two horses and two squires apiece, 2000 foot soldiers, and sufficient provisions to last for a year. The ambassadors, among whom was Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Marshal of Champagne (whose chronicle is one of the most trustworthy and delightful records of this period), were left unfettered in their dealings, and were as free to treat with the Doge as if their lords were present in person. Dandolo, who had been elected Doge at the age of eighty-four, ten years previously (1192), asked for eight days in which to consider his answer. He then announced that not only did he consent to the hiring of the ships, but though an old man and almost blind, he, and with him a great number of Venetian nobles, were resolved to take the Cross, and that an armed force should

accompany the expedition, on condition that the Venetians should receive one-half of every conquest made on land or sea. Then followed the agreement as to the hire: the Venetians were to furnish enough ships and transport vessels as would suffice to carry the Crusading forces and one year's provision for man and beast—bread, flour, vegetables, and wine for the former, hay and corn for the latter. All the ships were to be ready by 29th June 1202, and were to be at the disposal of the Crusaders for a year. In return the Venetians were to receive the sum of 85,000 silver marks, payable in four instalments: the first payment of 15,000 marks to be made before August; the second, of 10,000 marks, in November; the third, also of 10,000 marks, in February of the following year; and the rest in April of 1203. The Venetians also agreed to contribute fifty galleys at their own cost, which would escort and wait on the convoy. It will be observed that no mention is made in the contract as to the destination of the expedition, nor of the foe with whom they were to engage. Villehardouin says¹ that the Doge having explained to the barons of France the conditions drawn up by him and his council, concludes, "All these conditions which we have explained to you will hold for a year, dating from the day that we leave the port of Venice to perform the service of God and of Christianity in whatever place it be." The clever vagueness of these last words is significant, and they certainly were not forgotten by Dandolo when, later on, he saw to what advantage they could be turned for the good of the Republic. Is this, as some would have it, an evidence of the guile of the Venetians? Did they purposely omit any allusion to the destination of the fleet, or to the foe against whom they

¹ Geoffroi de Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, traduction par M. Natalis de Wailly. Paris: Firmin Didot, frères, fils, et Cie, 1872.

were to fight, in order that they might settle these points as they chose when all were embarked, and the power of decision would be in their own hands? Or was it, as Villehardouin states, because the Crusaders were all of divers opinions, some wishing for Palestine, others for Egypt, and no concord in that respect existing between them? Venice has also been reproached for the price agreed on between the contracting parties, the accusations of "greed of gain" (*avidità di guadagno*), of "base speculation" (*indegna speculazione*) being laid at her door by the detractors. When, however, the cost of the transport of many thousands of men and horses, the price of rations, and the time the contract was to last are taken into consideration, the sum demanded—85,000 marks (about £172,000)—cannot be considered exorbitant, nor can the Venetians be taxed with unscrupulous dealing.

The Doge lost no time in setting to work to fulfil his part of the bargain conscientiously. Orders were issued bidding every Venetian who was navigating beyond the Adriatic to return home; the Dalmatians were called on to furnish their contingent of vessels; and at the appointed time (June 1202) the naval force, consisting both of transports and ships of war, was ready. The fleet was anchored off the Lido; the siege engines were loaded; the complement of troops and horses were there to a man, their very places already assigned to each one—all was in perfect order.¹ The preparations were thorough and exact in every detail, and even hostile writers have to acknowledge that in this respect at all events Venice was

¹ Villehardouin says:—"Li Venisien lor firent marchié si pleuteuros con il convint de totes les choses que il convient à chevaus et à cors d'omes; et li navies que il orent appareillié fu si riches et si bels que onques nus hom cretiens plus bel ne plus riche ne vit, si cum de nes et de galiés et de vissiers, bien a trois tanz que il n'aust en l'ost de gens."—*Op. cit.*, pp. 32 and 34.

not found wanting. It is disappointing not to be able to give an exact list either of the number or kind of vessels which made up the armament. No two writers, however, agree on either point: Ramusio saying there were 480 ships in all, namely, fifty galleys, 120 huissiers (*uscieri*), 240 square sailed vessels, and seventy smaller ships carrying the provisions; Dandolo speaks of 300 vessels in all; Sanudo of fifty galleys, 240 ships, and twenty huissiers; whilst an eye-witness, the anonymous author of the *Devastatio Costantinopolitana*, speaks of sixty-two galleys, forty ships, and 100 huissiers. Venice indeed was ready, but what about the Crusaders? Where were the men who were to embark on board the transports, armed with the zeal and ardour that became true soldiers of the Cross, and keen to measure swords with the forces of the Infidel? They were not forthcoming at the time or place appointed, and the non-appearance of the hosts for whom the ships and victualling had been requisitioned boded ill for the account that would have to be kept with Venice. Things indeed went badly from the very outset. Count Thibaud of Champagne, the leader of the army and the most high-minded and disinterested of the Crusading knights, died before the expedition started, and the election of Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat, in his stead had caused much dissatisfaction throughout the ranks. Many in consequence forsook the cause altogether and went home; others enlisted under Walter de Brienne, then warring in Apulia against the Germans; some again, disapproving the idea of sailing for Egypt, embarked at other ports for Palestine; and some set sail from ports nearer home, so as to avoid the journey to Venice and the expense awaiting them there.

This defection on the part of the Crusaders pressed heavily on those who held to their engagement, and on the Venetians. These latter had laid out large sums in

the fulfilment of their compact ; they had made the most complete and efficient preparations for the undertaking, and in return they had so far received little over one-third of the sum agreed upon, with no prospect now of receiving more. It was no wonder that the merchant princes of the lagoons were sore and angry. The Crusaders, who had been loyal to their appointment, acted most honourably and generously. They tried by every means in their power to make good the deficiency of their comrades : they devoted their money and jewels, their plate and personal possessions, to make up the sum due ; but in spite of all their efforts, they could only raise about half the stipulated amount. This incapability on the part of the barons to discharge their debt provided an opening on which the Doge seized, and which he turned to the utmost advantage. He could now dictate the terms, and he did not fail to do so. He laid before the leaders of the expedition a proposition. If they would help the Venetians to recover Zara, then the Venetians would consent to defer the payment of the sum still owing to a more favourable moment. Zara, on the Dalmatian coast, was a town subject to Venice, but always in revolt. She refused to acknowledge Venetian rule in the Adriatic, and had at that moment put herself under the protection of the King of Hungary. The Doge's suggestion was by no means acceptable to the Crusaders. They had taken the Cross, they said, against the enemies of that Cross, not against a city defended by Christians and under the protection of a Christian king. The Pope, they knew, would in no wise countenance such a step, and all things considered, they must decline to entertain the proposal. Dandolo, however, was not to be gainsaid. He contrived to overcome all their scruples and objections. He gained the Papal Legate over to his side, and though many of the warriors of the Cross fell away, the rest ended by accepting

the plan with enthusiasm, even lighting bonfires to testify their joy and readiness.

After all these delays and difficulties the fleet weighed anchor from Venice with reduced numbers of cavalry, infantry, and ships, and sailed for Dalmatia as late in the year as 8th October. The scene has been described for us by Manfroni, quoting again from Gunther, as follows: "The Doge and his Admiral Vitale Dandolo were embarked on the chief galley (*galea capitana*), which was all painted red with an awning of red damask, and with four trumpeters blowing silver trumpets. The Crusaders, massed in groups on the decks of the beflagged ships, cheered and raised shouts of joy, the priests in the meanwhile intoned the *Veni Creator*, and more than a hundred drums and trumpets sounded out their notes of triumph from the galleys and ships." Villehardouin adds something like a sigh over the goodly steeds placed on board: "Ha, Diex!" he exclaims, "tant bon destrier i ot mis"; and he also describes the effect produced by the rows on rows of shields flanking the sides of the galleys, acting almost like palisades, and of the innumerable array of mortars, catapults, slings, and hurling engines, ranged in neat order on board the vessels. Another account says that when the fleet had passed out of the lagoons and every sail was set, the sea seemed alive with ships and joyousness. Gibbon, speaking of the fleet, says:

"A similar armament, for ages, had not rode the Adriatic: it was composed of one hundred and twenty flat-bottomed vessels or palanders for the horses, two hundred and forty transports filled with men and arms, seventy store-ships laden with provisions, and fifty stout galleys well prepared for the encounter of an enemy. While the wind was favourable, the sky serene, and the water smooth, every eye was fixed with wonder and delight on the scene of the military and naval pomp which over-

spread the sea. The shields of the knights and squires, at once an ornament and defence, were arranged on either side of the ships; the banners of the nations and families were displayed from the stern; our modern artillery was supplied by three hundred engines for casting stones and darts; the fatigues of the way were cheered with the sound of music; and the spirits of the adventurers were raised by the mutual assurance that forty thousand Christian heroes were equal to the conquest of the world.”¹

The first halt was made at Pola, where extra stores were taken on board. Then they past on to Triest, where the spectacle of such numbers and might induced the Triestines, who were wavering in their allegiance to Venice, to vow fidelity, and to declare their readiness to lend their aid whenever required in naval matters. From Triest they went to Muggia, and then for a month we have no record of their doings. The foes of Venice say that this time was purposely wasted to prevent the force from proceeding to Egypt before the winter. The more likely explanation is that that month was fully occupied in embarking the sailors and rowers from Istria and Dalmatia, who, according to the terms of their agreement, were to join when the fleet left Venice. On 10th November they cast anchor before Zara, and broke in two a great chain swung across the harbour; then they placed the ships in such fashion as to appear as though they were about to besiege the town. This menacing attitude alarmed the inhabitants, who, in spite of reinforcements of men and supplies received from the King of Hungary, listened to Dandolo's offer of terms made by him in all good faith, and from a hearty desire to avoid bloodshed if possible. It looked at first as though his object would be obtained, for ambassadors were sent to express the town's readiness

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. vii., ch. ix., p. 298.

to submit and to conclude terms of peace. Suddenly, however, these peaceful negotiations fell through. The ambassadors were recalled, and Zara prepared for war. This change was due to information having come to light as to the discord that reigned among the Crusaders. This discord had been increased a hundredfold by fresh letters from the Pope, discountenancing most strongly the attack upon Zara, and disowning the Legate's action in supporting Dandolo.

Innocent III. was following the course of events with feverish anxiety. A man of great energy and resource, this Pontiff had already had several passages of arms with Dandolo, but the astute Venetian had invariably gained the day. He was, on the one hand, as determined that the Crusade should be directed against Egypt as the Doge was, on the other, that it should leave unmolested Egypt and the trade it carried on with Venice. The Republic of St Mark was quite clear as to her sentiments towards Rome. Her commerce, and with it her wealth and power, came entirely from the East, and depended on a peaceful and friendly intercourse with nations and peoples who, at Rome, were regarded as heretics, infidels, or schismatics. The way the Popes had tried on more than one occasion, to check this intercourse with the East had led to much exasperation in Venice. The relations between the two states were often strained to almost breaking, and the haughty, indifferent manner in which the Republic of St Mark bore herself towards the Holy See is a characteristic note of her history. It was in Dandolo's reign that these differences first became acute, and the statecraft and determination of the "blind old Doge" instituted the policy of disregard and contempt which reached its culmination in the days of Fra Paolo Sarpi and Pope Paul V. Very remarkable was the tone taken by the Doge to the Papal Legate before the Fourth Crusade had yet



ASSAULT OF ZARA.

From the picture by Andrea Vicentino, in the Ducal Palace, Venice.

taken shape. He told this dignitary of the Church, Cardinal Pietro Capuano, that he might choose one of two things: either he could accompany the expedition as a simple priest, or go home. Strange words indeed for the head of a God-fearing state to use to the Pope's representative in days when men still shuddered at Papal excommunications and anathemas, and sought before all else to stand well with St Peter's successor! Nor did Dandolo confine himself to words. His actions were altogether offensive to Innocent, and were bound to incur his wrath and malediction; but knowing this, he never swerved from his purpose for a moment, and communicated much of his spirit of insubordination to his comrades and followers. The French barons stood by him, declaring it a worse offence to break their word than to disobey the Pope, and the siege of Zara was accordingly decided on. The galleys provided with long scaling ladders approached the walls, while the infantry landed to prosecute the attack on *terra firma*, manœuvring the battering rams and engines, and preparing to sap the foundations. The siege does not appear to have been as terrific as it was anticipated, and in three, or according to some writers, five, days, the Zaratans, who had vowed they would die sooner than yield, capitulated. The Doge ordered the walls of the town to be razed, and divided the booty.

The reduction of Zara having been effected, the Crusaders now believed that they would push on to Egypt to accomplish the object for which they had armed. This, however, was far from being Doge Dandolo's intention, as he soon showed. He pointed out that they were already in the middle of November, that the journey to Egypt was fraught with dangers on the way, and that once there, the accommodation would be of the worst. The season, in fact, was too far advanced to do aught but pass the winter at Zara, and proceed in the spring to Egypt.

This having consequently been settled, the French and Venetians thereupon divided the winter quarters in the town, the French having the larger, the Venetians the smaller, part. Disputes and fights were, however, continual between the allies: the French accusing the Venetians—perhaps not unjustly—of having secured the best quarters. All the winter these wrangles lasted, varied only with embassies to and from Rome, bearing alternate threats and excuses, and warning the Venetians of the excommunication that Innocent was preparing to launch against them. In spite of these warnings, however, the Venetians still withstood the Pope, and he, in his turn, declared them excommunicate. They accepted the sentence with absolute and supreme indifference. Not so the French, who were appalled; and fearing lest the same fate might overtake them, they despatched messengers to Rome, expressing penitence and devotion. Innocent, pleased to find some right-minded folk among so many offenders, sent his pardon to the French, and allowed them still to throw in their lot with the Venetians, and to profit by their services till they came to the Holy Land. Then, should they still prove rebellious, they were to withdraw from them.

In the midst of these proceedings, Alexius Angelus¹ arrived at Zara to beseech the Crusaders to aid him to regain the throne of Constantinople and restore his old

¹ The House of Comnenus, Emperors of Constantinople, finished in 1183 in the person of Andronicus, who, leaving no male heir, Isaac Angelus, his kinsman through the female line, was raised to the throne. Isaac had neither the virtues nor the talents needed for a ruler; his one thought was pleasure, and his life of debauchery and buffoonery alienated the respect and affection of his subjects, and made them hail a usurper in the shape of Alexius Angelus, Isaac's brother. The cruelties practised by Alexius on his brother, whom he dethroned and imprisoned, were keenly felt by Isaac's son, also named Alexius, and he resolved to avenge his father's wrongs and enlist the sympathies of the Crusaders of Italy on his behalf.

blind father to liberty and his rights. The tale Alexius told and the cause he had to plead were piteous in the extreme. In 1195 Isaac II. had been dethroned by his brother, another Alexius, who first blinded him and then imprisoned him with his young son, Alexius, at that time a lad of eighteen years old. After several years of bitter captivity young Alexius had managed to escape, and fled for succour to Philip of Swabia, who had married his sister, Irene. He strove to enlist the sympathies of the Pope and other European monarchs on behalf of himself and his father, but hitherto his efforts had met with small success. He also repaired to Venice shortly before the fleet had sailed for Zara, but for the moment the project for subjecting that town overshadowed all else in Dandolo's mind, and Alexius had had to leave without receiving much encouragement. Now he determined to try his fortune again, and to see whether he could not prevail on Dandolo to rescue and restore his father. He also tempted the Crusaders with rewards of so advantageous a nature that his case was taken into serious consideration. His offers were certainly calculated to satisfy all those with whom he had to deal: he volunteered to send an army of 10,000 men at his own expense to Egypt; to keep a force of 500 strong always ready for the war in Palestine; to provide ships, money, provisions, and war-supplies, as well as a sum of 200,000 silver marks to be divided among the Crusaders, and finally—the most seductive offer of all—he declared his readiness, when once his uncle was dethroned and defeated, to promote the union of the churches of the East and West. The bait was one to appeal to every taste, and the allusion to the union of the churches was a touch likely to allure even the Pope within its snare. Such considerations were too weighty to be set aside, and from that moment the destinies of the Fourth Crusade were settled.

Streit, quoting from the chronicle of a Canon of Faenza, asserts that Dandolo then showed himself in his true colours, and "disclosed his secret to all. He manifested his desire to punish the Greeks for their crimes, and give the crown to the son of the dethroned Emperor then in their midst, so that after the acknowledged submission of so great an empire, they could more easily advance to the conquest of the Holy Land."¹ A clearer proof, according to Streit, could not be given than this declaration, showing as it does how Dandolo put in the forefront the old score he had against Greece, then the restoration of Isaac's son, and last of all the thought of the Holy Land. But against this opinion rises up the reflection that events, over which Dandolo had no control whatever, had so lent themselves to favour the working out of his desires and ambitions as to seem like the result of guile and stratagem, whilst in reality it was but a series of fortuitous circumstances which all played with marvellous luck into his hands, and were all turned by his adroitness to wonderful account.

There was much division and discord in the camp when it was known that Constantinople was to be the goal of the expedition; and the arguments adduced against such a course were many. How was it possible to trust the Emperor Isaac? He was himself a usurper, who in the last Crusade had shown himself a keen ally of the Turks and a bitter foe of the Christians. What faith either could be attached to the words of such a prince, as destitute of money as of subjects, and quite devoid of any influence and power to promote the union of the churches? And would not disgrace attach for ever to warriors who had armed for the recovery of Christ's sepulchre, and had

¹ Tolosan, *Chron. Doc. di Stor. Ital.*, vi., 183. See in *Arch. Ven.*, T. XVI., P^{te} I. e II., "Venezia e la Quarta Crociata," dissertazione del dottore Lodovico Streit.



BATTLE OF ZARA.

From the picture by Domenico Tintoretto, in the Ducal Palace, Venice.

[To face page 138.]

instead turned to fight for prey and booty with a Christian city? These were some of the arguments urged against the expedition to Constantinople, but though Dandolo succeeded in silencing them, he did not overpersuade all the Crusaders, for many left him to follow a course more consistent with their convictions and the character they had assumed. On 7th April 1203, the reduced force left Zara, calling at Corfu (where Villehardouin tells us the horses were disembarked to be refreshed and watered), Durazzo, Negropont, and Andros, in order to proclaim Prince Alexius as the rightful sovereign of those places and win for him the homage of his so-called subjects. In this way more than two months were passed, and on 23rd June the fleet anchored off Abydos, at the mouth of the Dardanelles. The fury and indignation aroused among the inhabitants of Constantinople when they learnt that the Crusade was directed against them was uncontrollable. A general rising against the "Latins" (as Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese were indiscriminately termed) was organised, and the Venetian quarter was made the object of special resentment. The warehouses were sacked, the private houses rifled, many people were imprisoned, and many more put to death. The approach of the Crusading forces, however, aroused no alarm or anarchy in the city. The ships of the allies drew daily nearer, under the guidance and direction of Dandolo, whose knowledge of Constantinople and its defences and approaches was of great service to his followers. His counsel was to seize Princes Island, so as to establish there a base for military operations and secure a site from which the very difficult task of dislodging the adversary from Constantinople might be effected. He advocated also an attack from the sea side alone, knowing the weakness of the Greek naval power as compared with their numbers and strength on land. The French would not, however, agree to these

proposals. They were eager to give proof of their prowess, and on 24th June, escorted by a long line of ships with flags flying and in battle array, they passed within a stone's throw of the walls and anchored off Chalcedon,¹ on the Asiatic coast. Here they landed and pillaged freely, moving on after three days to Scutari, where the fleet joined them, and where the combined forces prepared to besiege the town.

The apathy and inactivity of the Emperor Alexius and his subjects in the face of this invasion baffles all belief. No steps were taken to arrest the foe, no preparations made to withstand him. The Greek navy, which only a few years previously had been said to number over 1000 vessels, was now reduced to a few ships of small, if any, account, seeing that their masts, and rigging, and sails had all been sold. The besotted and indolent usurper took no measures to remedy this deplorable state of things, and refused to believe that any harm could befall him or his empire.

Matters being in such a condition, the Crusaders determined, before resorting to arms, to try whether they could not gain their object of restoring the rightful rulers by peaceful means. A procession of galleys was thereupon formed, headed by the Doge in his *galea capitana*, in company with the Marquis of Montferrat and the Prince. This latter was clad in all the insignia of royalty, and as the galleys passed under the walls, the citizens were called on to recognise their lawful sovereign and to pay him homage. This appeal was met by a torrent of abusive language, while stones, arrows, and other missiles were hurled at the young man's head. Negotiations were consequently considered hopeless, and operations were decided on. It was arranged that the land forces should concentrate at Galata, while the galleys were to force the

¹ The modern Kadikeny.

passage of the Golden Horn, then barred by a massive chain stretched from the Tower of Galata to the Acropolis, and commence the attack where the walls were lowest and the defences weakest. On 25th July, therefore, the Crusaders, eager for battle, re-embarked on the huissiers, towed by the galleys; and preceded by boats full of archers and slingers they advanced against the ramparts bristling with mangonels and catapults. The force was divided into six *battles*, or divisions, whose object was to possess themselves of the Tower and suburb of Galata. This they accomplished after three days' skirmishing, while the fleet supported them by an able manœuvre. One of the largest of the Venetian huissiers, the *Aquila* or "Eagle," surnamed *Il Mondo intiero*, with spread sails and helped by wind and tide bore down upon the chain across the harbour. The iron-cased prow of the vessel struck this chain with full force and broke it asunder. The vessel then sailed up the bay, engaging and vanquishing the few ships which guarded the entrance, while the other galleys to the stroke of measured oars followed close in her wake. Other ships again followed till the bay was covered with Venetian vessels, flushed with victory and secure, in the newly won harbour, against any injury from foes or weather.

A council of war was held the same day and again the Doge urged his proposal of an attack by water only. This time, however, he proposed bringing into play the united forces of the armament, and employing all the machinery for war which was on board the galleys. The French again opposed him, not having, it was supposed, the "sea-legs" requisite for fighting to advantage on a foothold so shifting as the deck of a ship. It was, therefore, settled that the Venetians should advance by themselves, and that the French should march to the North where stood the royal palace of Blachernae. On 10th July the French host moved from Galata, passed

below the Golden Horn, crossed the Earviso, a little stream, by a bridge of boats, where they encountered and defeated a small band of Greeks, and encamped at a spot known as Boemond's Tower. The fleet followed these movements by sea, and anchored in order of battle opposite the palace of Blachernae. The Doge ordered the yards of the ships to be lashed together with ropes. He then threw bridges over from the masts of the galleys and huissiers to the walls, thus making fast these vessels and forming a passage from their tops to the ramparts. The galleys were covered with canvas and leather hides, and the bridges were padded to protect them from the Greek fire. Each huissier carried a mangonel at her prow; the "cages" aloft were furnished with crossbows, while around were ranged mortars and petards. The Byzantines were now at last stirring, and under the leadership of Theodore Lascaris were opposing the invaders to the utmost of their power. Doge Dandolo, however, was ready, and was more than a match for any foe. He ranged his forces in two lines: the front line, consisting of the huissiers, bearing aloft the archers and slingers; the second, formed of the heavier ships, carrying the towers, "which," says the Venetian historian Cappelletti, "were higher than the highest towers in Constantinople." The galleys with each rower straining at his oar came up in rhythmic speed, and flung the movable bridges on to the walls. On to these by aid of the masts and rigging the crews clambered in all haste, and for a while a furious contest raged, that seemed as though it were being fought in the air. In the thick of the fight was seen the figure of the old Doge standing at the prow of his ship, which he had fastened close under the walls. Here with the gonfalon of St Mark waving in his hand, he alternately commanded, threatened, and encouraged, clamouring at the same time to be carried on shore in order the better

to encourage his men. His example was nobly followed. Inch by inch his soldiers fought their way, steadily advancing, and intent on victory. On a sudden the banner of St Mark floated from one of the topmost heights, planted no doubt by some gallant warrior. The Venetians saw in the sight a miracle, and breaking into shouts of triumph they rushed on to victory. No less than thirty towers were taken, but the Doge, well aware that the victory was not yet absolutely secure, ordered his troops to set fire to the quarter still held by the enemy. The flames, fanned by a wind from the Black Sea, spread with appalling rapidity, and formed a wall of living fire between the Greeks and Venetians. At this moment news reached Dandolo that the French were being outnumbered and defeated. He at once set out to their rescue, and the cowardly Greeks, alarmed at the sight of this unexpected force, turned and fled, leaving the Crusaders absolute conquerors. The allies were indeed fortunate, for the Greeks outnumbered them so greatly that had they but stood their ground they must have been finally victorious and have saved their city and their Emperor. The news of the defeat completely disheartened the Emperor Alexius, and he fled from Constantinople, carrying off his daughter and a large amount of gold. No time was lost in rescuing poor blind old Isaac from his dungeon and placing him and his son as joint Emperors on the throne. The fickle crowd greeted them with acclamations and protestations of loyalty, while the allies called on them to make good their promised rewards and gifts, and to effect the healing of the schism between the churches. Once these conditions were fulfilled they would continue their course to the Holy Land, whither, with threats and angry insistence, Pope Innocent was urging them to proceed. The difficulty in Constantinople, however, was how the promised conditions were to be carried out.

The money, as had been foreseen, was not forthcoming ; the union of the churches was wholly impracticable ; but till one or other of these stipulations was fulfilled the Crusaders had no intention of moving on. The Emperor and his son strove hard to pay the money. They rifled the churches of their treasures, they laid heavy taxes on their subjects. At the same time they lived with their deliverers on such familiar terms and admitted them to such intimacy that the Greeks became daily more jealous and mutinous, and only awaited a favourable moment to rid themselves of their new sovereigns, and of the haughty arrogant victors who treated them with a superciliousness and a disdain past all bearing. Suspicion and dissatisfaction reigned throughout the city ; quarrelling and fighting were of daily recurrence among the motley crowd who had made Constantinople their headquarters, and the climax of all this unrest and misery was reached in an awful fire which broke out in September of this same year. The fire, which according to Villehardouin, raged for "two days and two nights," and was ascribed alternately both to Latins and Greeks, caused fearful havoc and loss, and some idea of its magnitude is given by the statement that the conflagration presented a frontage of three miles. This appalling disaster heightened the distrust and irritability rampant in the city, and awoke afresh in the minds of the allies the question as to what was their right course of action. The Crusaders wrangled anew as to the advisability of attending to the Pope's exhortations and proceeding to the Holy Land ; whilst the Venetians merely studied how to make use of circumstances so as to turn them to their own advantage and provide for the safety of their merchants and merchandise in the Levant. They managed in the meanwhile to secure from the French a renewal of the lease of the ships and transport, and the contract was signed up to Michelmas Day, 1204. Having

settled this business, they determined to know exactly how they stood with the Emperors, and sent in an ultimatum reminding them of their promises. Villehardouin, who was one of the ambassadors chosen on the occasion, describes the scene for us, and speaks of the insolent language held by the Crusaders to Isaac and his son; language such as no Emperor of Constantinople had ever listened to before, and which roused the fury and indignation of the Greeks who stood around to such a pitch that a tumult ensued, and the ambassadors seeing that the tide of popular feeling was setting against them, slipped out unobserved in the crowd and so managed to escape with their lives.

This took place in November, and hostilities were at once resumed, the Greeks commencing by an attempt to fire the Venetian fleet.

"They took," says Villehardouin, "seventeen large rafts and filled them with big and small pieces of wood, with wadding, pitch, and tar, and waited for the wind to blow strongly towards them. And one night at midnight they set fire to the rafts and loosed the sails to the wind; and the fire caught and burned high, so that it seemed as though the earth were ablaze. And the rafts came thus towards the pilgrim's fleet, and the cry arose in the camp, and they ran to arms from every quarter. The Venetians ran to their vessels, and commenced very vigorously to withdraw them from the fire. And Geoffrey, the Marshal of Champagne, who dictates this work, testifies to you that never folk on sea helped themselves better than did the Venetians; for they threw themselves into the galleys and barks, and seizing the lighted rafts with hooks, they drew them with full force before their foes out of the port and set them in the tide of the Arm [of St George, *i.e.*, the Dardanelles] and let them go, thus burning, down the pass of the Arm. Such a number of Greeks had assembled on the shore that there was no end to them, and the noise was so great it was as though the earth and the sea were

dissolving. And they entered into boats and barges and shot at our men who were fighting the fire; and some were wounded. . . . They endured this travail and anguish till day, but by the help of God' ours lost nothing save a ship of the Pisans, full of merchandise, which was consumed by the fire. They were in great peril that night, for had their fleet been burnt they would all have been lost and could not have got away either by land or sea. It was the price that the Emperor Alexius tried to pay them for the service they had rendered him."

Fifteen days later another attempt was made of the same sort (not, however, mentioned by Villehardouin), but the Venetians were on the lookout and the danger was averted.

The Greeks seeing that their chances of destroying the fleet were of no avail, tried other means to rid themselves of their foes. They repaired their defences and mustered all their fighting material; but, aware that neither energy nor action could be expected from such effete monarchs as Isaac and his son had proved themselves to be, they proceeded to elect a new Emperor. Their choice fell upon Alexius Ducas, surnamed from his shaggy eyebrows Murtzuphlus, who was one of the young Alexius's most trusted courtiers. His first act was to murder this luckless youth by treachery, and then to depose Isaac, who shortly after died from a broken heart. Murtzuphlus was at once proclaimed Emperor, and vowed that in eight days he would free Constantinople from the foreign invaders.

These events were fraught with consequences to the Crusaders. The conditions drawn up in their favour at Zara no longer held good; the promises made to them by Alexius and his father had now no meaning; they were in the midst of foes thirsting for vengeance and blood, in the heart of a city that was at length able to withstand them. Murtzuphlus also had tried to inveigle the leaders of the

allies into his power, and they saw that their only chance of safety lay in declaring war upon the usurper. To the Venetians indeed no other choice was open. The treaties drawn up of old in their favour would either have to be renounced for ever, or renewed at the edge of the sword. The Venetian merchants, who with their wives and families formed a large colony in Constantinople, would have to be left to the mercy of foes embittered by the worst passions that can possess humanity, and could hope for no mercy. The commerce that had been established by years of labour and perseverance and industry would be ruined for ever, and with it the prestige and glory of Venice. Such interests, such lives, and such a position had to be safeguarded at any price, and Venice was ready to pay it. The allies resolved upon hostilities, but before commencing they drew up the conditions to be observed when once the city was in their hands. No doubt seems to have existed in their minds as to the certainty of success, and this "calm, unclouded" confidence never deserted them for a moment. The treaty drawn up on 7th March 1204 was agreed to by all the leaders of the expedition, and its terms were as follows:—All the booty was to be collected and brought to one given spot, when, before all else, the debt still owing to the Venetians was to be paid off; the rest of the booty was then to be divided equally between the two people; a commission of twelve electors was to be named of six Venetians and six French, who were to appoint the new Emperor, to whom one-fourth of the Empire was to be assigned, the remaining three-fourths being partitioned between French and Venetians. A patriarch was to be chosen from the nation from which the Emperor had not been elected; and for a year both French and Venetians were to remain in Constantinople to establish the new ruler and help him to restore order. The Venetians were to retain all their old

privileges and rights, while they added besides a clause by which no citizen of any other state which was at war with the Republic might traffic in the Empire.

This partition of one of the world's greatest kingdoms before it was even in the hands of its assailants is one of the strangest things in history. The more so when we remember that these assailants were a handful of men far from home, with no supplies of food and ammunition beyond what they had on their ships, with no help beyond what they themselves could contribute, and yet confident of conquering and dividing the old Empire of Rome. The conception of such a plan was Dandolo's, and the power to carry it out lay in the galleys and ships of Venice and in the discipline and skill of her seamen.

The allies prepared for action by making new scaling-ladders, battering-rams, and other apparatus for war ; they laid in fresh stores of provisions from the Asiatic coast ; and by means of the light galleys they carried on a series of skirmishes which harassed and wearied the Greeks without any damage to themselves. The assault was begun on 9th April 1204. The land attack was made in four divisions of soldiers, each attended by its relative force of huissiers and escort-galleys. Some of the ships in the meanwhile managed, owing to a favourable tide, to anchor close under the walls where they engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the Greeks ; others not so fortunate had to anchor at a distance that rendered the flying bridges useless, and compelled the crews to wade to land weighted with their scaling-ladders and pickaxes. The fight raged fiercely ; but the ships were so badly placed for manœuvring that they could avail little, and the Crusaders were repulsed. Many were disheartened and wished to relinquish the undertaking, saying that Providence did not smile on the cause they had on hand. The Venetians, headed by the undaunted Dandolo, would not hear of



CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

From the picture by Domenico Tintoretto, in the Ducal Palace, Venice.



withdrawing: they devised a way to renew the attack so as to render failure impossible, and swiftly and surely repaired the damage done to the ships. They also lashed the huissiers together so as to give additional strength and weight to the attacking body, and at the same time they overlaid the galleys with gratings, and cased their vessels with leather hides, iron plates, and blankets to protect them from stones and other noxious missiles, and they prepared cans of vinegar with which to extinguish the Greek fire. Forty huissiers were lashed together, while the galleys and smaller vessels took up their position in the vanguard; and on 12th April, a favourable wind blowing from the north, the attack was begun again. The fight was even fiercer and bloodier than ever, and for awhile it seemed as though the Venetians would again be discomfited. At the critical moment, however, the twin huissiers, the *Pilgrim* and the *Paradise*, pitched heavily forward, bringing their yards on to the level of the walls, and enabling three sailors, two Frenchmen, and a Venetian¹ to seize hold of the turrets of a tower and plant on it the banners of the Bishop of Soissons and of St Mark. The sight aroused all the enthusiasm and courage of the Crusaders. Regardless of the numbers thronging against them and the weapons flying around them, they pressed on to victory, and Constantinople was taken.

Murtzuphlus tried in vain to rally his soldiers; they were altogether disorganised and effete; and during the night he fled, leaving the city in the hands of the enemy. The following morning the French and Venetians penetrated into the town, advancing warily, for they expected at every corner to encounter opposition. None was made; the East had given way to the West, and Byzantium was conquered.

¹ Villehardouin says there was but one Frenchman and one Venetian, and that the Frenchman was a knight named André d'Urboise. *Op. cit.*, p. 142. The Venetian's name was Pietro Alberti.

The horrors which followed baffle description. For three days the town was given over to the licentiousness and butchery of the French and Venetian soldiery, when scenes of unparalleled violence and cruelty took place. The churches were rifled and profaned; the houses of peaceful private citizens were plundered and ruined; nunneries and monasteries were desecrated; thousands of the inhabitants were murdered, while the amount of treasure stolen and of works of art spoilt is beyond all calculation. The glorious church of St Sophia was outraged in every way; the plunderers finally bringing beasts of burden into the building, and piling upon their backs the heaps of riches and precious things which could not be carried off otherwise. The wealth that the Crusaders amassed was fabulous. The debt owing to the Venetians was paid off with interest, and though much of the money taken was embezzled or stolen, a vast quantity yet remained to be accounted for and divided among the victors. No heed was given any longer to the needs and necessities of the Christians of Jerusalem; the lust of gain filled every heart, and though specious promises were made as to the Holy Land, they were made as a salve to dulled consciences, and were no more than empty words.

The allies had their work fully cut out for them in Constantinople. They had to appoint a patriarch as well as choose an emperor, and to apportion the new states and possessions now belonging to them. The choice of an emperor fell at first on Dandolo, but both he and his countrymen refused an offer which was at once incompatible with his age and with his position as the head of a Republic. Baldwin, Count of Flanders and Hainault, was then named, and crowned in St Sophia on 23rd May 1204. A Venetian, Tommaso Morosini, was named Patriarch, and for many years afterwards the

offices and emoluments of the church in Constantinople were in the hands of the Venetian clergy. The division of lands and riches and titles worked out also well for Venice. Her portion was to be a quarter and half a quarter of the Empire; over and above this she was allotted the Ionian isles, many islands in the Ægean Sea, the greater number of the harbours on the Grecian and Albanian coasts, with as many seaports as could serve for her commerce. The monuments of art which the Venetians saved from the plunder of the town, including as they did the four famous bronze horses, are too well known to be enumerated here, nor is this the place to enlarge on the treasures which were carried off wholesale from the "Queen of Cities" to enrich St Mark's and many another Venetian church. The Doge was to bear the title of: "Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia, Lord of one-fourth and one-eighth of the Roman Empire," to which title was added that of despot—a rank but one degree below that of emperor—he was permitted to wear the purple-dyed buskins in token of his sovereignty, and he was exempt from doing homage for the newly-acquired fiefs.

Thus ended the Fourth Crusade, a crusade whose object originally set on the freeing of Christ's sepulchre, had been diverted by Dandolo for the overthrow of the Eastern Empire, and for the gain and glory of Venice and the Venetians. He had accomplished his purpose, but in the few months yet left to him some misgivings may well have assailed even his dauntless spirit, and in the midst of the applause ringing in his ears another note may have made itself heard as to how posterity would judge and approve of a policy which was eventually to make it possible for the Turk to enter, and possess, Constantinople.

The close of this great enterprise was shrouded in defeat and disaster. The Emperor Baldwin's army met


with an overwhelming defeat at the hands of a wild horde of Bulgarians, Tartars, and Comans under Joannice, or Calo-John, King of Bulgaria. Baldwin himself was taken prisoner, and no certainty, beyond ghastly rumours, remains as to his fate. The Marquis of Montferrat died of wounds received in battle against the Bulgarians, and most of the other leaders of the expedition were killed or taken captive, till Dandolo was left alone, and died at last old and weary, crushed by the loss of his comrades in arms, and by the overthrow of so many bright hopes. He died in Constantinople on 14th June 1205, and was buried with great pomp in the church of St Sophia. He was ninety-five at the time of his death, and, however mistaken may have been the motives which urged him to the conquest of Byzantium, no one can withhold their admiration for his consummate genius as a general, or see in him aught save a patriot intent on his country's glory, and ambitious only for that country's weal.

“Who,” says Streit, speaking of Dandolo, “would dare to-day to censure the man who for so many years ruled the destinies of the East? The greatness and glory of his country were the ideals he set before him, and he knew, as no other Doge has known before or since, how to attain those ideals without ever losing sight of the Imperial interests. When he was able to call himself *quartæ partis et dimidiæ totius imperii Romanicæ dominator*; when he had secured to the clergy of Venice the patriarchate of Constantinople; when by his will the weak Baldwin had assumed the Imperial diadem, and the ambitious Boniface, after the cession of Crete, was satisfied with the crown of Macedon; then Henry Dandolo in the ninety-sixth year of his age attained his ideal, and in the honour and advantage of his country had his full reward. He died in the place where a twofold glory was his, first as the defender of Venice, and then as her avenger.”

The error committed in the destruction of the Greek

Empire in Constantinople was of far-reaching and disastrous consequences, but for the moment the capture of the capital of the East by a handful of French and Venetians under the command of an aged, almost blind man, cannot fail to arouse wonder and admiration. No blunder marred the progress of the fleet from the Adriatic to the Golden Horn; no defeat of any weight arrested the arms of the invaders, and all this was due to Dandolo. It was he who directed every move; who reconciled the chiefs when personal friction disturbed the harmony existing between them; who knew where to commence every siege operation, and whose advice, when followed, was invariably successful. The great Doge has been accused of wiliness and ambition, and doubtless he was crafty and ambitious, but he was so solely in his country's service; and his name will remain glorious to all time as one of the very greatest of Venice's great sons, as admiral and general, as statesman and patriot.

The immediate results of the Fourth Crusade were to raise Venice as a maritime power to a position of the first rank in the Mediterranean—a position which she owed to Enrico Dandolo, and to the greatness and efficiency of her Navy.



A Galley.

CHAPTER VII

VENICE AND GENOA

1238—1299

Battle of Tyre. Battle of Acre. Battle of Settepozzi. The
“Caravan of the Levant” captured at Saseno. Battle of Trapani.
Battle of Curzola.

VENICE and Genoa were foes of long standing. The many points they had in common did but enhance their rivalry at every turn and add a hundredfold to the bitter enmity that reigned between them. The nature of their pursuits, the importance of their trade, their struggle for supremacy, the desire of each to be recognised as the dominant power in the Mediterranean, all combined to accentuate this enmity and to make any abiding union between them impossible. Their interests, their commerce, their means of wealth were centred alike in the East, and to both of them the affairs in that region were of far deeper concern than matters lying nearer home, which, for the most part, they passed over with supreme indifference. This antagonism was also due, in a great measure, to their geographical position, for Genoa was as much cut off by her mountains from the rest of the Peninsula as Venice was by the waters of her lagoons.

There had been, however, a brief period—but only one—in the history of the two Republics when a lasting alliance, offensive and defensive, had been drawn up

between them, and when for some years the banners of St Mark and St George had flown in harmony on the masts of their respective galleys. This was in 1238, when their common interests almost forced them into a league against Frederick II. of Swabia. As far as Venice was concerned this league was not prompted by any desire to save Genoa from the Imperial clutches, but was formed solely with the object of uniting against a common danger, and to safeguard her own interests and possessions in the Adriatic and Syria. It was none too soon either for Venice to join in opposing the encroachments and designs of Frederick both in Italy and abroad, and to assert herself in the struggle going on in the Peninsula to check the Emperor's ambition. That monarch made no secret of his intention to establish a foothold in the East. He had allied himself with John Vatatzes, Emperor of Nicæa, and a bitter foe to the Latin Empire, and he strove by every means in his power to thwart and damage Venetian interests in the Levant. He openly supported Ezzelino da Romano, the Republic's deadliest enemy on the mainland, he favoured the people of Ancona (whose intolerance of Venetian claims in the Adriatic has often been dwelt on in these pages), and he avowedly aimed at crippling Venice's independence as much by sea as by land.

The alliance between the two maritime states was joined in 1239 by the Pope, Gregory IX., and had it but been strenuously carried into effect the Emperor's position would have been untenable. As it was he managed to evade the danger. He incited the subjects of the Republics to rise against their liege lords; he prepared for himself so efficient and vast a Navy as to make attack upon him well-nigh impossible; he entrusted the command of his fleet to Nicolino Spinola, a Genoese exile and one of the ablest admirals of the day. His stratagems were entirely successful. Venice, at first engaged with the

inhabitants of Ancona and Zara, was in 1240 altogether absorbed in the war against Ferrara, and left Genoa and the Pope to meet Frederick's attacks alone. The Pope's death in 1241 left Genoa alone and single-handed to carry on the campaign against the Emperor; and that she carried on the struggle for ten years, not only with valour but in such a way as to avoid annihilation, proves the efficiency of her Navy and the skill and energy of her commanders. Genoa emerged from the struggle fortified by endurance, disciplined by trial, and fit in every way to contest with Venice the supremacy of the Mediterranean.

In 1251, Genoa further strengthened her position by allying herself on land with Florence and Lucca, and at the same time renewed the alliance which she had contracted in 1238 with Venice. The renewal of this league in no way indicated, however, a closer bond of union between the two Republics. It was but the expression of an extra precaution taken against a common danger, and implied no increase of friendship or amity between the powers. The link that bound them was of too frail a nature to be cajoled into length of life, and that it held good for well-nigh twenty years was a matter of universal surprise—perhaps most of all to the states chiefly concerned.

The breach first showed itself in the East, and originated at Acre, in the commercial rivalry between the two peoples whose quarters were in dangerous proximity, actually touching at the church of Sta Saba, which stood on the confines of their respective territories. The possession of this building, together with the right to settle the ceremonies and services to be held in it, formed a never-ending cause of dispute. The Venetian *bailo*, Marco Giustinian, produced documents, and even a Papal brief, to prove that the church belonged to Venice. He was at once met with similar papers which the Genoese

laid before the Knights of St John to prove equally that the edifice was theirs. The contention waxed ever hotter, and the murder of a Genoese by a Venetian finally brought matters to a climax. The Genoese rushed to arms, entered forcibly into the Venetian quarter of the city, and drove their rivals to seek shelter in their own church of St Mark. The quarrel was espoused by the Pisans, who, ignorant of the fact that their fellow-citizens at home were fighting against the Genoese, here joined their arms to those of Genoa and made common cause against the Venetians. Together they attacked some Venetian ships anchored in the harbour of Acre, seized them, and divided the booty. This occurred in 1256, or early in 1257, and was of too serious a nature to pass unnoticed. Diplomatic negotiations were entered upon at once, and at the outset it seemed as though peaceful measures would prevail. Venice agreed to a proposal that her ambassadors should proceed to Bologna, and there discuss the settlement of affairs in Palestine with the envoys from Genoa. An embassy was also despatched from Genoa to Venice to offer an apology for what was, in sooth, a wanton outrage, and to express a readiness to repair as far as possible the injury done.

Venice was, however, too deeply offended to be satisfied with words or apologies. Her attitude of outward calm was but the presage of the storm about to burst. If we are to believe Da Canale's *Chronicle*, the Doge Raniero Zeno ordered the ambassadors summarily to depart, warning them to be out of Venetian territory in three days' time, and adding that he and his council would determine what satisfaction it would be necessary to demand. A strong fleet was got ready to proceed immediately to Acre, whilst proposals were made to Pisa to join in an offensive and defensive league against Genoa, when the crime of having taken part against the

Serenissima would be overlooked. For ten years to come the allies were to combine to molest Genoa on every possible occasion by land or sea and in all her colonies. Pisa consented, and the treaty was signed at Modena on 14th July 1257. Genoa's rejoinder was to effect an alliance with Philip of Montfort, lord of Tyre, and with the barons of Jerusalem against Venice. The contest aroused partisans throughout the East. Marco Giustinian exerted himself strenuously to gain allies for his side, and succeeded in winning to the Venetian cause Boemond, Prince of Antioch, Queen Placenza of Cyprus and her son Hugh, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and many of the great barons of the neighbourhood. The Knights of St John and the rich merchants of Acre, on the other hand, sided with the Genoese. These latter were certainly inferior to the Venetians in the number of their allies, but they sought to make good the deficiency by a full and careful preparation for the on-coming war. They burnt a tower belonging to the Pisans; they fortified the hill of Montjoy, rising at the back of Sta Saba; they stored arms and ammunition in the tower known as that of the Mosques; they stretched a heavy chain across the entrance to the harbour; and they gained over to their cause every available soldier in Acre.

These preparation were made none too soon. In the middle of September 1257, the Venetian fleet hove in sight, consisting of fourteen galleys and a considerable number of transport ships, under the command of Lorenzo Tiepolo, who lost no time in forcing the harbour entrance by driving his galley (*Capitana*) violently against the chain stretched across it. He attacked the Tower of the Mosques, which stood at the mouth of the harbour, and seizing all the Genoese merchant vessels, set them and two disarmed galleys on fire. He then landed, fought his way to Sta Saba, which he captured, and burnt all

the surrounding fortifications and houses. The day following, being reinforced by the sailors from his galleys and the Venetians and Pisans settled in Acre, he continued his attack, carrying fire and sword into the Genoese quarter and laying siege to a strong tower which the men of Acre held for Genoa.


The Genoese sought to make good the damage inflicted on them by concentrating their forces at Tyre, where they were within touch of their powerful ally, Philip of Montfort. A reinforcement from Genoa of ten galleys under Paschetto Mallone having now augmented the fleet of seven galleys which the Republic of St George had already sent to the East, measures were resolved on for the rescue of the Genoese colony shut up in Acre. Many a time did Mallone set out from Tyre to their relief, but he was checked on every occasion, and had invariably to put back. Tiepolo saw his opportunity in his rival's hesitation, and made the most of it. He drew up his fleet of eighteen or nineteen Venetian galleys in battle array outside Tyre, and offered battle to the seventeen galleys of the Genoese. These, however, could not be ranged for frontal attacks, and on seeing the advance of the Venetian ships, could only come out of the harbour one by one. This they did, and without awaiting the rest of their forces, threw themselves in single file on to the steady line of the Venetians. The result can be imagined. The Genoese admiral's galley, together with three others, which accompanied him, were at once surrounded and taken, and carried off in triumph to Acre.

The absolute lack of tactical skill on the part of the Genoese is matter for supreme surprise, and in some way lessens the glory accruing to the Venetians. The victory however, was an all-important one to them, strengthening their cause, and gaining for them fresh allies in the city of Marseilles and the Knights Templar of the Teutonic

orders. In company with these latter they assaulted the Genoese quarter in Acre, where, however, they met with firm opposition.

This state of war and bloodshed between Christians in the East caused serious alarm in Italy; especially to the Pope, who was anxious to heal the breach and put a stop to the iniquities of war. The Venetians and Pisans were by no means disinclined to accept the Papal intervention; but the Genoese were strongly opposed to it, and it was some time before Alexander IV. was able to induce them to listen even to a discussion of the subject and to agree, together with their adversaries, to send delegates to Viterbo to talk things over.

While negotiations were being lengthily drawn out at Viterbo, fightings and dissensions were continuing in Syria. The Venetian fleet had been reinforced by the arrival of Andrea Zeno from Venice with sixteen light galleys, followed shortly after by Lorenzo Barozzi with ten *taride*. Another contingent of three galleys from Crete brought Tiepolo's force up to an armament of thirty galleys, four big ships, and ten of smaller build. The Genoese were somewhat stronger than their foes in point of numbers, for they had some fifty galleys and four other ships, but they were weaker as to allies and were disheartened by reverses. Their admiral was Rosso della Turca, a tried and valiant captain who had commanded the Genoese expedition when Louis IX. of France had hired transports from Genoa to convey him and his troops to the Holy Land. The Venetians were keen to avoid an engagement by sea, and wished to possess themselves, if possible, of the land fortifications around Acre. The Genoese on the contrary had all to gain from a naval battle, and sought by every means in their power to bring it about. Rosso della Turca devised an advance upon Acre with his fleet, arranging at the



MODEL OF A GALLEY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

In the Museo Civico, Venice.



MODEL OF A GALLEASS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

In the Museo Civico, Venice.

same time that his ally, Philip of Montfort, should support him on land with his troops and the Knights of St John. On the morning of 23rd June 1258, he drew up his line of ships before Acre, inviting the Venetians to come out against him. The challenge was not accepted at once, many of the Venetian crew having been despatched to carry out some manœuvres on land. The Grand Master of the Knights Templar, however, urged on Tiepolo and Zeno to accept battle, and sent his own men to supply the place of the absentees. The lists were further swelled by a crowd of fighting men of all nationalities, who, either from greed of gain or animosity to the Genoese, offered to help the Venetians, and the battle began. No trustworthy details of the engagement have come down to us. We know only that it was a desperate fight; that both sides behaved valiantly, and that it ended in the complete overthrow of the Genoese. Their losses were great: no less than twenty-four galleys (some writers say twenty-five) were either taken or sunk; the number between killed and prisoners was 1700, and history is silent as to the fate of their admiral, Rosso della Turca.

The Venetian commanders, Tiepolo and Zeno, entered Acre in triumph, and supported by enthusiastic crowds they stormed the Genoese quarter, when the inhabitants surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared. Acre was thus completely lost to Genoa; every trace of the colony was swept away by the victors, who, in their arrogance, even forbade any Genoese from entering the port with their flag flying. The Genoese headquarters were now transferred to Tyre, but the overwhelming defeat they had sustained crippled their resources, and made them, for the moment, of small account as commercial rivals of Venice.

The news of the battle reached Europe only a few days after the delegates at Viterbo had come to terms,

and when they had actually set out for Palestine to carry the news that peace had been agreed upon, and to bid the inhabitants lay down their arms in the Pope's name. With the delegates was the Papal Legate on his way to take over the administration of the towers which had originally formed the bone of contention between the two people, and little did he think that the Venetian galleys which he met on his passage were then carrying home some of the stones of those very towers for erection outside St Mark's—a memorial for all time of Venice's great naval victory at Acre.

The failure of the peace negotiations was absolute; their renewal was impossible. Genoa's first object was, of necessity, to avenge the insults and injuries she had received, and, through victory, to regain the prestige she had lost. Venice and Pisa, on the other hand, had also to be held in check, otherwise the balance of sea-power in the Mediterranean which Venice's two victories at Tyre and Acre had upset, would have been disastrously affected and serious consequences would ensue. The difficulty for Genoa was how to readjust this deranged balance of power and enable her to act once more on the offensive.

Venice, by her alliance with Ghibelline Pisa, and the sympathy she had extended to Manfred in Sicily, had altogether departed from the old traditions which generally found her siding with the Popes and the Guelphs, and had proved that allies must occasionally be sought in out-of-the-way quarters and among nations with whom no intercourse was once deemed possible.

Genoa was resolved to adopt a similar policy. By herself she was powerless to withstand the Republics of Venice and Pisa, or to carry on a war with a base of operations hundreds of miles from home, and where every dockyard and arsenal was in the hands of foes. She determined to make overtures to Michael Paleologus,

Emperor of the Greeks, the founder of the Imperial house of that name, and the worthy successor of Theodore Lascaris and John Vatatzes. The choice was a happy one. Paleologus was Venice's deadly foe: he saw in her the obstacle to his regaining Constantinople and planting once again the seat of the Grecian Empire in its old capital, and he saw before all else that the removal of the Venetian fleet from the waters of the Bosphorus would mean the fall of the Latin Empire and the establishment of his own. He was, however, badly off as to ships, and he well understood that unless he was backed by a powerful maritime ally, no endeavours on his part could succeed against Byzantium. A league with Genoa would give shape to his cherished hopes, and he warmly accepted the terms laid before him by Guglielmo Visconti and Guarniero Giudice, the Genoese representatives, for an offensive and defensive alliance against Venice. To Genoa it was of little or no importance who reigned at Constantinople, nor was she affected by the indignation aroused by her alliance with the "schismatic conqueror" (as Gibbon calls Paleologus). Her one object was to quell the pride and power of Venice, to wrest from her her possessions in the Levant, and to bear a part in detaching Negropont, Candia, the Cyclades, and the feudatories in the Morea from their allegiance to the Winged Lion.

The throne of Constantinople was then occupied by Baldwin II., a weak and contemptible monarch, whose reign had been chiefly passed in wandering from one court to another asking for money, and resorting to every device to get it. He had despoiled his capital with that intent, even stripping the lead off the roofs and from the windows, and selling the sacred vessels out of the churches. He had raised money in Venice by handing over his son Philip as a hostage, and had pawned the Crown of Thorns to the great banking house of Querini, from whom it was

bought by Louis IX. of France and placed in the Sainte Chapelle, which he built expressly to house it. Not only was Baldwin's reign undignified, but his crown was insecure, and depended for its very existence on the presence of the Venetian fleet at Constantinople.

At the critical moment, however, this same fleet was absent: not lured away by guile or artifice, but sent off by Marco Gradenigo, the Venetian *bailo*, on an expedition which was intended to add fresh glory to Venice, and which cost her instead her dominion in Constantinople.

Gradenigo had but lately been placed in command; he was young and zealous, and in his eagerness to rouse the Latins from their state of apathy, he urged them to besiege Daphnusia, a town on the Black Sea. He pressed all the available troops, French and Venetian alike, into the service, and sailed away with thirty galleys, leaving only old men and women to defend the city and the Emperor.

Paleologus in the meanwhile had appointed one of his favourites, Alexius Strategopulus, general of his forces, he conferred on him the title of Cæsar, and ordered him to commence operations by attacking the Despot of Epirus. The inhabitants of that district were a hardy race of outlaws and peasants, unruly, licentious, and inimical to the Latins. Their language and religion inclined them to side with the Greeks, and under the name of "volunteers," they joined the Cæsar's army. They informed him of the defenceless condition in which the Emperor Baldwin had been left, and offered to guide him into Constantinople. This offer was accepted, and at night the Greek force was introduced by a secret way known to some of the "volunteers," and leading by the Golden Gate on to the ramparts. Cries of "Long life and victory to Michael and John, the august emperors of the Romans," rang out from the heights, and Strategopulus, who was awaiting the cry as a signal to advance, came in through the

Golden Gate. His own chosen Greek soldiers stood around him in a body, while the Comans or Tartars spread themselves in every direction, burning, pillaging, and destroying all that came in their way. The dread that these savage hordes inspired in the Latin inhabitants completed Strategopulus's victory, and nothing was thought of but flight. The Emperor Baldwin set the example, and followed by the Patriarch, the French, and most of the Venetians, he left the city and fled to the harbour to seek refuge on board the Venetian galleys. Those vessels were at that very moment returning from the siege of Daphnusia, and the feelings of the commander may be imagined as he led his fleet back to the spot which he should never have left, and saw Constantinople in flames. No hope of rescue remained. The French and Venetian rule in Constantinople, which had lasted for fifty-seven years, was ended, and the Venetian ships could but carry off the terrified refugees and emphasise, by flight, the completeness of their overthrow.

The fleet put out to sea, heading for Negropont, but the number of fugitives on board was so great that provisions were soon exhausted, and many a victim succumbed before they gained their destination. No proof has come down to us that the fall of the Latin Empire at Byzantium occasioned much concern at Venice. It may be that the extent of the disaster was not realised at first; that the fleet under Gradenigo having halted at Negropont, no visual evidence of the fugitive ships and their passengers was brought before the notice of the citizens at home; and finally, that the belief in their power to drive out the usurper and reinstate themselves speedily at Constantinople was a rooted conviction in every Venetian heart.

Michael Paleologus made his triumphal entry into Constantinople on 26th July 1261 (Heyd says the 15th

August), when he put an end to the pillage committed by his followers and made terms with the Venetians and Pisans who had not fled from the city. They were allowed to remain in their own quarter; their *bailo* might exercise his powers as of old, and they might still appeal to and be judged by their own laws and magistrates. The Genoese, in their capacity of friends and allies, were granted greater privileges. One concession, indeed, caused untold offence to the Venetians and considerably increased the bad feeling existing between the two states. This was Michael's gift to Genoa of the palace of the Pandocrater, where the Venetian *bailo* had always lived, and which, being in a part of the town remote from the quarter occupied by the Genoese, was of no special advantage to them. Nor was the insult—for so the Venetians reckoned it—softened to them by the destruction of the palace and the removal of the stones to Genoa, where they were used in the erection of the church of S. Giorgio. The arrogance constantly shown by the Genoese was not confined to their foes and rivals; it was so markedly displayed to the Greeks themselves that the Emperor decided to remove them from too close a proximity to his own subjects, and established them in the suburb of Galata, where they settled and fortified themselves, and remained for many a year.

Paleologus's agreement with the Venetians in Constantinople in no way affected his relations with the Republic of Venice. He desired neither peace nor alliance with the *Serenissima*, his object being to win back all the conquests she had made in the East and become absolute master of what had once belonged to the Latin Empire. He stirred up revolt in Negropont; he possessed himself of Lemnos, Scio, Rhodes, and many islands in the Ægean Sea, and handed the island of Scio over to the Genoese.

The Venetians could not remain inactive under such losses, and their first act was to get ready a force of eighteen galleys under Marco Michiel. The uselessness of providing so small an armament was, however, soon recognised, and a large fleet was prepared wherewith to safeguard Venetian interests and possessions in the East. A convoy of thirty-seven galleys was despatched to the Black Sea under Giacomo Dolfin, and an order was issued that every *Sopracomito* in command of a galley should be of noble rank, while Dolfin himself was to be supported by a body of six counsellors (*consiglieri*)—a new departure in the Venetian navy and marking the importance attached to this expedition. Some sailing vessels also accompanied the fleet, among them being one called the Lion, which certainly acted up to her name, for having in some manner got separated from her comrades and encountering a force of twenty Genoese galleys off the island of Tenedos, she had the boldness to engage them for awhile, and then managing to escape, rejoined Dolfin's ships. Dolfin met the Greco-Genoese fleet of sixty galleys outside Thessalonica, but declined an engagement, and manœuvred so as to evade the allies, who had finally to put into winter-quarters at Genoa.

Another expedition was sent by Lorenzo Tiepolo, the Venetian *bailo* in Negropont, to harry the seas up to Constantinople. The Venetians took a large quantity of booty, but on the return journey fell in with some of the Greco-Genoese galleys. A struggle ensued, in which “sed defendoient mult bien les Veneciens que de sor li sandals estoient montes” (Da Canale, p. 484), but they were defeated owing to superior numbers; the greater part of their crew were put to death, while the rest were sent to the Greek Emperor, who caused them all to be blinded in a barbarous fashion.

Reprisals naturally followed, and more men and ships

were got ready on both sides. The Venetians equipped thirty-two galleys which were despatched to Romania, and in the spring of 1263 the whole force, now under the command of Giberto Dandolo, met the Greco-Genoese fleet of thirty-nine galleys and ten pinnaces (*saettie*) manned by 6000 men armed well, and, according to Canale, "commanded by four admirals in whom the Emperor had much confidence." The foes met at the island of Settepozzi (the Seven Wells), off the coast of Nauplia, and a desperate conflict followed. The Venetians were inferior both in men and ships, but fortune and strategy stood them in good stead, and a brilliant victory ensued.

Canale tells us how, when "Messer Giberto, the noble Captain, both brave and bold, saw the great ships of the Genoese, he was in no way afraid, but like a lion haughty and secure he armed all his men, and ordered those in command of the galleys on no account to be so foolhardy as to strike before he gave the word. The Genoese came on in serried lines, each division of ten commanded by an admiral. But had you been present, O sirs, you might have seen the Venetians warming to the fight, and presenting a bold and skilful front. When Messer Giberto Dandolo, the noble Captain of the Venetians, saw that it was time to strike, he cried aloud, 'God and Monsignor St Mark of Venice be with us, up, up, and at them.' He let drive and struck the galleys of the Genoese; the other galleys charged too, and struck likewise. So the battle was long and bitter, each side having much to do to sustain it. In the midst of the affray a number of bold men of Venice boarded the galley of the Genoese admiral, cut down the standard, slaying one of the admirals on board, and after cutting down his standard, took possession of it, whilst the admiral himself escaped in a small boat. Now you must know that both standards were chained and double chained in the very centre of the galley. Two other Genoese galleys were also taken in that battle, whilst another, which the Genoese had captured—having ventured

too far ahead—was recaptured. When the two remaining Genoese admirals saw that the two standards were torn down, they put to flight with the rest of their galleys, leaving the four with all their men in the hands of the enemy. The wrong done to the Venetians in Constantinople was well avenged in that battle, for therein were slain and wounded 600 Genoese, besides 400 taken prisoners; whereas only twenty Venetians were killed and some 400 wounded, and these subsequently recovered. . . . Messer Giberto, the bold Captain of the Venetians, when he saw the galleys of Genoa in flight, was fain to pursue them, but when he learnt how many of his men were wounded, and that his galleys were somewhat damaged, the pursuit was given up. . . . The Genoese whom he had taken he put in chains, and cast them into the holds of the galleys, whilst he caused the wounds of both Venetians and Genoese to be seen to and dressed.”

The Genoese admiral, who fell fighting valiantly was Pietro Avvocato; the other, who basely fled, was Lanfranco Spinola.

The allied fleet in its flight came across four Venetian *taride* sailing to Negropont laden with provisions. These they captured, avenging to some extent the losses they had incurred at the battle of Settepozzi. Such passages of arms, even when backed by so stern an encounter as that of the Seven Wells, were, however, of no avail in determining the issues of the war, or in hastening its conclusion. The careless way in which the Genoese evidently threw away their chances of victory points to one of two things: either that they were forced to such a measure by the political state of affairs at home, where the factions of the nobility and people rent the town in two; or that they had no desire to finish a war which was highly lucrative to them on account of the large sums paid by the Emperor Michael for their services. This latter hypothesis gains weight when we read that on hearing of

the disaster Paleologus rudely and instantly dismissed the two Genoese admirals who came to report themselves, and showed clearly his intention of breaking with a people who had not adhered to the terms of their compact. He rebuked them roundly for not having driven the Venetians out of Romania, as they had undertaken to do, and for having involved him in a host of expenses and caused him to squander such a heap of *iperperi* (*un si grant moncians de perpres*).

The rupture, however, between Genoa and Constantinople did not mean peace between the two naval Republics. In 1264, hostilities were resumed on a larger scale and with ever-increasing bitterness. Operations began by Genoa preparing a numerous fleet under Simone Grillo to intercept the convoy of galleys sent annually by Venice to the East. The setting off of this "caravan" (as Venetian writers call it) was a yearly event of great moment. Bales of costly wares and money were sent in it to the ports of Egypt and Asia; the dates of its departure and return were fixed by stern laws, and equally stern were the regulations as to the number of men on board each vessel; the commanders and captains were appointed by the Great Council; while in case of war the Senate pronounced the "Closing of the Sea" (*Chiusura del Mare*), a decree which forbade any vessel in the "caravan" from detaching itself from the main body. If at any time there was a suspicion of foes being encountered on the high seas, the "caravan" was escorted by galleys of war, and no precaution was omitted that made for the safety of this all-important and purely commercial expedition. The Genoese knew well the importance which the Venetians attached to this yearly and time-honoured custom: their own instincts as merchants and traders made them specially alive to the importance of the success or failure of the enterprise, and in striking a blow at "the

Caravan of the Levant" they knew that they would wound Venice in one of her most vulnerable points. Their preparations were, however, made so openly that the Venetians were aware of their intent, as well as of the number of the vessels to be sent against them, and they made their plan accordingly. The Genoese had prepared twenty galleys and two large vessels, with a contingent of 3500 men, while four of their most approved sea-captains were to act as counsellors and advisers to the admiral. The Venetians were resolved to meet this armament with one twice as strong. They made ready no less than forty-seven armed galleys, and appointed as their admiral Andrea Barozzi, "a brave man and wise, and sprung of high lineage." This "noble captain" directed his course to Sicily, making sure that he would find the Genoese there, and by preventing them from sailing eastward he would effectually safeguard the "caravan." Unfortunately on this occasion his wisdom failed him. The Genoese were indeed there, but he did not find them. All he did find was "a boat in which there were men who told him on inquiry that the Genoese galleys had passed four days previously, bound for Syria. On hearing this Messere Andrea Barozzi made no further inquiry, he communed with his counsellors, and all were of one mind to follow up the Genoese, so they hoisted sail and pursued after them. But you must know that they were deceived," as they found to their cost. Grillo having succeeded so easily in putting Barozzi on a false scent, took up his position near Durazzo, and there awaited the on-coming of the "caravan."

Nor were Barozzi and his staff the only dupes. The news spread to Venice and was believed so implicitly that orders were at once given to hasten the departure of the "caravan"—a departure that had been delayed owing to the supposed presence of the enemy's fleet in the

Adriatic. The caravan consisted of thirteen *taride* galleys, three sailing vessels, two light galleys, and several smaller ships. The captain was Michele Duaro, or Doro, who kept on his course in fancied security, never dreaming of the ambush awaiting him, and ignorant of the fact that his every movement had been treacherously revealed to Grillo by one of the underwriters of the Great Council.¹ The Genoese fleet surprised him off the island of Saseno, and fell on him unexpectedly. Duaro at first tried to play the game of "bluff," and displayed a contempt for the foe which he was in reality far from feeling. He tossed a quantity of hencoops in front of the Genoese line of ships, bidding them mockingly go and fight with the chickens! Duaro was, however, in a tight place. He had no escort of warships, and his merchant-ships were in no way calculated to engage the swift light ships of Genoa, fitted from prow to stern with all the requirements of war, and manned with warriors ready for action. He did all that in him lay to save the situation. He ordered the crews to quit the *taride*, and transfer themselves with as much of the heavy costly merchandise as they could remove on board a huge vessel called the *Roccaforte* or "Strong Rock."² The *taride*, heavily laden with merchandise, were abandoned in mid-ocean, though not before the Venetians had pierced holes in many of them, so that they sank to the bottom with all their costly freight. Those still remaining afloat were approached with every precaution by the Genoese, fearful of treachery, and were captured by

¹ Da Canale, whose love for Venice and everything Venetian never falters throughout the whole of his *Chronicle*, is careful to tell us that the traitor hailed from Treviso, and must not for a moment be suspected of being a Venetian.

² How this transfer was actually brought about is not related by our chronicler. He merely tells us that the *taride* and smaller vessels clustered round the *Roccaforte*, under guise of seeking protection, and then chose a favourable moment to effect the transfer.

them. They were all deserted except for one man, who sold his life dearly, and who, Da Canale tells us, was one Gianozzo of Castello. The *Roccaforte* in the meanwhile made warlike preparations, and presented so stern and formidable a front that the Genoese shrank from attacking her, and sent an embassy to her in a small boat to offer terms. "Messere Simone Grillo called upon her crew to surrender, promising that he would land them in safety on dry ground and without damage to their persons." Duaro scornfully refused, adding that the *Roccaforte* was laden with gold, and inviting the Genoese to come and take it. Grillo launched a burning raft against the "Strong Rock," but the Venetians managed to drive it off, and aided by a favourable wind they escaped from the 'Genoese and gained the harbour of Ragusa.

The Venetians had suffered a severe defeat, morally even more than materially, though their loss of heavy merchantmen between sunk and taken was very considerable. Doge Zeno was furious. His wrath fell heavily on Duaro, who, together with his subordinates, he accused of supreme baseness (*somma viltà*), while he declared that such conduct had dimmed the honour and naval glory of Venice, and would soon be known throughout the world. His anger—which appears rather unjust when the unequal conditions of the fight are taken into consideration—was somewhat modified on learning that no prisoners had been made when the castaway *taride* had been captured, and perhaps the knowledge (which came to light shortly after) that Duaro had not been ably supported by his junior officers further softened his indignation.¹

¹ That the sub-lieutenants failed in doing their duty is evident from the minutes of the Great Council, which reveal how the captains in command on this occasion were requested to send in the names of these defaulters in order that a mark should be set against them, and

While these events were taking place Barozzi was calmly pursuing his way to Syria, searching in every corner for Grillo and his squadron, and, naturally enough, searching in vain. No suspicion of the deceit practised on him seems for a moment to have crossed his mind, nor when he failed to find the Genoese did he think of putting back to escort and protect the "caravan." He tried instead to besiege Tyre, when Philip of Montfort, Genoa's ally of old, defended the city and repulsed the Venetian attack.

Other engagements of no special importance kept the two fleets in constant strife for another year, when the damage done to the trade of both the states sapped their respective powers and energies, and seriously affected their exchequers into the bargain.

In 1266 the Doge ordered preparations to be made on a large scale, in order to drive the Genoese out of the seas which the Venetians considered particularly their own, and to bring the skirmishings and piracies of past years to an end by a decisive battle. Venice was actually too impoverished to provide more than four galleys for the task; but the Count of Zara, the Duke of Crete, and the Venetian colony in Negropont were called on to supply contingents, and between them all a force of fifteen galleys was equipped for war. The command was given to Giacomo Dandolo, who was said "to know the harbours and holes where the Genoese lay in hiding." He searched the sea-coasts of Italy and Sicily, seizing on a good deal of spoil from passing ships of Genoa, and, reinforced by a host of ten galleys, which the Doge had prepared in all haste and sent under the direction of Marco Gradenigo to his support, he finally encountered the Genoese fleet at Trapani, off the coast of Sicily, in June 1266.

that they should henceforth be debarred for ever from serving in the Navy.

The Genoese admiral was Lanfranco Borborino, who, in spite of superior numbers and the advice of his counsellors, refused to attack Dandolo, and entrenched himself instead behind a fortification of linked galleys. Seeing this, the Venetian commander determined to open the attack, and though the wind was contrary and prevented him from placing his ships to the best advantage, he struck boldly at his enemy's fortified line. Twice the Venetians attempted to break it, but not till the third time did they succeed in their object by detaching three Genoese galleys from the main body. This feat gained the victory for them. The Genoese, who had again tried the old trick of setting a burning raft adrift against their enemy's ships, were panic-stricken at the sight of their broken line, and fled in every direction—many of them in their terror flinging themselves into the sea. The Venetian leaders, Dandolo, Gradenigo, and Contarini, took advantage of this panic. They dashed into the midst of the flying disordered galleys, carrying off twenty-five captive, and dismantling the others to such an extent that not one vessel was left of the grand Genoese fleet. The prisoners numbered only 600; some 1200 victims were drowned, many were slain, and Genoa in her wrath and anguish arraigned Borborino and his officers before a court-martial to answer for so overwhelming a disaster.

The irritation produced by this defeat was widespread. The Emperor Michael Paleologus began to weary of allies who were more often conquered than conquerors, whose arrogance had angered him many a time exceedingly, and whose help as a naval ally he needed no longer. He had already made overtures to Venice, and in 1265 negotiations had almost been concluded between him and the Venetian envoys, Jacopo Dolfin and Jacopo Contarini. Doge Zeno, however, could not bring himself to accept the terms offered. He aimed at restoring the Republic to the

position she had gained at the time of the Fourth Crusade ; but in 1268, after an infinity of parleyings which occupied three years, nothing beyond an amicable truce for five years, including some privileges as to commerce, was arrived at.

But it was not only with Constantinople that the Republic of St Mark was now ready to listen to terms of peace. Her war with Genoa had lasted for more than ten years, to the injury of both states commercially, morally, and financially. Already the Pope, the King of France, and Charles of Anjou had all attempted to bring matters to a peaceful issue, with, however, no result, the obstacle (according to Manfroni) being that Genoa invariably refused to include Pisa in the proposed treaty, and that Venice loyally declined to agree to terms which excluded her ally. When finally this difficulty was overcome—chiefly through the influence of Louis IX. of France—a truce was signed by the three maritime Republics, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, in which mutual forbearance was guaranteed to the citizens, possessions, and fleets of each community, while Venice's newly formed treaty with Constantinople was to receive special recognition. Venice held to this treaty. It had not, it is true, secured to her all she desired, nor all that a few years previously—when her prestige in Constantinople was unimpaired—she would, perhaps, have exacted, but it conceded to her marked commercial privileges, and with that Venice was content.

The treaty which was signed at Cremona in 1270, on the other hand, was hardly of a nature to satisfy either Venice or Genoa : Venice found herself no longer the sovereign dominant power she had once been in the Eastern Mediterranean ; she had to give up the claim which Dandolo's skill had won for her at the Fourth Crusade as to being the "ruler of one quarter and half a quarter of the whole Empire of Romania," and to admit

the presence of able and powerful rivals in the very Empire where for sixty years she had reigned, and reigned alone.¹ Genoa in her turn had to accept a condition of things very different to what she had looked for both from her wars and their subsequent treaties; and these two states, though outwardly reconciled, were in reality still bitter foes at heart, and only awaiting a lawful excuse for resorting once more to arms. Such an excuse did not fail to present itself.

The Republic of St Mark still cast longing eyes towards the East, hoping that some chance might yet arise whereby she could regain her old footing and drive out the rivals who she foresaw would deprive her bit by bit of all she cherished most in the way of trade, wealth, and influence in Byzantium. A means for satisfying that longing seemed to present itself, when in 1281 Charles of Anjou proposed that the Navy of Venice should co-operate with his Anjou-Sicilian navy, and once more expel the Greeks from Constantinople. A treaty was accordingly signed on 3rd July at Orvieto, Venice pledging herself to furnish forty well-armed galleys, while the king was to provide a force of 8000 horse, and ships for the transport of the troops and provisions. King Charles himself and the Doge were to take part in the expedition, which was to be directed not only against Paleologus, but against all who were possessed of lands which had once belonged to the Latin Empire. This scheme, which, had it been carried out, would have altered the whole trend of history, was completely frustrated by the Sicilian Vespers. That

¹ Space does not allow of the relation of the wars which occupied the Republic first with Bologna, and then with Ancona, during the years which followed the signing of the treaty of Cremona, and the dissolution of that treaty. These wars, however, both of them naval wars, were fought to maintain Venice's supremacy in the Adriatic, and to convince the rest of Europe that her dominion was the safeguard against piracy and wholesale robbery and violence in those waters.

awful massacre of the French in Sicily deprived Charles of Anjou of all power, and left Venice to face the planned enterprise alone. She was, however, neither able nor willing to embark on such a task, and set herself instead not only to make terms with Andronicus Paleologus, but also to forbid her clergy from further inciting their flocks to war with the Greeks. The Pope placed her under an interdict for this behaviour, and for awhile the outlook was a dark and gloomy one in Venice.

With the election of Pietro Gradenigo to the dukedom, the sanguine spirits in Venice hoped for the dawn of brighter days, and under the rule of this eager and capable leader the citizens braced themselves anew to measure forces with Genoa, and to dispute with that hated rival the supremacy in the East. In 1289 a great blow had been dealt there to the trading states of Europe by the invasion of the Mussulmans, and by their capture in April of that year of Tripoli. An endeavour on the part of the three maritime republics to regain the town proved futile, and was followed soon after by the loss of Acre (Ptolemais). Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon, in spite of the Pope's efforts to the contrary, fell also in turn—fatal losses to the Christians in destroying their hopes of retaining an abiding lordship in Syria. Venice had consequently to look for other markets to which to transfer the trade she had hitherto carried on in the Holy Land, and her choice was limited. Obstacles of various sorts debarred her from the places she would naturally have selected, and forced her into quarrels with Genoa in regions where that republic had already established herself firmly. Before, however, coming to open war, Venice had entered into a league with the Sultan, Nasser Mahommed, by which she managed to regain certain privileges in Palestine and to strengthen her commercial status in the East. The Genoese resented this alliance. The secrecy too with which it had been

contrived made them scent danger, and in order to protect themselves against some hidden peril they resolved to forbid any Venetian vessel from entering the Black Sea. Such arrogance could not be tolerated; and the war threatening between the two republics became an ever-increasing certainty. Without any ostensible rupture of the peace, hostilities were brought ever nearer by the following incident off Corona: Venice at the Pope's instigation had despatched an expedition, subsidised by the Knights Templar to the assistance of the King of Cyprus. This expedition, consisting of four armed galleys, fell in with a few Genoese merchant galleys, homeward bound from trading in Greek waters, and without striking a blow the Venetian force surrendered to Genoa. This triumph—if such it can be called—was of more harm than advantage to the Republic of St George, for it brought her face to face with unlooked-for foes in the persons of the Pope, the King of Cyprus, and the Knights Templar, besides stirring the smouldering wrath of Venice. Genoa at once proceeded to soothe the angry passions which she had all unwittingly aroused, and sent legates to Venice with offers of indemnities for whatever injuries had been inflicted, ordering at the same time the liberation of any prisoners who had been taken.

Venice was too deeply offended to be put off with offers however tempting and words however fair, and after three months had been wasted in useless negotiations, war was declared in the autumn of 1294. In the meanwhile, the usual "Caravan of the East" had sailed in the spring under the command of Marco Basilio, with an escort of several light galleys. The main force consisted of twenty-five vessels, and every precaution was taken to guard against surprise. The *taride*, or heavy transport ships, were furnished with soldiers and archers, and reinforced by three galleys from Negropont, some *saettie*

(pinnaces), and other light craft. The Venetian commander felt himself sufficiently strong to wipe out the insults that Genoa had heaped on his country during the past year, and sailing by Cyprus, he halted at Limasol, destroying the Genoese warehouses and consulate there, and dragging the Genoese flag through the mud, tied to a horse's tail. He also seized on some of the enemy's vessels, and in short committed so many outrages that a few Genoese merchants, trading at that moment in the Black Sea, determined to be avenged. They appointed Nicolino Spinola their admiral, and after persuading some of their countrymen who were cruising off the coast of Asia Minor to join them with their ships, they attacked the Venetian convoy at Laiazzo or Ajas, off the coast of Armenia. The Genoese made every preparation for the battle: they hauled down their masts; they lashed the prows of their galleys together so as to oppose a firm and united front, and thus awaited the on-coming of the foe. The Venetians, on the other hand, confident of victory, advanced against the serried ranks of the Genoese with their masts and yards erect, believing that they had but to show themselves for the enemy to fly, and that they would then hoist sail and pursue after them.¹ This failure to take ordinary precautions on the part of the Venetians proved their ruin. A contrary wind carried them broadside on against their adversaries' galleys, thus exposing their most vulnerable parts to the full brunt of attack, and preventing them altogether from using their mangonels and catapults in self-defence. They were severely beaten. Their admiral, Marco Basilio or Basegio, was killed; twenty-five ships of one sort or another were taken, together with a

¹ The account of the battle is to be found in *Templier de Tyr* (Gestes des Chyprois, "Société de l'Orient Latin," 1887), p. 280, where we read how the galleys had their masts lowered before going into action; a fact of the utmost importance and interest in explaining the tactics of the times.

large amount of booty ; and to the bitterness of defeat was added the mortification of knowing that the victors were but traders and merchants, not the sailors and soldiers who formed the fighting force of the Genoese navy.

This battle, fought before war was actually declared on 28th May 1294,¹ caused the greatest distress and dismay in Venice, though on the shores of the Adriatic, where the Republic numbered many foes, the rejoicings were loud and were spread abroad in some most offensive verses. In Venice it was generally believed that Genoa would follow up her victory by attacking the colonies and outlying possessions of the Republic, perhaps even the town itself. Against such an eventuality every measure that made for safety was taken. Nearly all the patrician families were invited to equip two or even three galleys, according to the state of their rent roll, besides arming twenty men with "proper cuirasses, collars, and gloves of iron" ; a council of thirty was summoned which authorised the fitting out of eighteen galleys to protect Negropont ; the citizens were to be enrolled in groups of twelve men able to act as sailors when the occasion required ; while the unrecognised members of the state, such as pirates and corsairs, were readily accepted as coadjutors in the cause of national defence, and encouraged to scour the seas and carry on their practices unrebuked against any Genoese vessels that came their way. As far as Genoa was concerned these immediate precautions were wholly unnecessary. She took no steps at the moment to turn her victory at Ajas to account, but was absorbed instead in making vast preparations for the war which she knew was imminent. Venice

¹ Several errors have arisen as to this date, Dandolo in his *Chronicle* saying it was in October, and he is followed by Romanin and many other historians. I have followed Manfroni, who proves conclusively from the deliberations of the Great Council and from documents at the Marciana, that it must have been at the date given above and not in the autumn.

in her turn, seeing that no attempt such as she expected was made, fancied that she had done enough for the present distress, and busied herself with despatching small armaments under different patrician admirals to harass the Genoese when it was possible and injure their trade and interests on every opportunity. Four years went by in this unsatisfactory way, each republic reaping alternately some trifling advantage without, however, coming to any decisive action.¹

The great battle of Curzola brought matters to a crisis in 1298, when Lamba Doria at the head of seventy-eight well-armed Genoese galleys, off the Dalmatian coast, engaged the Venetians with ninety-eight galleys, under the leadership of Andrea Dandolo, a man of courage and energy, but lacking in the skill and strategical knowledge possessed in so marked a degree by Doria. The fight took place on 7th September, beginning early in the morning, when Doria succeeded in stationing his galleys so as to have the sun at his back, while it shone full in the eyes of his adversaries. He also kept twenty of his galleys in ambush, and began operations with a seemingly diminished force. The superiority of the Venetian numbers and the splendid fighting qualities of their comrades of Chioggia gave every promise of victory, but Doria's generalship prevailed against all odds. At the critical moment he slipped his reserve galleys off against the foe: they fell full on the Venetian flank, causing widespread terror and confusion, and the day was won for Genoa. The contest raged even then for some hours

¹ I have omitted all mention of the expedition against Constantinople under Ruggero Morosini, when, together with Marino Michiel, he assaulted Pera, carrying fire and sword into the Genoese quarter there. The details given by Dandolo and other Venetian historians as to the incidents of that raid are not corroborated by recent writers, and in any case they had not sufficient effect on the issues of the campaign to be enlarged on here.



Detail from the Picture in the Accademia, Venice, by Carpaccio, of "The Departure of the
Bride and Bridegroom."

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longer, both sides fighting stubbornly and striving to the last for the mastery. The Venetians, however, had finally to retire : they had lost no less than eighty-four galleys ; their admiral, Dandolo, who had been taken prisoner, dashed his brains out against the mast to which he had been chained, to avoid the ignominy of being led captive to Genoa, and 7000 sailors were killed or drowned. An even greater number were taken prisoners, among them being the great traveller Marco Polo, who solaced the four years he spent in captivity in Genoa in writing his famous book of travels.

The consternation in Venice was extreme, and to the grief and mourning of the citizens was added the dread lest Genoa should invade the lagoons and conquer the city. In spite of the victory, however, Genoa had suffered too severely to think of further action. Her losses between killed and wounded exceeded even those of Venice, while her ships were so fearfully knocked about that the fleet had to put back as soon as it could to Genoa, where it was received in the solemn dignified silence befitting the return of those who, though victorious, had given of their best and bravest in the strife. Both parties were indeed exhausted by all they had undergone ; even victory had been purchased too dearly to bring any satisfaction in its train, and when in the course of the following year Matteo Visconti, lord of Milan, induced the two states to come to terms, Genoa acceded to all that was laid down, without asking or obtaining any compensation or gain for her great triumphs at Ajas and Curzola.

Peace was signed on 25th May 1299, but even the bitter experience gained in this long and ruinous war failed to convince these foes of the blessings of peace, or the wisdom of avoiding the renewal of a war which could only involve terrible loss and suffering without gain or glory to either side.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR OF CHIOGGIA

1350—1381

Battle of the Bosphorus. Venetian Victory at Loiera. Venetian Defeat at Sapienza. Preparations for the War. Andrea Contarini. Carlo Zeno. His Adventurous Career. Vettor Pisani. His Victory at Actium. Defeat at Pola. Genoese enter the Lagoons. Doria at Chioggia. The Venetians sore Pressed. Fighting around Chioggia. Carlo Zeno to the Rescue. Final Triumph of the Venetians. Death of Vettor Pisani. Of Andrea Contarini. Of Carlo Zeno.

OF the four great naval wars which sapped the strength of Venice and Genoa, and drained the life-blood of the best and bravest of their citizens, the last one, the War of Chioggia, was the greatest of them all, and the one most fraught with dire consequences to both republics. This war, prompted on both sides by hatred and jealousy, was yet redeemed by traits of patriotism, self-denial, and bravery which brighten the pages of its history, and save it—at least on the Venetian side—from much that is sordid and ugly.

The peace signed in 1299, which claimed amongst other things to be “perpetual,” lasted for only fifty years. During that time Venice went through changes and upheavals in her home government of so important a nature as to have a lasting effect upon her history. These changes included the “Closing of the Great Council” (*Serrata del Gran Consiglio*) and the conspiracy of Baja-

monte Tiepolo, with the consequent institution of the Council of Ten.

On the mainland, wars with Ferrara, with Verona and Padua, had been carried on with varying fortune, while the possession of Treviso had aroused in Venice a taste and greed for expansion on land that had led her away from that need of concentrating by sea which had till then insured her success and greatness. Nor had the city escaped the ravages of the Great Plague which devastated Italy in 1348, when whole families were wiped out, and when huge barges rowed slowly along the canals to the cry of "*Corpi morti, Corpi morti*," calling on the inhabitants to fling out their dead so that one wholesale burial might suffice for all.

In the wake of these calamities fresh reprisals and hostilities had broken out with Genoa, the old furious encounters between the navies of the two republics being renewed in Eastern waters. The Venetians were commanded by Nicolò Pisani, the uncle of the more famous Vettor Pisani; while the Genoese leader was Paganino Doria. The first great battle was that of the Bosphorus (1352), when the Venetians, owing first to the mistaken advice of their allies, and then to the cowardice of these same allies, were totally defeated. Their fleet had been joined by those of Greece and Aragon, and through their counsels Pisani decided, against his better judgment, to attack the enemy at a moment and in a spot alike unfavourable. The Greeks fled at the very outset, and the Aragonese were not slow in following them.¹ The full force of the attack fell on the Venetian galleys, and though they defended themselves valiantly, and the fight was a fierce one, they were not able to save the day, and the Genoese remained victors.

¹ Some accounts, however, say that they fought even better than the Venetians.

Venice, however, retrieved her fortunes the following year under Pisani in August 1353. A brilliant victory was gained at Loiera in Sardinia, when thirty-two Genoese galleys were captured; but it must regretfully be added that the Venetians stained their victory by throwing their prisoners, to the number of 4000, into the sea. The despair in Genoa was excessive; greater even than that experienced on former occasions, which is saying a great deal, for it is curious to observe how heavily any reverse told immediately on Genoa. She invariably took the black view of every case, foreseeing the certain obliteration of her existence as a state, and hopeless as to any chance of salvation. Venice on the contrary was ever sanguine, and is always to be found—once the first shock of defeat had been got over—springing to action and preparing with energy and resolution to avenge the blow and remedy the ill. Genoa was indeed brought so low after her defeat at Loiera that she offered to sell herself to the Lord Archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Visconti, on the sole condition, however, that he should continue the war against Venice—hatred and revenge being yet stronger within her than despair. Visconti, though anxious to add Genoa to his dominions, was yet more alive to the harm that would accrue to all the neighbouring states from this fratricidal war between the two maritime republics, and he did his utmost to induce the belligerents to make peace. He sent Petrarch as his ambassador to Venice, hoping that the poet's friendship with the Doge Andrea Dandolo, and the literary tastes that the two men had in common would smooth the way to an amicable understanding. It was all in vain: neither the poet's eloquence, nor the historian's learning could allay the angry passions that had been aroused, and war was again resorted to.

On 4th November 1354, the Venetians met with a crushing defeat at the hands of the Genoese at Sapienza,

off the Morea—a defeat for which the Venetian commander was sorely to blame. His outposts were not guarded, carelessness and want of vigilance prevailed in his ranks, and when Giovanni Doria, Paganino's nephew, went, merely as a pastime, to reconnoitre the Venetian lines, he found them unprotected and at the mercy of any invader. He reported this to his uncle, who determined to profit by it. He advanced at once and surprised the Venetians. Numbers of them in their alarm and dismay threw themselves into the sea, more still were taken, and every vessel in the Venetian fleet was either captured or destroyed. Doria returned in triumph to Genoa, carrying with him over 5000 prisoners, among them being the Venetian admiral, Nicolò Pisani.¹

Venice was in grievous peril. The conspiracy of the Doge Marino Faliero was at that moment convulsing her home politics; and between the treason of the head of the state and the annihilation of her Navy, her condition was very grave. The nomination of Giovanni Gradenigo to the dukedom in the room of the traitor, tended to retrieve the situation, and the new Doge's first act in 1355 was to make peace with Genoa.

This peace was actually due to the good offices of the Lord of Milan, and by it the Genoese were pledged to abstain from entering into the Adriatic with any vessels of war, and from siding with any of the Venetian dependencies should they rise in revolt against their suzerain. The Venetians in their turn were not to enter Genoese waters, and both parties were to refrain for three years from trading in the Sea of Azof. Another advantage gained by this peace was, that it gave Venice breathing time to recover from the troubles which had harassed her government at home, and to prepare for a resumption of hostilities the moment she was fit to do so.

¹ The *Barbaro Chronicle* says he basely fled and was deprived for ever of all future command.

Wars with the King of Hungary (when Dalmatia was lost to Venice), with Candia, with the Duke of Austria, and with the Carraresi, lords of Padua, kept the Republic fully occupied for the next twenty years, but through all that period the intention to renew hostilities at the very earliest opportunity was never lost sight of for a single instant by Venice, and she merely bided her time to "begin again."

In the meanwhile each side availed itself of every possible opportunity to spite and annoy the other; and trivial, petty acts of rudeness and discourtesy were indulged in by the representatives of the two states in ways savouring more of unmannerly children than of responsible men. An instance of this occurred in Cyprus, at the coronation of the young King Peter II. of Lusignan in 1373. The Genoese consul, Doria, had claimed precedence over Malipiero, the Venetian representative, at the ceremony. The court authorities had decided, however, in favour of Malipiero, and Doria, to vent his ill-humour, threw bread pellets at him during the feast which followed the coronation. This insult led the Venetians, aided by the Cypriots, to throw some of the Genoese guests out of the windows of the banqueting hall, and this in its turn resulted in a general rising against the Genoese, when many were slain. A fleet to avenge the murdered men was sent from Genoa, under the command of Piero di Campofregoso, who seized the king's person and took possession of Famagosta. Peter called on Venice for redress, but the Republic was not then ready for war, and the evil day was again deferred; but not for long.

The possession of the island of Tenedos became in 1378 the determining cause of the war which immediately followed, and which is known in history as the War of Chioggia, since it was in and around Chioggia that most

of the decisive battles were fought. Venice and Genoa alike aimed at possessing Tenedos. Its position at the mouth of the Dardanelles made it an important spot for their Levantine trade, and when, after a succession of Eastern intrigues, it was finally handed over to Venice, Genoa blazed forth in a storm of wrath and indignation. War was now openly declared, and on either side was embarked on in a spirit of the deadliest animosity. Genoa led off with a more powerful array of allies than her rival, for she had on her side Francesco di Carrara, Lord of Padua, the King of Hungary, the Patriarch of Aquileja, the town of Ancona, the Queen of Naples, and the Duke of Austria. Venice was only supported, and that too in a half-hearted fashion, by the Visconti of Milan. But the war was a popular one with her people: every precaution that made for defence and security was cheerfully accepted, and volunteers for home or foreign service presented themselves on all sides. The citizens were enrolled in the usual groups of twelve; the soldiers once enlisted were allowed to choose the galleys on which they elected to sail; fines in money or imprisonment were laid on those—they were the exceptions—who failed to come forward; a loan was raised to meet the expenses needed for the vast preparations about to be made; while duties were laid on food, wine, and merchandise.

At this crisis in her story Venice was sustained and served by three heroes, Andrea Contarini, her Doge; Carlo Zeno and Vettor Pisani, her admirals; all men of the highest rank in the town, and endowed with the highest gifts of intelligence, courage, and capacity.

A legend runs that Andrea Contarini had refused on more than one occasion to accept the office of Doge, a prophecy having once been made to him that under his dukedom his country should experience great calamities. It is more probable that the restrictions made by the

Government on the liberty of action of each new Doge was in reality the motive for his refusal. Be that as it may, he consented to accept the post when the unanimous voice of the electors declared that he and he only was the man for the office, and he became Doge in 1368. How nobly he bore himself at the period of his country's greatest need will be seen later on.

Carlo Zeno, the second of this trio of heroes, was a son of one of Venice's oldest and noblest families, and his life and adventures read almost like a fable, so full are they of romance and incident. He was destined for the Priesthood, and was sent early with this intent to the Papal Court at Avignon, where, having been made a prebendary, he started for Padua to pursue his studies. On his way there he was attacked by highwaymen and left for dead. He was found in this plight, tended and restored to health, and went on his way to Padua. Gambling, however, absorbed him more than learning, and having squandered all his patrimony, he fled from the university, and for five years led a roving life, serving as a soldier whenever the occasion presented itself. At the end of this time he returned to his family, where the truant was warmly received, having been mourned as one lost and doubtless dead. He then went to his prebend at Patras, at that moment besieged by the Turks. The young ecclesiastic put himself in the first ranks of the defenders, and after a desperate encounter with the enemy was wounded, thought again to be dead, and preparations were made for his burial. The "corpse," however, gave signs of life, the ceremony was not held, and before long Carlo was again in Venice. Peter of Lusignan, King of Cyprus, was also in Venice at that moment, and his choice fell on Zeno as a man whose judgment and energy would serve for some of the intricate transactions in which the monarch was engaged. He despatched him on different missions to the

German Emperor, to France, and to England, and after much travelling in these countries Carlo returned to Patras. Here he fought a duel, and for an act so little in keeping with his calling he was deprived of his benefice. He thereupon renounced every ecclesiastical tie, and married a rich lady of Chiarenza, who died shortly after. He then quickly married as his second wife a daughter of Marco Giustinian, and turned his attention to commerce. His business often took him to Constantinople, and it so chanced that he was there at the moment when Andronicus, son of John Paleologus, Emperor of the Greeks, had raised the standard of rebellion and in concert with Sauzes, son of the Sultan Murad, had imprisoned his father in the tower of Amena. A romantic story—not ratified in full by the gravest historians—tells how Carlo Zeno endeavoured to rescue the debased and impotent Emperor from prison. A friendship of some standing existed between John Paleologus and the Venetian patrician, and in his captivity the Emperor recalled this friendship and determined to put it to the proof. By means of the jailer's wife (to whom it appears the Emperor had not made love in vain) a letter was conveyed to Zeno, imploring him to free the Imperial captive. The tower in which he was imprisoned was strictly guarded on the three sides, but on the fourth side a window overlooked the sea, and from this, though at great risk, the captive might be rescued. Such a risk, however, commended itself altogether to Zeno. He collected money and soldiers, and waited for a dark and stormy night in which to carry out the task. He reached the foot of the tower in safety and clambered up by a ladder of ropes which had been let down from the Emperor's chamber. Carlo urged on him to fly immediately and descend with him to the boat awaiting them below. John Paleologus was now seized with qualms: it may be that the frail swinging ladder down which he was to adventure himself

was not the means of escape that appealed most to him; or it may be, as he himself asserted, that he was unwilling to forsake the two sons who shared his captivity and who would have probably paid with their lives for his escape. He wept and pleaded, and begged Zeno to allow him time for reflection. Zeno replied that there was no time either for weeping or thinking; he said he had come at terrible risk and inconvenience to himself; that this was the Emperor's opportunity to take or leave as he chose, but that should he reject it he was not to summon him again to the rescue. Every moment was precious, but John could not make up his mind; and Zeno had no choice but to descend by the way he had come and regain the shore. A few days later the wavering monarch repented of what he had done; he reopened negotiations with Carlo, and offered to hand over to him an assignment to Venice of the island of Tenedos. The bait was not one to be rejected. Fresh communications were started: the assignment was conveyed to Zeno by the jailer's wife, who, as heretofore, acted as go-between. The transaction, however, ended there, for the woman was suspected, put to the torture and revealed the whole story. Carlo Zeno only just managed to escape and to reach the Venetian Fleet, then under the command of his father-in-law, Giustinian.

He was landed at Tenedos, where the governor, recognising the Imperial mandate, ceded the island to Venice, and it was accordingly added to the Republic's possessions.¹

Vettor Pisani, the third of this group of heroes, belonged to a family that originally came from Pisa, and his life and actions are so interwoven with the fortunes and mis-

¹ If history does not endorse all the foregoing incidents and details, it yet speaks plainly of John Paleologus's imprisonment, of his subsequent escape and restoration to power, and of the cession made by him of Tenedós to Venice.

fortunes of his country that what concerned her concerned him, and the story of the one is equally the story of the other.

These three men all occupied posts of command at the moment of the opening of the War of Chioggia, and nobly did each one acquit himself, though it cannot be said that their services met, during their lifetime at least, with the degree of recognition and gratitude which they so fully deserved.

Carlo Zeno was despatched to Negropont to watch over Venice's interests in the East; and on 22nd April 1378 Vettor Pisani was invested with the baton of command in St Mark's, the Doge consigning to him the standard of the Republic amid a vast concourse of people and with all the ceremonial befitting the solemnity of the occasion. An official declaration of war was sent at the same time to Genoa, and shortly afterwards a Genoese fleet sailed eastward under Luigi Fieschi to meet the Venetians under Pisani. After a cruise around Candia, he was returning to attack the Genoese nearer home when he encountered them off Cape Actium. Though it was the 30th of May, a violent storm was raging, rain was falling in torrents, and many vessels on both sides were disabled by stress of weather. The rest, however, engaged without delay, and for two hours the combat raged furiously, the storm adding to the difficulties of both combatants, for on board the tossing, pitching ships the marksmen could never be sure of their aim, nor could the rowers direct their vessels with precision. The battle ended in a brilliant victory for the Venetians. The Genoese lost several galleys, their admiral was taken and, together with numerous other prisoners, was sent to Venice, while the remnant of the Genoese force sailed for the Levant. Pisani would certainly have made straight for Genoa, where the news of the defeat at Actium had produced a

storm of public indignation and rebellion which led to the dethronement of the Doge Domenico da Campofregoso, and the appointment of the popular candidate Nicolò di Guarco in his stead, but his forces did not allow of it, and he too turned his galleys eastwards.

After he had assisted in escorting Valentina, daughter of Bernabò Visconti, the bride of the King of Cyprus, to her kingdom, he attempted to besiege the Genoese, who were defending Famagosta, but failing in this he cruised in Grecian waters, and returned to the Adriatic to drive out from thence some Genoese vessels which, under the protection of the King of Hungary, were molesting Venetian merchantmen and jeopardising the safety of the Gulf. The Venetian admiral captured Cattaro, Sebenico, and Arbe; he twice assaulted Trau, but failed to take it, and damaged the fortifications of Zara. He then entreated to be allowed to return to Venice on account of the approach of winter, and in order to rest and recruit his troops. This, however, was refused, and he was ordered to remain near Istria to safeguard the coast in and around home waters.

The foes of the Republic were in the meanwhile occupied in harassing her by land, and the Paduans and Hungarians carried their victorious arms as far as to Mestre, where they besieged the town and were only driven back by the Venetians after a fierce struggle.

The following winter was a disastrous one for Venice. Pisani was anchored off Pola with his ships' crews diminished by sickness and desertion. It is true that an expedition he undertook by order of the Senate to escort some ships that were to sail to Calabria for corn was successful in that he was able to rout some Genoese marauders who attempted to rob the transports, but his own vessels suffered much damage and his men were tired out when he regained Pola in the early spring.

His position was not an enviable one when on 7th May 1379 the Genoese fleet, consisting of twenty-three galleys and two galleons under Luciano Doria, appeared before Pola ready for battle. Pisani would gladly have refused the action : his ships were inferior in number ; his crews weakened by sickness ; while in the event of his being vanquished the whole coast-line to Venice would lie exposed to the enemy. Better to withdraw within the harbour and await the succour and supplies that could not fail shortly to arrive under Carlo Zeno from the Mediterranean. His officers, however, were of a different opinion : they even went so far as to accuse their captain of cowardice, and prayed him for the honour of the flag to accept the engagement. Pisani, goaded by their insulting, unjust remarks, gave way at last and agreed against his better judgment to engage the foe. He was evidently ignorant of his adversary's numbers, and when with sixteen galleys he put out to meet Doria, he imagined that their forces were about equal. But though Doria advanced at the head of only eighteen galleys, he had craftily left four or five others in ambush, and as soon as the foes met he made a feint of retreating. The Venetians, flushed with the belief that the victory was already theirs, pursued the Genoese, who drew them on to where their reserve ships were in hiding, and fell on them with vigour. A hopeless confusion followed ; the Genoese archery was deadly in aim and effect, and the rout of the Venetians was complete. Their fleet was well-nigh annihilated, for only six galleys escaped, over 2000 prisoners were taken, and hundreds were slain. The Genoese paid heavily for their victory in the death of their commander, Luciano Doria, who towards the close of the battle raised his vizor for air, and was immediately shot by an arrow and killed on the spot. His death was kept secret from his men till the victory was assured ; and in the meanwhile, till orders

were received from Genoa, his brother, Ambrogio Doria, took command of the fleet.

The news of the disaster spread consternation and woe in Venice. Apart from the universal mourning for the numbers who had died, there was also loud condemnation of the officers in command. Pisani was summoned to Venice for trial and to answer for his supposed want of generalship. The Senate, oblivious of their fault in not allowing him to recruit his exhausted crew during the winter, and of the condition to which the Navy was in consequence reduced, heaped all the blame on him. They even wished to condemn him to death, but they dared not proceed to such extreme measures. Pisani was the darling of the people, and such a sentence would not have been tolerated for a moment. He was therefore deprived of his office as admiral, condemned to imprisonment for six months, and forbidden to hold any office in the state for a period of five years.

The Genoese flushed with victory, and with increased forces determined to carry their conquests to the very heart of Venice. Under Pietro Doria, a cousin of the slain Luciano, they advanced along the coast, devastating and burning all that they could lay hands on, till they gained St Nicolò del Lido, and reached the harbour at the very moment when a *cocca* laden with merchandise from the East was returning home under her captain, Tommaso Mocenigo. Three galleys were despatched to seize the *cocca*, which was taken and burnt with all her cargo of precious goods. Her crew managed to escape, but the scene was witnessed by a crowd of Venetians, who stood amazed and horror-struck at the daring of the foe and at the insult offered to Venice. The Genoese rowed off, towing behind them with swaggering ostentation the trophies taken from Pisani at Pola, and after possessing themselves of Palestrina and Chioggia Minor, sailed by

Ancona, back to Zara, testifying to the world at large their superiority over Venice and their supremacy in the Adriatic.

The dismay aroused in Venice at such a deed can be imagined. For ages no foe had dared to approach so close to the town or enter so presumptuously into the very heart of the lagoons. Measures were at once taken to protect every home and hearth. Six galleys were got ready in all haste and sent under Enrico Dandolo to recall Carlo Zeno, who was cruising near Genoa, and bid him hasten at all costs to help those at home. Orders too were given to the governors of the Republic's outlying possessions to make ready to withstand any surprises or attacks from Genoese ships. In Venice itself fortifications were either strengthened or raised along the coast-line of the Lido. Between the two ports of S. Nicolò and S. Elisabeta a chain of strong beams stuck with iron prongs was slung under the water and secured with iron clamps and anchors. Behind this were stationed three *cocche* filled with marksmen armed with bows, slings, and grenades. Heavy chains barred the smaller canals, while all the posts which marked the sea-route were pulled up, and on every available bit of shore, troops and guns were placed to intercept or give warning of the approach of the invader. In the town itself all capable of bearing arms were under orders to be in readiness; fresh offices were instituted to supervise the system of defence; the great bell of St Mark was to ring out the alarm, and when its deep peal was heard, all the other bells in the city were to take up the cry, summoning the citizens to arms and bidding them assemble in the Piazza. The bells on the Lido were also to ring out as soon as "Marangon" (the chief and biggest of St Mark's bells) had sounded its warning, and all were to be ready and on the watch for the alarm. The Senate in the meanwhile used every

endeavour to detach the King of Hungary from his league with Genoa, sending ambassadors to him and offering to make almost any sacrifice to secure him as an ally. King Louis, however, encouraged by the assurances of his allies that it needed but a few days and Venice would be taken, made such exorbitant demands that the negotiations fell through. There was no hope but to renew the struggle with all the energy born of despair, and to arm for the fight now concentrating around Chioggia.

Pietro Doria having captured Chioggia Minor, now determined to possess himself of Chioggia Major, where Pietro Emo, as Podestà, made ready to oppose him at the head of 3000 men. Chioggia lies some 15 miles to the south of Venice, and stretches out in a longitudinal direction towards the mainland. A broad canal forms its connecting link through the lagoon with Venice, and it was there that the War of Chioggia was waged and the supremacy of the two naval republics contested. By land Genoa was supported and supplied by the armies of Francesco di Carrara and the King of Hungary, and, their troops occupying every available spot beyond Chioggia in the Trevigiano, Venice was cut off by land as well as by sea. The allies were unremitting in their determination to ruin the Republic. They erected forts; they excavated canals; they tore away the outworks set up by the Venetians, and they contrived that a steady flow of food and ammunition should be conveyed in never-failing supplies to the troops. Several skirmishes in which the Genoese were mostly successful took place during the first half of August 1379; and the Venetians began to realise that unless they were strongly reinforced from home their cause in Chioggia was lost. The enemy resolved to make a decisive attack on the city on 16th August, and arranged that part of the galleys should bear down on the town, while the rest of the galleys by

sea, and the *ganzaruoli* in the canals should cut off all communication with or succour from Venice. The land attack at the same time was to be made by three divisions of infantry, which were at all costs to destroy the only bridge yet standing between Chioggia and the foe.

The Venetians made a gallant fight; but they could not withstand the fires which the enemy had craftily arranged in every corner and at every turn to burst out with deadly effect when least expected, making all advance impossible and threatening to prevent all retreat. The Venetians fled in terror and confusion, leaving Emo alone with fifty of his bravest followers to contest every inch of ground before retiring to the citadel. His efforts were in vain: the enemy swarmed into the town, tearing down the Lion of St Mark, and overthrowing every mark of Venetian rule. Both sides lost heavily in the fray; but the allies, although actually the greater losers, had the satisfaction as far as numbers were concerned of having conquered Chioggia — a conquest that put them in possession not only of the fort which guarded the entrance to the lagoons, but also of the canal which led right up to Venice and through which all access to the Maiden city was practicable and easy. Chioggia was at once handed over by Doria to the Lord of Padua, who entered it in triumph and raised his banner over the palace, while that of Genoa floated over the walls, and the King of Hungary's over one of the towers.

The news was soon known in Venice, and caused indescribable dismay. The great bell of St Mark's rang out, and in its peal the citizens seemed to hear their death-knell as they hurried in arms to the Piazza, where the full extent of the disaster was made clear to them. Many were beside themselves with fear when they grasped the situation: the loss of friends or relations and the seemingly inevitable fate of Venice made them desperate, and they

thought only of saving themselves and their possessions, regardless of honour and patriotism. Others were animated by nobler sentiments, and considered no price too high to pay in order to save their country or perish gloriously with her. Among these was the Doge Andrea Contarini, whose first measure was to try and make terms with the victors. He applied to Francesco di Carrara for a safe-conduct for the ambassadors, whom he desired to send to treat with the allies. The ambassadors, Pietro Giustinian, Nicolò Morosini, and Giacomo Priuli, took with them seven of the chief Genoese then imprisoned in Venice to present them as free men to Doria, and so soften his heart towards the Republic. The offering and the negotiations were alike rejected. Carrara, it is true, was willing to treat and ready to accept terms from a people whom he well understood were almost desperate ; but Doria made sure of crushing Venice by the mere weight of arms, and would listen to no compromise. His answer rang out disdainfully and haughtily : " By God, Venetian Senators, you shall never have peace with the Lord of Padua or our Republic till we have bridled the bronze horses which stand in your square of St Mark. When we have the reins in our hands we shall know how to keep them quiet."

Venice realised that there was no hope for her, save in herself alone. In the grandest manner she rose to the occasion, and prepared for what she believed to be her last fight. A palisade was erected between S. Nicolò del Lido and Santo Spirito so as to circumscribe the town ; armed boats guarded every canal ; light boats acting as scouts were to report every movement of the enemy, and every device for keeping watch was resorted to far and near. Fresh taxes were levied and borne without a murmur ; the magistrates gave up their salaries ; all who were able to do so contributed to the cost of building new

galleys, and high and low lent their services in whatever manner they could for the safety of their town. The Doge made a public proclamation to the effect that the danger was indeed great and pressing; that everyone was to see to defending his wife, children, and goods; that all who were short of provisions might go to the houses of the nobles, who would provide, as for brothers, for those who were in need; and that everyone who cared to do so might freely offer advice, or make suggestions as to the best means for carrying on the war or providing for defence.

No thought of surrender was for a moment entertained. "Let us turn out all the galleys yet in the Arsenal, man them, and go out to meet and defeat the enemy: better that than yield to the pangs of hunger." Such was the united cry of the people, who were also unanimous and very resolute as to who should lead them in this forlorn attack. The Government were anxious to appoint Taddeo Giustinian as Captain General, but the popular demand was for Vettor Pisani, and the insistence on this point was so determined that the Senate had to yield. Pisani was at once set free, and the populace were beside themselves with joy at the liberation of their favourite. They flocked to the prison as soon as he appeared, they pressed around him, seized him in their arms, and carried him shoulder high, shouting as with one voice, "Long live Vettor Pisani." He tried in vain to quiet them, bidding them instead to cry "Long live St Mark." He was borne in triumph to the ducal palace, where the Doge with grave and affectionate words called on him to forget past offences and injuries, and to wipe out all painful recollections by a gallant and victorious bearing against his country's foes. Pisani made answer that he had ever conformed to the public deliberations and revered the public decrees; that he would neither complain of or

remember past offences, but would only endeavour by actions worthy of so noble a country to reciprocate the confidence with which he was honoured. He thereupon left the palace, overwhelmed by the acclamations of the people, which were, however, turned into angry murmurs when they learnt that Pisani was not to have the sole command, but that Taddeo Giustinian was to share it with him. They crowded round Pisani, appealing to him for directions, and insisting that they should embark on the same galley on which he was to sail. "And Messer Vettor Pisani answering, said: 'Comrades and brothers mine, go quickly to the Signory, for they will give you good directions and will settle what is right.' And these men bearing aloft their banner, went to the Senate and said: 'Sirs, for God's sake may it please you to give us quickly, to be under Messer Vettor Pisani, three galleys which we will man ourselves so that we may be with him whithersoever he may go.' And the Senators replied: 'Comrades, there is no need of galleys, but go to the Arsenal, and take to you as many *palischermi* and *ganzaruoli* as you require, and go at once and present yourselves to Messer Taddeo Giustinian, Captain of the Sea, and do that which he will tell you; for as for Messer Vettor he is Captain of the Lido and needed there.' When they heard these things they went away from the palace sorely discontented, and declaring one and all that they would rather be cut in pieces than serve under Taddeo Giustinian, and that they would not obey. And turning from the palace, they threw down their banner and tore it in pieces, uttering such bad words that it were not seemly to repeat them."¹

The Senate saw that it was useless to oppose this fixed and popular determination, and the sole command was accordingly vested in Vettor Pisani. An outburst of joy

¹ Chronicle quoted by Filiasi, vi., 22. 9. (Romanin, vol. iii., p. 279.)

and enthusiasm hailed this decision, and volunteers flocked on all sides to enrol themselves as soldiers and sailors, or to present offerings of jewels, and plate, down to the buckles and buttons on the dresses, everything that could serve in one shape or another to raise money for the equipment of the galleys. Forty galleys were brought from the Arsenal to the quay of St Mark, and in three days two-thirds of the crew were ready. The rest, however, could not be raised so quickly; November was drawing to a close, and Venice was sore beset. The enemy encircled her on all sides; famine added its horrors to the general depression, and the populace were actually the rulers of the town and the Lido. Money had to be found, and was raised by loans, by offers of reward to those who contributed most efficaciously and generously to the defence of the state, and by threats to those who refused to bear the burden of tried and patriotic citizens. Funds having been procured in these ways to the enormous extent of over six million *lire*, and the enrolling of every Venetian capable of bearing arms, from the age of eighteen to fifty, having been completed, active measures were resumed.

A small skirmish against the allies under Giovanni Barbarigo took place near the fort of Montalbano, then occupied by the Paduans, and the Venetians were victorious. The triumph was small, but it served to instil hope into the hearts of the besieged, and to restore their confidence and courage. Orders were also sent to recall Carlo Zeno without delay, and to join his country's forces with all haste before Chioggia. The Doge Andrea Contarini announced his determination to accompany the fleet under Pisani, and by his presence and influence to help on his country's cause. He was an old man of eighty, but "his heart was bold and his courage high," and he never faltered in loyally supporting the Admiral, or failed

to throw the whole weight of his position and authority into the scale in aiding Pisani to carry out his plans and stratagems. These plans were laid with consummate skill and prudence, and had for their object to cut off the land supplies from the allies, to imprison them in Chioggia, and in fact to reverse the positions—making the Genoese the besieged and the Venetians the besiegers.

The expedition set sail on the night of the 21st-22nd December 1379, the ships putting out to sea in absolute silence—a marked contrast to the ceremony and display that usually attended the start of a Venetian host, and one that added not a little to the impressiveness and importance of the moment. On board the galleys were numbers of patricians, for not one of the great families but was eager to join the fray and to take part in a strife which, as they well knew, would decide for ever the destiny of the nation.

Pisani's design was to block the canals leading from Chioggia in the three directions of Brondolo, Sottomarina, and Palestrina, and cut off all communications through these waterways by sinking in every one of them barges laden with stones. He had no slight task to carry out his purpose, for the Genoese were aware of it, and realising what havoc it would work them, set themselves strenuously to stop him. Seven of their galleys came out with this intent when he attempted to close the passage to Palestrina and succeeded in burning one of his ships. At the very moment when the vessel was in flames, Pisani's men, however, seized the opportunity to sink the stone-laden barges and succeeded in raising an impenetrable barrier where, but a few hours before, an easy thoroughfare had existed. The same manœuvre, only carried out under still more difficult conditions, was effected in the Canal of Brondolo, and again in the Canal of Lombardia, leading across the lagoon past Malamocco

to Venice and the Adriatic. Pisani having succeeded in these three enterprises, passed through the lagoon by the way of the Lido, made the circuit of the islands, and took up his position towards Chioggia and the open sea. Doria was in this way imprisoned in Chioggia, but neither was his position so precarious nor that of the Venetians so secure as to allow them to relax for a moment their vigilance or to relieve them from anxiety. A storm might at any minute scatter their ships, undo all their toil, and free Doria. The enemy's guns around Brondolo were thinning their ranks in deadly earnest day by day; the winter was an exceptionally cold and trying one; the ships' crews—volunteers for the most part, whose home and town life rendered them ill-fitted to withstand the toils and privations to which they were exposed—were falling victims to disease and death; provisions were running short, and a desire to return home began to make itself heard. The Doge set his face sternly against such a desire. "I who am wellnigh eighty years old," said he, "would rather die than leave here without being victorious."

The strain, however, was beginning to be past bearing, and Pisani, in spite of himself, had to fix a limit to his men's endurance. If by the 1st of January, Carlo Zeno had not come to his relief, he would abandon the siege. Such was his decision, and he knew well that in making it, he was hazarding his last chance. Those days were passed in feverish suspense. Every eye was strained for the sight of a sail; every hour brought fresh watchers to scan the horizon; every day diminished the faint ray of hope still lingering in Venetian hearts.

The old year passed away, and only at the very last moment, on 1st January 1380, were sails descried in the distance. But not even yet could the Venetians be certain of relief, for the Genoese, too, were eagerly

expecting supplies from home, and who could say whether the line of sails drawing slowly nearer would be those of friend or foe? When at last the yearning watchers distinguished the ensigns of St Mark, the joy that spread through the host can be imagined. The ships were indeed those of Carlo Zeno, who had received the summons to hasten home when off the coast of Cyprus, and had lost no time in obeying it. He came as a conqueror as well as a deliverer, for he had sunk over seventy Genoese vessels off Rhodes, and carried off much booty in stores and money. He at once presented himself to the Doge, related his adventures, and declared his readiness to serve wherever his services would most avail—preferably in the post of the greatest danger. The most arduous post was that before Brondolo, and he was accordingly sent there. He had scarcely taken up his position when a frightful storm came on, which tore up the anchors, scattered the galleys, and damaged them severely. The Genoese took advantage of it to destroy the palisades and open a route through the blocked canals, but Zeno fell upon them with three galleys and sustained the shock and fire of their defence till night came on and parted them. The storm still raged fiercely, and carried Zeno right against a tower occupied by the enemy. His dash and luck saved him, for when all had given him up for lost he returned safe and sound, having escaped as by a miracle, and reappeared to lead his men to further deeds of daring.

The mercenaries in the pay of the Republic, among whom were many English, Germans, and Italians, considered this moment a fitting one in which to fall out and fight among themselves. Such dissensions, which might have led to most disastrous consequences, were smoothed over by the Doge, who called the ringleaders on board his vessel and induced them to lay aside their differences.


A stroke of good fortune befell the Republic in the taking of the tower of Loredò, which enabled provisions to be transmitted to Venice, together with supplies of troops and ammunition for the attack which was now concentrated on Brondolo. The Venetians here made use of a rather clumsy, if effective form of cannon, which could only be fired once a day. One of its discharges, however, caused the death of the Genoese admiral, Pietro Doria, for it threw down a tower under which he was standing and killed him. His successor was Napoleone Grimaldi, who, now seeing to what desperate straits Genoa was reduced, determined boldly to cut a canal through the island and open a passage to the sea.

A fierce assault took place on 13th February, when Zeno succeeded in driving the Genoese out of Brondolo and forced them to retire inside Chioggia. Pisani and Zeno pressed home the siege, but they refused to listen to the clamours of the mercenaries, who wished to carry the town by assault, and murmured at the slower and surer process of a blockade. Francesco di Carrara kept on sending supplies of grain and food to his besieged allies; but more than once Zeno was able with light and swift boats to cut off these convoys, and reduce the Genoese within the walls to a sore plight. The besieged, on their side, made reprisals by building rafts from the timber of the houses which they demolished for this purpose, and the struggle became ever fiercer; patience, endurance, and ingenuity being shown as much on the one side as on the other.

The Genoese, however, did not yet despair. A fleet under Matteo Maruffo had been sent from Genoa, and a hope was entertained that by means of a sortie the garrison in Chioggia might join forces with their countrymen. The effort made to bring this about ended, however, in failure, and a second effort succeeded no better, Carlo

Zeno's troops cutting down the Genoese in the shallow water and marshes, while Pisani's artillery dealt with those who made for the sea. Famine did the rest, and on 24th June 1380 the town surrendered at discretion. A crowd of worn, emaciated figures—4170 Genoese and 200 Paduans—were conveyed as prisoners to Venice, while seventeen battered galleys were all that remained as trophies of the once formidable Genoese fleet.

So ended the actual war of Chioggia ; but Venice was not even yet able to enjoy the blessing of peace. The Genoese ships under Maruffo were approaching her littoral from Zara, reinforced by other ships under Gaspare Spinola, and had taken possession of Triest, Arbe, Pola, and Capodistria. Vettor Pisani was despatched on 30th July at the head of forty-seven galleys and many "armed boats," to rescue Capodistria and check the Genoese advance. He retook the citadel and pursued the enemy, encountering them at last near Manfredonia, where an action took place. The Venetians were inferior in numbers ; both sides lost heavily, but the Genoese were put to flight, and night coming on, Pisani withdrew into the harbour of Manfredonia. Here, on 15th August 1380—not two months after Chioggia had fallen—worn by wounds, sickness, and weariness, Vettor Pisani died. His body was embalmed and carried to Venice, where, amid real and public mourning and with every mark of honour, this greatest and bravest of Venetians was laid to rest in the church of St Antonio. The command devolved on Carlo Zeno, who passed from wranglings in the council chamber with the Senate to fightings along the coast with the Genoese. Both sides, however, were weary of a strife which ought never to have arisen, and which it was folly to prolong. Peace was brought about through the mediation of Amedeo of Savoy—the "Conte Verde"—and signed at Turin on 8th August 1381.



RETURN OF THE DOGE ANDREA CONTARINI FROM THE WAR OF CHIOGGIA.

From the picture by Paolo Veronese, in the Ducal Palace, Venice.

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Venice did not at once reap all the benefit that might have been expected by one who had come out victorious from a war of six years' duration, and had emerged from a struggle with a dreaded and hated rival. She had to cede Dalmatia to the King of Hungary; she had to hand over Tenedos to the Count of Savoy; she had to allow Treviso to fall into the power of the house of Carrara. In spite of these surrenders, however, Venice was not really a loser by the war. It is true she was brought very low for the moment, and had lost heavily in men and ships. But her recuperative power was astounding: she set to work to repair the damage done to her Navy; she devoted fresh energy to her trade and traffic in the East; she expanded—unwisely and unluckily—on the mainland, and while the pride and power of Genoa was broken for ever by the war of Chioggia, Venice emerged from it in some respects richer, greater, and stronger.

Little remains to be said of the other two Venetian heroes who had played so gallant a part in this great campaign. The Doge Andrea Contarini died on 5th June 1382. His dukedom had lasted fourteen years and had spread over a period of particular stress and storm. Throughout that period, however, he had never wavered in steady devotion to all that made for the good and safety of the state over which he had been called to reign, nor failed to act up to his highest and best instincts.

Carlo Zeno, the third of the heroes of that epoch, was not fated to end his days in quiet or in glory. An accusation—not proved, and not credited nowadays—was brought forward that he had accepted a bribe from Francesco di Carrara, and a paper was found in his possession, stating that a sum of 400 ducats had been handed over to him by Carrara. Zeno easily accounted for his having this paper in his possession, by explaining that it was the repayment of a loan made by him to Francesco, and after-

wards repaid by Francesco to him. He was not believed, and this man, who had spent vast sums of money in his country's behalf, besides giving of his best year after year in that country's service, was condemned to a year's imprisonment and to forfeit all his appointments. When his term of imprisonment was over he resorted to his roving adventurous life, and after many years spent in this way in the East he returned home to die, and passed quietly away in 1418 at the age of eighty-four. At the news of his death his fellow-citizens awoke to the fact of a great man having gone from their midst: a public funeral was accorded him, and he was carried to his grave by the sailors who had served under him, and who insisted on showing this last mark of respect to the captain whom they had loved so devotedly in life.



Chioggian Fishing-boat.

CHAPTER IX

VENICE AND THE TURKS

1396—1503

Decline of Venice as a Naval Power. Increasing Might of the Turk. The Turks conquer Constantinople. Venetian Rights in Constantinople maintained. Venice's Changed Policy. War of Eubœa or Negropont. The Island lost to Venice. Siege of Scutari. Heroism of Antonio Loredano. Truce with the Turk. Cyprus ceded to Venice. Discovery of America. Venetians under Grimani defeated by the Turks at Porto Longo.

THE decay of Venice as a maritime power, and her decline from the high position once gained by her admirals and sailors, form a sad page in her history. The decay may be said to have begun after the War of Chioggia, and to have reached its consummation in the Republic's dealings, primarily with her neighbours at home, and then with the Ottoman power abroad. The reflection, too, that she alone was to blame for this falling off only serves to enhance the feeling of sadness. Rail as we may at her folly, her selfishness, and the other venial sins that may, nay must, be laid to her charge, we marvel, looking back at her story, at the blindness which overcame her and which prevented her from guarding against a danger that was only too evident, and that stared her in the face at every turn.

For centuries Venice and Genoa hated each other with so bitter a hatred that they had no thought but to compass

each other's ruin, regardless of the approach of a common foe, whose overthrow would have meant their safety, and whose supremacy meant their annihilation. Petty jealousies and rivalries in trade, base envyings of each other's good and aggrandisement led them to squander wealth and energy on wars of no advantage to either party, and left them exhausted and impoverished when the hour of real danger came. It was not till the Turk entered Constantinople and made preparations to extend his conquests still further westward that the coast dwellers of the Mediterranean awoke to a sense of the selfishness of their policy and realised the extent of their folly. Again and again Venice had had the chance of destroying the on-coming might of the encroaching Mussulman, and again and again apathy or indifference stayed her hand, and the hour to strike was allowed to pass, never to return. Commercial interests by sea, and increased territorial acquisitions on land, absorbed the attentions of the Republic and made her oblivious to everything except the profits—invariably mercenary—of the moment, and the advantages to be reaped on the spot. Her outlying colonies, which formed at once the stay and support of the mother-country (if such a word may be allowed when speaking of a town) were neglected; no steps were taken to win the hearts of her distant subjects, or to bind them to the parent state by consideration or affection; while the concerns of Italian states and cities, which had in reality but an extraneous interest for Venice, occupied and engrossed the minds of her rulers to the exclusion of those of her dominions beyond the sea. All the while the Turk, growing in strength and audacity, was consolidating his position in the midst of Christendom, and was able each day to establish further and more firmly his empire in Europe. Had the two naval republics but consented to lay aside the mean rivalry that for centuries

characterised their mutual relations and resulted in such disastrous consequences, they could have disabled the invader, as far as the West was concerned, for all time, and kept him for ever out of Europe. But such harmonious, disinterested action required remarkable foresight and greatness of soul, qualities altogether wanting both to Venice and Genoa, and for the lack of which posterity must unhesitatingly condemn them.

For more than a century before Mahomet II.'s conquest of Constantinople, opportunities without number had arisen when Venice and Genoa in turn could have checked the small Turkish force then seeking to advance into Syria; but instead of showing alarm they either ignored his presence or made treaties with him, considering invariably their own advantage, and oblivious of everything except humbling and thwarting one another. Even the colonies dependent on them were left unguarded and unfortified, and no obstacle worthy of the name was placed in the way of the skilled and undaunted Moslem warriors.

The first quarter in which alarm was felt was Rome, and in 1396 Boniface IX. formed a league to make head against the Turks, whose inroads and victories in Greece aroused his fears for the safety of Europe. Venice joined this league, but no results of any importance were obtained: the allies failed to make profit out of the dissensions among the reigning dynasty of the Osmanli, and ten precious years were lost without a step being taken either to oppose the foe or even to get ready to withstand him.

The wars on the mainland, against the Carraresi of Padua; the acquisition of the towns of Vicenza, Bassano, Belluno, and Verona turned Venetian thought away from maritime matters; and, absorbed and inflated with her inland possessions, she neglected to a criminal extent the

whole condition of her Navy. A proof of this is to be found in the answer given to the ambassadors of Manuel Paleologus when he sent to ask for succour against Musa, the victor of his brother Solyman. The Senate replied that they were at peace with the Turk, a peace which they had no intention of breaking, but that they would place *one* galley at the Emperor's service should he feel disposed to leave Constantinople. Such a reply was prompted by men concerned for the welfare of their cargoes trafficking in the East, anxious that no action on their part should drive the Turks to close the entrance to the Dardanelles, and indifferent to all beside. A still lower condition of things was reached when in 1411, Venice for the first time in her history paid tribute to the Turks; and though in 1416 her galleys under Pietro Loredano gained a brilliant victory over the Turkish fleet, the victory was not followed up, and peace was shortly after signed between the belligerents—resulting, it must be added, in extremely advantageous commercial terms for Venice.

In 1453 Constantinople was conquered by Mahomet II., and all Europe stood aghast at a catastrophe which it would have required no special acumen to have foreseen, and which could well have been averted had the powers of the West but banded together for that intent. In vain the Emperor Constantine Paleologus had implored help from Venice; his appeals fell on deaf ears, and Venice, who should have strained every nerve to save Byzantium, and whose very life-blood should have been shed in setting a barrier against the invasion of Turkish hordes, Venice, the so-called "safeguard of the West," sent a feeble force of seven galleys under Jacopo Loredano to assist the Greek Emperor. This poor contingent might as well have stayed at home. Contrary winds and other hindrances delayed the ships, and when they reached Constantinople all was over. Constantine had fallen fighting gloriously to the last for a

forlorn cause, and the Crescent waved in the place of the Cross.

The brutality shown by the Turks towards the Christians after the siege, and the horrors that followed their entry into the city, startled and dismayed all Europe. Remorse may well have added its sting to many a Venetian mind, and the reflection of opportunities neglected may have haunted many a council chamber ; but such feelings, if they existed, were soon silenced. In Venice the absorbing topic of the moment was how to provide for the altered condition of things, together with earnest deliberations in the Senate as to the advisability of coming to terms with the Sultan. Indeed no other line of action was possible. Venice had neither a fleet nor an exchequer to allow of her assuming a warlike attitude. Her ships, few in number, were also in need of repair, and no money could be spared or raised for such an object, every ducat having been expended or promised to defray the cost of the conquests on the mainland. Venice knew too that in case of a naval war she stood alone. The hatred that was felt for her throughout Italy was open and intense, and not one of her neighbours would have held out a hand to assist her had she engaged in a war of any magnitude or peril.

Her greed of gain and her insatiable desire to possess herself, no matter how, of the lands and property of others, coupled with her previous successes and wealth, made her an object of avowed dislike and envy. Venice, therefore, had practically no choice but to make overtures to the Sultan, and he on his part was not backward in accepting them. An envoy in the person of Bartolommeo Marcello was despatched from Venice, and a sorry figure he cut. He had to offer excuses to Mahomet for the part played by Venetian subjects in opposing the attack on Constantinople, giving out that they were compelled to such a course by the insistence of the Greeks ; he had to congratulate

Mahomet on his victory, and in order to secure his friendship he had to appease him with presents. Marcello's embassy in its low and humiliating aim was so far successful. A Venetian colony was, with its *bailo*, to continue in Constantinople; the rights of trading were confirmed under advantageous terms; other rights as to religion were granted, and the like privileges were extended to the Venetian feudatories of Negropont and the Cyclades. In return Venice was to admit Turkish vessels under stress of war in her ports; she was never to aid the enemies of the Turks directly or indirectly, and in her quality of a loyal ally she was to warn the Porte of any danger that might threaten her. Venice could not complain of her part of the bargain. True she had for the first time to pay import and export dues on all goods entering or leaving Constantinople, but these dues were only 2 per cent., and the concessions she obtained were many and favourable, and showed how ready the Sultan was to conciliate and ensure her alliance. This attitude on Mahomet's part was not lost on the Senate; and the leading patricians of Venice, alive to the advantages to be gained by such a course, formed a strong peace-at-any-price party, making vigorous and determined opposition to any suggestion of ousting the Turk or restoring Constantinople to Christian dominion.

The feeble efforts made with this intent by Nicholas V., the knights of Rhodes, the King of Cyprus and the authorities gathered together at the Diet of Ratisbon, met with open or covert opposition in Venice, although in justice to her it must be added that all the schemes for such undertakings were adduced in so feeble and half-hearted a way as to inspire neither belief in their execution nor confidence in their success.

This state of things lasted for some time, but in 1463 the peace policy was laid aside, and, to quote Manfroni:

“Preparations for war against the Ottoman Empire were begun in Venice, and, compelled by necessity, the Republic forsook for the first time its exclusively commercial policy, the injurious effects of which we have already so lengthily described.

“From this moment a new period of colonial history begins for Venice: no more territorial conquests (if we except the peaceful acquisition of Cyprus), but the defending of territories, the possession of which dated from of old; no more splendid and glorious victories, but prudent retreatings, such as pertain to a weak man striving against a strong one; no more acts of violence and assertiveness, but humble givings up; long periods of peace intermingled with short wars; alliances often more dangerous than open enmities; commercial interests at war with military decorum and honour. Such was the particular character of this strife which lasted till the eighteenth century, when, by the peace of Carlowitz and Passarowitz, Venice agreed to share with Austria the perilous honour of being the outer rampart of Europe against the Moslem power.”¹

The Republic was forced to this course by the conviction at last borne in upon her of the alarming encroachments of the Turk, who was steadily swallowing up her possessions in the Morea, and by the fervid zeal and piety of Pope Pius II., whose entreaties to the princes of Christendom to arm in a crusade against the Ottoman Empire were too persuasive and insistent to be wholly withstood. Matthew Corvinus, King of Hungary, joined the league signed at Peterwardin in September 1463, in which Venice undertook to send forty galleys to the East, to despatch a land force to Dalmatia and the Morea, and to sign no treaty of peace without the consent of her ally (the King of Hungary), who, in his turn, promised to

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 45.

carry the war on to the Danube. Leagues and treaties were, however, of small avail in face of the discord and rivalry among the princes and states of Italy. And the target against which every venomous weapon of disdain and distrust was launched was Venice, the sole power, be it observed in Italy, who had at last stirred in the cause. Nor was it only in Italy that malicious tongues wagged and sought to blacken her in the eyes of Europe. The hatred felt by the Florentines towards the Republic of St Mark was fanned by jealousy of the meanest sort; and in Constantinople Florentine envoys used all their wiles and powers of persuasion to convince the Sultan of the treachery of Venetian ways, and to induce him to break for ever with the Venetians and to enter instead into contracts with the richer and more honourable merchants of Florence. The accounts of these backbiting, underhand slanders raised by one state against another form a lamentable page in the annals of Italian history, the more to be deplored as they furnished Mahomet with material which his quick, able genius knew how to turn to good account and to employ only too craftily against the Christians.

In consequence of these intrigues and divisions, the Pope and Venice were left to engage single-handed in the campaign against the Turk. The Dukes of Milan and Burgundy, the King of France, and the Republic of Florence had all in turn made profession of their readiness to obey Pius II.'s summons, and announced their intention to contribute men and arms to the war. But these intentions never got beyond fair words, and one excuse after another was laid before the Pope in lieu of the armaments and fleets which he—putting his trust in princes—had been led to expect. To incite the Venetians to still further ardour in the cause, Pope Pius despatched a letter to the Doge, Cristoforo Moro, urging him to take

part in person in the crusade, telling him that his presence on board his admiral's galley would strike terror in the East and recall the glorious memories of Enrico Dandolo. The Senate eagerly seconded the Papal entreaty, and a vote of 1607 against 11 proves how ready the patricians were to have their prince at their head. But Moro was not cast in the same mould as Dandolo: he pleaded his age and infirmities; his inexperience in matters nautical, and declared that he meant to stay at home. He reckoned, however, without his host. The Senate had determined that no pains should be spared to enhance the dignity and impressiveness of the expedition, and above all things they made up their minds that it should set forth under the command of the head of the State. "Serene Prince," said Vettore Cappello, one of the ducal councillors, to the Doge, "if your Excellency will not go willingly, you shall be made to go forcibly, for we hold the honour of our country above any consideration for your person." The Doge accordingly embarked, and set sail for Ancona, where his galleys were to join the few poor and ill-equipped ships which Pius II. had got together with infinite toil and trouble. The Pope had devoted strength and energy and money in furtherance of a cause which had absorbed him body and soul since the day of his election, but he saw none of the fruit of his labour. He arrived at Ancona ill and fretting sore for the appearance of the Venetian ships. They hove in sight when he was already in his death throes, and on the 14th August he expired, leaving his cherished work unfulfilled—or more truly, not even begun. With his death the crusade came to an end. He had been its originator and the spirit and life of its possible accomplishment. Without him it dissolved entirely, leaving only one result—that of Venice engaged, and engaged alone, in a desperate and long drawn out struggle with the Turks.

Operations began with the defence of Eubœa, or

Negropont, the key to the Republic's possessions in the Levant, and, since the fall Constantinople, the centre of her commercial activity. Great preparations were made to put the island in a fit state to withstand the enemy: the fleet was increased by a force of twenty galleys, and as the whole of that year (1469) went by without any signs of activity on the part of the Porte, it was hoped that hostilities might be avoided. Such hopes were soon dispelled. Early in June 1470 the Turkish fleet moved against the island, while Mahomet, in person, commanded the land forces by way of Thessaly and Bœotia. The Venetian admiral was Antonio Canale, a man of letters rather than a fighter, and certainly not the leader required to cope with such fearful odds as those now confronting him. The Venetian galleys numbered barely sixty, those of the Turks under Mahmoud Pasha were 300! One of the Venetian commanders, Longo by name, in his *Relazione*, says: "The sea seemed a wood: a thing which may seem incredible to hear, but which was appalling to see." The Venetians were spell-bound at the sight. Never before had they found themselves face to face with a fleet of such overwhelming size and strength, "and the sight froze all their blood." The Turkish rowing vessels were every whit as good as theirs; the sailing vessels, according to Longo, were perhaps superior. They were certainly better manned; the discipline was stricter; the supplies, munitions, and reserve of men were also better. The revelation of the Turks as a great naval power burst now for the first time on Western minds, and a cruel irony of fate willed that this discovery should be made by the state which had most scouted the idea of such a fact and to whom it was to bring the most disastrous consequences.

Canale had no choice but to avoid an engagement. He withdrew into the port of Samothrace; he made strenuous efforts to equip other galleys; and he urged

on the home government to send further supplies. By the end of July he had increased his force to fifty-two galleys, one galleass, and eighteen ships; but even thus he was too weak to withstand the foe, and the Pope's contribution of indulgences did not go far to help matters;—no help of any other sort was given by anyone. Within the city every man, woman, and child worked with a will to defend their homes and hearths from falling into Turkish hands; seeking by their valour and vigour to second their allies by sea, and being nerved to special deeds of courage and endurance by the example and admonitions of Paolo Erizzo¹ and Giovanni Bondumier, the former the *bailo*, the latter an *ex-provveditore* of Negropont. A striking description of the siege and its defence is given by a modern writer.

“The condition of the place,” he tells us, “as its defenders well knew, was not satisfactory. The walls had been, indeed, repaired forty years before; and on every battlement of the sea-wall the lion of the Evangelist bade defiance to the infidels; a moat washed the walls on the land side, so that it was completely surrounded by water; but the republic had strangely omitted to fortify the two heights which commanded the town, that of the Forks and that of the Nun's Mountain, trusting to her fleet to save Negroponte in her hour of need.”²

Canale at one moment made as though he would come bravely to the succour of the town, and was even within sight, almost within touch of the besieged, who from the walls and ramparts incited him to press on by a series of

¹ There were actually two Venetian *bailos* in Negropont, for Erizzo's term of office was over, and his successor, Alvise Calvo, had already arrived; but feeling that his presence could be of use, Erizzo stayed on devoting himself—with a devotion ending in death—to the Venetian cause.

² William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London: J. Murray, 1908), ch. xiv., p. 472.

signals, flag-flying, and other signs of encouragement. It was the one moment when victory was within his grasp, and when "the eye of the Republic" (as Negropont was termed) might be saved. Part of the fleet, it is true, had not yet come up, but on the other hand the wind was favourable, the tide was rising, and every captain and commander of the Venetian squadron clamoured to be led to the attack, and called on Canale to give the word to advance. Canale missed his chance. Lack of nerve, the dread of losing his ships, and of failing in the endeavour stayed his hand, and the chance was gone. When after some hours he agreed to move, the wind had veered completely round, blowing now dead against him, the tide was receding, and no advance was any longer possible.

Canale has been most severely criticised both in his own day and in later times for his want of dash; and every kind of motive—mostly dishonourable ones—have been imputed to him. Some faint excuse may be alleged for him in the condition of the fleet under his command, composed as it was for the most part of merchant ships, turned for the occasion into ships of war, a practice in the Venetian Navy much in vogue and much to be deprecated. This fusion of the two services—the merchant service and the war service—was actually allowed by the State, but it was not a wise measure. The captains of merchant vessels when appointed to the command of war galleys were invariably keener for the furtherance of their mercantile enterprises than for the honour of the flag; discipline was slack; obedience was not insisted on; divergences of interests led to insubordination, disobedience, and a contempt for order, which all tended to bring dishonour and defeat on the Navy. Canale's reserve was mostly composed of vessels and crews of this kind, and his reluctance to advance may have sprung from

a knowledge that he could not count on this part of his forces to support him, and that to go into action without a reserve meant annihilation for the rest. It was, however, the one opportunity of his life, and he missed it, whether from cowardice or excess of caution who can say? Sanudo, speaking of him, says: "He was a learned man, readier to read books than to direct affairs of the sea (*dottor atto piu presto a lezer libri che a governar le cose da mar*)," so that in his case it would seem as though the fault lay more in the choice of the man than in the man himself.

On the morning of 12th July the Crescent waved over Eubœa: no quarter was shown, no age, or sex, or rank respected; nothing but butchery, carnage, and horrors; and the civilised world shuddered over the cold-blooded brutality and violence of the Turks.

"One of the fairest cities in Greece," says Miller, "was converted into a charnel-house; the heads of the slain were heaped up in the Piazza di S. Francesco, in front of the official residence of the Latin patriarch; the Euripos ran red with the blood of the corpses thrown into it. It was calculated that 77,000 (other estimates give 25,000 or 30,000) Turks and 6000 Christians had perished in the siege. It was said that every male in Negroponte over the age of eight years was cut in pieces."¹

For some time Canale lingered about, watching in case the excesses of the conquerors would lead them to lay aside their caution, and allow of his catching them at a disadvantage; but no such chance occurred, and he had no choice but to obey the summons which recalled him in irons to Venice to answer for his failures and to make way for his successor, Pietro Mocenigo. The chief accusations brought against Canale were that he had delayed to succour Negropont; that he had disembarked at Crete

¹ Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

instead of hastening to the defence of the island ; that in not moving to the assistance of the town he had contributed to its fall ; that he had not attacked the Turkish fleet on its return to Constantinople ; that his fruitless endeavour to retake Negropont had caused the death of many brave men. He was condemned to spend the rest of his days in exile at Portogruaro—not too hard a fate if he was really guilty of the charges laid against him, and if the government and the condition of the navy were not more at fault than he was. The fall of Negropont, though affecting Venice more than any other Western state, was a menace of serious import to the rest of Europe, and the Pope was particularly concerned for the fate of Christendom. He wrote to the kings and chief rulers of Europe, urging on them to lay aside their quarrels and strifes and to arm in the Christian cause against the Infidel. But, as usual, his appeal met with nothing but fair words and promises, and the only prince to join the Venetians was Ferdinand, King of Sicily. Pietro Mocenigo in the meanwhile cruised along the Asiatic coast, seizing now and again some disabled castle or city, but never venturing to engage the Turks or expose his inferior ships and sailors to their superior men and methods. The dread of coming to close quarters with the Turks was another deplorable sign of the times ; for brave and daring as Venetian admirals and their crews might be, they knew their own inferiority too well to risk an encounter, or to attack with their ill-kept, ill-repaired vessels, the smart, up-to-date galleys of Turkey. From the fatal day of Negropont till victory once more showed herself on the Christian side at Lepanto, the Turkish fleet was never once defeated by any of the powers of the West. Some isolated acts of courage and a few victorious skirmishes may be chronicled here and there, but the grand days of old were over, and admirals such as Antonio Canale, Antonio Grimani, and the like—



DUCAT OF THE DOGE ALVISE SEBASTIANO MOCENIGO III.

In the Museo Civico, Venice.

worthy men as they were—were but poor substitutes for heroes such as Vettor Pisani, Carlo Zeno, and Andrea Contarini. No engagements of any importance took place from 1453 to 1571: not from lack of opportunity, but because every such opportunity was studiously avoided, and no commander dared expose his fleet to what he knew must be certain defeat and dishonour.

Some indeed of the feats of arms recorded reflect small credit on the allied Papal and Venetian forces. This is especially noticeable in their assault on Smyrna, which they took by surprise, treating the inhabitants with brutal ferocity, not stopping at inhumanities that would have shamed the Turk, selling many of the captives as slaves, and ruthlessly plundering all the property that fell into their hands.

A brighter episode, from a heroic point of view, was the siege of Scutari, when the gallant bearing of Antonio Loredano, the Venetian commander of the town, saved the city for a while to the Republic. Want of food and, worse still, want of water had spread discontent and revolt among the besieged. Loredano on learning this, presented himself to the malcontents, and baring his breast, exclaimed: "If you want food eat my flesh, if you are thirsty drink my blood." The words acted like magic: the crowd, filled with admiration for such a leader, redoubled their efforts against the foe, and the town was saved. Only for a time, however. Mahomet was determined to conquer Scutari; he was angry at having been repulsed; and he assisted in person at the operations in 1478, when for the third time the city was besieged. A valiant defence was begun, but the Republic had endured too many reverses on all sides to make much resistance. One disaster had followed another. Candia had been threatened; Croja had fallen; the Turks had penetrated into Friuli, when the fires of the hamlets and villages that

they burned in their devastating and victorious progress through the province had been seen from the belfries of Venice, forcing the dread question home to every mind—How long would it be ere the same fate would befall Venice?¹

The conviction, too, that the power of the foe who reigned at Constantinople was increasing, and of the impossibility to oppose or negotiate with him, gained strength at every moment. Nothing remained but to make peace, and in 1479 Venice had to accept the terms insisted on by the Sultan, to cede Stalimene and Scutari, to renounce for ever all her rights in Negropont, and to pay a tribute of 10,000 ducats. A more mortifying conclusion to a useless and costly war, a war of ten years' duration, can hardly be imagined. Venice's chief sources of wealth, her colonies—the pride and strength of her existence—had to be surrendered; a dishonourable peace had to be signed; and all because jealousy, greed of immediate gain, and the advantage of the moment had possessed almost every Venetian to the exclusion of foresight, discipline, and vigilance. The Navy, above all, had been criminally neglected: ships and men had alike been allowed to go to rust; the mistaken policy of territorial acquisition had been fostered at the expense of that sea-power wherein alone lay Venice's greatness, and without which she was but a mere toy on the waters, a prey to the first strong ravisher.

The indignation aroused in Europe over this treaty was as violent as it was unjust. Venice had expended men, time, and treasure over a war in which no help of any valid sort had been vouchsafed by other states and countries, and in the teeth of open and covert animosity from so-called friends and allies, none of whom had

¹ Twelve thousand of the inhabitants perished, either slain or carried off as slaves by the Turks.

encouraged her with aught but fair, false words. It was all very true to assert that it concerned Venice more than any other power to keep the Moslem from settling in Europe, but was it to be expected that she could do this alone and unaided? Was her arm strong enough in the fifteenth century to withstand the strength and valour of the Turk? Or was it possible that she alone could defend the sea-coast of Europe against Turkish galleys? The idea is absurd. And though Venice failed, and failed lamentably, and in a way for which posterity must for ever blame her, these shortcomings on her part must not blind us to the culpable neglect of other states, who, Christian though they were, with wealth and resources at their disposal, failed at the critical moment to respond to the call of duty, and left Venice single-handed to cope with the Infidel. Venice no doubt had interests and responsibilities which concerned her exclusively, and which she had to administer as she judged most expedient, regardless of the condemnation or approbation of Europe. Her commerce had suffered fearfully during this war of wellnigh eighteen years; and to repair and restore that commerce was to her a matter of vital importance. But apart from the loss of Negropont and other outlying possessions, her right of way, so to speak, was barred at every point. Florentine merchants had privileges and monopolies which had once belonged exclusively to her; and the Venetians met with insults, difficulties, even imprisonments and tortures, where once they had laid down the law and dictated their own terms.

The peace of 1479 did much to ameliorate this state of things, though it could not restore the proudly prosperous footing of old days. Venetian merchants and traders had to accept an impost of 4 per cent. instead of 2 per cent. on all imports and exports; they found themselves looked upon with ever-increasing suspicion by the

new masters of Constantinople, and were compelled to compete with rivals more favoured, more trusted, and wealthier than themselves.

That same year, however, an important addition was made to Venice's foreign possessions when the Republic calmly and unscrupulously forced the luckless Queen of Cyprus, Catherine Cornaro, to hand over her rights to that realm and to renounce every claim to her island kingdom and home.

But more important events were yet to mark the close of this century, which had an adverse effect upon the prosperity of Venice, in the discoveries of America, and of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope. The significance of this latter discovery was at once realised in Venice, where, as the chronicler Priuli says, "The whole city felt it greatly and remained stupefied; the wisest considering it the worst of news." And so it was in a way. It diverted from Venice a constant source of wealth in her commerce with the East, and opened up to other countries privileges and monopolies which had once been exclusively hers.

A calamity of another nature overtook the Republic in the naval campaign of 1499, when Venice in alliance with France declared war against the Turks. The fact of this French alliance needs some explanation. It will be remembered that the Republic of St Mark had been the first Italian state to commit the fatal mistake of inviting Charles VIII. to enter Italy and establish his claims to the throne of Naples. That invitation, though unheeded at the moment, was accepted later on, and the terrible results of the French descent on Italy are well-known matters of history. Charles's early death made Louis, Duke of Orleans, King of France; and his rights through his grandmother, Valentina Visconti, to the duchy of Milan furnished him with an excuse for taking an

active part in the politics and concerns of Italy. Venice lost no time in openly supporting Louis's claims, regardless of the fact that she had formed a close alliance with Louis's bitterest foe and opponent, Lodovico Sforza, the actual, though usurping Duke of Milan. This alliance was first covertly, then openly joined by the Pope, when it was settled that Milan was to be dismembered and a large part of Lombardy allotted to Venice. Such an arrangement aroused intense wrath and activity in the minds of the other states and princes in the Peninsula. Florence, Milan, and Naples all prepared for action, the object of their special vengeance being Venice, and the foe they elected to aid them in such an object being Turkey. Mahomet had been succeeded by Bajazet, who was nothing loth to join the quarrel, and whose indignation against the Republic of St Mark dated from the time when she had bidden Charles VIII. enter Italy in order, as he suspected, to engage in a crusade against him. A French army invaded the Milanese territory, supported by the land forces of the Republic, and at the same time a Venetian fleet put to sea under the command of Antonio Grimani. It was composed of fifty galleys gathered together from Candia, Corfu, and Dalmatia, and all measures possible were taken to raise supplies and men. The gondoliers for the public service in Venice were forced to serve, and all the available merchant ships were likewise got ready for home defence. The vessels for this latter purpose consisted in all of fifty-six galleys, reinforced by ten ships of other kinds; and further help was to be looked for from the French fleet, which was at that moment getting ready at Marseilles. In the meanwhile, the Turkish fleet under Borrak Rais had sailed from the mouth of the Dardanelles and taken up its position at Porto Longo, the harbour of the little island of Sapienza—an ominous spot, the Venetians having but

a century before been severely defeated there by the Genoese. The rival fleets were about equal in numbers, though the Turks had more *palanderie* than the Venetians, these *palanderie* being a light kind of vessel less fitted for war than for carrying messages or for racing. A council of war was held, and Grimani, seconded by his three principal officers, Pesaro, Guoro, and the warrior chronicler Malipiero, determined to attack the Turks as soon as they prepared to move out of the harbour. On 12th August, the enemy's ships began slowly to leave Porto Longo, and the Venetians at once assailed them. The accounts of their attack are varied and confused, but there can be little doubt that the plan of battle was badly drawn up, and that Grimani was not only lacking in all the qualities of a skilful admiral, but did not possess the necessary courage for a leader. What between his want of strategy and want of boldness, the day was lost to Venice. There was besides an absence of co-operation among the leaders and a confusion in the giving and executing of orders which added greatly to the overthrow.

The following criticism, cited by Sanudo from a letter written by Grimani's chaplain, shows the shortcomings of the Venetian forces, and proves how some of the most efficient of the galleys took simply no part at all in the action: "If all the seventeen big galleys had taken part in the fight, Your Excellency may think what would have happened . . . by the Eternal God there would have ensued immortal victory without even the drawing of swords. The whole host exclaimed with one voice, 'Hang them, hang them.' And by God that would have been a better reward than they deserved; though were it a question of hanging, then four-fifths of our host should be hanged."¹

Malipiero echoes the same sentiment, for he too says,

¹ Sanudo, *Diari*, vol. ii., cols. 1232-34.

“ And if the remainder of the great galleys and our ships (*nave*) had pursued after the Turkish armada, we should have destroyed them . . . the deeds done against the government have been very criminal and very cowardly.”¹

The hopeless state to which things had arrived in the Venetian Navy may be grasped when we read in Sanudo² that while the fleet lay at anchor after the disaster, Grimani called together all the captains (*comiti*) and masters (*padroni*) of the galleys and ships, and bade them in the next engagement kill their superior officers, if they should refuse to obey his, Grimani's, orders and attack the enemy. The incalculable harm that would have resulted from such an order may be imagined, and its execution, had it been brought about, would have meant an end of all rule and discipline and a reign of absolute anarchy and carnage.

Grimani had still, however, a chance of repairing his blunder; for the Turks did not follow up their advantage, and prompt and decisive action on his part might yet have retrieved the fortunes of the Republic. The French had now come to the assistance of their allies, eager for the fray, and the Turks having loosed from their moorings at Navarino, where they had anchored after the engagement at Porto Longo, the word was given to advance to battle. A strange thing then happened: two ships only, one Venetian and one French, advanced and engaged the whole of the Turkish fleet, while the rest of the allies looked on. These galleys were two of the largest of their sort, and what with the awe they inspired by their huge size, and the deadly skill and accuracy of their artillery, they succeeded in keeping the foe at bay, and were able to retire with the loss of only two men. Why the whole of the fleet was not allowed to join, why Grimani failed to follow up his advantage and seize the victory which was almost in his grasp, is a problem beyond our power to

¹ Malipiero, *Annali*, p. 76.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., col. 1239.

solve. It was not, however, till 25th August, after a series of feints, of attacks and counter-attacks of no decisive nature, that another council of war was held, and Grimani gave orders for a vigorous onslaught.

At the outset the Venetians had the best of it, and profited by it to possess themselves of a rich and abundant booty. They then made no further effort, and allowed the Turks to secure the victory. The French were demoralised by this behaviour on the part of their allies, but instead of endeavouring to maintain the honour of the Christian host and recover the day, they sailed to Rhodes and proclaimed aloud the cowardice and incapacity of the Venetian sailors. King Louis, on hearing the news, is reported to have said to Loredano, the Venetian ambassador: "You Venetians are wise in your councils and abound in riches, but so fearful are you of death that you have neither spirit nor manliness in war. When we undertake the business of war it is with the determination to conquer or to die."¹

The consternation with which the news of the defeat was received in Venice was extreme. Grimani was recalled from his command and summoned to Venice to answer the accusations laid against him. With chains about his feet, surrounded by a yelling mob hurling insults at him and clamouring for his blood, this man who aspired to become Doge, who had held the high office of Commander-in-Chief of the Venetian Navy, and whose son was a cardinal, was now called on to make good his defence.

The trial dragged on for some time, and Grimani pleaded that it was not cowardice which withheld him from attacking, but the uncertainty of his orders being carried out in such a manner as to insure victory. This saved him

¹ See Manfroni, *op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 221, who quotes Sanudo, vol. iii., p. 11.

from the extreme penalty of the law. His officers, too, bore witness in his favour. The charge of cowardice and treachery was withdrawn, and he was simply banished as guilty of weakness and irresolution. Writing of this period, Manfroni says: "The chastisement of one of the miscreants (and he certainly not the chief one) could not, however, restore to the Republic her lost honour. Abandoned by the French, who were occupied with the fate of Lombardy, where Lodovico il Moro had returned early in December 1499; disturbed by the threatening attitude of Cæsar Borgia in Romagna; obliged to maintain a large force under arms in Italy for her own defence; straitened in her pecuniary resources owing to the reductions in her commerce and her enormous war expenses, Venice tried to renew relations with the Turk and to purchase, at whatever cost, that peace which she needed in order to adjust affairs in Italy."¹

The Secretary of the Council of Ten, Alvise Manenti, was despatched to Constantinople with full powers to treat for peace; but no terms were possible, for the Turk's demands were exorbitant, and included into the bargain a claim for the supremacy of the sea. That alas! was no longer in the power of the Republic to give or to withhold, and the irony of the Grand Vizier's words to Manenti was only the more galling because of its stinging truth. "You have wedded the sea till now," he said, "for the future that belongs to us, who have more thereon than you." "I think," remarked Manenti, "that he had been informed of this by *our good friends* the Florentines."

The failure to bring about negotiations was emphasised by fresh victories of the Turkish arms: Modon,² described

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 222.

² Speaking of these two harbours in the south-west of the Peloponnesus, Miller says: "The Messenian port of Methone, or Modon, destined to play so important a part in Frankish times as a half-way house between Venice and the East . . . The other Messenian

by Venetian writers as "one of the eyes of the Republic, the gate of Venice, and the barrier of Italy," was lost under Girolamo Contarini in 1500, Coron fell shortly after, and the same fate befell Navarino¹ and Nauplia in the Peloponnesus, cities of vast military and commercial importance.

The Republic had entered into an alliance with Spain the previous year, and many a petition had been addressed to Gonsalvo di Cordova, the Spanish general, to come to the aid of his country's allies and help them to defend their colonies from the Turks. Gonsalvo heeded these entreaties to the extent of only studying his own convenience, and never went near any of the scenes of action till it was too late to be of any use. When reproved by the Venetian *Provveditore* Querini, he arrogantly retaliated that it was no fault of his, and that he had not been summoned.

In December of this same year (1500) the Spanish-Venetian fleet (the latter under the command of Benedetto Pesaro) attacked Cephalonia, when after a long struggle the Turks acknowledged themselves beaten, and sent in their submission to the Spanish general—a proceeding hardly calculated to flatter Venetian amour-propre or enhance a friendly feeling between the allies.

The treaty of Granada [1500], involving as it did the partition of the kingdom of Naples, necessitated Gonsalvo's presence in that region. He accordingly hurried off in order to bring the Neapolitan seaports under Spanish rule. In the midst of the misfortunes which fell thick and fast upon Venice, it is a relief to find that Pesaro, left to his own devices, gained several victories over the Turks at Sta Maura, Prevésa, and Vonitza, where his handling of a force of light station of Korone or Coron, which we shall always find associated with it under the rule of Venice, produced such a quantity of olive oil that no other place in the world, so it was said, could compare with it."—Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹ Navarino was also known as Zonchio, or the "Port of Rushes."

galleys went far to prove that under an able and bold leader that form of vessel (even when, as in the case of Pesaro's fleet, the ships were thoroughly out of repair) was obviously more efficient than the heavy lumbering commercial galleons which were then so much in vogue in the Venetian Navy.

It was in vain, however, for Pesaro to lay his experiences before the authorities at home, and to plead how very different a record he could have presented had he but had efficient ships and crews to support him. Venice paid no attention. His representations, too, as to the superiority of experienced hardy Sclavonians as galley slaves over the "Lombardi," as he termed the feeble inefficient land subjects of the Republic, fell on unheeding ears, and this all-important subject was treated with supreme unconcern and indifference.

In 1503, Venice sore tempest-tossed between her so-called allies and friends, Spain and France, who accused her with more bitterness and injustice than facts have warranted, of lack of good faith, made peace with the Porte. Cephalonia, Nauplia, and Malvasia were restored to her, but she had to acquiesce in the cession of Modon and Coron and to continue the payment of a heavy tribute.



A Gondola.

CHAPTER X

WAR OF CYPRUS

1521—1570

Position of Venice after the League of Cambray. Alliance with Spain. Andrea Doria. Fire at the Arsenal of Venice. Venice in League with Spain and the Pope. War of Cyprus. Marc' Antonio Colonna, and Giannandrea Doria. Siege of Famagosta. Death of Marc' Antonio Bragadino.

THE League of Cambray had been formed by the powers of Europe in 1508 with the avowed object of crushing Venice, and of checking her ambition to be as powerful by land as she had been by sea. The league had succeeded but too well; and Venice, humbled and weakened, never regained her former position, or took rank again as a state entitled to unquestioning respect and consideration. This changed attitude towards her was evident in the behaviour of Francis I. of France, who treated the Republic with an insolence and disdain that he would never have dared to display to a powerful or prosperous ally. And Venice, too enfeebled, too crushed to retaliate or assert herself, could only make such tentative and irresolute efforts to form alliances, whether Christian or infidel, as would keep her from sinking into absolute insignificance and from being trodden underfoot by other states. Her leaning was specially towards the Turk, whose word she had hitherto found more trustworthy than that of the volatile and heartless Francis, or of the ambitious and

designing Charles V. of Spain. When, however, Solyman the Magnificent besieged Rhodes (1522) and swept away the Christian knights of the island, Venice had to assume an attitude which was not calculated to raise her in the eyes of the Porte; and her cringing expressions of congratulation to the Sultan on his victory must have filled him with contempt, if not with suspicion.

Turkey in fact had no reason for wishing to ally herself with Venice, who consequently in 1538 joined the league formed by the Pope and Spain to hold the Turk in check in the Archipelago. The Venetians were to furnish eighty-two galleys, and in return were to receive back the possessions which they had owned in Constantinople at the time of the Fourth Crusade. Charles V. was to be proclaimed Emperor of the East, and a suitable dominion was to be allotted to the Pope. The strange conduct of Andrea Doria, who commanded the Imperial forces at Prevésa, blasted all these hopes and irretrievably ruined the Christian cause. His tactics are inexplicable, and point either to jealousy of the Venetian admirals, Capello and Grimani, who urged him vehemently to attack the Turkish fleet, or to a secret understanding with the famous corsair, Chiaraddin Barbarossa, who led the Turkish forces. The result of his indecision, or incapacity, or treachery—let experts decide which—spelt disgrace and disaster to the Christians, and secured to the Turks the naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. This took place in 1540, and for the thirty years which elapsed between the inglorious day of Prevésa and that of Lepanto the Turks superseded the Venetians as the dominant naval power, and knew well how to make the most of their position. “The disgusting scene at Prevésa,” says Manfroni, “marks the beginning of a new period in the history of the Mediterranean, a period of depression for the Christian states, of mean condescensions, of shameful

alliances. Henceforward no merchant vessel will plough the seas without the sanction of the Turk, and no coast will be secure without their protection.”¹

In 1566, Solyman was succeeded by his son Selim, surnamed the Drunkard, who commenced his reign by protestations of friendship to the Republic which his deeds were soon to belie. The Sultan, like his father before him, was anxious for various and weighty reasons to possess himself of the island of Cyprus. One of these reasons has often, and erroneously, been ascribed to Selim’s longing to become master of the numerous and fertile vineyards on the island so as to satisfy his taste for drink, a taste which it is by no means proved that he possessed to any marked extent. The real cause, however, may be found in the use made by the pirates and corsairs who infested those waters and took refuge in the bays and harbours of Cyprus in order to escape from their Turkish pursuers, or to attack them from safe quarters. Let Cyprus but once fall into Ottoman hands, such practices would then cease, and no marauders would be tolerated in lands or seas where the Crescent waved in undisputed dominion.

During Solyman’s reign Venice had spent enormous sums of money in bribing the Sultan’s ministers to leave her in possession of the island, an arrangement which was bound to come to an end sooner or later. In Constantinople the enemies of the Republic had described her as being so exhausted, impoverished, and feeble that the mere threat of a war would probably induce her to cede Cyprus, and they declared that sooner than engage the Turkish fleet she would consent to accept any terms. The moment too was favourable as far as the rest of Europe was concerned, for the carrying out of Selim’s plans. Spain was occupied in struggles with the Moors; France, exhausted by religious and civil wars, was desirous

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 345.

of friendship with the Porte; the Emperor was engrossed in Hungarian affairs, and Venice herself was in a particularly sorry plight. The harvest had failed, and terrible sickness and mortality were rife among the people, owing to the unwholesome and scanty food on which they had been forced to subsist. This scourge was again followed by a fire at the Arsenal (13th September 1566), of which the appalling nature lost nothing when the report circulated at Constantinople. The description given in Romanin¹ from the words of an eye-witness, Francesco Molin, gives us some idea of what the scene must have been.

“On the night of 13th September,” he writes, “at midnight on the Eve of the Exaltation of the Cross a fire broke out in the powder-magazine of the Arsenal, hurling some of the guards, and some towers covered with lead into the air with a hideous din. The explosion was felt throughout the city, which was well-nigh overthrown, for hardly a door or a window was left. And this I say to show its vehemence, for the casements were split and could not be opened for the mass of broken glass. Many buildings were destroyed, and the noise was so great that it was heard in several neighbouring towns, whilst the flames could be seen on high even from Verona. No house, however, suffered more than did ours, as it is separated from the scene of the disaster only by the canal and some timber which was opposite it against the walls of the Arsenal. And no one in our house suffered more than I, for I was ill in bed with a lingering and malignant fever which had afflicted me for several days. On that day ill luck would have it, I had taken medicine, and by worse luck I slept in a room overlooking the said spot. At the first shock I awoke to see windows breaking, walls opening, beams burning, and everywhere such an amount of fire that I fancied the Day of Judgment had come, as did many others—a rumour being spread abroad a few days before that that day was

¹ Vol. vi., ch. vi., p. 367.

at hand. So commending myself to God, I waited for what should come. The turmoil having abated, although it seemed as if the very air were on fire, I got out of bed, only to be covered with stones, beams, and ruins. On trying to leave my room my feet were sorely wounded, whilst I heard voices of many people imploring help and crying on God. . . . So having descended the stairs with my family and my poor father and mother, we had great difficulty to get out of the door, though it was open and torn from its socket, owing to the quantity of stones, timber, and rubbish which had nearly blocked it up. We got out as best we could and remained almost till day-break out of doors, in the square (*Campo*) of S. Francesco; and seeing endless crowds of senators and gentlemen rushing to the Arsenal, we learnt from them the awful nature of the disaster, and sorrowed more for the harm and damage wrought to the public than for our own present distress. When the day broke we realised the mercy that through God's grace He had shown in protecting this Republic, for we found that the mischief was confined to a small area; and although the violence of the fire and powder had overthrown nearly all the walls within its limits, and although the explosion, when the buildings had been hurled into the air, had been severely felt, yet with all that only two or three galleys in the dock had been set on fire, and these were quickly saved by the promptness of those who ran to extinguish the flames. Nor did the fire spread as it was firmly believed it would do to the halls where the arms, ammunition, and stores of wood were kept in great abundance; so that although the damage was far from slight it was not as bad as might have been expected."

Molin goes on to speak of the many houses swept away by the "rage of the fire," and of the way in which, ill as he was, he had to see to his goods and chattels, "which caused the fever to become more acute than before, and obliged to me to keep my bed for many days, sorely afflicted with a grievous indisposition. But would to God that all the ills occasioned by that fire had been spent on

me; whereas it is well known that the tidings spread abroad of the destruction of the Arsenal of Venice by fire—distorted in the telling to suit different hearers—in conjunction with the famine, were potent incentives for the cruel and bitter war which the Turks waged upon our country.”

Many persons were killed, more perhaps from accidents than from the fire, and, as Molin had foreseen, the rumours that spread far and wide as to the destruction of the Arsenal and the hopeless condition to which Venice was reduced in consequence, did not tend to strengthen the Republic's position in the eyes of the world. The origin of the fire was ascribed to different causes, the chief one being Turkish villainy and treachery, but whether the Turks were really guilty of the act or not has never been determined. They certainly knew how to take advantage of it, and pushed on their preparations for the campaign against Cyprus with redoubled zeal. A formidable fleet of nearly 350 sail (160 galleys and about 190 transport and other ships) under Piali Pasha and Ali Pasha set out for Cyprus, while a land force of about 100,000 men under Mustafa Pasha was despatched there in June 1570.

Venice now began to get ready for the struggle. She had done all that in her lay to propitiate the Turk, and to convince the Sultan of her pacific and honourable intentions towards his government, and of her regret that pirates, sheltering under the ægis of the Republic, had harassed and waylaid his ships. War at that moment with Turkey was indeed the last thing that Venice desired. She hankered in reality after a close alliance with the Porte, and believed that such an alliance would be far more advantageous to her than one with Spain would be, Spain whom she suspected at every point and by whom she was in turn disliked and mistrusted. A last attempt made by Venice to induce the Porte to abandon her warlike projects

on Cyprus was met by the haughty demand to Venice to cede the island without further ado, failing which it would be taken from her by force.

Such insolence left Venice no alternative ; and flinging back with some of her old spirit and pride the retort that she would know how to protect her own, she applied to the Christian powers for help against a foe whom she knew but too well she could not possibly engage alone. Her first appeal was to the Pope. She felt that he himself would not refuse her his aid ; and she also entreated him as Father of the Faithful to rouse the rest of Christendom to the defence of an island whose possession affected all Christians alike. And certainly neither the Republic nor the Holy See can be reproached with want of energy in trying to beat up allies for the war. Not only were appeals made near home, to France and Spain, to Portugal and Germany, but far and wide, even to Persia and to the "King of Muscovy," emissaries were sent to beg for assistance in the coming struggle. But the response to this widespread endeavour consisted mainly in excuses or fair promises—sometimes indeed in neither the one nor the other. The "Coalition of the World" dreamt of by the Republic and Pius V. melted away, and instead of seeing armies and navies flocking to support the sacred cause, Venice and Rome had to be grateful for some galleys sent by Philip II. of Spain, and had to prepare alone, with the courage born of despair, for the unequal contest which lay before them. The Pope named Marc' Antonio Colonna "generalissimo" of the forces, while Girolamo Zane and Giannandrea Doria commanded respectively the Venetian and Spanish fleets. The Pope also applied to Venice for the hire of twelve galleys. The Papal fleet had been wiped out by the Turks under the Pontiff's predecessor, and Pius V. now sent to Venice for galleys which he could equip and man at his own expense. As will be seen after-

wards, the Republic showed more alacrity in accepting the commission than in fulfilling it.¹

The instructions issued by Colonna with regard to the number of men required on board each galley are interspersed with minute directions as to their arms and dress. The morions, or open helmets worn by the artillerymen, are to be of the most recent device, and their belts are to be of velvet "as broad and fine as can be." He is also anxious that their stockings shall be of velvet or cloth, the jerkins wadded, for although it is still summer "it is cold on board the galleys."² A Capuchin friar was to embark on each galley to see after the men, and there were to be besides two doctors and two medicine chests.

In order to hurry his Venetian allies, Marc' Antonio Colonna made a rapid journey by land to Venice. He arrived so unexpectedly that the Doge had not time to go or even send, to meet him, and the ceremonial that should have marked his arrival had to be deferred till the next day. Four state barges with fifty Senators dressed in crimson damask robes brought the General to the ducal palace, where the Doge received him in the "Sala del Collegio," coming down the steps of his throne to greet him. Colonna, after he had openly announced the Pope's readiness to help in every way in his power, impressed on the Venetian authorities the need of hurrying on the preparations, and expressed regret that the twelve galleys which had been promised were not yet ready, and stirred and exhorted the dilatory folk of Venice so effectually that

¹ It is mortifying to have to add that when these hulls were sent they were so old and in such bad repair they were hardly serviceable; and the following year the Pope, instead of applying again to Venice, hired twelve galleys from the Grand Duke of Tuscany for the expedition against Lepanto.

² Padre A. Guglielmotti, *Marc' Antonio Colonna alla Battaglia di Lepanto*, Roma, "Tipografia Vaticana," 1887, lib. i., cap. iii., p. 24.

“he accomplished in a month what others would not even have thought of in a year.”

Colonna's visit was well timed. The position the Turk had gained for himself was causing great nervous anxiety at that moment throughout Europe, and this was felt with intensity in Venice. Neglect and indifference as to her Navy was now succeeded by a series of spasmodic measures, that continued but a short while and yet proved sufficiently the efficient manner in which that Navy could still have acted had the necessary care and money been bestowed upon its administration.

Action was at once taken. Giulio Savorgnan was sent to Cyprus as military engineer, and other men, whose knowledge and discretion could be relied on, were sent to supervise the organisation of the supplies ordered from Dalmatia and Candia. Sebastiano Veniero went as Podestà to Corfu to direct operations there; no vessel lying in any Venetian port was allowed away without leave; all the heavy galleons were put under the command of tried captains; the newly devised “quadrireme” of Vettore Fausto was pressed into the service, and levies were raised in Candia and Corfu. Every measure too that made for the defence and safety of the island was also adopted in Cyprus: gifts of money being generously poured in, and high and low voluntarily giving their services as soldiers in the ranks.

In August of this same year (1570) another of those pageants so dear to Venetian hearts took place when Girolamo Zane was solemnly entrusted with the standard of the Republic in St Mark's, and embarked on board his flagship at the Piazzetta. Flags flew, banners waved, trumpets sounded, timbrels clashed, and a host of spectators gathered along the whole length of the Riva degli Schiavoni and shouted themselves hoarse, cheering their comrades and invoking blessings and good luck on

their heads. Zane's fleet of 137 galleys set sail for Cyprus, but halted on the way at Suda in Candia, there to be joined by the Papal reinforcements and by those which Philip II. "out of zeal for religion, but at great inconvenience to himself" (as he expressed it), had agreed to send as his contingent. This halt was disastrous. The soft, relaxing air of the place, the idle life, and the vices consequent on idleness (joined to bad, unwholesome food) demoralised the troops, and about 3000 men are calculated to have died from fever and other maladies. The waiting too for allies who showed but a half-hearted desire to help must have taxed the endurance of the Venetians wellnigh past bearing. This half-heartedness, it must be said, was almost entirely on the Spanish side. The Pope, Pius V., was sincere and loyal in his endeavour to help Venice and drive out the Turk; but Philip II. had no such desire, and his ruling passion throughout the campaign was to thwart and abase the Republic of St Mark. His general, Giannandrea Doria, though ostensibly instructed to acknowledge Marc' Antonio Colonna as his commanding officer, was also provided with secret orders from the King to avoid any engagement with the Turks, and to effect this besides in such guise as to disgust the Venetians and frustrate their hopes of a great and decisive victory. Doria accordingly idled away his time at Messina, and only when he could no longer ignore the fact that Colonna was impatiently awaiting him, did he sail slowly for Otranto, which he reached on 20th August. The Papal commander-in-chief had waited for him fourteen days. At their first meeting the Genoese admiral acknowledged Colonna as his superior, and then went on to express his surprise at the foolhardiness of the Venetians in venturing to make head against the Turks, who far surpassed them in strength at sea. No good could come of such an act, which would infallibly lead to the hosts of the Pope and


the King being put to flight, and to the total defeat of the "Serenissima," considering the condition the force was in from the mortality which had just decimated it. He made allowance for the feelings of despair that had driven them to such a course, but added that they might, at least, out of respect and gratitude, have come to Otranto to meet their allies and unite with them. He, Doria, would then have convinced them that the season was too far advanced, the troops too feeble, the enemy too strong to proceed to Cyprus, and that they would do well to stay nearer home, and guard their own interests in the Adriatic. He called on Colonna to second him in this view, and to bear in mind that the King had bidden him attend, above all things, to the safety of the fleet. Fortunately for Venice and for Christendom, Colonna was not led away by Doria's selfish, narrow reasoning. He reminded his colleague that fine weather might still be looked for in August, that King Philip would never wish his force to abstain from reaping honour and glory, together with other arguments that checkmated Doria's wiles and showed him that he, Colonna, meant to go, and that without further delay, to succour the Venetians.

While the Generalissimo was bringing Doria to reason—a process that cost a great deal of valuable time—affairs were going badly in Cyprus. A strong Turkish contingent under Mustafa Pasha had landed in June with the intention of capturing Nicosia, the capital of the island, and Famagosta, the principal port. Nicosia was first besieged. The governor of the town was Nicolò Dandolo, a man of small resource and less courage, irresolute, without energy, and too proud to accept advice and counsel from his inferiors. He failed to seize the few and only opportunities which presented themselves of making sorties and driving back the Turks; and they, seeing how incompetent an adversary they had to deal with, gained daily in audacity

and pressed on the siege with unswerving determination and skill. Dandolo thereupon wrote urgent letters to Zane, telling him of the sore strait to which he was reduced, and stating his inability to hold the fortress unless he were relieved. The letter was in Zane's hands, and he, distressed and perplexed at the non-appearance of the Papal and Spanish fleets, was wondering what course to pursue, when suddenly Colonna's and Doria's ships hove in sight. Before he might indulge in the relief that such a sight brought with it, he had, however, to observe the outward forms of respect and reverence that his government bade him pay to the Papal and Spanish admirals. He drew up his galleys in two lines to receive the approaching vessels; a salvo of artillery roared out its welcome, and in friendly company the three fleets entered the harbour. Doria at once called rudely and roughly for material for calking his ships, while Colonna and Zane held council on the Papal flagship as to what was to be done. Zane laid Dandolo's letter before Colonna, together with another he had just received from Venice bidding him sail for Cyprus to relieve Famagosta as soon as ever the allies arrived. Zane pleaded eloquently for the carrying out of these instructions to press on to Cyprus and succour Dandolo. He pointed out how a naval force alone could avail to rescue Famagosta, and that, even supposing Nicosia had fallen, their only hope of vengeance, or of finally wresting the island from the Turks, lay in the Navy alone, and must be effected through the Navy. Colonna shared his views, but Doria, imbued with the wiles and crooked dealing of his Spanish master, opposed them. The contention was so sharp between them that Colonna requested the Venetian admiral to withdraw while he essayed to persuade Doria to accede to their wishes and act in harmony with them. A council of war was accordingly held to consider the advisability of accepting

or rejecting the Venetian request to advance. Doria was the first to speak, and his reasons, even if plausible, were certainly not bold, and showed unmistakably that tendency to irritate and thwart Venice which lay at the root of Philip of Spain's policy. He urged anew the lateness of the season, and the lack of any port beyond Candia in which to harbour. The Venetian galleys, he represented, were almost empty, owing to the great mortality the force had suffered, whereas those of the Turks were fully manned; an advance or an engagement would probably ruin the only fleet that Christendom could provide at the moment, or imperil its existence by an ignominious flight. Adding, however, that he was ready to fight, if the Venetians were really prepared for such a step; he begged them to settle the matter quickly, as he was bent on returning to Sicily at the end of the month. Part of the council held with Doria, part advocated a bolder line of action, but it was not till Colonna threw all the weight of his position and authority into the scale that it was at last settled to sail for Cyprus. Even then Doria hampered his colleagues by insisting on concessions and privileges for himself and his galleys, which were conceded in the hope of conciliating his touchy, provocative temper, and inducing him to co-operate heartily in the undertaking.

More precious time was even then wasted in holding a grand review of the combined fleets, when the numbers were found to be as follows: 126 Venetian galleys, forty-nine Spanish galleys, twelve Papal galleys, one galleon, eleven galleasses, six other ships, total 205. There were on board, 1300 cannon, 16,000 soldiers, and double that number of sailors and rowers, so that any further excuse as to refusing with so strong and efficient a fleet to proceed to the scene of action would have been absurd. The Venetians too were able to silence the murmurs over the shortage of men on their galleys by reminding the Papal and



BAS-RELIEF CARVED IN HONOUR OF THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO.

By Domenico da Salò, in the Church of San Giuseppe di Castello.

Spanish commanders that their rowers, being free men, could be loosed from the oar the moment an engagement began, and make good the deficiency of fighters by handling a sword as readily as they had previously handled an oar.

While these useless formulas and deliberations had been taking place at Suda, very different scenes were being enacted at Nicosia, which the Turks were besieging in deadly earnest. They assaulted the town repeatedly, but in spite of their valour and resolution, they met with steady opposition. Mustafa thereupon determined to strengthen the besieging force, and called on the Turkish admiral to furnish him with supplies from the fleet. Piali Pasha responded by sending 100 men from each of his galleys, and this force of 20,000 foot soldiers marched under the command of Ali Pasha to the siege of Nicosia. This occurred on 8th September, at the very moment when the allies at Suda were wrangling, undecided whether to advance or not. Had they but done so then and there, they would have found the Turkish fleet disarmed, and at their mercy. They would have gained a striking victory and have saved for all time their country's honour and credit. Never was a chance so aggravatingly thrown away! Never was caution carried to so criminal an extent!

Nicosia fell in spite of a gallant resistance, and the horrors that followed on the Turks taking possession of the town aroused widespread terror and disgust. Forty thousand persons were put to the sword, 15,000 were carried off in chains; the bishops and clergy were butchered, churches were desecrated, tombs rifled, women and children were outraged before being slaughtered, and for three days the sack of the city went on in unrestrained and open violence. Mustafa Pasha wishing to present some of the best of the spoil to his master, shipped off a boat load of the fairest damsels of Nicosia to the Sultan.

One of these maidens in despair at the fate that awaited herself and her friends, managed secretly to set fire to the powder-magazine. The vessel blew up; it fired two other vessels sailing beside it filled with jewels and treasure for Selim; the three ships sank with all on board, and only a few persons escaped to tell the tale. Dandolo, whose lack of courage and initiative had contributed to the loss of the town, fell ingloriously in the universal carnage, and his head was cut off and sent to Famagosta as a warning to Marc' Antonio Bragadino, the governor there, of the fate which he might expect.

On 13th September—five days after Piali had dismantled his ships!—the allies loosed anchor from Suda and sailed leisurely to Castel-Rosso, on the Coast of Caramania. It was here that towards the end of the month Luigi Bembo brought the news that Nicosia had fallen on the 22nd, and announced it in strict privacy to the Venetian admiral, Zane. Zane evidently lost his head on hearing what Bembo told him, for instead of keeping such news to himself and only pressing on with increased steadfastness for Famagosta, he blazed the matter abroad, and proposed calling another council of war to deliberate afresh as to what should be done. Zane might have known from former experience that a gathering of the leaders meant only a renewal of the discord and differences that always reigned at such meetings, and to which this one certainly proved no exception. A sharp altercation raged between Colonna and Doria; Colonna espousing the cause of the Venetians and anxious to support them in saving Cyprus, Doria determined to support his Royal master's wishes and secret instructions in humbling and crushing them. In spite of Colonna's and Zane's expostulations to remain with them and proceed all together to Cyprus, Doria clung obstinately to his intention to do as he chose, and sailed

away to Sicily, leaving his allies too weakened by his defection to proceed to Cyprus, and compelled by stress of weather to return to Candia.

This retrograde movement on the part of the fleet sealed the fate of Famagosta. That seaport, the last foothold of the Venetians in the island, had been besieged for several months, and was gallantly defended against fearful odds by the governor Bragadino, ably supported by Astorre Baglione of Perugia, and the Venetian patricians, Lorenzo Tiepolo, Antonio Querini, and Luigi Martinengo. Every advantage had been taken to secure the town against the foe; but months of fighting, watching, and fasting had exhausted the garrison, and their stores of ammunition and provisions were almost finished. Day by day the handful of men who defended the town grew steadily smaller; sickness, wounds, and famine claimed an ever-increasing tale of victims; but yet no question of surrender was entertained. The women, organised in regular bands and preceded by a Greek friar carrying a crucifix, repaired daily for several hours on to the ramparts, where they helped to build up the defence and to carry stones, wood, and water. The Bishop of Limisso was to be found ever in the post of danger, ministering to the dying and encouraging the living, till a bullet pierced his brain and he fell close to the wall while engaged in prayer. Again and again the Turks stormed the breach, and again and again they were repulsed. These attacks cost numerous lives on both sides—a matter of deadly importance to the besieged, who were few in number, though hardly affecting the Turks, who were collected in hordes for the siege and could well spare even some hundreds of lives.¹ The struggle, however, was too uneven to go on for long, and Mustafa, filled with


¹ The Turks are said to have lost 50,000 men and some of their best officers during the fifty-five days that the siege lasted.

admiration for the courage and endurance of his foes (who, he said, fought not as men but as giants) offered terms of peace. These terms were honourable, and Bragadino, urged by his generals and the garrison, agreed to accept them. Life and property was assured to everyone, and vessels were to be provided to convey those who wished to leave the island as far as to Candia. Already some of the inhabitants had taken advantage of this concession and were embarked on the Turkish ships when Bragadino and his chief officers went to the Pasha to hand over the keys of the city. A horrid scene of treachery and bloodshed now ensued. Mustafa, after talking for a long time with the Venetian leaders and apparently treating them with great friendliness, suddenly asked for a guarantee for the vessels lent for the transport of the Christians. Bragadino in reply pledged the public good faith, a pledge the Pasha refused to accept, demanding instead that Querini should be handed over to him as a hostage. Bragadino declared that he would never consent to this, whereon sharp reprisals followed, Mustafa asserting that the Christians had put to death a quantity of Mussulman slaves, Bragadino hotly maintaining that no such thing had occurred. The Pasha upon this, beside himself with anger, ordered his attendants to seize and bind Baglione, Martinengo, and Querini, who were at once hacked in pieces. Tiepolo was hung, but a worse fate was in store for Bragadino. His nose and ears were cut off; and after being forced to witness the execution of his friends, he was made to work like a beast of burden in carrying earth and stones to the ramparts which he had so long and gallantly defended. For eleven days this cruel sport lasted amid the jeers and insults of his tormentors, and then the end came. He was flayed alive, though even while the skin was being torn from his quivering flesh he kept on reciting the words of the "Miserere," then

commending his soul to God, with his last breath he called on the name of the Lord Jesus. His death did not, however, satisfy the cruel lust of the Turks. The dead man's skin was insultingly stuffed with straw, and paraded on a donkey under a red umbrella—in derision of his office—amid the insults of the crowd through the streets of the city. It was then suspended to one of the yards of Mustafa's galley and carried to Constantinople as a trophy of the great victory gained at Famagosta. It was kept in the Arsenal at Constantinople till the year 1580, when one Girolamo Polidori abstracted it and brought it to Venice, where it was placed first in the now suppressed Church of San Gregorio, and finally deposited in an urn in SS. Giovanni e Paolo, where it is to this day.

The fall of Famagosta brought Venetian rule to an end in Cyprus, and the island was lost to Christendom at a moment when its possession was all-important as a base of operations in the waters of the Archipelago. The Turk was now to reap that advantage; and the allied Powers, Spain especially, can hardly have con-
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A Seventeenth-century Fanale.

CHAPTER XI

LEPANTO

1571

Christian States leagued against the Turk. Don John of Austria named Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. Marc' Antonio Colonna at Civita Vecchia. Delays and Difficulties in Starting. The Allies assemble at Messina. Poor Condition of the Venetian Galleys. Don John determines to Advance. The Number of Galleys engaged. Don John and Sebastiano Veniero fall out. Battle of Lepanto. Barbarigo's Death. Triumph of the Christian Arms. Rejoicings throughout Christendom.

THE news of the loss of Nicosia filled the hearts of the Venetians with horror and dismay. But the sense of disappointment at the failure and the mismanagement of the expedition was widespread and bitter. The knowledge of the inability of Venice to act alone, and of her dependence on Spain—a power which she altogether distrusted and which hated and mistrusted her—only made the situation more painful and complicated. And yet, considering how her chief ally, Spain, had borne herself, can we wonder if Venice at times longed to rush on her fate single-handed, rather than be hampered by the cold calculating caution of so-called friends which had always stood in the way of success and had chilled the generous ardour which still burned in many a Venetian breast? Such a course was, however, impossible; Venice had no choice but to take her part in the league against the Turk. At the same time it required but small sagacity to realise that the aims of this league must be adopted heart and soul by all the Christian

powers, and made superior to the bickerings and jealousies of rival states, if it was really intended to hold the Turk in check and secure the safety of the Western world.

Pope Pius V. had already shown his readiness and indeed eagerness to further the objects of the league. He had summoned the representatives of the different powers, under his presidency, to Rome to discuss the lines on which they should act, and in July 1570 his delegates, together with those of Venice and Spain, had met for the purpose in the Vatican. All that year was spent in discussions, when, owing to the failure of the expedition to Cyprus, the question arose as to who should now be named Commander-in-Chief of the forces. The Venetian ambassadors were Michele Soriana and Giovanni Soranzo; whilst cardinals, nobles, and statesmen represented the Pope and King Philip. The meeting was far from harmonious, nor were its deliberations expeditious. The Spaniards were dilatory, seizing on every pretext to spin out the time and postpone the moment for embarking on the war. The Venetians were in a hurry: the enemy was devastating their lands and property on all sides with fire and sword, and each day that passed was a loss of so much precious time to them and a gain to their adversaries. It was not, however, till the end of February of the following year (1571) that Don John of Austria, King Philip's natural half-brother, was accepted by all the parties concerned as Commander-in-Chief by land and sea, and Marc' Antonio Colonna as his successor should any evil befall him. Sebastiano Veniero was to command the Venetian fleet; and Giannandrea Doria that of the King of Spain. The league was to be a permanent one between the King of Spain, the Pope of Rome, and the Republic of Venice; offensive and defensive against the Turk and his dependents; its forces were to consist of 200 galleys, 100 ships, 50,000 infantry, and 9000 cavalry; the cost to be

divided into six parts: three to be borne by the King, two by the Republic, and one by the Pope. On 25th May 1571 the league was duly signed and ratified in Rome; and on the 13th June, Marc' Antonio Colonna sailed to Civita Vecchia on his way to Messina, where the forces were to assemble under Don John. He was received at Civita Vecchia with every demonstration of joy and respect by the inhabitants of that town, who, to do honour to the Captain of the Papal contingent, presented him with the following curious offerings: 12 boxes of white sugar-plums; 18 packets of white wax torches; 18 packets of big white candles; 24 loaves of fine sugar; 25 capons; 25 chickens; 100 cocks; 24 ducks; 12 geese; 5 Guinea fowls and 1 Maltese hen; 6 peacocks, 3 males, and 3 females; 2 *genchi* (?); 6 *crastati* (?); 2 barrels of wine; 3 coffers of white bread; 4 coffers of fruit; 1 portion of *nivi* (?). These gifts were made with marked ostentation: a procession of numerous serving men dressed in livery carried the gifts publicly on trays or cars, covered with cloths, flowers, placards, and banners, preceded by trumpeters who proclaimed on high the magnificence of the donors and the dignity of the guest whom they wished to honour.

On his way to Messina, Colonna sent word to Veniero of his movements, and prayed him to lose no time in joining him. Veniero was then in a tight place. He had been compelled for want of space to break up his fleet into two divisions, one was stationed at Candia under the *provveditori*, Marco Querini and Antonio Canale;¹ the

¹ Pantera, when discoursing on large double-handed swords and their efficacy "in the hands of those who know how to use them on board ship," cites the case of the "Venetian *Provveditore*, Antonio Canale, at the fight of the Curzolari," as Lepanto is often called. "He, though old and stricken in years, having donned a pair of string shoes in order to stand more stoutly, and having put on a jerkin or short coat all wadded with cotton, with a



*I Capitanì Gnali dell'armata Venetiana, sogliono uestire questo habito, e tale fu uisto
già il Ser.^{mo} Sebastiano Veniero quando frucasso l'armata Turca a i Curzolari l'anno 1571
Franco forma con Privilegio*

SEBASTIANO VENIERO.

From Giacomo Franco's "Habiti d'Honomeni et Donne Venetiane," Venice, 1609.

other he kept under his own command, assisted by his flag-lieutenant, Agostino Barbarigo, at Corfu. The Turkish fleet, in the meantime, under Ali Pasha, had advanced to the very entrance of the Adriatic, and thus enormously enhanced the difficulties of Veniero's position. The risk that he incurred of being blocked by Ali and unable to join his allies had to be weighed against the danger to which Venice herself was exposed, for with no ships for her home defence she was absolutely at the mercy of a foe whose daring and ambition might easily lead him into the very heart of the lagoons. There was, moreover, no time to hesitate, or to demand counsel from Venice: Veniero had to decide, and that without delay. He called his chief officers together, frankly laid before them the doubts and difficulties of the situation, and they all agreed that the right course was to push on at all hazards, and that instantly, for Sicily. Such a resolution was thoroughly in keeping with Sebastiano Veniero's wishes and temperament. He was essentially a fighter, and his seventy years had in no way dulled his keenness for war or his love of fighting. His body was scarred with innumerable wounds, for wherever a quarrel arose Veniero was to be found taking part in it, and his eager, hot temper joined to his noble birth and great eloquence made him a leader of men. He despatched messengers to Querini and Canale to advance towards Sicily, whilst he pushed on with his own squadron for the same place. He only just avoided encountering the Turkish fleet, and many a doubt must have arisen in his mind as to whether that foe so close at hand would meet him in open fight when he had joined the allies, or whether they would slip away to similar bonnet on his head to protect him from the arrows, mounted an armed Turkish vessel with spirit, and jumping from one galley to another with a big sword in his hand, wrought marvellous prowess in his own person on the foe, and rescued a galley which was already in the hands of the Turks."—*Op. cit.*, p. 84.

Venice and raze the city to its very foundations. He reached Messina on 23rd July, a few days before Colonna's arrival, and on hearing that his colleague was in sight, Veniero put out to meet him with salvoes of artillery, flags flying, and all the ceremonial and display that those times and customs demanded. Marc' Antonio's force consisted of the twelve Papal galleys hired from the Grand Duke of Tuscany, together with three galleys from Genoa. Veniero had forty-eight Venetian galleys; and while awaiting those from Candia under Querini and Canale, he was further reinforced by the six huge galleasses which played so famous a part at Lepanto, and secured the victory to the Christian allies.

The Turks on their side with 200 sail were devastating Corfu and the Dalmatian coast, and would undoubtedly have carried their arms even to Venice had not a shortage of men on some of their vessels held them back. As it was, their presence in the Adriatic prevented a large number of the Venetian levies from embarking on board Querini's ships, and that admiral had to give up all hope of getting them, and proceed to Sicily without the full supply of soldiers that Venice had undertaken to provide.

Don John's appearance in Messina was all the while eagerly looked for. He tarried, however, in a way that fretted his Italian allies almost past endurance. Their irritation would have been even greater had they known the trivial obstacles which Philip II., in his desire to hinder the expedition from getting under way, had placed in his brother's path. Philip in reality had no wish to engage the Turk. His heart was set on operations in Barbary, where he considered that a wholesale suppression of the Moors would further his policy far more effectively than a triumph over Turkey. Secret orders were therefore given to Don John's chief officers and counsellors, the Marquis of Santa Croce, Cav. Gil D'Andrada, Don Sancho de

Leyva, and Don Luis de Requesens, to do all that in them lay to avoid a battle, and if possible to persuade Colonna and the Venetians to pursue a similar line of action. That Philip's policy was more for the good of his own state than for that of Venice no one can deny; but that it was in keeping with the objects for which the league had been formed, of driving the Turk out of Cyprus and checking his omnipotence in the Mediterranean, cannot for a moment be admitted.

Don John sailed with thirty-four galleys for Italy, leaving Don Sancho de Leyva to guard the Spanish littoral with twelve galleys. Giannandrea Doria went with him, and they touched first at Genoa, where all sorts of balls and festivities were held in honour of the young prince, whose youth and beauty and "incomparable mode of dancing" won all hearts. From Genoa he proceeded to Naples, where his ranks were swelled by Giovanni Andrea Provana with three galleys; Francesco Maria, Duke of Urbino; and with three Genoese galleys under Spinola, who had Alessandro Farnese on board his flagship. Here some more days were passed in renewed feastings and ceremonies, and here, too, Don John was solemnly invested by the Viceroy, Granvelle, with the standard of the league. It was not till 23rd August that he reached Messina, where he was received with every demonstration of joy and respect by Colonna and Veniero, whose dreary time of waiting seemed at last drawing to an end. Some days, however, had to elapse, waiting for the galleys and levies which had not yet arrived; and in the meanwhile Don John reviewed the forces already assembled, when Spanish jealousy or malignity whispered to him to look very attentively at the Venetian vessels, and to be sure, in case of a battle, to set them in the forefront of the fight. As a matter of fact, the galleys of Venice were neither so well equipped, nor in such good condition as those of the

other allies. Veniero hastened to explain that the want of men was due to the blockade of his infantry in the Adriatic, a want which he fully expected to make good by the levies being then raised by the Republic in Calabria and around Naples; whilst the rest of the squadron which was due from Candia would be found to be in better plight. This reply satisfied the Commander-in-Chief, but when a few days later the remaining Venetian galleys (fifty-seven in all), led by Querini and Canale, arrived, they were pronounced to be even less well equipped than the others. Veniero must have ground his teeth for rage. He had left his country a prey to Turkish audacity (and it was no merit of his if the enemy could not profit by it); for a whole month he had had to remain inactive when his pulses were on fire to strike, and at the end he had to listen to complaints as to the state of his country's ships.¹

And the bitterest pang of all must have been in the consciousness that such criticism was only too well founded. His ships—and he knew it—were inferior in every respect. Fewer soldiers, far fewer sailors, less skill in the handling of the vessels, and a lack of the smartness, discipline, and order that was to be found on the other galleys were now the characteristics of the Venetian Navy. In order to remedy as far as possible these deficiencies, Don John ordered Italian and Spanish soldiers and sailors to embark on board the Venetian ships, and Veniero had no alternative but to submit to

¹ The inferior condition of the Venetian Navy at the time of the battle of Lepanto is dwelt on by Pantera. "It happened in the year 1571," he remarked, "that owing to the avarice of the ministers in buying and distributing bad food, much sickness, many deaths, and great disorders ensued; indeed to so great an extent that almost all the host was undone; and sore damage befell the Republic, in that over 35,000 men between soldiers, sailors, and the crew died."—*Op. cit.* p. 95.

this mortifying arrangement. On the other hand, he may have felt that in accepting the terms laid on him in this respect he had earned the right for himself of insisting on his terms in their turn being respected. These terms were that the allies should advance at once against the Turks and engage them at all hazards. He had the weight of the whole Spanish Cabinet against him, but at the same time he was not speaking to deaf ears when he pointed out to Don John the sorry figure he would cut in the eyes of the world should he retire without striking a blow, and that at the head of such a host as he had around him he could not fail to crush the Ottoman power for ever, and win for himself everlasting renown. He was also warmly seconded in his entreaties by Colonna, whose kindly feelings towards Venice cannot be sufficiently dwelt upon and whose influence was always favourable towards the Republic of St Mark. Don John, too, was keen for action. He was but twenty-two at the time; he was brave, high-minded and generous, and he resolved to waive the counsels prompted by undue caution and procrastination, and follow the bold policy insisted on by Veniero and supported by Colonna. The order to advance to battle was given by the young general, who proclaimed his confidence in heaven and declared that he was certain that God would give him the victory.

The news of this decision, taken on 12th September, reached Madrid on 28th September, when Philip, hoping yet to be in time to stop his eager, rash brother, despatched Don Garzia di Toledo to join the prince wherever he might be and help him in every possible way. It was, however, too late to speak any longer of caution or delay, the squadrons had started and were not now to be held back. The manner of advance and attack had been thoughtfully planned and sketched out at Messina, and indeed the handling of so gigantic a force

required judgment, foresight, and a power of organisation of the very highest order. Every detail had been considered, and every provision made to guard against disaster and to avoid any blunder. The captain of each vessel had been given written instructions as to the place he was to occupy in advancing and in battle, and the route he was to follow by day and night. The three generals, Don John, Colonna, and Veniero had also seen fit to mix the men and ships of the different nations engaged. Thus, instead of there being as might have seemed more natural a Spanish, a Papal, and a Venetian squadron, the whole force was divided into right and left wings, a main body, an advance guard, and a reserve squadron, in all of which Spaniards, Romans, and Venetians were promiscuously intermingled. This fusion is supposed to have been made to guard against treachery, but if such was really the case—and there seems little reason to doubt it—it tells a sad tale of the suspicion and distrust which reigned amongst the allies, and the measures that had to be taken to provide against mutiny and desertion.

The advance guard was under the command of Don Juan of Cardona, and was composed of seven galleys—four Venetian and three Sicilian. The main body, under Don John, supported by Colonna and Veniero, was of sixty-two galleys—twenty-seven Venetian, nine Spanish, four Neapolitan, seven Papal, three Maltese, one Savoyard, five Genoese, six of Giannandrea Doria, one of Grimaldi, one of David Imperiale. The left wing, under Agostino Barbarigo, *Provveditore* of the Venetian fleet, had fifty-three galleys—forty-one Venetian, eight Neapolitan, one Papal, two of Giannandrea Doria, one of the Lomellini. The right wing under Giannandrea Doria was of fifty galleys—twenty-five Venetian, six Neapolitan, five Sicilian, five of Giannandrea Doria, two of Savoy, one of Grimaldi,

four of the Negrone, two Papal, one Genoese, two of the Lomellini. In the reserve squadron, under Don Alvaro da Bazan, Marquis of Santacroce, were twelve Venetian, ten Neapolitan, three Spanish, two Sicilian, three Papal.

This made a total of 202 galleys, instead of the 208 which Don John, writing from Messina, had stated that he had at his command. This discrepancy as to numbers exists in every historian who treats of Lepanto, and in most cases is probably due to some confusion in the nomenclature of the galleys or in the manner of enumerating them in their order. It may be assumed that the number of galleys was just over 200, and there were besides the six galleasses, and a force of from 28,000 to 29,000 fighting men.¹

Sforza Pallavicini, who was to have commanded the Venetian soldiers, had to resign his post through sickness, and Prospero Colonna, Marc' Antonio's son, Don Gaspar

¹ Guglielmotti (*op. cit.*, lib. ii., cap. xvi., p. 203) draws up the following table of the ships, ammunition, and men :—

		Galleys.	Ships.	Galleasses.	Cannon.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Rowers.
Italians—								
Under their respective flags.	Venice . .	105	10	6	905	11,200	7,000	22,800
	The Pope . .	12	60	2,200	700	2,400
	Savoy . .	3	15	500	180	600
	Genoa . .	3	15	500	180	600
	Malta . .	3	15	600	200	900
Under the King's flag.	Naples . .	19	95	1,900	1,100	3,800
	Sicily . .	4	20	400	240	800
	Giannandrea Doria	10	50	1,000	600	2,000
	Nicolò Doria . .	2	10	200	120	400
	Lomellini . .	4	20	400	240	800
	Negroni . .	4	20	400	240	800
	De Mari . .	2	10	200	120	400
	Grimaldi . .	2	10	200	120	400
	Imperiali . .	2	10	200	120	400
	Sauli . .	1	5	100	60	200
Spain . .		31	20	...	555	8,000	1,700	6,200
		207	30	6	1,815	28,000	12,920	43,500

Toraldo, and Pompeo Giustini were appointed in his stead.

This huge unwieldy force, which when drawn up in battle-array presented a front of five miles in extent, sailed onwards, keeping a sharp lookout to avoid being surprised, and in order to discover the enemy's whereabouts. An admirable service of scouting was organised and despatched under Gil D'Andrada for this purpose. While awaiting his return, no small pressure was put upon Don John to induce him to leave the Turks alone, and devote himself to work nearer at hand, such as an attack on Sta Maura, or Prevésa, or any other fortress in the vicinity. Don John steadily discountenanced these suggestions, and on 2nd October Gil D'Andrada returned with the information that the Turkish fleet was sheltering, with a force superior in some ways to that of the Christians, in the Bay of Lepanto. The Turks in fact had 222 galleys; but they were lacking in the stronger branch of the service, and had nothing wherewith to encounter the formidable Venetian galleasses, or to oppose to such splendid fighting bulwarks.

The allies now set sail for Cephalonia, but a most unpleasant incident occurred at Comenizza, a spacious port on the Albanian coast, where Don John had elected to anchor in order to hold a review of the fleet before engaging the foe. It will be remembered how the Venetians had had to accept a complement on board their galleys of men of different nationalities—a measure in no ways conducive to concord or goodwill either on the part of the Venetians or of their imposed mates. Veniero, to his credit be it said, had greatly restored the order and discipline of olden days on board his galleys. He was, too, a martinet, and allowed no relaxation of his rules, either among his own men or among those to

whom discipline was unusual and unacceptable. Any questioning as to a command, or any hint of insubordination met with instant and condign punishment, and a Spanish soldier who had answered him insolently was immediately hanged by his orders. This act was fresh in everyone's mind when on 3rd October the news of the fall of Famagosta and all the horrors perpetrated by the Turks on Bragadino and his officers reached the advancing fleet. The news was a shock to all on board and especially to the Venetians. Their last foothold in Cyprus was gone; their countrymen had succumbed to a cruel, ignominious fate; and the efforts that should have been made to avert these calamities had failed through the weakness of their own arms and the faithlessness of their allies. These reflections must have sunk deep in Veniero's mind and added greatly to the irritability of a temper never mild or lenient at the best of times, and particularly strained and provoked at that moment. Whilst preparing to set sail for Lepanto on this same 3rd of October, a sailor on board Veniero's galley, one Muzio of Cortona, a subject of the King of Spain and a truculent turbulent fellow, let fall some insulting remarks about the Venetians. A quarrel at once arose, warmly espoused by some Spanish marksmen on the one side and some Venetian sailors on the other. It soon became serious. From words they came to blows, which led again to fierce fighting, and the deck was covered with dead and wounded men. Veniero, beside himself at such disorder and rioting and refusing all advice to refer the matter to Don John, ordered Muzio and his associates to be strung up at the mast's head. The order was at once carried out, and the corpses of these brawlers hanging aloft was clear evidence of the Venetian admiral's mode of procedure.

Don John's anger knew no bounds when he learnt what Veniero had done. That justice of so summary a

nature should be administered without a word from him aroused his deepest indignation; and that an officer, even of so high a rank as Veniero's, should presume to deal death-sentences without consulting him was an offence of the gravest kind. His first impulse was to place the Venetian commander instantly under arrest, and it was even whispered that he thought for a moment of putting him to death. The situation was strained to breaking-point, and it needed but a spark to fire those hot and angry tempers into flame. One more word of anger, one more gesture of impatience, and the Christians would have been at each others throats. Fortunately for the success of the expedition, the wise counsels and tactful words of Marc' Antonio Colonna prevailed to restore peace. He was ably seconded by Agostino Barbarigo, and between them they persuaded Don John to lay aside his outraged dignity, to think only of the cause they had in hand, and to press on against the Turks. The Prince yielded to their pleadings—but on one condition only, namely, that Veniero should not appear again in his presence, nor show himself any longer at the Council Board. The irascible old warrior, who probably knew in his heart that he had acted with overmuch haste and independence, agreed to his Commander-in-Chief's conditions, and saved his own dignity by declaring that no power on earth would induce him ever again to set foot on board a Spanish vessel. Barbarigo was to act as intermediary between his own commanding officer and Don John, and peace and harmony were once more restored.

No further incidents marred the rest of the expedition. The allies arrived off the islands of the Curzolari, a group of rocky islets to the north of the Gulf of Lepanto, on the evening of the 6th of October, and there awaited the coming day. The Turks thinking to find them in the Straits of Cephalonia, came out from Lepanto, and early

on the morning of Sunday the 7th the two fleets found themselves face to face around the rocky cluster of the Curzolari. Here, amid associations of great epoch-making battles, the question of dominion was to be determined between Christian and Infidel, and their mutual position as to naval supremacy in the Mediterranean settled for all time.

Day had hardly dawned when the watch on board Don John's *Real*, or flagship, discerned on the far horizon the sails of two vessels. The distance was still too great to decide whether they were galleys or fishing boats, but in a few minutes a line of oncoming masts and sails left no doubt, and the Christians knew that the foe was at hand. Don John at once ordered a small cannon to be fired and a white standard run up on the mast of his *Real*; these being the signals already agreed on at Messina for the commencement of the engagement. He had also requested the commanders of each galley to be sparing of their artillery, for the guns were of very short range, and the process of reloading was long and intricate. The principal tactics in a naval fight in those days was to board or sink the enemy's vessels, and to trust more to that manœuvre than to disabling them by shot or shell.

The three squadrons moved on under their respective colours: the Blue Squadron in the centre, under Don John; the Green Squadron on the right, under Giannandrea Doria; the Yellow Squadron on the left, under Agostino Barbarigo. The same instructions held good for all, in that the galleys of each squadron were to be so close together as to allow no more space than what was needed for the play of the oars, so as to prevent any hostile galley from getting in amongst them; the right and left wings were to be spread in such a fashion as to be able to turn whichever way the exigencies of the fight might determine, without inconveniencing the centre or the other

wing. The line of advance was to be perfectly straight, without curving either to the right or the left, and was, as far as possible, to be maintained in that order. There were sixty-one galleys (Prescott says sixty-three) in the Blue Squadron: Don John in the centre in the *Real* of Spain had on his right the *Capitana* of Rome with Marc' Antonio Colonna, and on his left that of Venice with Sebastiano Veniero; behind was the flagship of Savoy, with the Count of Ligny and the Prince of Urbino; beyond was the flagship of Genoa, with Spinola and Alessandro Farnese; followed again by Spanish, Venetian, and Papal galleys. The Green Squadron, under Doria, was of fifty-three galleys (Prescott says sixty-four), while the reserve, under the Marquis of Santa Croce, consisted of thirty-five galleys. The Yellow Squadron, under Barbarigo, was of fifty-five galleys. The six huge Venetian galleasses, under Francesco Duodo, were to have taken up a position a mile in advance of the line, when each respective squadron would have been guarded by two of these colossal battle-ships, but some delay occurred in placing them, and the battle was well advanced before the two which should have covered the Yellow Squadron were got into their place.

A final council was held on Don John's ship to issue the last instructions, and even then there were some of his most intimate counsellors who were not ashamed to bring forward the craven suggestions of retiring before the foe and awaiting a more favourable moment and better conditions wherein to begin the attack. These counsellors — in whose ranks neither Marc' Antonio Colonna nor Barbarigo were to be found — were summarily dismissed by Don John with the words: "Depart, gentlemen, this is not the time for counsel, but for battle."

The first move on the part of the allies was made by Doria, who spread his squadron so far out on the right as

to break the prescribed line and upset the plan drawn up at Messina which fixed every man's place. A terrible doubt arose as to whether the Genoese admiral, foiled in his scheme of avoiding a battle, intended to carry out his wishes at any cost and escape in this way from the engagement. The Turks on their side were convinced that he had taken flight. Ali Pasha accordingly fired a volley, partly as a taunt at what he considered a cowardly retreat, partly as a challenge to the adversary. Don John at once accepted the challenge, answering it with an exchange volley. Every flag was thereupon hauled down from the respective galleys, and the great Standard of the League, bearing the Image of the Crucified Redeemer and blessed by the Pontiff, was run up on the Commander-in-Chief's vessel. As the standard rose in view every man in the Christian host, from the highest to the lowest, bared his head, and on bended knee confessed his sins to the priest on board each ship. Sacramental absolution was then pronounced and remission of sins with plenary indulgence was bestowed. The galley-slaves were freed from their chains, food and wine was given liberally to all; while Don John, embarking on a light frigate, passed down all the lines to encourage the men and address a word of greeting or exhortation to the captains. The Venetians were particularly reminded of the fate of the luckless Bragadino, and urged to avenge his death and that of his comrades; they were called on to emulate the deeds of their forefathers and prove themselves worthy descendants of those heroes of old. Promises of renown and gain in this world were held out to all who conquered in the fight; whereas everlasting life would be the guerdon of those who laid down their lives, fighting against the Infidel for God and their country. While passing along the lines, Don John caught sight of Veniero on his quarter-deck and exchanged so friendly a greeting with him as to wipe out the remem-

brance of the difference that had existed between them—a fine trait on the young Commander-in-Chief's part, and one that Veniero's greatness would know how to appreciate at its true worth. It is said that when Don John returned to his ship after this inspection he first warned his cowardly advisers against any further counsel for retreat, and in his exuberance of spirit at the prospect of immediate action, ordered every trumpet to be blown, and in sight of the whole host danced a Spanish dance known as "*la gagliarda*" on board his deck.

The Turks on their side came on in much the same order as their adversaries: in three squadrons, the centre, under their leader Ali Pasha, being opposed to Don John of Austria; the viceroy of Egypt, Mahomet Scirocco, being opposed to the left or Yellow Squadron of the allies, under Agostino Barbarigo; and Uluch Ali, the dey of Algiers and the most noted corsair in the Mediterranean, being face to face with the right or Green Squadron, under Giannandrea Doria. Their line was, however, crescent-shaped, and the wind in the morning was all in their favour, carrying them on swiftly towards the foe, while the Christians on their side were toiling in rowing and made next to no progress. Towards noon, however, a change took place: the wind shifted completely, blowing straight from the opposite quarter, and proving as helpful to the allies as it was harmful to the Turks. The Turks had greatly under-estimated the force and numbers of the Christian host; and when at midday the attack became general and the heavy fire from the Venetian galleasses poured with deadly effect on to their advancing lines, a good deal of disorder and confusion ensued. Ali Pasha, however, ordered his rowers to pull with redoubled vigour so as to pass beyond the range of this murderous fire, for the galleasses were too cumbersome to move hither and thither, and once they had, as it were, shot their bolt, they



THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO.
FROM THE PICTURE BY ANDREA VICENTINO IN THE DUCAL PALACE.

were of no further avail. The Turks, with their order slightly broken, came on with yells of courage and assurance, and hurled themselves with thundering shock on the Christian centre. At first it seemed as if the infidels must win. Doria's wing on the right had given an impression of flight to friends and foes alike; Barbarigo's wing on the left, which was to keep as close as possible to land, had not been able to keep Mahomet Scirocco from slipping between him and the coast and attacking him in the rear. A desperate struggle ensued, and nobly did every Venetian bear himself at that critical moment. Barbarigo, with his visor raised and without a thought for his own personal safety, rallied his men at every point and urged them on to victory. An arrow pierced his left eye, inflicting so deadly a wound that he was forced to withdraw to his cabin, where he died next day. His efforts were not in vain, however: on all sides Venetians hastened to the support of their comrades, prodigies of valour were performed, and the enemy had to retire. Giovanni Contarini, Barbarigo's sister's son, fell fighting valiantly to avenge his uncle, and the command then devolved on Federigo Nani.

The grief caused by Barbarigo's death is shown in a letter written by Marc' Antonio Colonna to his friend Buonvicino, two days after the victory of Lepanto. After giving thanks to God for the great and signal victory, which had far exceeded their hopes and expectations, he goes on to say how it has now been proved that "the Venetians are made of the same stuff as in the olden times, and that the Turks, to say the least of it, are no more than other men." He then speaks of what the world at large has lost by Barbarigo's death.

"My grief at the loss that all Christendom has sustained in the person of Agostino Barbarigo of glorious and

honoured memory, equals my satisfaction at the victory. He was a man of rare qualities in all respects, and was worth in one day more than any other soldier. Our Republic of Venice has certainly lost in him her right arm, whilst I have lost more than I can say. How fortunate is he to be thus happily free from the trials of this world! And his loss is so great that by it, methinks, God has seen fit to take away the fruits that would otherwise have accrued to us from so signal a victory. As for me, when I was with him I was so happy that every care vanished away. And what makes it harder for me is that I had not the last consolation of embracing him after the victory! But not to weary you I will conclude.

“MARC’ ANTONIO COLONNA.¹

“FROM PATALA.—9th October 1571.”

The Turkish leader, Mahomet Scirocco, also fell in this engagement. His flagship was boarded, and he himself was found on the quarter-deck in a dying condition, covered with wounds.

At the actual moment when this hand-to-hand struggle was going on between the Christian left wing and their opponents, the rest of the host had not yet engaged in action. Before the struggle on the left, however, was decided, the central divisions of the two fleets bore down upon each other, and Don John of Austria and Ali Pasha met in deadly conflict. The shock was terrific. The Pasha’s galley was larger and heavier than that of Don John, and so violent was the impact, that the spur of the Moslem vessel penetrated to the fourth bench of the Spanish flagship. The defence and counter-attack were steadily maintained till the vessels on each side were gradually laid so completely alongside one another as to form one widespread deck, where the combatants met to conquer or to die.

¹ Guglielmotti, *op. cit.*, vol. vi., lib. ii., cap. xv., pp. 218, 219.

The galley of Pertev Pasha, the bey of Negropont, having on board Ali's two sons, singled out for attack Sebastiano Veniero's galley. Veniero's numbers were inferior to those of the Pasha; he had been wounded in the foot by an arrow; most of his men were slain; and had it not been for the timely succour brought him by Giovanni Loredano and Caterino Malipiero, he must have been taken. Both Loredano and Malipiero, together with a host of other Venetian patricians, fell at Lepanto, and many of the highest in the land laid down their lives "for God and for the cause" ere victory declared it on the Christian side.

An example of the indomitable love of country and liberty that inspired the Venetians is given by Pantera,¹ when speaking of Benedetto Soranzo's galley at Lepanto. This galley had been boarded by the Turks, and was in sore distress. Soranzo himself had died fighting gallantly, and the *scrivano*, or secretary, had taken over the command. Seeing that all hope of rescue was in vain, he judged it would be more to the honour of his country to destroy himself and his comrades, together with their foes, than to live in slavery or face a death of ignominy and torture. He accordingly set a lighted fuse to the powder-magazine on board his galley, and the whole mass, friends and foes alike, "in one wild roar expired."

The attack in the centre raged fiercely. Don John, standing beneath the great Standard of the League, prepared, if need be, to preserve it with his very life, refused indignantly to listen to the entreaties of Don Luis de Requesens, who watched over him with faithful, loving solicitude, to withdraw from so exposed and perilous a position. Here in the heart of the battle the son of Charles V. proved himself worthy of his royal descent. Twice his soldiers boarded Ali's flagship, and twice were they repulsed by the numerous levies that came up in

¹ Pantera, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

never-failing regularity to the support of the Pasha. These unceasing reinforcements threatened to overcome the allies ; but at that critical juncture Don John put himself, sword in hand, at the head of his men to infuse into them fresh energy, while Marc' Antonio Colonna, who had captured the bey of Negropont's galley and so succoured Veniero in his need, came to the rescue and drove the whole weight of his own vessel on to the poop of Ali's ship. The Pasha, attacked on all sides, still fought valiantly. He could not, however, make head against such tremendous odds. His standards were all taken, and he himself was forced back to the very stern of the ship and was never afterwards seen alive. A mystery envelops his fate. Some writers say that he drew a scimitar from his belt, cut his throat, and threw himself into the sea. Others declare that his head, stuck on a pike, was brought to Don John, who turned from it with horror and ordered it to be thrown overboard. The most probable solution is that Ali fell fighting gallantly, and that his body was never recovered from amongst the hundreds of slain who perished on that day. That Ali was a fine character the following trait will testify. Before engaging the allied fleets he made a proclamation to his galley-rowers, who were for the most part Christian slaves chained to the oar, that should he be victorious he would give them their liberty ; "If the Christians are the victors," he added, "you will be in safe hands."

A scene described by one Diedo, who took part in the battle and which the author admits gave rise to considerable amusement, may here be mentioned. After dwelling on the carnage and horrors of the fight, he goes on to relate how "those Turks who could not escape to land, or who would not (as did some) throw themselves into the sea, fought with such obstinacy that many of them were left without weapons of defence, and consequently snatched up oranges and lemons of which a quantity lay handy, and

sought to molest our men with them. Some of these, out of disdain or in ridicule, retaliated by throwing them back at them. This form of conflict seems to have occurred in many places towards the end of the fight, and was a matter for considerable laughter.”¹

The victory, that after two hours of stern fighting was assured to the left wing and the centre of the Christian host, was in jeopardy in the meanwhile on the right wing under Doria. His intentions in placing himself so far away from the rest of the fleet have occupied the minds of many historians and naval men, and have been interpreted in many ways, mostly to his discredit. Be that as it may, the manœuvre—if it can be called one—proved an egregious error. The distance he had placed between himself and the main body of his colleagues made his position one of anxiety instead of usefulness, while it became easy for his opponent, Uluch Ali, to surround him completely. That able general lost no time in doing so, and a wholesale carnage ensued. Doria then at last saw his error, and endeavoured to retrieve it. He strove to rejoin the rest of the host, and urged on his rowers to do their utmost to bring this about.² It is probable that not a man or a galley would have escaped from the *mêlée* had it not been that the Marquis of Santa Croce, seeing the danger, came up with the reserves. Don John also seeing the straits to which Doria was reduced, went in person to support Santa Croce with twelve galleys. This unlooked-for relief routed the

¹ *Biblioteca Rara. Misc.*, vol. i., 206, c. 169. “La Battaglia di Lepanto descritta da Gerolamo Diedo,” p. 36.

² This is not the place to discuss the conduct of Giannandrea Doria at Lepanto. Experts and critics have written and spoken at length on the subject, and the majority agree in condemning his tactics, while all recognise that owing to him the Christian victory was neither so great nor complete as it should have been, and that the Moslems saved a number of ships which would otherwise have been captured by the allies.

Ottoman commander. He feared lest he in his turn would be surrounded; he realised that he could not make head against these unexpected reinforcements, and, bent on saving the fleet under his charge, he made all haste to escape to Santa Maura. The Marquis of Santa Croce was eager to capture the great Mediterranean corsair, and so complete the Christian triumph. But Uluch was too wary to allow this. The wind was in his favour, and in spite of all the efforts made on the part of the allies, this Calabrian renegade saved the honour of the Crescent and put safely into the bay of Prevéša with thirteen galleys; while thirty-five others reached in equal safety the harbour of Lepanto.

The fight, begun at midday, lasted till evening, when sure signs of an approaching heavy storm warned the allies of the need of seeking shelter. They made without delay for the neighbouring port of Patala, and had time to enter it before the tempest broke in all its fury at midnight. The allies were encumbered with a large additional number of ships and captives taken in the fight, and had they and all this extra host been exposed to the rage of the elements, the damage and loss wrought to life and property would have been considerable. The number of galleys alone which fell into the Christians' hands was over 117,¹ besides some twenty galleons, while fifty vessels of different sorts were wrecked and afterwards burnt on the shore; and more than 10,000 prisoners were taken, many of them men of rank and distinction, and thousands of Christian slaves were set free. Eighty thousand Turks were slain, whilst the

¹ Jurien de la Gravière says 190 galleys, not counting other vessels. He puts the number of galleys sunk and burnt at fifteen. Pantera (p. 401) says the spoil that accrued to the Venetians was: thirty-eight galleys, four galleons, thirty-eight big pieces of artillery and six small pieces. The standards were all allotted to the generals.

Christian losses amounted to about 7500, of whom over 2000 were Venetians.¹

The joy and enthusiasm that reigned throughout all ranks was real and great. Don John and Sebastiano Veniero, oblivious of the disagreements which had existed between them and which had nearly ruined the expedition, fell on each others necks and forgot for a moment their former quarrels. It was, however, only for a moment, as the next morning they were at loggerheads again. Veniero, without deferring to Don John, sent off on his own account an envoy to Venice, to announce the news of the victory, and the Commander-in-Chief, indignant at this want of regard for him, despatched *his* envoy to Venice to demand satisfaction for such conduct from the Senate.

These and other petty differences, which arose plentifully as to the distribution of the booty and similar matters, could not, however, mar the greatness and importance of the victory. The spell which hung over the hitherto invincible Moslem fleet was broken; the belief in the skill and courage of Christian soldiers and sailors was restored; all Christendom rang with the praises of the young hero of Lepanto, and echoed in hearty unison the words of Pope Pius V.: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John."

¹ These numbers are only approximate, every writer giving a different one, and all admitting that no absolute figure can be stated.

CHAPTER XII

WAR OF CANDIA

1635—1694

Turkish Treachery. Siege of Canea ; of Suda. Tommaso Morosini's Death. Storm at Sea. Grimani's Death. Battle of the Dardanelles. Lazzaro Mocenigo's Death. Siege of Candia. Francesco Morosini, Captain-General. Surrender of Candia. Conquest of the Morea. Francesco Morosini appointed Doge. His Victories in the Archipelago. His Death at Nauplia. Funeral in Venice.

FOR many years after the victory of Lepanto an appearance of friendliness and harmony existed between the Republic of Venice and the rulers of Constantinople. Treaties of an amicable nature had been signed, and observed, by both states ; and Venice, at least, did all that in her lay to safeguard the friendly relations which she knew right well were essential to her well-being and the maintenance of her trade. The Sublime Porte, on the other hand, had no such interests to study. Her attitude, inimical towards the whole of Christendom, was more especially hostile towards Venice, because the Republic had constantly stood between her and her ambitions, possessing, as she did, many of those lands which the Mussulman coveted most. Cyprus had been wrung from the dominion of the Winged Lion, and the same fate was in store for Candia, a land of the highest importance to Constantinople in the furtherance of her ambitious aims.

The peace above referred to had lasted for many years,

when in 1635 Constantinople found it necessary to trump up an excuse for the declaration of war. It did not matter in the least that that excuse should be a totally unjust and irrelevant one. The Turkish government—and for the matter of that the Venetians too—had cause to complain of the piracies and excesses committed in the Archipelago by corsairs and traders, who respected no laws, and cared nothing for the ill-feeling they aroused between Christians and Infidels. The chief offenders were the Knights of Malta, who in spite of repeated warnings from Venice persisted in their evil courses, adding insult to injury by attacking Christian vessels, especially those of the Republic, whenever the occasion presented itself. A stern remonstrance was sent by the Venetian Senate to the Grand Master, pointing out what harm such conduct brought upon Christianity, how the Order—instituted for the good and for the support of the Catholic religion—had failed in its high mission, together with many like arguments and entreaties. All was in vain: the acts of plunder and violence continued as heretofore, till an event occurred which brought matters to a climax.

A Turkish convoy, carrying a number of pilgrims bound for Mecca, was chased by six Maltese vessels, and after a desperate fight the Maltese remained victors, and in possession of a galleon, on board of which were no less than thirty ladies of the harem, several slaves, and a vast amount of treasure. On the return journey the conquerors put into the disused harbour of Kalismene, on the south side of Candia, to replenish their supplies of water and provisions. From there they coasted for several miles, attempting again and again to put into port, and being checked at each place from so doing by the Venetian governors. The wind at last being favourable, they sailed off to Malta, leaving the captured Turkish vessel a derelict, off the coast of Cephalonia.

The news of these doings spread consternation in Venice, and fury in Constantinople, where the Venetian *bailo*, Giovanni Soranzo, wrote home describing the agitation on all sides, and the embarrassment of the different ambassadors while they endeavoured to exculpate their several governments, and avert from their own heads the Sultan's wrath. Though Venice was in no way to blame for this act of the Knights of Malta, it had inflamed the hatred of Moslems for the Christians generally, and it soon became evident that war alone could wipe out the insult. Preparations were immediately set on foot in Constantinople for some great expedition; but absolute mystery prevailed as to its destination, and no one guessed with certainty which power was to be attacked. Rumour hinted at Sicily, Malta, and Candia, the preference being given to Malta. The *bailo*, Soranzo, had little doubt in his own mind that Candia was the point aimed at, and though the Byzantine authorities tried to throw dust in his eyes, he was given to understand from other sources that his fears were correct. Soranzo lost no time in writing to the home government, bidding them look to their defences, and prepare in the fullest way to meet the coming storm. Venice had need of the warning. Although she possessed many dominions beyond the sea, she was not a good "mother country," and in Candia, more perhaps than in her other colonies, her yoke was hated, and tended to alienate her subjects. Candia, the Crete of old, is the largest of the islands in the Mediterranean, and the most southern point of Europe. The shape of the island is long and narrow, being about 160 miles in length from east to west, and only about 30 broad at its widest point; while its sea-coast measures over 400 miles. It is extremely fertile, for the vine, the olive, orange and lemon trees, as well as other fruits, grow in abundance, and though it produces little corn it is rich in pasture and grazing lands, while a

series of bays on its sea-coast provide it with numerous harbours. The chief ports on the north side, Grabusa, Suda, and Spinalunga, were spacious and easy of fortification; and close to the coast were the principal towns, Candia, the capital, Canea, Rettimo, and Sitia. The island became Venetian property in 1204, when it was bought by the Republic from Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat; and a regular form of government on the lines of that of Venice had been carried on ever since. For a long period, however, things had gone badly in the island: abuses in the administration had crept into every department; the army was altogether disorganised, and so too were the finances. In vain Venice strove by wise laws and directions to remedy the evil; but the governors she sent to improve matters generally made them worse, and at last Venetians and the Venetian rule were held in abhorrence throughout the island.

Things were in this state when in 1645 Andrea Cornaro, the Governor, or *Provveditore Generale*, as he was called, received supplies of men, provisions, and a sum of 100,000 ducats in answer to his appeals to the Republic for help, with instructions to put the island into a thorough state of defence. Don Camillo Gonzaga and the Baron von Degenfeld were appointed commanders-in-chief of the land forces; and a convoy of two galleasses and thirty light galleys was to be got ready to sail to Candia as soon as possible. Cornaro, who was an exceptionally good specimen of a Colonial Governor, worked zealously and honourably to carry out his instructions, and, as the supplies sent to him were altogether inadequate, he strove hard to raise an army among the people of Candia, and rouse them to join heartily in keeping out the Turk. He was indefatigable too in his labours of reform. There was no department of law, education, civil or military affairs that he did not investigate and endeavour to place on a

sound footing; he tried to check the corrupt practices which prevailed everywhere; to foster the cultivation of the soil; and to put down brigandage. He trained the native levies; placed overseers in the principal seaports; he restored the fortifications, and raised the wages of those who showed zeal and readiness to serve his country's cause.

The Turks, in the meantime, were actively employed in getting ready for action, always maintaining, however, that Malta was the object against which their operations were directed. On 30th April 1645, without any declaration of war to any Power, the Turkish fleet sailed from the Dardanelles, a formidable host consisting of 400 sail, and carrying a fighting force of over 50,000 men. Their first halt was at Tine, a Venetian possession, where, the two states being at peace, they were courteously received and entertained; and on 21st June they were sighted off the coast of Candia. No doubt existed any longer as to the destination of this "perfidious invasion," as Cornaro calls it; and he at once took measures to protect Canea, where, as he rightly imagined, operations would begin. The first actual point of attack was the Castle of San Teodoro, outside Canea, which was well and ably defended by its captain, Biagio Zuliani. Zuliani succeeded in sinking one or two of the enemy's ships; but his force of thirty men and a few old guns could make no head against the Turkish hosts, and in despair, therefore, he bravely set light to the powder-magazine and blew up the citadel and all who were in it, preferring to die nobly with his little band rather than to fall into the enemy's hands. A goodly number of Turks perished also in the explosion, so that this first victory on Venetian territory cost the victors dear, and showed them too the nature of the foes with whom they had to deal.

The Turks pressed on undaunted on Canea, where the Governor, Navagero, strove against impossible odds to save the town. He had neither men nor materials to aid

him in the task ; the supplies sent to him never arrived ; the troops were disaffected ; the inhabitants terrified ; and, except for the brave Abbot of the monastery of St Basil, who with 150 of his monks " handled their weapons with such skill as to appear as though they had never held a missal," none of the citizens showed any valour or resolution in the defence of their city. The efforts, too, of the Venetian officers to inspire the inhabitants with some show of courage availed nothing against the furious bombardment and onslaught of the Turks ; and after fifty-seven days of siege the Venetians were forced to capitulate. Some of them were still in favour of holding out, but they were overruled, and all they could do was to demand favourable terms. These were granted, and the Venetians were allowed a free passage, and the right of carrying off their arms and goods to all who chose to leave the town ; while those who elected to stay had their lives, their possessions, and their rights as citizens guaranteed to them. On 23rd August 1645, the remnant of the garrison, with flags flying and drums beating, came out of the town and embarked for Suda ; the Turkish commander even lending some saiques to hasten their departure, so that he might enter Canea more quickly and establish more firmly his foothold in the island.

The fall of Canea spread alarm and distress in Venice, and the rapid advance of the Turks on to Suda was not calculated to restore confidence. Great things were, however, expected of the Admiral, Marin Cappello, who had refused to move with his ships to the help of Canea from the harbour of Suda, alleging that his position there was too strong to be abandoned, and that he would defend it at any cost. The enemy's sails, however, were hardly in sight when Cappello, under the excuse of the necessity for going in search of water, made off, and not all the supplications of Minotto, the Governor of the port, could

avail to keep him back. He was saluted with a derisive discharge of guns as he put his disgraceful resolve into effect, but even this insult failed to check his cowardly flight, although he knew it meant the ruin and fall of Suda, and with it eventually of Candia. Cappello's flight was no sooner noised abroad than the Turkish admiral sent to Minotto and his colleagues, Michiel and Malipiero, to demand the surrender of the town in words that ring with all the insolence and assurance of one who knew the superiority of his position and meant to enforce it. "This is to notify to Your Excellencies that we have need of the harbour of Suda for our hosts, and without this surrender you cannot have our friendship. But if you will consign it you shall all be treated with honour, as were the people of Canea, and if you will not, be sure that I will set to work by land and by sea. And send me your answer as soon as ever you have received this." The answer did not tarry. The Venetian leaders replied that the fort was not theirs, but had been entrusted to them to defend, and that they would do so as long as the breath remained in them. The Turk might come when he chose, they were ready and awaiting him. The Turk, however, had his attention called away once more to Canea, and Suda and its brave defenders were for awhile left in peace.

The Venetians, who, with their allies, now possessed a force of forty galleys, thirty *galeoncini*, and some light craft, under the command of Girolamo Morosini, were bent on recovering Canea. They held a council of war to consider how best to accomplish this, but were met by the unwillingness of their allies to proceed further against the Turk. The Venetian leaders pointed out the advisability of immediate action, the Turks being, it was reported, at variance among themselves, their numbers reduced, so that a bold stroke on the part of the allies could not fail of success. These arguments prevailed at last in overcoming

the reluctance of Ludovisio, the Papal commander, and the other admirals acquiesced in his decision. A night attack was settled for 16th September, when in all secrecy the fort of St Teodoro was to be surprised and captured. But the fleet had no sooner set out than a tempestuous head-wind drove it back, and Ludovisio once more urged the inadvisability of pursuing the campaign any further. The season, he declared, was too advanced; the Turks were now aware of their intentions; provisions were scarce; they had no choice but to bow to the inevitable; to go into dock for the winter and prepare to resume hostilities in the following year with more hope of success. This advice was unpalatable to the Venetians; and Cornaro boldly declared that the allies might do as they liked, but that the Venetians would renew the fight single-handed. This declaration had the desired effect. The allies, shamed into acquiescence, agreed to try again, and the entire force proceeded to Canea. The fate that had befallen them before befell them again: a heavy gale drove the ships back, and they were forced to take shelter in Suda. Nothing could now induce the auxiliaries to stay, and they sailed off to their different destinations, leaving the Venetians to stand alone and unassisted as "Europe's bulwark" against the Ottoman.

Venice did not shrink from the task. She had, it is true, brought much of the evil on herself, and had added to the evil a neglect of her colonies and home-defences that was simply criminal; but face to face with the peril, she rose to the occasion with a courage and resolution worthy of her best and highest traditions and in a spirit faithful to the noblest memories of her past. Her first step was to protect the frontiers adjoining Turkish territory; to send troops to Dalmatia and Corfu; to scour the seas with her galleys; to see to the fortifications at the Lido and Malamocco, and above all to put Candia into

a thorough state of defence. The difficult business of appointing a Commander-in-Chief was put to the vote, when the choice fell upon the Doge Francesco Erizzo, an old man of eighty. In spite of his age Erizzo gallantly declared his willingness to devote his remaining years to his country's service, and made ready to lead the expedition. He died, however, in the midst of his preparations, and Francesco Molin was made Doge in his stead; Giovanni Cappello being named Captain-General over the expedition. Strenuous efforts for foreign help were made at the same time, and embassies to Poland, Russia, Persia, Sweden, Denmark, to the Netherlands and to England, solicited in vain the aid of these mostly Christian powers. France, and Spain, and Germany were also appealed to, but the two latter were too busy attending to the Peace Congress, then gathered at Münster, to attend to the appeal; and France, while openly professing friendship for Venice, was surreptitiously doing all in her power to aid and abet the Infidel, whose cause and interests were closely allied to her own. The Sire de Varenne, who had been sent by Cardinal Mazarin to Constantinople ostensibly to mediate between Venice and Turkey but in reality to reassure the Sultan of France's friendly attitude towards him, stopped in Venice on his return journey and warned the Senate of the terrible war determined on against their state, and advised them to ward off the danger by negotiation. This, however, the Republic would not do. She was resolved to oppose Turkey whether alone or in company, and maintain her position as the great sea-power in the Mediterranean, and from that resolve she never swerved.

Her chief difficulty was want of money, for the exchequer was empty, and funds were needed at every turn. A strong measure had to be resorted to. It was proposed to increase the number of the nobility by

allowing all who wished to belong to the Great Council to purchase the right to do so. The price for this privilege was 100,000 ducats—60,000 of which were to be paid down as ready money, the rest, 40,000, to be paid into the Mint. This measure was not accepted without much discussion and opposition, many of the old patricians resenting an admixture of “new-comers” and “monied men” into their midst; others maintaining that all petty jealousies should be sunk in the face of their country’s need, and that the first duty of a patriot was to sacrifice all for his country. It ended by seventy families being enrolled as nobles, but beyond the financial gain—which after all was what was aimed at—this infusion of new blood brought no advantage to Venice, and only created much ill-feeling between the old and new nobility.

In the spring of 1646, after much valuable time had been lost owing to the lack of accord between some of the commanders, operations were resumed in which the Venetians, through want of resolution and daring, allowed the enemy to possess themselves of several commanding positions, and, in the autumn of this same year, to lay siege to Rettimo. Here again the Turks were victorious, chiefly owing to the dissensions that reigned between the Venetians and the few French and Flemish troops which were serving in Candia as allies of the Republic, and to the cowardice of these allies, who fled again and again the moment they found themselves face to face with the foe. The Turks captured the town in November, and committed horrid outrages: eighty-eight officers and more than 1500 soldiers were slain, besides a number of the inhabitants. The churches were rifled and desecrated, and a large quantity of booty secured. A strong force of Turkish soldiers garrisoned the fort, but with the approach of winter hostilities were suspended till the following year.

The interval was used by Venice for effecting some

changes among her generals: Giovanni Battista Grimani, "a man," says Nani, "in whose small body was enclosed a great soul," was named Captain-General in the room of Giovanni Cappello; Leonardo Mocenigo was made *Provveditore Generale*, and Nicolò Dolfín was given command of the land forces in the place of Andrea Cornaro, who had been killed at Rettimo. The Republic had also to see to her defences in Dalmatia, where the Turks had invaded her territory. This, however, was an easier task than in Candia, for the Dalmatians were loyal and devoted subjects of St Mark's, and were never found wanting in the hour of need to the parent state.

Venice again made fresh appeals to the rulers of Europe, pointing out that, however ready she might be, however resolute and courageous in prosecuting the war against the common foe, they must not forget that she was doing so alone and unaided in Candia, Dalmatia, and Friuli; and that what between the lands, islands, and frontiers of well-nigh 1500 miles in extent which she had to defend in her position as the bulwark of Christendom, her arsenals had become emptied, her exchequer exhausted, and her subjects were being sacrificed; that she had gathered subsidies as far as in her lay of men and ships from every part of her dominions, but that such efforts must have a limit, and should Candia be taken, no barrier would then exist to keep the Turk out of Europe, nor stop him from laying a ruthless and destroying hand upon Italy, the stronghold of Christianity and therefore the object of his special hatred.

This appeal met with no response, and in 1647 the Venetians had again to carry on the war unassisted. The campaign was opened on their side by a fine act of heroism and devotion. Grimani was at sea, keeping a watchful lookout, and seizing any Turkish vessel which chance threw in his way, when Tommaso Morosini, one of his best

and bravest captains, got separated from the rest of the fleet and was carried by a strong breeze towards Negropont. The Turkish Pasha on the island despatched no fewer than forty-five ships to make sure of capturing the galley, but Morosini seeing escape was impossible, determined to sell his life dearly. Without waiting to be attacked, he displayed his flag, set his men in fighting array, and opened a furious cannonade on the foe, setting fire at the same time to several of their ships. For a while the enemy was kept at bay, but they soon swarmed round Morosini's galley, she was boarded, and in the *mêlée* that followed Morosini's head was blown clean from his body. The sight of their dead leader only inspired his men with fresh determination to avenge his death; and they fought with all the courage of despair, regardless of the fact that some Turks had cut down the banner of St Mark and hoisted the Crescent in its place. The unequal combat was kept up till Grimani's galleys hove in sight, when the Turks, unable to face so large a force, retired, leaving Morosini's dismantled ship to be rescued by his countrymen, who captured all the Turks they found on board and raised once again the standard of the Republic. Morosini's death caused genuine sorrow in Venice, where the honour of a public funeral was accorded him, while rewards of different kinds were bestowed on his followers.

Sultan Ibrahim's wrath was unbounded on learning that one single Venetian galley had held her own against a whole squadron of his ships; but for the moment his wrath could only vent itself in confiscating the goods of Moussa, one of his own admirals who had fallen in the fight, and in preparing with ever greater assiduity for further operations.

These operations began around Suda, where in June 1647 a disgraceful flight of the Venetian land forces under their general, Dolfin, encouraged the Turks to undertake

the siege of the town of Candia with redoubled hope and confidence. This siege, which was to last twenty-two years, was to bear nothing but barren glory to Venice, and to cost her in the end millions of money, thousands of lives, and one of her fairest possessions in the Near East.

The brilliant capture of the fortress of Clissa, in Dalmatia, by the Venetians marked the spring of the next year (1648), when a small body of men under Leonardo Foscolo carried the fort which, enclosed in a circuit of three walls, was considered in those days impregnable. Against this success must be set the loss of Grimani, who was drowned in a fierce gale in March, when twenty-eight of his ships went down with all on board. When the disaster occurred, he was anchored off the mouth of the Dardanelles with the object of blocking the sea-approach to Constantinople—a favourite manœuvre with Venetian admirals, and one to which they frequently had recourse. The chronicler, Battista Nani, a contemporary, and trustworthy historian, tells the tale in forcible language.

“It was the month of March,” he says, “and the Armada of Venice had hardly set sail from the port when, owing to a high wind, the ships had to part company. Calm being restored, the Captain-General (Grimani) with the greater part of his fleet put into Psarà (Absara), that being a commodious haven for the tossed vessels to shelter in, when on the night of the 17th a most furious tempest broke upon them from the North-West, with all the horrors that darkness, winds and waves bring in their train. The ships and galleys broke their cables, or dragged their anchors, and were driven upon the rocks, where many of them stuck fast, thus magnifying the danger and causing the greatest fear. The fury of the winds was so great that the pilots could not guide their vessels, nor could the crews make head against the violence of the waves. In the darkness and tumult no orders could be given or understood; officers and men

were hopelessly mixed, and the soldiers sought to fly from so perilous a condition and fate. The galley of the Captain-General, rudderless, her masts gone, her sails torn, was cast adrift, and became the sport of the waves, tossed now towards the land, now driven back on the sea, when he, hurrying along the deck and speaking words of encouragement to everyone, was thrown on to the benches by a great wave. A bigger one still swept him away and sunk the whole ship. At dawn the tempest abated, but a more tragic scene could not be witnessed, for terror reigned everywhere: the sea was covered with corpses, the rocks strewn with half-dead bodies, some either stunned with fear or numb with the cold, were devoid of both clothes and food, whilst on all sides men wept for some lost relative or friend, or for some lost possession. Many seeking safety found destruction, some threw themselves into the sea, others on to rafts, while the most luckless were those who on the point of reaching land were crushed to death between the ships and the rocks. Eighteen galleys were destroyed, two hulls only being saved; nine smaller ships were lost, while the rest stood in dire need of repair. Giorgio Morosini managed with difficulty to save his own and another galley, at the expense of throwing overboard every particle of unnecessary goods. As, however, he was the *Provveditore* of this squadron, he courageously assumed command of the miserable remnants of his fleet, and awaited the coming of Antonio Bernardo, '*Provveditore Generale* of the Sea,' with his galleasses, and Bernardo Morosini with some smaller ships (which were successful in keeping off the rocks and so escaped shipwreck). And they having taken counsel together, agreed that the smaller ships should go with Morosini to Castelli, and the rest go into dock in Candia. The crews, therefore, being embarked and having recovered the guns and arms, together with what clothes and bread had been saved, they burnt the fragments of the wrecked vessels and set off on their appointed way. Great was their joy on arriving in a body at Sdille to come across Giacomo Riva, who with a

squadron of ships was carrying supplies to Candia. From him they made good their losses, and changing their plan decided that the galleasses should also go to the Dardanelles. The rest went on to Candia, where, with those saved from the tempest, sixteen galleys were manned; and with these, and six other ships, *Provveditore* Morosini first succoured Suda, and having captured the galley of the Bey of Andros, arrived opportunely at Castelli.”¹

This energy and pluck on the part of the Venetians exasperated the Turks. They trusted that Grimani's death and the destruction of his fleet would have placed the dominion of the sea in their hands, and forced Venice to withdraw from the struggle. That she should not only refuse to consider herself defeated, but that she should also press on to the Dardanelles were matters of keen annoyance and disappointment in Constantinople, and destroyed all hope that the end of the war was at hand.

But the visions of peace which both sides conjured up at intervals were as remote as ever.

Luigi Leonardo Mocenigo was appointed Captain-General in the room of Grimani, and important steps were taken for levying more oarsmen for the galleys. The law that ordained that none but Venetians should work at the oar, had to be revised. The guilds, or corporations (*arti*) who till now had been obliged to furnish so many men as rowers on board the galleys of the Republic were reduced by this constant and heavy strain to such an extent as to be almost annihilated, and it was therefore decreed that instead of men they should find a sum of money with which to pay the mercenaries who were now to be raised outside the hitherto prescribed limit. In this way galley-slaves were selected from every part of Europe,

¹ Battista Nani, *Historia della Repubblica Veneta*, in Venetia, MDCLXXXVI., Combi e La Noù, parte seconda, libro quarto, p. 149.

and thus reinforced, Mocenigo proceeded to succour the town of Candia.

The city was besieged with all the strategic appliances then in vogue. Day and night the incessant roar of cannon thundered through the air; mines and counter-mines were sprung with unceasing regularity; the fights underground were as deadly as those overhead, and plague and pestilence added their quota to the tale of woe and suffering. In the face of these difficulties Mocenigo worked on every side with unsparing devotion: he organised the citizens—men, women, and children—in defending the walls and ramparts; he directed the attacks and sorties; he encouraged and comforted everyone in their trouble and perplexity, while his courage and hopefulness inspired the besieged to hold out and endure.

The strain of this long drawn-out strife began, however, to tell heavily on both parties, and overtures of peace were tentatively brought forward in Venice and Constantinople. But the Turk demanded too much; and Venice was not yet brought so low as to accede to his terms. These were, that all Candia should be surrendered, together with the stronghold of Clissa, in Dalmatia.

The Sultan Ibrahim's death in 1649 gave rise to the belief that under his son and successor, Mahomet, a lad of twelve years old, easier conditions might be obtained. Such a belief was quickly dispelled when Alvise Contarini reached Constantinople on a mission from Venice to convey her congratulations to the new monarch on his accession. The Grand Vizir, enraged that the ambassador was not also the bearer of despatches notifying the cession of Candia and Clissa, refused to allow him a passport, and caused Grillo, the Republic's interpreter at the Porte, to be savagely strangled, while the luckless *bailo*, Soranzo, who had languished in prison since the outbreak of the war, was heavily laden with chains and

dragged in this guise through the streets of the city, amid the jeers and insults of the crowd. All Europe rang with the iniquity of such doings, but the countries which should have raised their voice in protest were too engrossed in their own affairs to make any practical remonstrance, and Venice, again left to her own resources, or with help of so meagre a nature as not to deserve the name, saw herself compelled once more to carry on the conflict alone.

A brilliant but barren naval victory off Fochies, in the Gulf of Smyrna, early in the year (1649) gladdened every Venetian heart, when at the head of a strong force Giacomo Riva utterly discomfited the Turks, but he failed to follow up his victory.

Nani relates how in the following year (1650) an Englishman distinguished himself against the foes of the Republic. A Turkish fleet under Ali Mazzamamma had tried in vain to dislodge the Venetians from their position at the mouth of the Dardanelles. They presented a firm front to the Turks, and these latter, compelled to retire, "met," says Nani, "the *Elizabeth Mary*, an English ship, which Riva had sent away. On being hailed by the Turks to ascertain her nationality, her captain, Thomas Middleton, flew the flag of the Republic, and fought with such vigour that the galleys lost many men and had to put into Mitylene to recover from the damage done them. The Englishman brought his ship to Venice, and received in consequence honourable rewards."

No engagement of note occurred after this till in July 1653, when the Venetian fleet under the joint command of two Mocenigo brothers, Alvise Tommaso and Lazzaro, was victorious at Paros. The victory was a signal one: the Turks, seized with panic, fled on every side, regardless of the threats and entreaties of their leaders. The rejoicings in Venice were great, and thanksgiving services were held in the churches for the triumph

of the Christian arms, though the death of Alvise Tommaso Mocenigo, one of the Republic's best admirals, dimmed the general gladness.

A fresh endeavour for peace on the part of Venice met with the usual ill-success: the Venetian envoy, Giovanni Cappello, was seized and imprisoned, and ended his days miserably in prison, having even tried to commit suicide to escape from the torments to which he was being subjected. There was no choice but to continue the struggle, and strive by dint of hard fighting to gain the desired end.

A detailed relation of the engagements as they followed one another in the course of this twenty years' war in close and often monotonous succession would only be wearisome reading; but the several great battles fought around the Dardanelles reflect such glory on Venice and her admirals that they, at all events, cannot be passed over in silence. The first of these was in 1654, when Murad Pasha at the head of ninety-five vessels, consisting of galleys, *maone*, and other ships called *sultane*, surrounded the Venetian fleet under Giuseppe Dolfin, and endeavoured to free the passage of the Dardanelles—which the Venetians as usual strove to keep blocked. Dolfin's force was far inferior to that of the Turks—he had but twenty-six vessels in all—but his tactics were masterly, and he was ably seconded by his men and officers. He waited to be attacked; and allowed Murad's vessels to come close to his own, when at a given signal the cables were cut, and aided by wind and tide the galleys were slipped against the foe. Eight galleys under Francesco Morosini were towed by other ships "so that they might together give mutual assistance." Some of the ships, however, got under way before the appointed time, and drawing after them six galleys, got carried beyond the line of action. The rest, comprising the admiral's ship, the *Great St George*, together with

the *Golden Eagle*, the *Orsola Bonaventura*, and the *Margarita*, remained firm at their posts. The first ship actually to come in touch with the enemy was the *Golden Eagle*, commanded by Admiral Daniele Morosini. She had gone slightly ahead, and was keeping several Turkish ships which surrounded her at bay when she took fire, and blew up with all on board. Morosini, though wounded, managed to escape in a boat, only however to be taken prisoner by the Turks. The same fate befell Sebastiano Molin and his galley, the *Orsola Bonaventura*; and the remainder, their small numbers sadly reduced by these disasters, had no easy task to hold their own against the fearful odds opposed to them. A hot fight raged round the admiral's flagship, where the survivors from Morosini's ill-fated galley had taken refuge, and where all on board were resolved to die sooner than yield.

"The vessel," says Nani, "hurled fire from every side, striking those afar off and scourging those which were near. Though seriously crippled, with her mast broken, her sails torn, her helm splintered, and water rushing in at all parts, she continued to defend herself from her foes, and defy the sea; waging war in sooth with every element, that of fire, which however was soon got under, being added to the others. Issuing from the Canal of the Dardanelles into the midst of the enemy's forces, she drove them from her, and when no longer able to steer her course she drifted towards land, and letting go the only anchor that yet remained to her so as to seize a little breathing time, she repaired in haste the helm, and plugging the holes in the hull, she prepared afresh for action. Many galleys made ready to cannonade her; and her defenders, knowing they could not hold out much longer, resolved to die in good earnest, and as a last resource to blow up the ship, sooner than be dragged in chains to swell the victor's triumph."

Dolfin managed, however, to save his good ship, and

using sheets and other cloths in place of the torn sails, he rejoined the rest of his squadron in this sorry and dilapidated state. His appearance was hailed with delight, for he had been given over as lost, and the officer next in seniority had already assumed the command in his place and had hoisted his flag.

The Turks on their side had suffered a severe defeat. Their losses in men and ships were heavy; the admiral was wounded; and had Dolfin been able to carry out his intention of attacking them on the following day with all his force, they could not have withstood him in their disabled state. The wind, however, made this plan impossible, and the Turkish fleet retired to Mitylene, where a whole month was spent in repairing the damage done to the vessels. The victory was celebrated in Venice with great rejoicings: *Te Deums* were sung in the churches, and honours and rewards were showered on those who had distinguished themselves in the fight.

The winter brought the usual cessation of arms; peace was as remote as ever, and nothing but empty glory was the fruit of Venice's first victory at the Dardanelles.

At the close of this year (1654) the Republic had to mourn the loss of Luigi Leonardo Mocenigo, who died aged seventy, at Standia, a small island off the north-east coast of Candia. Mocenigo may be called a genius in his way. He had not been brought up to the profession of arms, and he was an oldish man when his country claimed his services. But he displayed talents as admiral and commander that entitle him to a high position even among the great men whom this epoch called forth, and his striking monument in the Church of the Mendicanti is a fitting tribute to his greatness and renown.

The second battle of the Dardanelles took place on 21st June, in the following year, when Lazzaro Mocenigo (the same who had distinguished himself with his brother,

Alvise Tommaso, off Paros in 1651) gained a brilliant victory over the Turks under their leader, Mustafa Pasha. Mustafa was obliged to put into Fochies, having lost eleven ships, while the Venetians—if their chroniclers can be implicitly trusted in such matters—lost but one ship, bearing the peculiar name of the *David Goliath*, which was burnt.

The next engagement at this same place “where every rock was celebrated and every spot famous,”¹ occurred on 26th June 1656, when the Venetians drawn up in the form of a crescent, awaited the oncoming of the foe under Sinan Pasha. The Pasha opened a heavy cannonade, hoping to dislodge the Venetians from their position. Having failed, however, in this, and the wind being in his favour, he gave the order to advance. The Mussulman ships came on in their accustomed fashion, with shoutings and yelling of voices and trumpets. The Venetians at the critical moment slipped their cables, and with the full force and impetus of their weight swept onward in their turn. The shock was terrific, but it only led to much confusion and a hideous amount of carnage. The Venetians soon saw the necessity for reforming, and they seized the opportunity. The galleys gathered round the other ships in crescent shape, Antonio Barbaro, “Captain of the Gulf,” being at one extremity, Pietro Contarini at the other. The vanguard was composed of Maltese vessels, and behind these was a reserve force of galleasses under their captain, Giuseppe Morosini. Sinan tried to break through this formidable array, but he gained no advantage beyond destroying the symmetry of its order, and a general mêlée followed, when after a long and arduous fight, the Venetians emerged victorious. They lost, however, one of their best generals, Lorenzo Marcello, who was killed by a cannon ball when, having captured

¹ Nani, *op. cit.*, parte seconda, libro sesto, p. 280

one of the enemy's galleys, he was about to board another. The news of his death was kept from his men by his kinsman and lieutenant, Giovanni Marcello, who concealed the body and only imparted the fact to Badoero Barbaro, the next in command.

The loss on the Turkish side was enormous: 10,000 men are said to have perished; a great number of ships and much booty was taken; no less than 5000 Christian slaves were rescued; and the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos surrendered to Venice. In Constantinople the result of the battle spread wholesale consternation. It was feared that the Venetian fleet, flushed with victory and spoil, would sail unchecked to the city walls and possess itself of the capital; a step, however, too hazardous for the Venetian admirals to attempt.

Venice was elated at the news. A public decree ordained that, in honour of the event, a procession should take place every year to the church of SS. Giovanni e Paolo (the victory having taken place on the festival of those two saints), and Lazzaro Mocenigo, to whom the credit of this triumph was rightly ascribed, was made Captain-General. Lazzaro, resolved to show himself worthy of the confidence his fellow-citizens reposed in him, was determined to add to his already well-earned laurels.

In the following year (1657) he conceived the daring scheme of destroying the entire Turkish fleet and advancing upon Constantinople. In order to carry this out he moved towards the Dardanelles, intending as he went to put in at the various harbours on either side to renew the water-supply, which was almost exhausted on board his ships. He encountered terrific storms on the way, and the Turks learning the damage his galleys had suffered in consequence, judged the moment an opportune one in which to strike the first blow. On the morning of 16th July they sailed out from the Straits of the Dardanelles with

thirty-three galleys, nine *maone*, twenty-two ships (*navi*), fifty saiques, and numerous other small craft, supported by a heavy fire from the neighbouring forts. The Venetians, in order to escape the fire which rained on them from every side, advanced in their turn and engaged the foe. The first galley attacked by the Turks was Bembo's, which, surrounded by overwhelming numbers, was only saved from destruction by the *Rosa Mocenigo* coming to the rescue. These two vessels managed to turn the guns on their assailants and disabled two of their *sultane*. Fierce fighting took place on board the *Paramor*, and the *Prophet Elijah*, under the command of Francesco Basadonna and Angelo Bembo: they and the other patricians, among them Barbaro, "Captain of the Gulf"; Luigi Battaglia; Luigi Foscari; and Girolamo Priuli, all performing prodigies of valour.

Night fell only to find the issue of the fight still uncertain, and the foes mixed in confusion and disorder in the straits around Tenedos.

Mocenigo and his division had not then taken part in the day's action. A strong head-wind had checked his constant and desperate efforts to enter the Straits, and it was only at night, when the storm had abated a little, that the whole force came together again. A council of war was immediately held, when it was settled that a general attack should be made next morning, and that, at whatever cost, the Turkish fleet should be annihilated. A fresh gale, however, sprung up in the night, made this plan impossible, and it was not till towards evening that Mocenigo could give the signal to advance.

In spite of a serious mishap to the galley of the "Captain of the Gulf,"

"Mocenigo moved swiftly on, amid a hail of bullets, his face all aglow between his eagerness for the fray, his hopes of victory and his contempt of danger. He stood

erect beside his standard, exhorting and commanding with voice and gesture, urging all on to conquest, when behold ! a fatal flame, either from a stray shot of the enemy, or a careless spark used on board to ignite the ammunition, fell on the powder-magazine and the vessel blew up. A yard-arm struck the Captain-General on the head and he at once fell lifeless. The other galleys were stayed in their course through sheer dismay, and all further effort was abandoned. The treasures on board the *Real*, the standard, the lantern, the ships' log, the documents, and most precious of all, the General's body, were saved,¹ although verily he could not have had more fitting sepulchre than the sea, on which he sacrificed his life, and attained glory. Francesco Mocenigo, his brother and also his lieutenant, was dragged out of the water half alive, and so too were many others. More than 500 died, among them four nobles : Constantino Michiel, Matteo Cornaro, Tommaso Soranzo, and Giovanni Balbi. . . . Such was the fate of Lazzaro Mocenigo,"²

says Nani, and he goes on to eulogise the dead admiral, and to comment on the heavy loss the Christians sustained by his death, and the inopportune moment of its occurrence.

"In the course of his private life," he adds, "he had passed through divers and various vicissitudes. He ever displayed consummate bravery, whereby, as if by flight, he attained the apex of military command. He drew upon him the eyes of the world, winning universal applause, beloved by the troops, and feared by the foe. Being intrepid in danger and fortunate in battle, he was esteemed by all. Most upright as a Governor, he allowed of no relaxation of discipline whatever ; incapable of cowardice, he ever showed himself just in rewarding bravery. He held that

¹ This was accomplished with much heroism and at great personal risk by Guglielmo Avogadro degli Azzoni, *sopracomito* of the galley of Treviso, who relates his deed of prowess in an unpublished letter to his brother Giacomo, dated from Tenedos, 28th July 1657, and whose services were recognised and rewarded by the Senate.

² *Op. cit.*, libro settimo, p. 328.

courage would overcome everything, and that the valour of a strong man would force Nature to bow down to him and Fortune to favour him. At times when carried away by his ardour, he would rush blindly into danger, even to the extent of risking all that he had ; yet what seemed temerity was often the virtue of necessity, for he held that once you had measured the number and valour of your foe you could only meet and combat him when your courage was in no way inferior to your means of resistance."

Thus ended the last of the great fights round the Dardanelles, the one to which the name of "the Battle of the Dardanelles" is more especially given, and which had lasted three days. The victory remained with the Venetians, but it was dearly bought, for with Lazzaro Mocenigo died—at all events for the moment—his country's dreams of success and the chances of crushing the Ottoman dominion on the sea.

The Venetian fleet, disheartened and disordered by the death of Mocenigo and of many other brave commanders, made only a feeble stand against the Turks, who easily regained Tenedos and Lemnos—thus wresting from Venice the only tangible evidence of a struggle which had lasted twelve years.

Overtures of peace were again brought forward by Turkey, and were warmly entertained by one party in Venice, who pleaded that enough had been done for honour ; that the damage done by the war to the commerce and industry of the town would bring absolute ruin ; that it was useless any longer to ask or look for aid from the rest of Europe ; that not only had they to wage war against the Ottoman Empire, but against the winds and waves as well ; and that this offer, seeing that it originated from the foe himself, should not be rejected or despised.

The war faction, however, headed by Giovanni Pesaro, would have none of these counsels ; and the mere fact that

Turkey demanded the cession of Candia was proof enough, said they, that she was not sufficiently strong to conquer it by force. To cede the island after all the blood and treasure spent to preserve it, was unworthy of themselves and of their ancestors; and with this and many other specious arguments the offers of peace were rejected, and a renewal of hostilities was resolved upon. Francesco Morosini was appointed in the room of Lazzaro Mocenigo; whilst in Turkey, where intense indignation reigned over the Republic's refusal to make peace, Hussain, or Kussain Pasha, who had directed most of the operations in Candia, was recalled, and another Hussain appointed in his place.

There were signs that some of the European powers were about to shake off the apathy which had disgraced them for so long and realise at last the position of the Venetian Republic and their duty and obligations towards her. There had, it is true, been some feeble exhibitions of help in 1652, when the Kings of Spain and of France, and the Florentine Republic sent gifts of money; and the Duke of Parma had sent both money and men. Help in the same way had been given in the following year by Rome and the Duke of Modena.

At the very opening of the war, Cardinal Mazarin, who, whether from political astuteness only or from real sympathy, had shown a desire to help the Venetians on more than one occasion, had despatched nine ships of war to aid in the siege of Rettimo; he had afterwards made a donation of 100,000 *scudi*, and he now urged his sovereign, Louis XIV., to come to the rescue with a force of 4000 men. The troops were under the command of Prince Almerigo d'Este, but they were not possessed of the endurance needed for a long drawn-out war, and were impatient for action, insisting only on being allowed to rush upon the foe—an insistence that had at last to be complied with. The brilliancy and dash of their charge

was undeniable, but the Turks repulsed them with heavy losses, and their leader, waiting for another chance in which to retrieve his laurels, fell a victim to wasting sickness, and died in the flower of his youth at Paros. His body, brought to Venice, was buried in the Church of the Frari, where a tomb with an equestrian statue was erected to his memory.

No better fortune awaited the contingent sent soon after by Leopold I., Emperor of Germany, though the cause of their ill-success can only be ascribed to the season, which was too far advanced for military operations. Morosini was held responsible for these failures and summoned to Venice to be tried by court-martial. He was, however, honourably acquitted, and in 1666 he returned to take command again in Candia, where, in the meantime, his brother Giorgio Morosini, and Angelo Correr had acted as generals in his stead.

Before he started for the scene of action, an important ally had been gained for the Republic in the person of the Duke of Savoy. For thirty years all amicable relations between Venice and Savoy had been suspended, owing to the claims preferred by both states to the empty title of King of Cyprus. This claim being now abandoned by Venice, Savoy sent some soldiers under the Marquis Villa (whose grandfather had fought at Lepanto) to help the Venetian cause in Candia.

The siege of the town itself had been pressed on with more or less vigour all these years, and early in 1666 the Venetian fleet landed a reinforcement of men and stores. The Turks worked just as strenuously on their side, with a view to bringing the siege to an end and making themselves masters of the island. The Grand Vizir, Achmet Kiupergli, opened the attack on 22nd May 1667, with a cannonade of 300 guns. The bastions round the town were defended by Badoero Barbaro, Girolamo Battaglia,

and his brother Francesco, at that moment the Governor or Duke of Candia. Other patricians occupied posts under them, and a solemn compact had been formed at the instigation of the Marquis Villa, to sink all petty jealousies and strifes, and work only for the safety of the town.

The Turks had planted a formidable line of batteries round the walls, and day and night the sounds of the rattle of the guns overhead, the springing of innumerable mines, and the hurling of huge stones kept up a ceaseless roar. "The incessant noise of the artillery" (to quote our faithful Nani again) "was therefore terrible, for balls of enormous weight rent the walls and crushed the roofs, while no less harmful was the scourge of shells, and above all of stones, which carried death in their track as they sped through the air, never leaving the defenders a moment of quiet, or a spot of safety. But all had been well arranged in the city, no fear was shown, nor did any heed the danger."¹

Many sorties were organised, but the main energies of besieged and besiegers were alike directed to the mines, and the fighting below ground was even more sanguinary and determined than overhead.

"The use of subterranean works having been introduced," continues Nani, "it is incredible how cruelty waxed on both sides, at one time half-burnt men were blown into the air, at another the living were buried alive, for the cellars were filled with gunpowder which was set on fire and exploded, hurling everything to a great height from the ground and with such shocks as to destroy everything. In the tunnels soldiers met at every hour, either to gain the different ramifications, or contest the enemy's advance. The horror of combating in the dark, particularly with grenades, in those obscure recesses, and even fighting with their hands when the places were too

¹ *Op. cit.*, libro decimo, p. 450.

narrow to allow of the use of firearms was indescribable. The Turks dug even lower than the Venetians, who in their turn burrowed deeper still, seeking by sheer toil to outwit craft, and it often befell that those who penetrated the lowest, blew up those who at that very moment had thought to be the destroyers of others above them. In one common sepulchre the torn limbs and corpses of friend and foe were mixed in hopeless confusion, and rivers of blood and sweat ran indiscriminately down the cavernous passages.”¹

In six months only—from May to November—no less than thirty-two attacks and seventeen sorties were made ; 618 mines were sprung on one side or the other, 3200 Venetians and 400 of their officers were slain, and 20,000 Turks are said to have perished.

The women worked, and fought, and died like heroes, while Venice did her best by sending monthly supplies of ammunition and victuals.

Things were in this condition when Francesco Morosini arrived. The winter was given up to the usual repairs and preparations which invariably marked that season, and both sides made ready for what was to prove the final and decisive conflict. The recall of the Marquis Villa by the Duke of Savoy was a serious loss to Venice ; but, on the other hand, the new Pope, Clement IX., was far more in earnest over affairs in Candia than his predecessors had been, and he not only sent help himself, but he appealed to other princes to do likewise—an appeal that met with a speedy response from the King of France, the Dukes of Lorraine, Tuscany, and Milan, the town of Lucca, the Emperor of Germany, and several German states. The Turkish Grand Vizir kept a sharp lookout on all Venetian ships bringing supplies to Candia, and every device had to be tried in order to escape his vigilance and avoid his ambushes.

¹ *Op. cit.*, idem.



LANTERN ON FRANCESCO MOROSINI'S GALLEY (1688).
In the Museo Civico, Venice.

A night attack early in March 1668, brilliantly conceived and executed under Lorenzo Cornaro and Francesco Morosini—the latter coming to Cornaro's aid with a bright display of torches—routed the Turks, capturing five of their galleys and freeing over 1000 Christian slaves. This defeat only incited the Turks to besiege the town more closely than before. They were callous of life, and wrought with all the fury and valour of fanaticism. The defence was equally gallant and determined, and the issue of the struggle was for a time uncertain. The eyes of all Europe were on Candia, and many a chivalrous spirit, thirsting for glory and adventure, was fired to join the war, and arm in the Christian cause. Chief among them was a company of young French nobles, headed by the Duc de la Feuillade, who with his followers landed in Candia, eager to rush into action and deaf to all suggestions of prudence and caution. They were convinced that they had only to make a daring sortie for the Turks to raise the siege, and no arguments or entreaties to the contrary were of any avail. Morosini had to yield against his better judgment to their insistence, and on the morning of 16th December they started on their rash venture with a party of guides and a few Italian and Maltese troops. The impetus of their charge bore all before them at the first outset, but the enemy, reinforced by overwhelming numbers, rallied, and an awful slaughter ensued. The French were hewn down in handfuls, and the survivors, wounded and discouraged and reckless of all consequences, were only impatient to get away. They had done enough, they said, for honour, and they sailed for home, only for the greater part of them to die on the journey from the results of the sickness and pestilence they had contracted in Candia. The depression consequent on their departure can be imagined; and the Pope, anxious to raise the drooping

spirits of the besieged, appealed anew to the Christian powers to succour the town before it was too late. The eager, excitable chivalry of France again answered to the appeal, and a naval force under the Duc de Beaufort conveyed a body of troops, commanded by the Duc de Noailles, to Candia.

The fighting still went on there with undiminished energy and courage. Not one inch of ground was taken or yielded without a desperate struggle, while the incessant springing of mines, the ruin and misery and sickness increasing daily all round with its tale of havoc and desolation, tried the nerves and endurance of the bravest to the uttermost. The arrival of the French in the middle of June 1669 revived the hopes of the besieged, for no one could have doubted but that the experience bought by their countrymen's failures would have induced them to act with the calmness and deliberation that the occasion required. Such hopes, however, were groundless. The Duc de Noailles, possessed with the sole idea of rushing on the foe, refused to listen to Morosini's remonstrances or to accept any judgment save his own. Every precaution that Morosini could take was taken, and the French advanced "with admirable courage and in marvellous order." But it availed nothing: they were defeated as their comrades had been before them, and they fled from a foe whom they may well have begun to consider superhuman as well as invincible. No idea of retrieving their blunder, or staying to share the fate of those they had ostensibly come to help, seems ever to have occurred to them: their only wish was to depart, and in spite of Morosini's prayers and the supplications of the garrison, the Duc de Noailles set sail on 21st August, followed shortly after by the Papal galleys and the Maltese and German troops, leaving Morosini to his fate. Morosini's position was desperate. His forces had dwindled to 3000 men,

the town was crumbling to ruin beneath his feet, and already the enemy had found a way to effect a passage through the fort of St Andrea. Further resistance was useless, and negotiations could not be delayed. He had not time even to refer to Venice for instructions or advice, and could only confer with his principal officers as to the acceptance of the terms dictated by the Grand Vizir.

The conditions imposed by the Turk—largely, it is said, out of respect and admiration for Morosini—cannot be called either harsh or exacting, and on 6th September peace was signed. The Venetians were to leave Candia, carrying with them their arms, guns, their ammunition, and the sacred vessels of their churches. The island was to be given up, but the Republic was still to retain possession of the ports of Suda, Carabusa, and Spinalunga, as well as the border towns and the fortress of Clissa, in Dalmatia.

Francesco Morosini quitted Candia on 26th September, followed by the representatives of the Republic, the troops, the artillery, and the citizens; the following day the keys were handed over to Achmet Kiupergli, and the war, which had lasted twenty-five years, was at an end.

Looking back at this period, it can truthfully be said that it ranks as one of the fairest in Venetian history. With weakened powers and in an age when self-sacrifice and patriotism had become rare, Venice had displayed in the highest degree forms of courage, endurance, and perseverance; she had found among her sons, men of nobility and capability who had served her cause devotedly, while her steadfastness of purpose and tenacity of will in carrying on so desperate a struggle for many years alone and unaided, stands out as a shining example to all time and to every age.

Francesco Morosini's act in making peace and surrendering Candia did not pass unnoticed in Venice, where the question of calling him to account, with the

intent to condemn him, was very seriously considered. His defence, ably undertaken by Giovanni Sagredo, was, however, approved by the Senate, and of the accusations brought against him each one was in turn combated and refuted. The voice of public opinion, however, made itself heard by means of a satirical publication claiming to be "the last will and testament of Candia," which was freely and widely circulated at the time. In it Candia is represented as dictating her final wishes before her "soul breathes its last in the arms of the Turk," and makes ironical allusions to most of the European powers, not excluding the Court of Rome, for not coming to her rescue in the evil hour. She forgives all her enemies in the persons of public ministers and those who administered her affairs in war by land or sea, and those who had nefariously filched from the public revenue. Her "personal estate" represented by "my chapters of glory and honour I divide between Lunardo and Lazzaro Mocenigo, Tommaso Morosini, Giovanni Alvise Emo, Benedetto da Canal (who was the first to teach the nobles of Venice to die for me), to Catterino Cornaro, and Francesco Morosini." The satire, though showing much of what was passing at the moment in people's minds, did not touch upon the greater issues that the loss of Candia meant to the Republic. That loss was of far deeper significance than the wits of the day apprehended, for it brought home with increasing force and bitterness the fact that Venice had no longer any share or action in Eastern affairs, and that her place as trader and traveller in the bazaars and waters of the Levant would know her now no more. And when, a few years later, the Turk was at the gates of Vienna and the destinies of Europe seemed to be in his very grasp, the absence of a friendly power in Candia was felt with deadly effect, and Venice was avenged for the sins of omission so wantonly committed against her in her hour of need.

For many years after peace was signed, Venice remained in a state of moral and financial exhaustion. The stress she had gone through, the strain of the burden laid on her, brought a sort of reaction once the tension was over, and her one object was to remain as far as possible outside the jar and turmoil of politics and fighting. She kept, however, an attentive eye on the Turco-Hungarian war, ever on the watch to see if an opportunity arose for recapturing Candia; and she refused the offers of the Pope, the Emperor of Germany, and the King of Poland to throw in her lot with theirs against the Mussulman, chiefly from the conviction that the moment was not a favourable one for her purpose. A strong faction too within her walls was very averse to the idea of war, pointing out the folly of embarking on such a course before they had recovered from the perils and privations occasioned by that in Candia. Others, on the contrary, dwelt on the advisability of uniting themselves to such powerful allies, and of remaining no longer in a state of isolation that, in their case at all events, was far from "splendid." After much discussion it was settled to join the league, and Venice made ready for war by appointing Francesco Morosini *Generalissimo* of the forces, and the Count of Königsmark his second in command.

The part played by the Navy in this war—a war which was to culminate in the conquest of the Morea—though not a large one, was marked at the outset by several triumphs in the Archipelago. The first of these was the capture by Morosini of Sta Maura, an island lying between Corfu and Cephalonia, and of importance to Venice in that it commanded the approaches to the Adriatic. Morosini then proceeded to attack Prevéša, and the Turks deeming it expedient to check his further progress, sailed out with their fleet from the Dardanelles. They were not, however, strong enough to attack him, so

they set to work to lay waste some islands in the Archipelago while making ready at home to commence operations on a large scale in the spring. Venice was compelled to do the same; but her exchequer was low and the long strain of the last war had exhausted her supplies. She still, however, could raise money by having recourse to the sale of the office of *Procuratore di San Marco*, and her patents of nobility, and these she now turned once more to account. Thirty-eight families were enrolled in the *Libro d'Oro*, and Venice, no longer hampered by straitened means, could engage in a manner becoming to her dignity as an ally with a large stake in the enterprise.

Morosini was successful at Coron, Zermata, Calamata, and other places; and after a council of war held at Sta Maura, he decided to advance upon the Morea. One town after another fell before him; and on 11th August 1687, a swiftly rowed felucca reached Venice, bringing the news of the conquest of the Morea. The joy that this news caused was unbounded: public thanksgivings were offered up in the churches; public honours were decreed to Morosini, who was hailed as Venice's greatest general, whilst the special honour—never before accorded to any Venetian in his lifetime—was bestowed on him by the erection of his bust in the hall of the Council of Ten. Over it was hung the banner taken from the Turk, with the inscription: "Francisco Maureceno Peloponnesiaco Adhuc Viventi Senatus." The following year his citizens, in order to emphasise still more their gratitude and appreciation of his services, unanimously elected him Doge in the room of Marc' Antonio Giustinian, who had died 21st March 1688.

Morosini's dukedom was marked by a series of land and sea fights in Greece and the Archipelago. The Venetian forces, sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated, were at last so unfortunate under the command of Domenico

Mocenigo, that the Doge was entreated on all sides to resume his rôle as general ; and in spite of his age and " the weight of years," he gave in to his country's wishes. A solemn service was held on 24th May 1693, in St Mark's, with all the ceremonial that such an occasion called forth, the Doge being present, attired in all the paraphernalia of office. His heavy mantle of rich gold brocade was upheld by two pages, in his hand he carried his bâton of general, while the Papal Nuncio, the French ambassador, and a crowd of nobles, secretaries, civil and ecclesiastical dignitaries, of friends and relations, thronged his steps as he walked in stately procession to and from the church. The next day he went in the Bucentaur to the Lido, followed by a vast concourse of people in skiffs, barges, gondolas, boats of all kinds and sizes, assembled for the last time in Venetian history to speed their Doge on a foreign expedition. He embarked in his galley at San Nicolò, and set sail at once for Malvasia, where the fleet was awaiting him. Several small victorious actions took place in the waters of the Archipelago, which were of use in safeguarding the Morea, but with the approach of winter Morosini had to withdraw to Nauplia in the Peloponnesus, where he died, worn out with the trials and fatigues he had undergone, on 6th January 1694.

He was deeply and sincerely mourned by all classes, especially those who had served under him, and who recognised that in him they had possessed " a skilled leader, a valiant warrior, a father to his soldiers, and a good citizen."¹ He was laid to rest in the Church of Sto Stefano, with all the respect and ceremony due to such a hero ; while his name, inscribed on a marble slab in the Sala dello Scrutinio in the ducal palace, records the homage paid by the Senate of Venice to one of their greatest doges and generals.

¹ Romanin, *op. cit.*, vol. vii., ch. vi., p. 509.

CONCLUSION

A RETROSPECT OF THE COMMERCE OF VENICE.
ITS BEGINNING. ITS DECAY

700—1797

First Maritime Laws and Regulations. The Mercantile Service. Interest taken by Venetian Patricians in Trade. Exports and Imports. "Nautical Statutes." The Merchant Galleys and their Destinations. Time needed for a Voyage. Height of Venice's Glory. Beginning of the End. Decadence.

IN considering the history of Venetian commerce, the position of the town must be always borne in mind as contributing in no small degree to its development and success. On the edge of the sea; at the foot of the mountains; within easy reach of numerous rivers, Venice had every facility at hand for the importation, the exportation and the transmission of merchandise to different parts of the world. That transmission was at first carried on almost entirely by boats and barges, land traffic being at a discount, or when it was employed, being done by means of caravans. The rivers most especially used for purposes of trade were: the Brenta for all that related to Padua; the Bacchiglione for Vicenza; the Sile for Treviso, Ceneda and their surroundings; the Piave for the extensive province of Belluno, comprising as it did the Cadore with its thickly planted land and numerous forests; the Livenza, the Tagliamento, and the Isenza for Friuli;

the Po for Ferrara and Mantua; the Adige for Verona. Venetian boats and rafts were to be met with everywhere, and Venetian stations and emporiums were dotted about in every place which was considered likely to prove convenient or advantageous for trade. The Venetians patronised every market within reach, they bought and sold at every fair; then as time went on they carried their ventures to the south of Italy and to Sicily, to the coasts of Dalmatia and Croatia, to the islands at the base of the Adriatic, and from there they pushed on to the Archipelago, to the shores of Greece, and the borders of the Sea of Marmora, to Constantinople, to the Black Sea, and to the coasts of Asia and Africa.

The laws relating to the maritime trade of Venice went through many phases, for though at first, as can be well imagined, everyone was a law unto himself and smuggling and piracy went on hand in hand, this state of things was not allowed to continue for long. In the eighth century already the rights of maritime trading were taken into consideration, the first step in this direction being the sending of squadrons to suppress piracy and to endeavour to free the highways from the smugglers and corsairs who molested every vessel that hove in sight. It was then established that the trading ships should always journey in convoys, in order to protect themselves from these same corsairs and pirates who were as much, or even more, to be feared than storms and tempests. And verily the merchant of those days had no easy time of it either by land or sea. On board ship he was frequently called upon to defend his goods at the risk of his life; on landing at a foreign port he was beset by snares of every kind, for even if he should escape financial disaster, he had to guard against the treachery—including assassination—that often lurked for the moneyed foreigner. Venetian merchants and shipmasters managed, however, to evade the harbour dues

which the other maritime Republics had to pay on arrival at an Eastern port, dues of an extraordinarily long and complicated nature, but which were swept aside for the Venetians; and in an age when protection was most rigorously upheld they managed by diplomacy and statecraft to secure to themselves all the advantages of free-trade. These advantages were withdrawn bit by bit as time went on, but while they lasted the Venetian trader was more an object of envy and dislike than even his rival from Pisa or Genoa.

In the thirteenth century fresh regulations were again issued as to the mercantile service, guarding against undue excesses or covetousness on the part of the navigators, such as the weight of the cargo committed to their charge, the forms of the contracts, payment of dues and the like. One of the oldest magistracies that Venice ever boasted was then instituted in the shape of the "Merchant Consuls" (*Consoli dei Mercanti*), to act as guardians and overseers.

Towards the middle of the fourteenth century still more stringent laws were promulgated on this same subject, when it was decreed that the Merchant galleys (*galee da Mercanzia*) should be owned by the State, which in its turn should lease them to the highest bidder. A patrician, bearing the title of Captain, and elected in the *Pregadi*, or Senate, was to assume the command, and be responsible for the carrying out of these laws, besides regulating the duration of the halt in a foreign port and the details connected with the return journey. Eight young nobles were to embark on each of these galleys in order to gain as intimate a knowledge of handling a ship and getting used to the sea as of conducting a good bargain. How strictly the directions for the guidance of these youths were drawn up, and how close and personal an interest the Venetian nobles of those days took in matters of trade

can be seen from the memorial (*ricordo*) written about the year 1475 by Benedetto Sanudo, on the occasion of his brother Andrea's first voyage to Alexandria. Andrea was one of the eight young patricians on board a galley commanded by the "magnifico Messer Bon," and his brother begins by commending him to God, wishing him a prosperous journey, and praying that he may be preserved in health both of mind and body.¹

"Keep yourself from the perils which occur only too frequently on a galley," enjoins this cautious brother, "and be ever careful of your health. Together with you there will be eight nobles, who will all be under the orders of the magnificent captain, and you will show him that reverence which is his due, taking care to do nothing contrary to his wishes, and accompanying him wherever he goes. And never absent yourself from the galley, even when desire prompts you, unless with his permission, because you will do him immense pleasure and favour by showing him reverence and doing what you know he wishes should be done.

"The eight nobles are all gentlemen and your equals; you will study to show them such civilities as I am sure your prudence will suggest to you, not becoming over familiar with them, especially as they are older than you, but addressing each of them reverently.

"The chaplain will be Messer Piero Antoni; act so as to have him for your companion; confer with him in all your need, and you may be sure that he will always help you more than anyone else.

"You will, as you know well, have Peter as your servant, who is charged to look after you and to take care of your things; but you will keep the key of your box yourself, as well as that of your writing-case, sending him to fetch what is necessary when you want it. To him,

¹ The original of the *Ricordo* is in the Museo Civico of Venice (Cod. Cicogna, 4090, MS. No. 4), and part of it is to be found in a pamphlet entitled *La Nobiltà Veneziana e il Commercio Marittimo*, by Admiral Luigi Fincati: Rome, Barbèra, 1878.

Peter, you will show what kindnesses you can, and either in going or returning you will make him a present as seems good to you, being guided by what the other nobles give their servants. I will not refrain, although you are aware of it, from saying how on board a galley nothing is done but to play cards or draughts (*tavoliere*), and how there are some who only embark for this; hence I warn you as you value your honour never to play cards or draughts with anyone, for if one plays only a *marcello* one is afterwards held to have played a *ducat*.¹ You will therefore avoid this reproach, and when others sit down to play you will sit down to read one of the books that you have with you, though should you occasionally desire some other pastime rather than that of reading or writing you might play draughts with Messer Prè Piero Antoni, just, as I said, to while away the time. And this I would say to you, although I know you are not given to gambling, but sometimes one is induced to do in company that whereunto one is not really inclined. Therefore, you must avoid all that you hold to be wrong, and that would be prejudicial to your honour.

“When the galley touches at some port and you disembark, be careful not to wander too far from the place of embarkation, for at the sound of the drum all must be on board, otherwise whoever is not there will suffer for it, and be left on land.”

This watchful elder brother then points out to the younger one the dangers of another and more subtle kind that lie in wait for him at Corfu and Candia, and he entreats him for love of heaven not to be taken captive by the sirens who haunt those isles.

“On arriving at Alexandria,” he continues, “you will call on the magnificent Messer Piero Bembo, our most worthy consul, to do him reverence and touch his hand. You will sleep in his house if you stay the night, and also

¹ A *marcello* was a small silver coin worth about 5d., a *ducat* was a gold coin, known in later times as a *zechin*, and worth about 10s.

dine there if so it seems good. But as the air of Alexandria is said to be unwholesome, if you choose to go on board the galley and sleep there, do so, but be careful to take someone with you, for there are some Moors abroad who are wont to be insolent, but who might be afraid of you if they see that you are not alone. . . . I would also warn you not to eat or drink too much, because there are some kinds of beasts in Alexandria that are said to be poisoned quails, and of those I would have you beware.

“If by chance you should be ill on board, you had better go amidships, or in the sitting-room, whichever is most suitable, and do not eat too much and then you will be well.

“Remember that your locker, being in a place from where, when it is opened, the wind might carry some of the effects overboard, you must warn your servant Peter to be careful how he opens it, and to see to it that nothing falls into the sea.”

Then follows a long and intricate account of how the merchandise that is entered “in the name of me, Benetto Sanudo & Co.”—and that consists of 190 dozen of red caps—is to be disposed of, and of how so much good pepper (for these patricians of the house of Sanudo, Dukes of Naxos, were pre-eminently pepper-merchants) is to be bought in exchange; the buyers being enjoined to give even a ducat or two more than the current price if by so doing they can be certain of obtaining a superior quality of pepper. Should the supply of pepper be inadequate to the sum to be expended on it, then the surplus money is to be laid out on sugar, and should the supply of sugar fall short, then nutmegs are to be purchased—always, however, bearing in mind that large supplies of nutmeg are expected from Syria and that the market may be overstocked, so much caution must be exercised on this head. Minute instructions are also

given to one "Domenego Tressa," evidently a trusted agent of Sanudo & Co.; but all the same young Andrea is ordered to keep a written statement of the sale of the caps, and every time that Tressa is engaged in a deal Andrea is to attend also, in order to learn the different sorts of spices and drugs, as well as to be able on his return to Venice to answer the questions that will be put to him, and to give an exact report of all he has seen and done.

The care for his young brother's health is again shown in the concluding part of the *ricordo*, when Benedetto says :

"Your return will probably be in the depth of winter, be careful consequently to be warmly dressed, so as not to suffer from the cold, and above all protect and cover up your mouth. I need say no more: take heed to keep well, and pray our Lord God to grant you a good and happy voyage with health of soul and body."

The capital that Benedetto Sanudo entrusted to his brother Andrea amounted to over 3500 ducats, and as the other nobles on board, including the *magnifico Capitano* and the "patron," would have similar sums to lay out, we may calculate that money to the extent of at least 35,000 ducats would be in circulation for the purchase of "good pepper," and other spices and drugs, which in their turn would be exported to Flanders, Germany, and England; only, however, after they had paid entry and exit dues in the port of Venice, bringing in in this way a rich yield to the State revenues. These dues, with the hire of the galleys, the sale of the merchandise, and the gains made on exchange, represent a net revenue of at least half a million of the Italian money of to-day, a revenue too that was realised in so short a space of time as nine months from one port alone, and that it took only ten patrician

families to amass. The galleys of Syria and Romania, which trafficked on the same lines, brought in results equally advantageous to the State, and insured a net income to Venice of many thousands of ducats annually.

The exports of the Republic, in as far as her home industries were concerned, were not very extensive in early days, though one of them, that of salt, was of inestimable value, and produced enormous sums. The salt marshes of the Venetian lagoon, with their low shallow basins, provided this necessity of life, and here and in other suitable places extensive saltworks were set up, where the trade was carried on under strict and jealous protection. In later times, when the island of Cyprus was one of Venice's richest and fairest colonies, the income there produced by the State monopoly of salt has been calculated as having brought in no less than 300,000 to 800,000 ducats.

Glass, salted fish, and wooden utensils came next in importance; and much later on the manufacture of lace—a manufacture that has developed to a very important extent in recent times, and is a source of considerable gain to all concerned in it. It was, however, in their capacity as carriers and importers that the Venetians made a special mark. From the moment when the early settlers chose the lagoons as their home, they lived in daily, hourly contact with the sea, and the quantity and variety of their vessels, joined to their skill in handling them, made them in demand among nations not possessed of the like advantages. This was pre-eminently the case at the time of the Crusades, when the Venetians knew how to make capital out of their neighbours' needs, and obtain their full money's worth for the hire of their transport ships. Venice also carried goods and wares of every sort and kind from Italy, Germany, Hungary, Illyria, and Dalmatia to the East, receiving Eastern products in

exchange, in the shape of balsam, drugs, perfumes, incense, numerous sorts of gums, cassia, and other medicaments; stuffs, silk and cotton goods, cloth from Damascus and Bagdad; pearls, coral, gold, silver, both raw and coined, which she brought home, and disposed of in the markets of the West.

There is little doubt that already in the ninth century Venice traded with Byzantium, and it is a known fact that the robes worn by Charlemagne's courtiers when he was in Italy had been purchased at a great fair held at Pavia, when Venetian merchants displayed the gorgeous stuffs for wearing apparel that they had obtained in the East and brought to Italy for sale. This intercourse with the East was turned to good account by the Venetians, who learnt numerous arts there; among them the manufacture of silk, glass, optical instruments, clocks,¹ chemistry, perfumery, confectionery and dyeing. The art of dyeing and also of gilding, was brought betimes to a high state of perfection, and gilt leather was one of the staple exports of the Republic to Spain and the Levant, while the dyed stuffs and red damask of Venice were of an excellence that has never been surpassed.

This traffic with the East, and especially with Constantinople, was at first rendered onerous by the heavy tariff dues which Venetian ships paid at the different ports on arriving and departing, but at the end of the tenth century Venice was already in a position to be courted and propitiated, and these taxes were then so reduced as to make them of almost no account. This was notably the case in 1082, when the Emperor Alexius I. granted privileges and concessions of an altogether exceptional

¹ We read that in this century Doge Orso Participazio (864-881) sent twelve clocks to the Emperor Basil, who is said to have stowed them all into one church.—Armingaud, *Venise et le bas Empire* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1868), chap. vii., p. 115.

nature to the Venetians in return for the loyal support given him by their Navy against the Normans at Durazzo. These concessions were indeed so numerous and advantageous as to serve for models on future occasions, when they were invariably made the basis on which to rest any demands for further privileges.

In and around Italy the Navy of Venice also plied a brisk and lucrative trade: wood for fuel and timber for building purposes were brought from Dalmatia, corn and wine from Apulia, and it must be admitted that a period of dearth was invariably a period of special gain to Venetian dealers and one which they were quick to turn to good account.

A table of “Nautical Statutes” had been compiled in the reign of Doge Sebastiano Ziani (1172), which was considerably amplified in the thirteenth century, and again after the conquest of Constantinople. “These Nautical Statutes,” says Romanin,¹ “entered minutely into all that related to the construction of merchant vessels; to the quantity and quality of the cargo (which varied from 200,000 lbs. (*libbre*) to 1,000,000 lbs.); to the anchors, ropes, etc. Every vessel of 200,000 lbs. had a crew of twenty men, which was increased by one man to every extra 10,000 lbs. The number of the crew was always to be complete, and no one was admitted under eighteen years old; the crew had to promise that they would never allow a pilgrim, or a soldier, or a servant to take their place; everyone was to have his prescribed weapons, and no one was to quit the ship without leave; they were to swear to fulfil their own duties faithfully and well; they were neither to commit, nor to allow of, any theft; they were to denounce any hurt or decay that they found in the vessel, together with any tampering done to the cargo, and any infringement of rules. In case of shipwreck the

¹ Romanin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., chap. iii., p. 242.

sailors were bound to attend with all diligence to the salvage for the space of fifteen days, when their gains would be 3 per cent. Every ship had to have besides two scribes (*scrivani*), who were pledged to keep an exact entry of the quantity, quality, weight, and measure of the ship's freight. The merchant consuls measured the amount of the timber, and had to keep a strict watch to see that nothing was added to the prescribed and recorded quantity. The master (*padrone*) of the ship was bound to be on board at the hour of departure, and not to leave till the ship was in port. He was to give diligent and careful heed that the arms were in order, that the sailors, pilots, and merchants were not wanting in their tasks and duties; that no portion of the ship's gear was sold; that the crew was regularly paid, etc."

The vessels of lesser tonnage carried two trumpets; those of heavier tonnage had a trumpet, a drum and two kettledrums; each passenger, as well as each sailor, might bring a mattress and cushion, a trunk for his things, a flask of wine and one of water, or a double supply, together with a certain amount of flour and biscuit, should the voyage be a long one. No sooner was the ship in port than her unlading and relading were instantly carried out in a most expeditious and methodical manner.

The quantity and quality of the ballast was also strictly regulated, and the articles used for this purpose are of interest as showing the kind of merchandise most in request at the time when these Statutes were first instituted. They consisted of:—lead, tin, iron, emery, unwrought brass, glass, vitriol, rock alum, and white Alexandrian alum. The cargo, or freight, consisted of pepper, ginger, loaf and powdered sugar, rice, almonds, apples, prunes, wine, grain, oil, lac, myrrh, gum arabic, incense, indigo, ammonia, aloes, nutmegs, cloves, cardamoms, camphor, galingale, gall-nuts, cubebs, mastic, wax, raw and

manufactured silk, cotton, wool and woollen stuffs, linen, leather, hides of all sorts, etc.

The fall of Constantinople (1453) and the loss of the Republic's Oriental colonies dealt a serious blow to Venetian enterprise and commerce, and though Venice was shrewd enough to make excellent terms with the Sultan Mahomet, her prestige suffered and her financial condition was very gravely affected. The possession of Cyprus, however, made good to a certain extent the change of rulers at Byzantium, for not only was the fertility of the isle a source of enormous wealth in itself, but its position off the coast of Syria and Asia Minor made it one of the principal routes for the trading vessels to touch at on their outward- or homeward-bound journeys to the East. Besides salt (of which mention has been made), the chief products of Cyprus were :—sugar, indigo, cotton, and spices ; and many a princely fortune was built up by the patricians of Venice through trading in these goods alone.

Egypt may be ranked next after Cyprus as the greatest source of wealth to Venice, and that—to Venice's shame it must be said—owing principally to the slave trade, which had its headquarters in that country. This trade, in violation of all rules and ordinances, was largely practised, and especially in the fifteenth century, by both Venetians and Genoese, who imported Tartars, Russians, Bulgarians, and even Greeks, from their colonies at Caffa and Tana on the Black Sea, and conveyed them in caravans to Egypt. From there they were sold, the women for the most part to harems, the men to serve as soldiers. In Egypt, too, as in the days of the children of Israel, there was corn to be had, as well as sugar, spices, glass, woven stuffs, jewels, and goldsmith's work, all of which the merchant galleys brought to Venice.

The departure of these same galleys was a regular institution, the six principal expeditions being : the

Galley of Alexandria, which sailed twice a year with special ceremonies and under a special escort; the *Galley of Beirut*, which sailed once a year for Syrian ports; the *Galley of Romania*; the *Galley of Flanders*; the *Galley of England*; the *Galley of Barbary*, which touched at Syracuse and Tripoli and at other ports on the north coast of Africa, and journeyed to Malaga and Almeria, in Spain, whence she turned back, touching again at Tunis on her homeward way; and the *Galley of Acquemorte*, which journeyed to the north of Spain and to France, carrying to those countries, as the *Galea d'Inghilterra* did to England, spices and other Oriental merchandise. The times, however, were troublous, and jealousies, increased taxation, disputed claims as to monopolies and other trading rights, often arose to interfere with the sailing of the merchant galleys and to break the regularity of their start. No sooner, however, were these difficulties smoothed away by mutual concessions, or some amiable treaty, than the Venetians set to work to repair their losses and despatch the convoys with all alacrity to their different destinations.

The length of time that these vessels took for a voyage can be accurately gauged by a ship's log of the year 1408, when one of them sailed from Venice to Jaffa and back, laden with pilgrims for the Holy Land. This *Galeazza da mercanzia* was under the command of "Ser Andrea Arian," and left the port of S. Nicolò del Lido on the night of 1st July. After touching—among other places—at Durazzo, Corfu, Modon, and Candia, they reached Jaffa on 4th August. On the 7th the pilgrims disembarked, and on the 22nd, their pilgrimage ended, they re-embarked, and on the 24th the homeward journey was begun. On 25th October they reached Venice, having covered a distance of 1600 miles in less than four months; the outward journey, undertaken at a favourable time of

year—July and August—having occupied thirty-three days; the return journey, undertaken at a less favourable time—September and October—having occupied sixty-two days. It speaks well for the seamanship of all concerned; and Admiral Fincati (from whose work, *Splendore e Decadenza di Venezia*,¹ these facts are taken) says that a sailing vessel of to-day could not do better; though, as he observes, the voyage being for the transport of passengers, not for commercial purposes involving the lading and unlading of goods, the halts were as short as possible and only of such duration as was absolutely necessary.

The same author would have us note that at this epoch, *i.e.*, the very beginning of the fifteenth century, Venice had attained to the summit of her glory. The city then numbered 190,000 inhabitants; over a thousand noblemen had fortunes varying from 200,000 to 500,000 *lire* a year; the mint coined a million of gold ducats, 200,000 pieces of silver, and 80,000 of copper, so that money to the value of not less than 18,000,000 of the *lire* of to-day (some £720,000) was in annual circulation.

The armed mercantile fleets (*le flotte armate in mercanzia*) sailed and returned every year laden with merchandise estimated at over 40,000,000 of *lire*, and, though the exact value of these sums cannot be perfectly estimated to-day, there is no doubt but that the gains were enormous—the more so that Venetian trade consisted almost entirely of monopolies, whilst owing to all absence of competition the merchants could not only fix, but command, their prices, no matter how exorbitant those prices might be.

The number of ships then in Venice was 3000, between those owned by the State and by private individuals;

¹ Luigi Fincati, *Splendore e Decadenza di Venezia*. Roma: Barbèra, 1878.

which were manned by 38,000 sailors, showing that even when allowance for the number of foreigners employed is made, nearly a whole third of the male population of Venice was composed of seamen. The rest were artisans and merchants, who in one way or another provided the material whereby the whole of this mighty machinery was kept going.

The war which Venice waged with Turkey in the second half of the fifteenth century, involving as it did the loss of Negropont and many other of the Republic's colonies, wrought much harm to her trade: traffic was interrupted, the enemies and rivals of Venice prospered and were advanced, while the few established traders who still trafficked in Constantinople were alternately persecuted, imprisoned, and put to the torture.

A further blow was in store for Venice in the discovery of America, and, worse still, in the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope. The news of this latter discovery was received in Venice with dismay, and may be best expressed in the words of the chronicler, Priuli,¹ who alluded to the rumour of such a discovery as follows: "Letters from Alexandria speak of the arrival of three *caravelle* of the King of Portugal at Calicut (on the coast of India) and Aden. This news and all it portends seems to me of great weight, if it is true. Anyhow I do not credit it as being authentic." The Venetian representative in Portugal, Domenico Pisani (who had gone to solicit aid for the Republic against the Turks), was enjoined to investigate the matter, and the answer, according to Sanudo, ran thus: "It is now a year since the King of Portugal sent thirteen *caravelle* to Calicut for spices, and shortly, they say, they are expected back; and great rejoicing prevails that the way of the spices has been

¹ Priuli, *Diarii*: Estratte publicate dal Fulin in *Arch. Ven.*, xxii., 155.



A CARAVELLA.

From a Model in the Arsenal of Venice.



SMALLER CARAVELLA.

From a Model in the Arsenal of Venice.

[To face page 328.]

found. And the King has said that great advantages will accrue in consequence; and now are there ready four other merchant *caravelle* for Calicut, which are to start in three or four days. The way is very long, being 4000 leagues, or 16,000 of our miles.”¹

The news went from bad to worse. The *caravelle* returned safe; the “way of the spices” was an authentic one (only in the hands of an alien people); and a further expedition of six vessels was reported as having returned intact, so laden with treasure that the smallest ship had “300 *cantera* of pepper, and 200 of cinnamon, nutmeg, lacquer and benzine”—a report which “gave those in this land much to ponder over, especially when they reflect that six other ships are expected from day to day; and the merchants are fearful that it will be their ruin.”

And in truth such it was. Venice could no longer dictate as of old, and make her own terms; she had, instead, to accept those of other nations, and see the monopolies and open markets which had been hers for centuries pass into the hands of rivals and strangers, and closed to her for ever.

The Venetians realised fully the misfortunes that had befallen them, and were not at first minded to acquiesce calmly in the changed aspect of affairs. Many plans were discussed for remedying the evil, among them being an order of the Senate to their agent, Bernardo Giova, who was to proceed to Egypt, and lay before the Soldan a design for opening a passage between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea—forestalling Lesseps, in fact, as to the opening of the Isthmus of Suez—and fighting the Portuguese with their own weapons. The orders sent by the Senate were these: “One thing we will on no account set aside, a thing suggested already as an opportune measure for impeding and altogether holding up the navigation of

¹ Sanudo, *Diario*, vol. iii., col. 1597.

the Portuguese: to wit, the ease with which a canal could be made from the Red Sea to communicate with the sea on the other side; which canal could be protected by two fortresses, so that no one but whom the Soldan so willed should do so, could either come in or go out.”¹

For one reason or another, however, all the plans of Venice for thwarting the Portuguese came to nought, and these latter were left masters of the field, securing their position ever more firmly by the conquest of Goa in 1510, and of other towns later on in the Malay Peninsula. Venice too, unlike Florence and Genoa, failed in making arrangements and terms that might have availed in saving some of her commerce; while she lost clients in the shape of Germany, France, Spain, and England, and had, moreover, to relinquish her trade in Egypt, as she had had already to do in the Black Sea, Asia Minor, and Greece.

The course of events, it has been urged were against Venice, and she had no choice but to bow to the inevitable. But in reality it was not so. The discovery of America and of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope did, without a doubt, damage Venetian commerce most seriously, but the remedy lay largely in Venetian hands had they but chosen to use it. As it was, the nobles forsook their trade and their travels to sink into mere fops and fainéants, unworthy of their great past and of the heroic names they bore. Instead of devoting themselves heart and soul to all that concerned the Navy, they stayed at home, living on their capital, and inspired—with but few exceptions—by no ambition beyond vying with their neighbours in ostentation and extravagance, and devoid of all aim in life save that of squandering the fortunes which they had inherited. The decadence of the upper classes permeated only too surely to the lower classes. The keen


¹ “Il Canal di Suez e la Republica di Venezia,” in *Arch. Ven.*, ii., p. 195.

love of work, backed by a hearty thoroughness in that work, and the readiness to accept discipline and practise self-denial which had distinguished the working classes of old, gave way to a love of pleasure, of ease, and of idleness, which undermined the old characteristics and proved the undoing of the race. Had Venice boldly faced competition with the Portuguese; had she upheld her right to trade in the markets now open to everyone; had she accepted the altered condition of things and adapted herself to them, she could then have removed far from her the decaying, stagnating influences which wrapped her as in a pall, and held her place among the great trading powers of the world. But she had become enormously, dangerously rich; and under the snare and burden of wealth the characteristics and habits of her citizens changed and deteriorated, till they sank at last, stifled and strangled by fetters which they had neither the strength nor the ability to cast off.

The evil effects of Venice's period of prosperity and affluence were not, however, felt at first in their full force. The war galleys still went out in pomp and power on a few occasions when a flash of the old spirit awoke anew in Venetian breasts: and at Lepanto and in Candia, in the Morea, and against the Barbary corsairs the best traditions of the past were nobly maintained. Not so, however, with the merchant service. No record speaks of even one effort to revive the trade and commercial enterprise that had brought such gain and glory to the lagoons; and when the Republic fell in 1797, and Napoleon entered Venice as conqueror and despoiler, this branch of the service had declined so steadily and completely as to leave no trace of its existence.


Nor have the endeavours of later times availed either—and that in spite of a combination of fortuitous circumstances—to revive or restore it. The Isthmus of Suez has

been cut, the pass of the Brenner has opened up the markets of Central Europe, some of the largest ships that sail the waters of the Mediterranean can and do enter the harbour of Venice with an ease that was unknown in the days of the Republic ; but these and other advantages have all been in vain. Venice has never succeeded in casting off the lethargy that crept into her very soul at the close of the fifteenth century, and that has remained ever since as the most marked and marring feature of her life and of that of her sons and daughters.



A Galleon.

APPENDIX



A Trabacolo.

APPENDIX

THE following list of ships built and in use in Venice from the fifth century to the fall of the Republic is compiled chiefly from *Venezia e le sue Lagune*, Vol. I., Part I.

FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURIES

ACATION (in Italian *Acazie*, *Acates*, or *Acate*).—The earliest form of ships used by the Venetians, and probably at first only for river navigation. In time they were adapted for commerce and eventually for war, when they were linked together and a wooden tower was erected on them. They then entered the class known as *catostromi*, i.e. "ships with decks." Their shape and tonnage is unknown, but it is supposed that they were copied from the Greeks; and that a Greek named Pinapo, or a Cretan named Entinopo, built the first ships of this kind in the dockyard of Rivoalto (Rialto) in 421.

SCRILLA.—Vessel for commerce and home transport, and much used in the lagoons. It probably carried the triangular or lateen sail.

CURSORIE.—Vessels chiefly in use on the rivers, and for home transport.

CAMPOLO.—For home navigation.

LIBURNICHE.—So called, according to Pantera, from Liburna, in Dalmatia. They were light vessels resembling to some extent the slender galleys of later times, carrying probably the triangular sail, and having, according to Roindelet (*Mémoire sur la Marine des Anciens*), two or even three ranks of rowers. Winesalf, quoted by Jal, says

that what the ancients called *Liburnian* the moderns call galley.

SEVENTH CENTURY

TARATE, TAREDE, or TARIDE, also called CARACCHE.—There is little known about these ships beyond the fact that they were sailing ships exclusively, making no use of oars, and were built in Venice in this and perhaps even in the preceding century. The only ground on which to form some idea of the size and solidity of the more modern *Tarede* lies in the fact that in 1176 one of these vessels brought the three granite pillars from Constantinople to Venice, one of which fell into the sea at the moment of unloading and was never recovered; the other two were erected on the Piazzetta, where they stand to this day. The weight of the three pillars was about 180 tons. Jal's glossary describes the *Caracca* as of the family of "round ships," and a heavy member too of that family.

MARCILIANE.—Trading vessels, exclusively Venetian, and which trafficked only in the Adriatic, or at the furthest in the Archipelago and round Sicily. They sailed only, having three or four masts but no oars, and they carried as many as 200 barrels of oil—the weight of each barrel being about 2000 lbs. (*libbre*), or rather less than a ton.

PANDORA.—Transport ship. This ship is mentioned in Cristoforo da Canale, *Codex*: "Dialoghi su la milizia Maritima," as being in use in the twelfth century, but nothing is said as to her size or shape.

VARCHETTA (perhaps a corruption of *Barchetta*).—Trading vessels, supposed to have resembled the *Tarede*.

NAVI LUNGHE.—Warships. According to Pantera, these *Navi* comprised ships of various sorts, worked by oars and including in their ranks the Biremes, Triremes, Quadriremes, Quinqueremes, and so on up to ships of six, seven, eight, nine, and ten oars. The bireme, he adds, was the smallest of all the *Navi Lunghe*, and was so called because she was worked by two rowers to each bench. These ships, often spoken of by different authors, were built in Venetian dockyards, and are said to have been the precursors of the Dromons, of which mention will shortly be made.

EIGHTH CENTURY

BUCENTAUR (*Bucintoro*).—The state barge known by this name belongs rightly to the tenth century, but as a ship bearing this name is mentioned in Sagornino's *Chronicle* as existing in 798, it must be entered here.

NINTH CENTURY

DROMONS, DROMONE, or DROMADO.—Warships and also merchant ships, adapted from the Grecian navy and considerably altered to suit Venetian requirements. This vessel was known under different names, such as "turret-ship" (*Nave turrita*), "big ship" (*Nave grossa*), "trieme" (*trierio*), and so on. She had two decks, with castles or turrets at her prow and stern, and carried many machines known as mangonels (*manganelli*, *mangani*, *trabucchi*, and *bricolle*) for hurling stones and missiles of hurtful kinds, including spiked beams, on to the enemy's ships, together with "syphons" (*sifoni*) for throwing Greek fire. The Dromons had two decks, where were two rows of oars, with twenty-five benches to a row, making a total of fifty rowers. They had, besides, masts and sails, the names of these latter being *mezzana*, *terzaruola*, *artimon*, *papafigo*, and *cochina*. The crew numbered several hundred, as besides the sailors who had special charge of the sails, there were the soldiers known as *sifonieri*, who were told off for the making and throwing of the Greek fire; the carpenters, the stone-masons, who hewed the stones into the needed shapes for the mangonels; the calkers, the trumpeters, and also the officers and their special attendants. The Dromons were at first built of cypress or pine wood: the idea being that these woods were impervious to *teredini*, or sea-worms, though it is more probable that a large quantity of cypress and pine being grown at that time on the islands round about Venice, an abundant supply of this sort of timber was to be had easily on the spot.

PANFILE.—Warships of Greek origin. Jal is of opinion that they were the same as the *Galee grosse*. They were large and heavy, though rather lighter than the Dromons.

GALLEY (*Galea*).—Swift warships. See Chapter III.

NAVI ONERARIE.—Transport ships, chiefly for attend-

ance on battleships, though used too in the merchant service for carrying very heavy cargoes. Worked by sails and without oars.

IPPAGOGHI, IPPIGI, or HIPAGMI.—Ships for the transport of horses exclusively, and much in request at the time of the Crusades. It is supposed from the extraordinary depth of these ships that the horses were ranged in double rows, one above the other, leaving at the same time space for storing the fodder, and room for the accommodation of the crew.

NAVI BELLICHE.—Warships. Probably one of the Dromon family.

NAVI CASTELLATE.—Warships. Probably the "turret ships" of the Dromon order.

PALANDARIE.—Transport ships. Sometimes used for war, and carrying both oars and sails.

CHELANDIE.—War and transport ships, and used too for coastguarding purposes. The origin of these ships is Grecian; the shape of the vessel is unknown, but she is spoken of as a powerful warship built more for defence than for attack, with high decks between which the defenders, often to the number of 200, were stationed. Andrea Dandolo in his *Chronicle* mentions a ship of this sort as being in use in the year 850. The Venetians, who have always possessed a special art for distorting names, changed and varied this word *Chelandia* to such an extent as to make it quite unrecognisable.

TENTH CENTURY

USSERI, USCIERI, or USCHERI.—Transport ships, partaking of the nature both of the *Chelandia* and the *Ippagogo*, i.e., for shipping horses.

ARSILII.—For war and transport. The word *arsilio* is altogether Venetian, and served to signify a vessel no longer fit for war, and therefore to be adapted to transport purposes. In the seventeenth century the *arsilii* were used for war, and they are mentioned by Sanudo in his *Diarii*.

CUMBARIE, GUMBARIE, or GAMBARIE.—A ship of Saracenic origin, and whose name, according to Jal, is a

corruption of the Hebrew word *Nabarah*, or passenger boat. The *Cumbarie* were at first only long, light boats rowed by oars, but eventually they assumed larger proportions. At the time of Doge Pietro Candiano II. (935), thirty-three of these ships were built; and in that same century a fleet of Venetian *Cumbarie* armed for war and under the command of the Doge Pietro Candiano III. went forth to battle against the Narentines. The *Cumbarie*, according to Sagornino, were of Venetian construction. They have been likened to galleys for the reason that they were long in shape and were worked by oars.

BUCINTORO.—This ship is generally known as the state barge that was in use on all great public functions in Venice, and especially on the Feast of the Ascension, when the Doge went forth to wed the sea. This festival, known in Venetian dialect as that of "*La Sensa*," was in vogue for some centuries before mention is made of any Bucentaur, and, according to Romanin, the first decree alluding to the Bucintoro is of the year 1311, when it was judged expedient to rebuild and beautify the barge set apart for the Doge's special use, and adorn it with carvings, hangings, and decorations of a peculiarly ornate character. At that date it was not rowed, but simply towed by small rowing boats. It was rebuilt several times, always gaining in magnificence as the years went on. The last Bucentaur that Venice ever owned was built at the Arsenal in 1722, from designs by the naval architect, Michele Conti. It was launched in the basin of the Arsenal, 12th January 1728, and sailed out from there on 12th May of the same year. This last state barge of Venice was wantonly destroyed in 1797, when, to the surprise and distress of the citizens, all the gilt work was piled up in a heap on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore and burnt on the morning of 9th January 1798. The ashes were collected and carried away. The hull was reduced to a kind of battery ship armed with heavy cannon, when it served sometimes as a kind of coastguard ship on the lagoon, sometimes as a prison ship, till finally it was taken to the Arsenal, where it was kept as an object of interest till 1824, when it was destroyed. This vessel was a two-decker, rowed by 168 rowers working forty-two oars—the men being chosen from the *Arsenalotti*, or workmen of the Arsenal, whose overseers were seated close to the Doge and the Signory. The Bucentaur was pre-eminently a fine weather vessel, and

never went out unless the sky was serene and the sea and the air calm.

ELEVENTH CENTURY

GALEA LUNGA.—A warship of extraordinary swiftness, first mentioned in 1084. She was worked by oars, having a crew of 140 rowers, and was a modified form of the first galley of the ninth century.

SAICA.—Transport ship of Turkish origin. Some *saiche* built in Venetian dockyards formed part of the fleet led by Doge Vitale Michiel in 1097 into Syria. It may be that originally these ships went by some other name, and that in later times this name was given them from their likeness to the Turkish *saique*.

TWELFTH CENTURY

BRULOTTI.—Ships used solely for incendiary purposes in war. At the siege of Syracuse in 1449, four of these rafts—for Jal and others are of opinion that the *brulotti* were no more than old hulls or disabled ships used for this purpose—under the command of Luigi Loredano succeeded in blowing up two ships and some smaller craft belonging to the enemy.

SEOLE.—Boats for use in home waters, and alluded to in the year 1150. The name of *Seole* may have come from *suole*, the shape resembling that of the sole of a man's foot, being broad at the forepart, and narrow and rounded at the other end.

PARONENO.—Nothing is known of this ship except from a statement contained in an old chronicle at Vienna, where it is stated that a Venetian patrician, the Beato Pietro Acotanto, who died in 1187, went from Venice to the Holy Land in a vessel known as a *Paroneno*. It is not even certain whether this ship was Venetian or not.

THIRTEENTH CENTURY

DROMONS.—In this century the Venetian dromons were enlarged to the extent of being double their former size and strength, and carried 100 oars.

NAVI VELIERE.—Ships for war and for transport.

Some of these took part in 1170 or the following year in the expedition against the Emperor Manuel. They were entirely sailing vessels.

SCHIFI.—Small sea-going craft, attached to the service of two-decked vessels, and of a totally different build to the skiff of modern times.

BATELLI.—Also attached to larger vessels, and measuring 30 feet in length.

GONDOLA.—So called, says Casoni, from the Greek word *Kondy*; though Muratori is not of this opinion and says that the etymology of the word is lost. In this century it was a kind of barge, 24 feet long, carrying twelve oars, and altogether unlike the gondola of to-day, or of those in use in the intermediate centuries. The first mention of the gondola occurs in 1280, and there is no doubt that it always carried the rostrum, or high peak. The rostrum dates from the time of the Greeks and Romans, and served as a weapon of considerable importance from the serious damage it inflicted on the enemy's ships. In pictures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the gondolas are represented with two rostrums, or peaks, of fine iron work at either end, and richly decorated with jewellery and costly stuffs. In the eighteenth century they were again slimmer and lighter than they had been a century before, but covered with black and more soberly decked within, and with but one peak, that at the prow, remaining.

BUZI.—Ships for war and for commerce. They carried two masts, and their freight was sometimes of 300 tons.

NAVI BUZI.—The same sort of ships as the *Buzi*, but of larger and stronger build. Jal speaks of both kinds extensively, and they are often alluded to in Venetian histories and chronicles.

NAVI QUADRE.—Warships. This name is presumably generic for ships whose extremities were of a rounded, as opposed to an elongated, form. In the category of *Navi Quadre* may be classed the ship named the *Liona*, mentioned in Barbaro's *Chronicle* of the year 1252, and which had a crew of 200 sailors and 600 marines. The *Roccaforte* (of which mention has been made, and which served at the time of the Crusades for the convoy of some

of St Louis of France's troops to the Holy Land), though occasionally spoken of as a Dromon, was more probably a *Nave Quadra*. This *Roccaforte*, the largest ship of the expedition, had two decks and a freight of 550 tons. In 1263, 500 soldiers were embarked on board this ship, and, in accordance with the habits of those times which required that large vessels should be well furnished with anchors, she carried twenty anchors. At this period, too, ships nearly always had two helms, the second one being placed beside the stern—a custom that prevails to this day on the barges plying on the Adige and the Po. There were several big *Navi Quadre* built in this century, among them being the *Aquila*, which at the Fourth Crusade (1204) broke the chain which guarded the port of Constantinople.

NAVI LATINE.—Ships for war and for commerce, and unlike the *Navi Quadre*, having but one helm.

GALEE GROSSE.—Ships for war and for commerce. See Chapter III.

PIATTA, or PLATO.—Civic boat, and as its name designates, having a wide keel. The *Piatte* were capable of carrying very heavy cargoes without any fear of capsizing.

FOURTEENTH CENTURY

NAVI MARANO.—Transport ships, often, too, used in war. Some uncertainty exists as to whether they were actually of Venetian or Spanish origin.

PARENTARIE, or PARENDARIE.—Transport ships, also used for war. Probably akin in some ways to the *Palandrie* of the ninth century.

COCCHE, or NAVI ROTONDE.—Ships for war, sometimes used also for transport. In the Middle Ages the name of *Navi Rotonde* ("round ships") was given to all the vessels which used sails exclusively and had nothing to do with oars. Their construction differed altogether from ships worked by oars, in that their proportions were far shorter, and that they stood much higher in the water. The *Cocche*, which belonged entirely to this class, were among the largest and strongest of these "round ships." There is also little doubt that the *Cocche* were the first ships on which the Venetians placed artillery. The crews

in some of these warships amounted to 1000 men, while the smaller sort had often 700 or 800 men on board.

GANZARUOLO.—A light, fast ship, of the same family, according to some authors, as the *Tarede* and *Marciliane* of the thirteenth century, whereas others call her only an escort ship to the *Cocche*. The *Ganzaruoli* of this century were the boats in which the youth of Venice, noble and commoner alike, embarked at the Piazzetta and rowed off to the Lido, where they diligently practised shooting with the bow and crossbow. This practising was greatly insisted on by the State, especially on holidays, with a view to training the youth of the town in martial exercises and shooting. This wise habit was kept up until the fall of the Republic, at which time there was a confraternity or guild of urban militia called *bombardieri*, and *bombisti*, formed of citizens and shopmen, who, together with the *arsenalotti*, practised with bombs, guns, and explosives on the Lido. In 1784, when Angelo Emo sailed against the Barbary corsairs, this body of men were employed as artillerymen and did signal service.

GALALDELO.—Of much the same nature as the *Ganzaruolo*; as was also the *Perischermo*.

GALEE GROSSE, or GALERE GROSSE.—The same as those described in Chapter III., save that in this century they underwent certain alterations.

PIATTONI, PEATONI, or PLATES.—Civic boats and barges, used by the Doge and Signory on occasions of public functions, or for votive visits to the churches, and to commemorate any striking historic event. There were three of these ducal *Piattoni*, gorgeously decorated with carvings, with gold and silver ornamentations at the sides, and with a rich covering called *tiemo*. They were rowed by eight *arsenalotti* on each barge, dressed in very gay attire.

GALERE DA MERCANZIA.—Trading vessels, mentioned elsewhere.

TARTANE, and TARTANE GROSSE.—Warships, but also and chiefly used for commerce. They carried only sails, were long in shape, swift in movement, and easy to turn. In the seventeenth century, however, they were adapted for war, and their size and shape underwent considerable

alteration. The *Tartana da Guerra*, called too *Tartana Grossa*, in some way resembled the *Navi Latine* of the preceding century. She carried three masts; two, and sometimes four, heavy guns and other artillery. The *Tartana* is in vogue to this day, whilst there are also boats of a similar name which are used for fishing and for conveying small loads at short distances. The *Tartanelle pecchereccie*, also of this date, were two-masted, lateen-sailed boats, which had, however, nothing in common, beyond their name, with the other *Tartane*.

GALEA CETEA.—A large warship. A decree issued by the Senate on 12th March 1334 ordains that two galleys of limitless (*smisurate*) size be laid down in the Arsenal. The vessels were built, one of them carrying eighty, the other 100 oars, and they ranked among the largest kind of galley then employed in the Navy.

SCAFA, or SCAFO.—Boat for home navigation, and adapted also for use on the rivers. The *Scafe*, which hailed from Illyria, were of special service during the war of Chioggia.

LEMBO, or LIBO.—A large boat much resembling the *Scafa*, and that also took part in the war of Chioggia. Both these crafts had flat-bottomed keels and were thus able to carry heavy cargoes with but slight draught, and were easy to manœuvre in shallow and even marshy waters.

CAMMELLI.—Large flat-keeled, open barges, chiefly used for towing large and heavy ships.

GAGIANDRA, or GAJANDRA.—A big barge. In 1355, when Venice was at war with Genoa, a *Gagiandra*, which had been built expressly for this purpose, was despatched from the Arsenal to carry a huge iron chain to close the port of S. Nicolò del Lido, or, as it was also called, the "Port of the Two Castles."

GALEOTTE.—Swift warships, introduced, it is supposed, in 1344, when war was waging against Genoa. They carried sails and oars—from sixteen to thirty of the latter; had one single mast, and in later times carried guns.

NAVE (*propriamente detta*) Ship (properly so called).—For commerce and transport. This kind of vessel was

first built at the Arsenal by a Venetian family called Lisiado, in the year 1348, but after that date the *Navi* were invariably built for war. We read in Marin Sanudo's *Commentari della Guerra di Ferrara* "how in the middle of July 1482, one of our most beautiful *Navi*, capable of carrying a freight of 2800 *botti*, went down in the harbour of Ancona by reason of a blemish in her keel." We also read of how a certain Admiral Francesco Canea built a ship fitted to carry 4000 *botti*, a feat that was considered marvellous in those days and that greatly impressed all those who recorded it. (Two *botti* made about a ton of modern weight.)

GRIPPARIA.—Mention occurs of such a ship in 1363. It was probably of foreign origin.

NAVE USELLERIA.—A modified form probably of the *Ippagogo* of the ninth century.

NAVE USCHERIA, and NAVE USSERIA.—Both of them, doubtless, copies on rather different lines of the above, but distinct the one from the other—a difference, according to some, to be found only in the name.

GALEAZZA DA MERCANZIA, or GALEA GROSSA, which is, in fact, the real Venetian Trireme, and of which mention is to be found in Chapter III.

MARANO.—Trading vessel of Spanish origin, and different to the *Marano* already alluded to. Several *Marani* were built in 1370 for carrying stones to the Lido to erect a big breakwater. The word *marano* was of evil omen in Venice, being used, according to Sanudo, to denote foreign merchants who were greedy of gain; whilst the canal in which traitors, heretics, state-rebels and evil-doers were drowned, and which runs from the Lido to the island of Murano, was known by the same name of *Marano*.

FIFTEENTH CENTURY

After alluding to a newly devised machine for dredging, the list for this century begins with a

FUSTA, or the Venetian Bireme.—A swift warship, of which mention has been made in Chapter III.

BARZA, BARCA, or BARCHE.—Sea-going ships, though in use chiefly for home defence, in which capacity some

barze lay off the Lido at the time of the League of Cambray.

BARCHE FALCATE.—Large boats, though of different and slighter build than the *Barze*, and which served to carry ammunition to battleships.

PALISCHERMI.—Different and larger boats than those known by this name in the preceding century. These carried artillery and served in the train of big warships.

BARZOTTO.—A heavy transport ship. We read in Sanudo's *Diarii* of 30th October 1529, that "one Lunardo Brexan has made a most beautiful barzotto," which carried 1200 *botti* (some 600 tons).

BERLINGER.—A trading vessel worked by sails.

CARAVELLE.—For trade and transport. These ships came originally from Spain and Portugal, but when they were adopted in Venice they were built on larger lines as more suitable for the heavy cargoes they had to carry.

BOMBARDE.—War boat, worked both by sails and oars, and designed to carry petards.

GALEA SOTTILE, or GALEA LEGGERA (the light *Trireme Veneziana*).—Warship. See Chapter III.

GALEA, or GALERA MEZZANA.—Chiefly for commerce; carried oars and sails, and had a crew of 200 men.

BARBOTTE.—Boats for home and river navigation.

RADEGUARDA.—Another kind of river barge.

GANZARA.—Like the two preceding ones, particularly suited for river traffic.

BURCHI.—Barges for home transport.

BURCHIELI.—Barges in use to this day for home transport, and worked by two men with oars and a small sail.

BURCHIONI.—A large kind of *Burchio*.

GRIPPI.—Ships for commerce and transport. They carried a single mast, and were famous for their speed. They resembled in some points the *Gripparie* of the year 1363.

SCHIERAZZO, or SCHIRAZZO.—Of Turkish origin, and resembling in some way the *trabacoli* of to-day.

BREGANTINI, or BRIGANTINI.—Swift vessels worked by oars and used for scouting purposes. Widely different to the *Brigantino* of to-day, which carries sails and two vertical masts.

FREGATA.—Swift ships, specially told off in war time for the service of the *Provveditori* of the Venetian fleet.

SAETTIA, or SAITTIA.—An extremely swift rowing boat, also known as *Sagitta*, *Sagetia*, and *Sagittaria*.

COPANO.—Small boat similar to the *Schifa* of the twelfth century, and used especially to carry fresh water from land to big ships.

BARCHE LUNGHE.—Something between the *fusta* and the *frigata*, and carrying from twenty to thirty, and even more oars.

SIXTEENTH CENTURY

CESILA.—Swift transport boats. It is possible that the word *Cesila*, or *Sesile*, which in Venetian dialect stands for the fleetest kind of swallow or swift, may have suggested the name for these vessels. Sanudo, on 18th April 1512, speaks of “a new boat having been made to-day at the Arsenal . . . called *sesile*, which is rowed with oars.”

GALEA, or GALERA BASTARDA.—Warship, partaking of the nature of the galley, of the *Nave*, and of the Trireme. The invention of this ship is ascribed to one Francesco Bressan, head designer at the Arsenal, and of a family of naval constructors. Besides the Francesco mentioned here, there was also a Matteo, a *proto nell' Arsenale*, who on 17th February 1526 presented a model of “a most beautiful Galion” to the Senate; and there was Leonardo, who, as has been said, built a fine *Barzotto* in the fifteenth century.

GALEA, or GALERA BASTARDELLA.—A somewhat altered form of the *Galea Bastarda*.

QUINQUEREME FAUSTINA.—A famous and powerful warship. See Chapter III.

QUINQUEREME DI ALESSANDRO PICCHERONI or

PIZZERONI.—This was a design by one Piccheroni of Mirandola, which, however, the Senate declined to consider till it was reduced to simpler lines, and when its number of five rowers to a bench had been reduced to four. Even then it seems to have been conceived on such extravagant proportions as to have been unpractical, and impossible of realisation.

GALEAZZA DA GUERRA.—War galley. See Chapters III. and XI.

QUADRIREME.—War galley. See Chapter III.

GALIONE, or GALEONE. — Large warship. See Chapter III.

GALIONCINO.—Warship. See Chapter III.

FELUCCHE, or FILUCCHE.—Swift and small vessels used in war and in many respects similar to the *fusta* of the fifteenth century. The *felucca* hails actually from the southern shores of Italy, and was probably introduced at the time of the war of Cyprus. There were *felucche* of different sizes, and that carried three lateen sails. The crew consisted of only ten rowers.

CAICCHIO.—A small boat, probably not unlike the *Copano* of the previous century.

FISOLERO.—Small civic boat. Altogether Venetian, and used for shooting on the lagoons.

LEGNO SICURO DA SCOGLI.—A kind of life-boat invented by one Leonardo Fioravanti in 1583, but which does not seem to have been entirely successful.

The following craft came into construction in this century, but as they are chiefly repetitions of previous vessels and of no special note in the Navy of Venice, their names only are recorded :—

LEGNi ROTONDI.

ASSIOCIAMENTO DI TRE GROSSE NAVI.

NAVI DE CHEBA, or A CHEBA. (*Cheba*, or *gabbia*, is the Venetian for cage, and the word is used to denote ships with a lookout on the masts.)

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

War of Candia.—Owing to this war, not many new ships were designed or built during the first half of this century, the old models being adapted and refitted, the following being the only few vessels of note that were laid down in Venetian dockyards:—

PALANDRA.—Warship, altogether different to the *palandrie* of the ninth century, and fitted to carry a large amount of ammunition and artillery. She had three vertical masts, and a fourth oblique one protruding at the prow and known as *bompresso*. The forepart of this ship was entirely given up to the storage of mortars, petards, vast heaps of ropes, hawsers, and apparatus for regulating the force of the hurling machines, while the cabins, store-rooms, and berths were all aft. Around and about the prow were wrappings and wadded arrangements to prevent any damage that might accrue from the enemy's fire, these protections being known as *madrieri*. The crew consisted of twenty sailors, six bomb-throwers, one head bombardier, the captain, a helmsman, a secretary, an accountant, and a pilot. The *Palandra* was laid down during the War of Candia, probably about 1649, from a model—not too closely followed—of a French ship. Forty years later (1689), in the War of the Morea, the Doge Francesco Morosini, however, found that her drawbacks far outweighed her advantages, and he designed in her stead the galley known as the *Galea*, or *Galera del Morosini*—a warship of less speed than the *Palandra*, but far superior for the conveyance and handling of artillery.

GALEAZZA DA GUERRA RIFORMATA.—The fighting *Galeasse* underwent great modifications in this century, and lost many of their old characteristics. The oars were much more numerous and of greater size, and besides the thirty-four rowers required to handle them, there were on board 200 soldiers with their officers, sixty marines, an admiral, a *comito* (commandant), a secretary, a barber, a doctor, four head bombardiers, eight plain bombardiers, two men for repairing the oars, four calkers, four carpenters, an accountant, a chaplain, and other officers and waiters, so that the crew in all amounted to 700 souls. There was also a vast and varied quantity of arms and cannon, whose names and uses are now altogether unknown and obsolete.

PETACCHIO.—Swift ship for war and commerce. She served chiefly as a scout for the vanguard, and resembled, though on smaller lines, the *corvette* of to-day.

GIACKI, or GIACHT.—A small and swift sailing warship that would nowadays be classified as a small *brick* (brig).

FLUT, or FLUTA.—A ship of foreign extraction, and in use in war or for trade. The nature of the lagoons was such that all foreign vessels adopted in the Venetian Navy had to undergo considerable alterations before they could be used in these peculiar waters; alterations that made them barely recognisable under their old names. The keel had to be reduced and the draught made lighter—an operation that materially affected the speed of the vessel.


The following boats, most of them for civic purposes only, were built at this epoch, of which the most noted were the *Bruchiello*, the *Peote*, the *Bissone*, the *Margarote*, *Balotine*, *Gobbi*, *Caperiole*, *Scoaszere*, *Sandali*, and *Polacche*. The first of these, the *Bruchiello*, was a sort of “family-removing van,” and was used by the patricians when they removed with their families and possessions to pass the summer in their villas on the banks of the Brenta. Once on board there was no hurry to reach the destination, the voyage was a relaxation, and halts were made at any particularly inviting spot. Feasts and revels were held with friends on board, and the hours were passed in pleasant and social intercourse.

The PEOTE were river barges pressed into the service on the occasion of a regatta, when they were rigged out with costly hangings and adornments, while tents with figures, emblems, and facetious devices were crowded along the length of the barge. They were rowed by six or eight oars.


The BISSONE—in use to this day—were swift eight-oared boats specially designed for the regattas, and together with the *Peote*, *Margarote*, and the *Balotine*, were gaily adorned on such occasions. When Napoleon the Great came to Venice in 1807, a special *Bissona* was built in his honour, far larger than those hitherto in use and worked with twelve oars. There is a niche at the far part of the prow where the owner of the *Bissona* can lie extended on



Detail of Trabacolo.



Detail of Trabacolo. Showing the high seat for the Helmsman.



Detail of Trabacolo.

soft cushions and command a perfect view of the scene before him.

The MARGAROTE were of a slighter form of the *Battelli* family; in shape they were rather like the *Bissone*, only slenderer and not so gorgeously decorated.

The BALOTINA.—A six-oared swift rowing boat, also adapted for pageants and regattas, and specially reserved for the director of the sports, who, standing at the prow, directed the movements of the other craft and kept the course open for the competitors by waving an arched rod from which were hung small balls of clay (*creta*)—the only means possible for insuring any order in such a gathering, and when in the general hubbub and confusion no human voice could have made itself heard.

The GOBBI—now disused—were two-oared boats, somewhat of the nature of the *Battelli*.

The CAPRIOLA again was akin to a sandalo, and was formerly used by the fishermen of the lagoons for catching the *cape*, a small kind of crayfish to be found in these waters.

SCOAZZERA.—A heavy barge, not altogether unlike the *Burchiello* and the *Chioggian Battello*, known as the *topo*. It really acted as a scavenger boat and is only mentioned here because in this century it was made to take part in a ludicrous character in the regattas. Cleaned and smartened up, and shining with tar, it was worked by eight oars, but as not even the best rowers or gondoliers could force it to proceed beyond a certain slow and ponderous pace, its appearance always evoked laughter and merriment, and was a signal for universal hilarity.

SANDALO.—A light and small sort of gondola, and much in vogue to this day among the fishermen of the lagoons.

POLACCA.—A small ship, rather like a *piccola Nave*, used for trade, and carrying three masts.

We must now return to ships of larger dimensions and greater importance than the civic barges, and begin with the

VASCELLI DI PRIMO RANGO (*ordine*) O DI LINEA.—Ships of the first rank, or of the Line. The first one

mentioned is the *Thundering Jove* (*Giove Fulminante*), a vessel carrying artillery and built from an English model, though the keel had to be made flatter so as to raise the vessel higher in the water. She was constructed in the Arsenal in December 1660, and from this date till the fall of the Republic in 1797 no less than thirty-six of these ships of the line were launched in the Arsenal, nearly all on the same lines as the *Thundering Jove*. They carried seventy-four cannons, resembling the guns of modern times, only rather smaller.

VASCELLI DI SECONDO RANGO.—The first of these was the *Fama Volante* (*Flying Fame*), laid down in June 1667, and between that date and 1797 fifty-six ships of the same class were built.

VASCELLI DI TERZO RANGO (*Frigates*).—The first ship of this class was named the *Madonna della Salute*, and was laid down in September 1660. Twenty-four of these ships with slight variations were built in the Arsenal.

NAVIATE.—Ships for commerce, introduced at first by private enterprise, and that were simply a form of the well-known *Navi*, and like them carried three masts. With these new ships of the line, with the usual galleys, *galeotte*, etc., the Republic maintained regularly two fleets at sea. One, known as the *Armata Grossa*, was composed for the most part of high-decked ships (*alto bordo*), and always cruised in the Adriatic Gulf. The other, known as the *Armata Sottile*, was composed chiefly of rowing vessels, and served for the transport of troops, for conveying governors to outlying provinces, and for the correspondence and intercourse that Venice kept up with her dominions beyond the sea, in Istria, Dalmatia, Albania, the Ionian Islands, and so forth.

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In this century the building of the big warships already alluded to was continued, and great changes were effected in the galleys. The first of these was the *Galea Riformata*, or "Reformed Galley," which was no other than the Galley of old with certain alterations to fit her for the exigencies of modern warfare and navigation.

SCIABECCO.—A ship in vogue among other nations, but



G A L L E A S S E

(Vedute) per Poppa, e per fianco

*Dedicato
©M. Illustrissimo, et Eccellentissimo Signore, Angelo Emo, Patrio Veneto,
Gouvernator di Galeazza per la Serenissima Repubblica*

ANGELO EMO'S GALLEASS—STERN VIEW AND BROADSIDE.

From Coronelli's "Atlante Veneto," Venetia, 1692.

only introduced late into Venice. She carried three masts and was built in different sizes.

OBUSIERA.—A ship which carried guns, bombs, and grenades called *obice*. Some of these *obusiere* took part in the expedition against the Barbary corsairs in 1784, off the coast of Africa.

FREGATINA.—This vessel, evidently of the nature of the *Corvetta*, was probably a repetition of the fregate of the fifteenth century. These *Fregatine* also took part in Angelo Emo's expedition against the Barbary corsairs, and one of them was particularly told off for his special use.

CANNONIERA.—One of the last warships built by the Republic, and used chiefly as a coastguard ship.

GOLETTA.—A ship of much note, and used for both war and commerce, though more strongly and heavily built when used for war than for trade. At the time of the fall of the Republic, there were several kinds of this boat, some of them carrying as many as sixteen guns.

BRIGANTINO.—A warship also used for commerce, and in no way to be compared to the *brigantino* of the fifteenth century, the one under consideration being absolutely a sailing vessel.

GALEOTTE.—Warships worked by oars and totally unlike the vessels bearing the same name and in use in the fourteenth century. These last Venetian *Galeotte* had from thirty to forty oars, whilst their sails and oars were similar to those belonging to the general galleys.

BUCINTORO ULTIMO.—Laid down in November 1722, launched on 12th January 1728, dismantled in 1797, and utterly destroyed on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore in 1798.

GALLEGGIANTE DI ANGELO EMO.—The vessel successfully handled by the admiral, Angelo Emo, in the war against the Barbary corsairs in 1784 at Tunis, Sfax, Biserta, and Susa. She was well provided with ammuni-

tion and stores, and played an honourable part in this last heroic war waged by the Republic.

CUTTER, or COTTER.—This vessel was laid down on 30th April 1797, when the name of *Oreste* was given her; and on the same day too was laid down a *Brick* (*Pilade*), the first one of that kind built in Venice.



Seventeenth-century Ship.

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CCCLXXIX.

CHRONICLES

Altinate.

Avogadro degli Azzoni.

Barbaro.

Cicogna.

Da Canale.

Dandolo, Andrea.

Navagero.

Priuli.

Sagornino.

Sanudo.

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